Split handshakes allows the handshaking of a TLS connection to be
performed remotely. This encompasses not just the private-key and ticket
operations – support for that was already available – but also things
such as selecting the certificates and cipher suites.
The the comment block in ssl.h for details. This is highly experimental
and will change significantly before its settled.
Change-Id: I337bdfa4c3262169e9b79dd4e70b57f0d380fcad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25387
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I2486dc810ea842c534015fc04917712daa26cfde
Update-Note: Now that tls13_experiment2 is gone, the server should remove the set_tls13_variant call. To avoid further churn, we'll make the server default for future variants to be what we'd like to deploy.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25104
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This adds support for sending the quic_transport_parameters
(draft-ietf-quic-tls) in ClientHello and EncryptedExtensions, as well as
reading the value sent by the peer.
Bug: boringssl:224
Change-Id: Ied633f557cb13ac87454d634f2bd81ab156f5399
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24464
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Having it in base.h pollutes the global namespace a bit and, in
particular, causes clang to give unhelpful suggestions in consuming
projects.
Change-Id: I6ca1a88bdd1701f0c49192a0df56ac0953c7067c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25464
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Since SSL{,_CTX}_set_custom_verify take a |mode| parameter that may be
|SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, it should do what it says on the tin, which is to
perform verification and ignore the result.
Change-Id: I0d8490111fb199c6b325cc167cf205316ecd4b49
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25224
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This function can serialise a session to a |CBB|.
Change-Id: Icdb7aef900f03f947c3fa4625dd218401eb8eafc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25385
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Mono's legacy TLS 1.0 stack, as a server, does not implement any form of
resumption, but blindly echos the ClientHello session ID in the
ServerHello for no particularly good reason.
This is invalid, but due to quirks of how our client checked session ID
equality, we only noticed on the second connection, rather than the
first. Flaky failures do no one any good, so break deterministically on
the first connection, when we realize something strange is going on.
Bug: chromium:796910
Change-Id: I1f255e915fcdffeafb80be481f6c0acb3c628846
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25424
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Previously we required that the calls to TLS's AES-GCM use an
incrementing nonce. This change relaxes that requirement so that nonces
need only be strictly monotonic (i.e. values can now be skipped). This
still meets the uniqueness requirements of a nonce.
Change-Id: Ib649a58bb93bf4dc0e081de8a5971daefffe9c70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25384
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Running can spawn gdb in an xterm, but the default xterm is rather
small. We could have everyone set their .Xdefaults, I presume, to solve
this, but very few people are running the old xterm these days.
Change-Id: I46eb3ff22f292eb44ce8c5124e83f1ab8aef9547
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24846
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This change reslices how the functions that generate the key block and
initialise the TLS AEADs are cut. This makes future changes easier.
Change-Id: I7e0f7327375301bed96f33c195b80156db83ce6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I7932258890b0b2226ff6841af45926e1b11979ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24844
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(See also https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154.)
The exponent here is one of d, dmp1, or dmq1 for RSA. This value and its
bit length are both secret. The only public upper bound is the bit width
of the corresponding modulus (RSA n, p, and q, respectively).
Although BN_num_bits is constant-time (sort of; see bn_correct_top notes
in preceding patch), this does not fix the root problem, which is that
the windows are based on the minimal bit width, not the upper bound. We
could use BN_num_bits(m), but BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime is public API
and may be called with larger exponents. Instead, use all top*BN_BITS2
bits in the BIGNUM. This is still sensitive to the long-standing
bn_correct_top leak, but we need to fix that regardless.
This may cause us to do a handful of extra multiplications for RSA keys
which are just above a whole number of words, but that is not a standard
RSA key size.
Change-Id: I5e2f12b70c303b27c597a7e513b7bf7288f7b0e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25185
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Our 64-bit performance was much lower than it could have been, since we
weren't using the 64-bit multipliers. Fortunately, fiat-crypto is
awesome, so this is just a matter of synthesizing new code and
integration work.
Functions without the signature fiat-crypto curly braces were written by
hand and warrant more review. (It's just redistributing some bits.)
These use the donna variants which takes (and proves) some of the
instruction scheduling from donna as that's significantly faster.
Glancing over things, I suspect but have not confirmed the gap is due to
this:
https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/295#issuecomment-356892413
Clang without OPENSSL_SMALL (ECDH omitted since that uses assembly and
is unaffected by this CL).
