Also IWYU the headers.
BUG=79
Change-Id: Iafee0444c9979496166885db6ba5009cb597cb4d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Corpus recorded from runner and merged into existing corpus with
libFuzzer's -merge flag.
BUG=79
Change-Id: I986a50976ffef141b63e31de3a81fdb4ed5c1348
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11130
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This code has caused a long history of problems. This change rewrites it
completely with something that is, hopefully, much simplier and robust
and adds more testing.
Change-Id: Ibeef51f9386afd95d5b73316e451eb3a2d7ec4e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8033
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We already had coverage for our new EVP_PKEY parsers, but it's good to have
some that cover them directly. The initial corpus was generated manually with
der-ascii and should cover most of the insanity around EC key serialization.
BUG=15
Change-Id: I7aaf56876680bfd5a89f5e365c5052eee03ba862
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7728
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These source files previously didn't have the ISC license on them.
Change-Id: Ic0a2047d23b28d9d7f0a85b2fedb67574bdcab25
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7735
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is a fairly common operation on an X509.
Change-Id: I1820f20b555f75c98ab7e3283b5530bc1c200e2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7611
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They now fuzz a lot more than just the initial flow.
Change-Id: Ib0b7eb66969442e539a937d7d87f5ba031fcbef3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7610
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Maintain the max_len values in foo.options files which ClusterFuzz can process.
Also recompute the recommended client and server lengths as they've since
gotten much more extensive.
Change-Id: Ie87a80d8a4a0c41e215f0537c8ccf82b38c4de09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7509
Reviewed-by: Mike Aizatsky <aizatsky@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Now that client.cc and server.cc run through application data, regenerate the
corpus.
Change-Id: I8278ebfe47fd2ba74f67db6f9b545aabf9fd1f84
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7301
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As long as the HTTP/1.1 client auth hack forces use to support renego, having
it on seems much more useful than having it off for fuzzing purposes. Also read
app data to exercise that code and, on the client, trigger renegotiations as
needed.
Change-Id: I1941ded6ec9bd764abd199d1518420a1075ed1b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7291
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also pass set -e instead of chaining things with &&. (One line was missing the
&&.)
Change-Id: Ia04e7f40f46688c9664101efefef1d1ea069de71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7300
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This results from running the fuzzers for a little while with both the
8bit-counters change and after taking the transcripts from the runner
tests as seeds for the `client` and `server` fuzzers.
Change-Id: I545a89d8dccd7ef69dd97546ed61610eea4a27a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7276
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If running the stack through a fuzzer, we would like execution to be
completely deterministic. This is gated on a
BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE #ifdef.
For now, this just uses the zero ChaCha20 key and a global counter. As
needed, we can extend this to a thread-local counter and a separate
ChaCha20 stream and counter per input length.
Change-Id: Ic6c9d8a25e70d68e5dc6804e2c234faf48e51395
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
crypto/x509 parses the SPKI on-demand, so we weren't actually exercising the
SPKI code.
Change-Id: I2e16045bd35dbe04d4b8d8b45939c8885e09a550
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7161
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
