Quite a lot of consumers of the SSL stack will never need to touch files from
the SSL stack, but enough do that we can't just ditch them. Toss that all into
their own file so a static linker can drop it.
Change-Id: Ia07de939889eb09e3ab16aebcc1b6869ca8b75a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5820
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
History has shown there are bugs in not setting the error code
appropriately, which makes any decision making based on
|ERR_peek_last_error|, etc. suspect. Also, this call was interfering
with the link-time optimizer's ability to discard the implementations of
many functions in crypto/err during dead code elimination.
Change-Id: Iba9e553bf0a72a1370ceb17ff275f5a20fca31ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5748
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Applications may require the stapled OCSP response in order to verify
the certificate within the verification callback.
Change-Id: I8002e527f90c3ce7b6a66e3203c0a68371aac5ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5730
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds the ability to configure ciphers specifically for
TLS ≥ 1.0. This compliments the existing ability to specify ciphers
for TLS ≥ 1.1.
This is useful because TLS 1.0 is the first version not to suffer from
POODLE. (Assuming that it's implemented correctly[1].) Thus one might
wish to reserve RC4 solely for SSLv3.
[1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html
Change-Id: I774d5336fead48f03d8a0a3cf80c369692ee60df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5793
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is useful to skip an optional element, and mirrors the behaviour of
CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string.
Change-Id: Icb538c5e99a1d4e46412cae3c438184a94fab339
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5800
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_CTX gets memset to zero, so many of the values needn't be explicitly
initialized.
Change-Id: I0e707a0dcc052cd6f0a5dc8d037400170bd75594
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5812
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Since we're able to render it fancy, may as well.
Change-Id: Ia1ab4b7ad0cdd78c8ffb75342ee62365843e7d5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5810
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are a few things that differ in ways that are not source-compatible, so
it's probably worth documenting them.
Change-Id: I4ef26173a9347d9fd517c1b5215e08ced660b79d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5788
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
setup_key_block is called when the first CCS resolves, but for resumptions this
is the incoming CCS (see ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec). Rather than set
need_record_splitting there, it should be set in the write case of
tls1_change_cipher_state.
This fixes a crash from the new record layer code in resumption when
record-splitting is enabled. Tweak the record-splitting tests to cover this
case.
This also fixes a bug where renego from a cipher which does require record
splitting to one which doesn't continues splitting. Since version switches are
not allowed, this can only happen after a renego from CBC to RC4.
Change-Id: Ie4e1b91282b10f13887b51d1199f76be4fbf09ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5787
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Note that DTLS treats oversized ciphertexts different from everything else.
Change-Id: I71cba69ebce0debdfc96a7fdeb2666252e8d28ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5786
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the two extensions select different next protocols (quite possible since one
is server-selected and the other is client-selected), things will break. This
matches the behavior of NSS (Firefox) and Go.
Change-Id: Ie1da97bf062b91a370c85c12bc61423220a22f36
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The maximum buffer size computation wasn't quite done right in
ssl_buffer.c, so we were failing with BUFFER_TOO_SMALL for sufficiently
large records. Fix this and, as penance, add 103 tests.
(Test that we can receive maximum-size records in all cipher suites.
Also test SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER while I'm here.)
BUG=526998
Change-Id: I714c16dda2ed13f49d8e6cd1b48adc5a8491f43c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5785
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Don't dereference |d| when |top| is zero. Also test that various BIGNUM
methods behave correctly on zero/even inputs.
(Imported from upstream's cf633fa00244e39eea2f2c0b623f7d5bbefa904e.)
We already had the BN_div and BN_MONT_CTX_set tests, but align them with
upstream's for consistency.
Change-Id: Ice5d04f559b4d5672e23c400637c07d8ee401727
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5783
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BN_rand generates a single-word zero BIGNUM with quite a large
probability.
A zero BIGNUM in turn will end up having a NULL |d|-buffer, which we
shouldn't dereference without checking.
(Imported from upstream's 9c989aaa749d88b63bef5d5beeb3046eae62d836.)
Change-Id: Ic4d113e4fcf4ea4c0a4e905a1c4ba3fb758d9fc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5782
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the seed value for dsa key generation is too short (< qsize),
return an error.
(Imported from upstream's 1d7df236dcb4f7c95707110753e5e77b19b9a0aa and
df1565ed9cebb6933ee7c6e762abcfefd1cd3846.)
This switches the trigger for random seed from seed_len = 0 to seed_in =
NULL.
Change-Id: I2e07abed754c57ef9d96b02a52ba6d260c3f5fb9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5781
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The bidi shutdown code uses type = 0 as a special signal value, but code
elsewhere doesn't account for this.
BUG=526437
Change-Id: I090cee421633d70ef3b84f4daa811608031b9ed9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5771
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense over DTLS; you can't reuse the
underlying channel after receiving close_notify because the channel is
unordered. This removes one caller of dtls1_read_bytes.
Really close_notify makes no sense in DTLS. It can't even protect
against some kind of truncation because it's all unordered. But continue
to send it in case anything is (unreliably since the channel is lossy)
relying on close_notify to signal some kind of session end. This only
makes SSL_shutdown stop trying to wait for one once we've already
decided to shut down the connection.
BUG=526437
Change-Id: I6afad7cb7209c4aba0b96f9246b04c81d90987a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now that it even works at all (type = 0 bug aside), add tests for it.
Test both close_notify being received before and after SSL_shutdown is
called. In the latter case, have the peer send some junk to be ignored
to test that works.
