RSA keygen isn't the fastest. Just use the existing one in
rsaCertificate.
Change-Id: Icd151232928e67e0a7d5becabf9dc96b0e9bfa22
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34764
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
For now, this is off by default and controlled by SSL_set_enforce_rsa_key_usage.
This may be set as late as certificate verification so we may start by enforcing
it for known roots.
Generalizes ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage to check any part of the
key_usage, and adds a new error KEY_USAGE_BIT_INCORRECT for the generalized
method.
Bug: chromium:795089
Change-Id: Ifa504c321bec3263a4e74f2dc48513e3b895d3ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34604
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They were causing a "panic: ServerHello unexpectedly contained extensions"
if the client unconditionally signals support for OCSP or SCTs.
Change-Id: Ia60639431daf78679b269dfe337c1af171fd7d8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34644
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These tests failed when CECPQ2 was enabled by default. Even if we're
not going to make CECPQ2 the default, it's worth fixing them to be more
robust.
Change-Id: Idef508bca9e17a4ef0e0a8a396755abd975f9908
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34524
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If 256-bit ciphers are a requirement for CECPQ2 then that introduces a
link between supported ciphers and supported groups: offering CECPQ2
without a 256-bit cipher is invalid. But that's a little weird since
these things were otherwise independent.
So, rather than require a 256-bit cipher for CECPQ2, just prefer them.
Change-Id: I491749e41708cd9c5eeed5b4ae23c11e5c0b9725
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34504
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I84abfedc30e4c34e42285f3c366c2f504a3b9cf2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34144
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This function allows a client to send a TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate message.
Change-Id: I69935253795a79d65a8c85b652378bf04b7058e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33706
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Since the underlying operation is deterministic the confirmation hash
isn't needed and SXY didn't use it in their proof.
Change-Id: I3a03c20ee79645cf94b10dbfe654c1b88d9aa416
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33605
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This allows an application to obtain the current TLS 1.3 traffic secrets
for a connection.
Change-Id: I8ad8d0559caba266f74081441dea54b22da3db20
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33590
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Just forbid it altogether, so we don't need to worry about a mess of
equipreferences.
Change-Id: I4921ff326c6047e50c075d4311dd42219bf8318e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33585
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change includes support for a variant of [HRSS], a post-quantum KEM
based on NTRU. It includes changes suggested in [SXY]. This is not yet
ready for any deployment: some breaking changes, like removing the
confirmation hash, are still planned.
(CLA for HRSS's assembly code noted in b/119426559.)
[HRSS] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/667.pdf
[SXY] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1005.pdf
Change-Id: I85d813733b066d5c578484bdd248de3f764194db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33105
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See the IETF thread here:
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg27292.html
In particular, although the original publication of RFC 5246 had a
syntax error in the field (the minimum length was unspecified), there is
an errata from 2012 to fix it to be non-empty.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid2864
Currently, when empty, we implicitly interpret it as SHA1/*, matching
the server behavior in missing extension in ClientHellos. However that
text does not support doing it for CertificateRequests, and there is not
much reason to. That default (which is in itself confusing and caused
problems such as older OpenSSL only signing SHA-1 given SNI) was
because, at the time, there were concerns over making any ClientHello
extensions mandatory. This isn't applicable for CertificateRequest,
which can freely advertise their true preferences.
Change-Id: I113494d8f66769fde1362795fb08ff2f471ef31d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33524
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This way we'll notice if we ever generate a bad padding extension or
duplicate an extension. This did require fixing one of the JDK11 test
vectors. When I manually added a padding extension, I forgot the
contents were all zeros and incorrectly put in "padding" instead.
Change-Id: Ifec5bb01a739014ed0fdf5b49b82a6b514646e9a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Errors are supposed to be fragments that go into sentences, rather than
sentences themselves.
Change-Id: I6569fce25535475162c85e7b0db7eeb62c93febd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33324
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
JDK 11 shipped with a TLS 1.3 implementation enabled by default.