Before:
Did 105149 Ed25519 key generation operations in 5025208us (20924.3 ops/sec)
Did 125000 Ed25519 signing operations in 5024003us (24880.6 ops/sec)
Did 37642 Ed25519 verify operations in 5072539us (7420.7 ops/sec)
After:
Did 206000 Ed25519 key generation operations in 5020547us (41031.4 ops/sec)
Did 227000 Ed25519 signing operations in 5005232us (45352.5 ops/sec)
Did 69840 Ed25519 verify operations in 5004769us (13954.7 ops/sec)
Clang + OPENSSL_SMALL:
Before:
Did 68598 Ed25519 key generation operations in 5024629us (13652.4 ops/sec)
Did 73000 Ed25519 signing operations in 5067837us (14404.6 ops/sec)
Did 36765 Ed25519 verify operations in 5078684us (7239.1 ops/sec)
Did 74000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 5016465us (14751.4 ops/sec)
Did 45600 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 5034680us (9057.2 ops/sec)
After:
Did 117315 Ed25519 key generation operations in 5021860us (23360.9 ops/sec)
Did 126000 Ed25519 signing operations in 5003521us (25182.3 ops/sec)
Did 64974 Ed25519 verify operations in 5047790us (12871.8 ops/sec)
Did 134000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 5058946us (26487.7 ops/sec)
Did 86000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 5050478us (17028.1 ops/sec)
GCC without OPENSSL_SMALL (ECDH omitted since that uses assembly and
is unaffected by this CL).
Before:
Did 35552 Ed25519 key generation operations in 5030756us (7066.9 ops/sec)
Did 38286 Ed25519 signing operations in 5001648us (7654.7 ops/sec)
Did 10584 Ed25519 verify operations in 5068158us (2088.3 ops/sec)
After:
Did 92158 Ed25519 key generation operations in 5024021us (18343.5 ops/sec)
Did 99000 Ed25519 signing operations in 5011908us (19753.0 ops/sec)
Did 31122 Ed25519 verify operations in 5069878us (6138.6 ops/sec)
Change-Id: Ic0c24d50b4ee2bbc408b94965e9d63319936107d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24805
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The original comment was a little confusing. Also lowercase
CTR_DRBG_update to make our usual naming for static functions.
Bug: 227
Change-Id: I381c7ba12b788452d54520b7bc3b13bba8a59f2d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25204
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(The BN_num_bits_word implementation was originally written by Andy
Polyakov for OpenSSL. See also
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154.)
BN_num_bits, by way of BN_num_bits_word, currently leaks the
most-significant word of its argument via branching and memory access
pattern.
BN_num_bits is called on RSA prime factors in various places. These have
public bit lengths, but all bits beyond the high bit are secret. This
fully resolves those cases.
There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where
the bit length is also secret. The two left in BoringSSL are:
- BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime calls it on the RSA private exponent.
- The timing "fix" to add the order to k in DSA.
This does *not* fully resolve those cases as we still only look at the
top word. Today, that is guaranteed to be non-zero, but only because of
the long-standing bn_correct_top timing leak. Once that is fixed (I hope
to have patches soon), a constant-time BN_num_bits on such inputs must
count bits on each word.
Instead, those cases should not call BN_num_bits at all. The former uses
the bit width to pick windows, but it should be using the maximum bit
width. The next patch will fix this. The latter is the same "fix" we
excised from ECDSA in a838f9dc7e. That
should be excised from DSA after the bn_correct_top bug is fixed.
Thanks to Dinghao Wu, Danfeng Zhang, Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, and Xiao Liu
for reporting this issue.
Change-Id: Idc3da518cc5ec18bd8688b95f959b15300a57c14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25184
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The EC_POINTs are still allocated (for now), but everything else fits on
the stack nicely, which saves a lot of fiddling with cleanup and
allocations.
Change-Id: Ib8480737ecc97e6b40b2c05f217cd8d3dc82cb72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25150
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is to simplify clearing unnecessary mallocs out of ec_wNAF_mul, and
perhaps to use it in tuned variable-time multiplication functions.
Change-Id: Ic390d2e8e20d0ee50f3643830a582e94baebba95
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25149
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This cuts out another total_num-length array and simplifies things.
