Bug: 124
Change-Id: Iff02be9df2806572e6d3f860b448f598f85778c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20107
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

There's a lot of duplicated code between the two. This is in preparation
for adding two more of these fuzzers, this time for DTLS.

Bug: 124
Change-Id: I8ca2a02d599e2c88e30838d04b7cf07d4221aa76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20106
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Change-Id: I69157b5e2527a2f92fc7b4b924a36e3399d043db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19444
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

So long as the code is there, it should be fuzzed.

Bug: 104
Change-Id: Iffaa832cc50c2d3c064eb511ba3a133d7f5758f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17533
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

This allows us to fill in holes in our fuzzer coverage, notably client
resumption (and thus early data) and server client certificates. The
corpora are not refreshed yet. This will be done in upcoming changes.

Also add an option for debugging fuzzers. It's very useful to test it on
transcripts and make sure that fuzzer mode successfully makes things
compatible.

Bug: 104
Change-Id: I02f0be4045d1baf68efc9a4157f573df1429575d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17531
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

I'm going to work on adding these to CI, since we keep breaking it on
accident.

Change-Id: I9acd4d3fa7b00c4f0cb0f187dae6bb9c51997515
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16125
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Due to middlebox and ecosystem intolerance, short record headers are going to
be unsustainable to deploy.

BUG=119

Change-Id: I20fee79dd85bff229eafc6aeb72e4f33cac96d82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14044
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

The new APIs are SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list() and
SSL_set_strict_cipher_list().  They have two motivations:

First, typos in cipher lists can go undetected for a long time, and
can have surprising consequences when silently ignored.

Second, there is a tendency to use superstition in the construction of
cipher lists, for example by "turning off" things that do not actually
exist.  This leads to the corrosive belief that DEFAULT and ALL ought
not to be trusted.  This belief is false.

Change-Id: I42909b69186e0b4cf45457e5c0bc968f6bbf231a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13925
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>

Change-Id: Ib777dcc80c7acd6dc1eda1c211b91e5428b83df1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12971
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>

Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Data allocated in one fuzzer iteration and then freed in the next
complicates the leak checker. Avoid this by dropping hidden global state
at the end of each run.

Change-Id: Ice79704f2754a6b1f40e288df9b97ddd5b3b97d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11600
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

They take a const pointer. See
http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html#building

BUG=chromium:655016

Change-Id: Id6c7584c7a875e822b1fbff72163c888d02a9f44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11580
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>

Also IWYU the headers.

BUG=79

Change-Id: Iafee0444c9979496166885db6ba5009cb597cb4d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Corpus recorded from runner and merged into existing corpus with
libFuzzer's -merge flag.

BUG=79

Change-Id: I986a50976ffef141b63e31de3a81fdb4ed5c1348
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11130
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

These source files previously didn't have the ISC license on them.

Change-Id: Ic0a2047d23b28d9d7f0a85b2fedb67574bdcab25
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7735
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

They now fuzz a lot more than just the initial flow.

Change-Id: Ib0b7eb66969442e539a937d7d87f5ba031fcbef3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7610
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

As long as the HTTP/1.1 client auth hack forces use to support renego, having
it on seems much more useful than having it off for fuzzing purposes. Also read
app data to exercise that code and, on the client, trigger renegotiations as
needed.

Change-Id: I1941ded6ec9bd764abd199d1518420a1075ed1b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7291
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

If running the stack through a fuzzer, we would like execution to be
completely deterministic. This is gated on a
BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE #ifdef.

For now, this just uses the zero ChaCha20 key and a global counter. As
needed, we can extend this to a thread-local counter and a separate
ChaCha20 stream and counter per input length.

Change-Id: Ic6c9d8a25e70d68e5dc6804e2c234faf48e51395
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

This change adds fuzzing tests for:
  ∙ Certificate parsing
  ∙ Private key parsing
  ∙ ClientHello parsing
  ∙ Server first flow (ServerHello, Certificate, etc) parsing.

Change-Id: I5f53282263eaaff69b1a03c819cca73750433653
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6460
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>