Unfortunately, that implementation does not work and fails to send the
SNI extension on resumption. See
https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806.
This means servers which enable TLS 1.3 will see JDK 11 clients work on
the first connection and then fail on all subsequent connections. Add
SSL_set_jdk11_workaround which configures a workaround to fingerprint
JDK 11 and disable TLS 1.3 with the faulty clients.
JDK 11 also implemented the downgrade signal, which means that
connections that trigger the workaround also must not send the downgrade
signal. Unfortunately, the downgrade signal's security properties are
sensitive to the existence of any unmarked TLS 1.2 ServerHello paths. To
salvage this, pick a new random downgrade marker for this scenario and
modify the client to treat it as an alias of the standard one.
Per the link above, JDK 11.0.2 will fix this bug. Hopefully the
workaround can be retired sometime after it is released.
Change-Id: I0627609a8cadf7cc214073eb7f1e880acdf613ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33284
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I48a1e9e27013bb91b783949b65463208516bb3d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33265
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We can actually use modules now.
Change-Id: I0bd8abaf4e3318069f93fa17e89b4804d03944eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33205
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Bug: chromium:347402
Change-Id: I1442b595ed7296b9d9fe88357565f68e1ab80ffd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32644
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Due to non-compliant middleboxes, it is possible we'll need to do some
surgery to this mechanism. Making it per-SSL is a little more flexible
and also eases some tests in Chromium until we get its SSL_CTX usage
fixed up.
Also fix up BoringSSL tests. We forgot to test it at TLS 1.0 and use the
-expect-tls13-downgrade flag.
Bug: 226
Change-Id: Ib39227e74e2d6f5e1fbc1ebcc091e751471b3cdc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32424
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We no longer need to fork them. This is in preparation for pulling it
via Go modules, but probably need to figure out the network issue first.
Slightly bad manners for CI to do that.
Change-Id: Ic258264f3c3559817d5e4921e4ad3282e94d05fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31904
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This should make it easier for us to reuse Go code properly.
util/fipstools is kind of a mess. runner has been using relative
imports, but Go seems to prefer this mechanism these days.
Update-Note: The import spelling in ssl/test/runner changes. Also we now
require Go 1.11. Or you could clone us into GOPATH, but no one does
that.
Change-Id: I8bf91e1e0345b3d0b3d17f5c642fe78b415b7dde
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31884
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Historically, OpenSSL filled in a fake session ID for ticket-only
client sessions. Conscrypt relies on this to implement some weird Java
API where every session has an ID and may be queried out of the client
session cache and, e.g., revoked that way.
(Note that a correct client session cache is not keyed by session ID and
indeed this allows one server to knock out another server's sessions by
matching session IDs. But existing APIs are existing APIs.)
For consistency between TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, as well as matching
OpenSSL's TLS 1.3 implementation, do the same in TLS 1.3. Note this
smooths over our cross-version resumption tests by allowing for
something odd: it is now syntactically possible to resume a TLS 1.3
session at TLS 1.2. It doesn't matter either way, but now a different
codepath rejects certain cases.
Change-Id: I9caf4f0c3b2e2e24ae25752826d47bce77e65616
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31525
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Update-Note: If not explicitly configured to use tls13_all, callers that enable
TLS 1.3 will now only enable the final standard version.
Change-Id: Ifcfc65a9d8782c983df6e002925e8f77f45b6e53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31384
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The client downgrade detection tests were not asserting on the error (would
have caught the missing error string). Additionally, Downgrade-FalseStart-Draft
isn't testing what it's supposed to; it doesn't actually configure a draft
version or anything. Fix that and have it use ALPN rather than NPN, to match
the test above.
Change-Id: I0b759385641aa00994a912303a6f5bd65522b4bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31204
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I2d1671a4f21a602191fd0c9b932244a376ac5713
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31104
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The anti-downgrade signal is being implemented in a follow-up change.