Leading zeros at the front of the schedule don't do anything, so it's
easier to just produce a fixed-length one. (I'm also hoping to
ultimately reuse this function in //third_party/fiat/p256.c and get the
best of both worlds for ECDSA verification; tuned field arithmetic
operations, precomputed table, and variable-time multiply.)
Change-Id: I771f4ff7dcfdc3ee0eff8d9038d6dc9a0be3d4e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25148
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Adding 51-bit limbs will require two implementations of most of the
field operations. Group them together to make this more manageable. Also
move the representation-independent functions to the end.
Change-Id: I264e8ac64318a1d5fa72e6ad6f7ccf2f0a2c2be9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24804
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These are also constants that depend on the field representation.
Change-Id: I22333c099352ad64eb27fe15ffdc38c6ae7c07ff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24746
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Note this switches from walking BN_num_bits to the full bit length of
the scalar. But that can only cause it to add a few extra zeros to the
front of the schedule, which r_is_at_infinity will skip over.
Change-Id: I91e087c9c03505566b68f75fb37dfb53db467652
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25147
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This appears to be pointless. Before, we would have a 50% chance of
doing an inversion at each non-zero bit but the first
(r_is_at_infinity), plus a 50% chance of doing an inversion at the end.
Now we would have a 50% chance of doing an inversion at each non-zero
bit. That's the same number of coin flips.
Change-Id: I8158fd48601cb041188826d4f68ac1a31a6fbbbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25146
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This is to make it easier to add new field element representations. The
Ed25519 logic in the script is partially adapted from RFC 8032's Python
code, but I replaced the point addition logic with the naive textbook
formula since this script only cares about being obviously correct.
Change-Id: I0b90bf470993c177070fd1010ac5865fedb46c82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24745
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This is in preparation for writing a script to generate them. I'm
manually moving the existing tables over so it will be easier to confirm
the script didn't change the values.
Change-Id: Id83e95c80d981e19d1179d45bf47559b3e1fc86e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24744
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The optimization for wsize = 1 only kicks in for 19-bit primes. The
cases for b >= 800 and cannot happen due to EC_MAX_SCALAR_BYTES.
Change-Id: If5ca908563f027172cdf31c9a22342152fecd12f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25145
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Simplify things slightly. The probability of the scalar being small
enough to go down a window size is astronomically small. (2^-186 for
P-256 and 2^-84 for P-384.)
Change-Id: Ie879f0b06bcfd1e6e6e3bf3f54e0d7d6567525a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25144
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
fiat-crypto only generates fe_mul and fe_sq, but the original Ed25519
implementation we had also had fe_sq2 for computing 2*f^2. Previously,
we inlined a version of fe_mul.
Instead, we could implement it with fe_sq and fe_add. Performance-wise,
this seems to not regress. If anything, it makes it faster?
Before (clang, run for 10 seconds):
Did 243000 Ed25519 key generation operations in 10025910us (24237.2 ops/sec)
Did 250000 Ed25519 signing operations in 10035580us (24911.4 ops/sec)
Did 73305 Ed25519 verify operations in 10071101us (7278.7 ops/sec)
Did 184000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 10040138us (18326.4 ops/sec)
Did 186000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 10052721us (18502.5 ops/sec)
After (clang, run for 10 seconds):
Did 242424 Ed25519 key generation operations in 10013117us (24210.6 ops/sec)
Did 253000 Ed25519 signing operations in 10011744us (25270.3 ops/sec)
Did 73899 Ed25519 verify operations in 10048040us (7354.6 ops/sec)
Did 194000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 10005389us (19389.6 ops/sec)
Did 195000 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 10028443us (19444.7 ops/sec)
Before (clang + OPENSSL_SMALL, run for 10 seconds):
Did 144000 Ed25519 key generation operations in 10019344us (14372.2 ops/sec)
Did 146000 Ed25519 signing operations in 10011653us (14583.0 ops/sec)
Did 74052 Ed25519 verify operations in 10005789us (7400.9 ops/sec)
Did 150000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 10007468us (14988.8 ops/sec)
Did 91392 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 10057678us (9086.8 ops/sec)
After (clang + OPENSSL_SMALL, run for 10 seconds):
Did 144000 Ed25519 key generation operations in 10066724us (14304.6 ops/sec)
Did 148000 Ed25519 signing operations in 10062043us (14708.7 ops/sec)
Did 74820 Ed25519 verify operations in 10058557us (7438.4 ops/sec)
Did 151000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 10063492us (15004.7 ops/sec)
Did 90402 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 10049141us (8996.0 ops/sec)
Change-Id: I31e9f61833492c3ff2dfd78e1dee5e06f43c850f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
No sense in tempting middleboxes unnecessarily.