Change-Id: I5ea3ff429ed1389a3577026588fef3660d2d0615
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30904
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Works in the 1.3 and 1.2 client handshakes, not implemented on the
server for now.
Creates an SSL_CTX option to reverify the server certificate on session
resumption. Reverification only runs the client's certificate verify callback.
Adds new states to the client handshakes: state_reverify_server_certificate in
TLS 1.2, and state_server_certificate_reverify in TLS 1.3.
Adds a negative test to make sure that by default we don't verify the
certificate on resumption, and positive tests that make sure we do when the
new option is set.
Change-Id: I3a47ff3eacb3099df4db4c5bc57f7c801ceea8f1
Bug: chromium:347402
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29984
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The runner currently expects split handshake tests to work is GOOS is
"linux", but that includes Android, which the shim doesn't support.
Rather than try to align these two conditions, have the runner ask the
shim whether it supports split handshakes or not.
Change-Id: I7bea0d94142c4b6ee42b8f54c67b8611da93feb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30204
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The new binary, called |handshaker|, allows split-handshakes to be
tested using shim and handshaker binaries built at different
revisions.
The shim now proxies traffic to the handshaker during the split
handshake. The handoff and handback steps serialize additional state
about the test being performed, and its results.
The proxy and handshaker make heavy use of Unix-isms, and so
split-handshake tests are now restricted to Linux.
Change-Id: I048f0540c3978a31b3e573e00da17caf41a8059e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29348
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Callers who use SSL_get0_certificate_types today will find an empty list
in TLS 1.3, which removed it. To provide feature parity, add an accessor
for the signature algorithms list. SSL_get_signature_algorithm_key_type
can be used to map it to a key type.
"Peer signature algorithms" was already taken in the public API by
SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm to refer to which the peer selected, so
I named this matching SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs.
Change-Id: I12d411d7350e744ed9f88c610df48e0d9fc13256
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29684
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Vartanian <flooey@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Change-Id: Id7f5ef9932c4c491bd15085e3c604ebfcf259b7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29665
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This partitions the session ID space of the internal cache by version,
which is nominally something we want, but we must check the version
externally anyway for both tickets and external session cache. That
makes this measure redundant. (Servers generate session IDs and 2^256 is
huge, so there would never accidentally be a collision.)
This cuts down on the "key" in the internal session cache, which will
simplify adding something like an lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key function.
(LHASH is currently lax about keys because it can freely stack-allocate
partially-initialized structs. C++ is a bit more finicky about this.)
Change-Id: I656fd9dbf023dccb163d2e8049eff8f1f9a0e21b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29585
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We have generic -on-resume prefixes now. This avoids the global counter.
Change-Id: I7596ed3273e826b744d8545f7ed2bdd5e9190958
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29594
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
This was changed in draft-ietf-quic-tls-13 to use a codepoint from the
reserved range.
Change-Id: Ia3cda249a3f37bc244d5c8a7765ec34a5708c9ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29464
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL3_VERSION) now fails.
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 is now zero. Internal SSL3-specific "AEAD"s are gone.
Change-Id: I34edb160be40a5eea3e2e0fdea562c6e2adda229
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: This tweaks the SSL_shutdown behavior. OpenSSL's original
SSL_shutdown behavior was an incoherent mix of discarding the record and
rejecting it (it would return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL but retrying the
operation would discard it). SSLeay appears to have intended to discard
it, so we previously "fixed" it actually discard.
However, this behavior is somewhat bizarre and means we skip over
unbounded data, which we typically try to avoid. If you are trying to
cleanly shutdown the TLS portion of your protocol, surely it is at a
point where additional data is a syntax error. I suspect I originally
did not realize that, because the discarded record did not properly
continue the loop, SSL_shutdown would appear as if it rejected the data,
and so it's unlikely anyone was relying on that behavior.
Discussion in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340 suggests
(some of) upstream also prefers rejecting.
Change-Id: Icde419049306ed17eb06ce1a7e1ff587901166f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28864
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This change adds server-side support for compressed certificates.
(Although some definitions for client-side support are included in the
headers, there's no code behind them yet.)
Change-Id: I0f98abf0b782b7337ddd014c58e19e6b8cc5a3c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have a successful TLS 1.3 deployment, in spite of non-compliant
middleboxes everywhere, so now let's get this optimization in. It would
have been nice to test with this from the beginning, but sadly we forgot
about it. Ah well. This shaves 63 bytes off the server's first flight,
and then another 21 bytes off the pair of NewSessionTickets.
So we'll more easily notice in case of anything catastrophic, tie this
behavior to draft 28.
Update-Note: This slightly tweaks our draft-28 behavior.
Change-Id: I4f176a919bf7181239d6ebb31e7870f12364e0f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28744
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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If the callback returns an empty ALPN, we forget we negotiated ALPN at
all (bssl::Array does not distinguish null and empty). Empty ALPN
protocols are forbidden anyway, so reject these ahead of time.
Change-Id: I42f1fc4c843bc865e23fb2a2e5d57424b569ee99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28546
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's conditioned in OpenSSL on client offer, not server accept.
Change-Id: Iae5483a33d9365258446ce0ae34132aeb4a92c66
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28545
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, we'd omitted OpenSSL's OCSP APIs because they depend on a
complex OCSP mechanism and encourage the the unreliable server behavior
that hampers using OCSP stapling to fix revocation today. (OCSP
responses should not be fetched on-demand on a callback. They should be
managed like other server credentials and refreshed eagerly, so
temporary CA outage does not translate to loss of OCSP.)
But most of the APIs are byte-oriented anyway, so they're easy to
support. Intentionally omit the one that takes a bunch of OCSP_RESPIDs.
The callback is benign on the client (an artifact of OpenSSL reading
OCSP and verifying certificates in the wrong order). On the server, it
encourages unreliability, but pyOpenSSL/cryptography.io depends on this.
Dcument that this is only for compatibility with legacy software.
Also tweak a few things for compatilibility. cryptography.io expects
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead to return something, SSL_get_server_tmp_key's
signature was wrong, and cryptography.io tries to redefine
SSL_get_server_tmp_key if SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY is missing.
Change-Id: I2f99711783456bfb7324e9ad972510be8a95e845
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: Enabling TLS 1.3 now enables both draft-23 and draft-28
by default, in preparation for cycling all to draft-28.
Change-Id: I9405f39081f2e5f7049aaae8a9c85399f21df047
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28304
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We forgot to do this in our original implementation on general ecosystem
grounds. It's also mandated starting draft-26.
Just to avoid unnecessary turbulence, since draft-23 is doomed to die
anyway, condition this on our draft-28 implementation. (We don't support
24 through 27.)
We'd actually checked this already on the Go side, but the spec wants a
different alert.
Change-Id: I0014cda03d7129df0b48de077e45f8ae9fd16976
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28124
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
All CBC ciphers in TLS are broken and insecure. TLS 1.2 introduced
AEAD-based ciphers which avoid their many problems. It also introduced
new CBC ciphers based on HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 that share the same
flaws as the original HMAC-SHA1 ones. These serve no purpose. Old
clients don't support them, they have the highest overhead of all TLS
ciphers, and new clients can use AEADs anyway.
Remove them from libssl. This is the smaller, more easily reverted
portion of the removal. If it survives a week or so, we can unwind a lot
more code elsewhere in libcrypto. This removal will allow us to clear
some indirect calls from crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c, aligning with
the recommendations here:
https://github.com/HACS-workshop/spectre-mitigations/blob/master/crypto_guidelines.md#2-avoid-indirect-branches-in-constant-time-code
Update-Note: The following cipher suites are removed:
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
Change-Id: I7ade0fc1fa2464626560d156659893899aab6f77
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