Change-Id: Iec66f77195f6b8aa62be681917342e59eb7aba31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24964
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Some non-FIPS consumers exclude bcm.c and build each fragment file
separately. This means non-FIPS code cannot live in bcm.c.
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25044 made the self-test
function exist outside of FIPS code, so it needed to be moved into is
own file.
To avoid confusing generate_build_files.py, this can't be named
self_test.c, so I went with self_check.c.
Change-Id: I337b39b158bc50d6ca0a8ad1b6e15eb851095e1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25124
Reviewed-by: Martin Kreichgauer <martinkr@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ib067411d4cafe1838c2dc42fc8bfd9011490f45c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25064
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Because the android sdk managed by CIPD (see go/use-adjective-apis),
its deps repo ndk needs to be relocated, as well as hooked by the root
DEPS instead of recursedeps. This CL addes android ndk deps in
util/bot/DEPS.
Bug: chromium:659808
Change-Id: I270053ae56ba1caaf9c67f2240855eafd499b782
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24864
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This change adds |BORINGSSL_self_test|, which allows applications to run
the FIPS KAT tests on demand, even in non-FIPS builds.
Change-Id: I950b30a02ab030d5e05f2d86148beb4ee1b5929c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25044
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Update-Note: Token Binding can no longer be configured with the custom
extensions API. Instead, use the new built-in implementation. (The
internal repository should be all set.)
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I007523a638dc99582ebd1d177c38619fa7e1ac38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20645
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is a reland 9d1f96606c, which should
hopefuly be fine after afd1cd959e. Though
I've also gone ahead and gotten the latest versions of things.
(android_tools and clang updated.)
In particular, get the new NDK. Unfortunately, the new clang picks up
an unfortunate change for clang-cl that we now must work around.
http://llvm.org/viewvc/llvm-project?view=revision&revision=319116
Bug: 109
Change-Id: If19b09c585957fefaffa8c3197a50189402a555a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25025
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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AVX-512 adds a new text instruction syntax to x86-64 assembly to specify
the writemask registers and the merge-masking vs zeroing-masking signal.
This change causes these tokens to be passed through.
Patch by Jeff McDonald.
Change-Id: Ib15b15ac684183cc5fba329a176b63b477bc24a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24945
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(Note that support for GCC 4.7 ends 2018-03-23.)
Change-Id: Ia2ac6a735c8177a2b3a13f16197ff918266bc1cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Errorf treats its argument as a format string and so “%rax” is a
problem.
Change-Id: I863ef361f07d0b8a348994efe45869202d0b31f1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24944
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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NIAP requires that the TLS KDF be tested by CAVP so this change moves
the PRF into crypto/fipsmodule/tls and adds a test harness for it. Like
the KAS tests, this is only triggered when “-niap” is passed to
run_cavp.go.
Change-Id: Iaa4973d915853c8e367e6106d829e44fcf1b4ce5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24666
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds support for two specific CAVP tests, in order to
meet NIAP requirements.
These tests are currently only run when “-niap” is passed to run_cavp.go
because they are not part of our FIPS validation (yet).
Change-Id: I511279651aae094702332130fac5ab64d11ddfdb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24665
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In order to process some NIST FAX files, we needed to implement a custom
scanner function to skip over lines that are effectively comments, but
not marked as such.
In the near future we'll need to process KAS FAX files, for which we
need not only to skip over unmarked comment lines, but also to skip some
lines of the response which the FAX doesn't include.
For this we need a more powerful callback function, which this change
provides.
Change-Id: Ibb12b97ac65b3e85317d2e97386ef1c2ea263d4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24664
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chromium's licenses.py is a little finicky.
Change-Id: I015a3565eb8f3cfecb357d142facc796a9c80888
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The latest MSVC 2017 complains about std::tr1::tuple, which was fixed in
upstream GTest.
Upstream have also merged all our patches, we now no longer are carrying
a diff. (Thanks, Gennadiy!)
Change-Id: I6932687b8e8c1eff8c2edf42da0a12080e7b61dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24685
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