Also test that SSL_shutdown fails on unclean shutdown and that quiet
shutdowns ignore it.
BUG=526437
Change-Id: Iff13b08feb03e82f21ecab0c66d5f85aec256137
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5769
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When discarding a record, it's important to start reading the next one,
or the state machine retry signaling doesn't work.
BUG=526437
Change-Id: I5e4a5155310d097c0033cdf5d06712410a01ee08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5768
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's c8491de393639dbc4508306b7dbedb3872b74293.
Change-Id: I017fb137d6d93b6abb82fdb03f02be8292963d0d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5767
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The handshake state machine is still rather messy (we should switch to CBB,
split the key exchanges apart, and also pull reading and writing out), but this
version makes it more obvious to the compiler that |p| and |sig_len| are
initialized. The old logic created a synchronous-only state which, if enterred
directly, resulted in some variables being uninitialized.
Change-Id: Ia3ac9397d523fe299c50a95dc82a9b26304cea96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5765
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Our tests shouldn't panic if the program misbehaves.
Change-Id: I113e050222bcf48e5f25883f860dbc1c5c77e77e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5764
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some compilers complain and it's worth checking. Maybe the file changed in size
between ftell and fread.
Change-Id: I7898b8517556ec6899bd6e8866ba3d1cd7efd5f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5763
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Move cert_chain to the SSL_SESSION. Now everything on an SSL_SESSION is
properly serialized. The cert_chain field is, unfortunately, messed up
since it means different things between client and server.
There exists code which calls SSL_get_peer_cert_chain as both client and
server and assumes the existing semantics for each. Since that function
doesn't return a newly-allocated STACK_OF(X509), normalizing between the
two formats is a nuisance (we'd either need to store both cert_chain and
cert_chain_full on the SSL_SESSION or create one of the two variants
on-demand and stash it into the SSL).
This CL does not resolve this and retains the client/server difference
in SSL_SESSION. The SSL_SESSION serialization is a little inefficient
(two copies of the leaf certificate) for a client, but clients don't
typically serialize sessions. Should we wish to resolve it in the
future, we can use a different tag number. Because this was historically
unserialized, existing code must already allow for cert_chain not being
preserved across i2d/d2i.
In keeping with the semantics of retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs,
cert_chain is not retained when that flag is set.
Change-Id: Ieb72fc62c3076dd59750219e550902f1ad039651
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5759
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The difference of two pointers is signed, even though it's always
non-negative here, so MSVC is complaining about signedness mismatch.
Change-Id: I5a042d06ed348540706b93310af3f60f3ab5f303
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5766
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than parse the fields in two passes, group the code relating to
one field together. Somewhat less annoying to add new fields. To keep
this from getting too unwieldy, add a few more helper functions for the
common field types.
Change-Id: Ia86c6bbca9dd212d5c35029363ea4d6b6426164a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5758
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's completely redundant with the copy in the SSL_SESSION except it
isn't serialized.
Change-Id: I1d95a14cae064c599e4bab576df1dd156da4b81c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5757
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Gets another field out of the SSL_SESSION.
Change-Id: I9a27255533f8e43e152808427466ec1306cfcc60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5756
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is analogous to openssl s_client's -sess_in and -sess_out. Use PEM to
align with OpenSSL. This is useful for debugging session resumption and also
generating things to test serialization against.
Change-Id: Idc58e8fa3dd4c2385f6a2d647e66ef11427be60d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5761
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's supposed to be void*. The only reason this was working was that it was
only called in C which happily casts from void* to T*. (But if called in C++ in
a macro, it breaks.)
Change-Id: I7f765c3572b9b4815ae58da852be1e742de1bd96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5760
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The old empty record logic discarded the records at a very low-level.
Let the error bubble up to ssl3_read_bytes so the type mismatch logic
may kick in before the empty record is skipped.
Add tests for when the record in question is application data, before
before the handshake and post ChangeCipherSpec.
BUG=521840
Change-Id: I47dff389cda65d6672b9be39d7d89490331063fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5754
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering
logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and
ssl->packet_length are gone.
ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and
dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns
the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was
redundant with the buffer length.
Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake.
Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but
return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the
handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing
SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc.,
combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why
ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly
different needs.)
The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since
it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added
if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to
avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and
not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if
enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record
would fit in the buffer.)
The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather
than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally
switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see
3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.)
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This consists mostly of re-adding OpenSSL's implementation of PBKDF2
(very loosely based upon e0d26bb3). The meat of it, namely
|PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC|, was already present, but unused.
In addition, |PKCS8_encrypt| and |PKCS8_decrypt| must be changed to
not perform UCS-2 conversion in the PBES2 case.
Change-Id: Id170ecabc43c79491600051147d1d6d3c7273dbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5745
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
arm_arch.h is included from ARM asm files, but lives in crypto/, not
openssl/include/. Since the asm files are often built from a different
location than their position in the source tree, relative include paths
are unlikely to work so, rather than having crypto/ be a de-facto,
second global include path, this change moves arm_arch.h to
include/openssl/.
It also removes entries from many include paths because they should be
needed as relative includes are always based on the locations of the
source file.
Change-Id: I638ff43d641ca043a4fc06c0d901b11c6ff73542
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5746
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Match the other stack-allocated types in that we expose a wrapper function to
get them into the zero state. Makes it more amenable to templates like
ScopedOpenSSLContext.
Change-Id: Ibc7b2b1bc0421ce5ccc84760c78c0b143441ab0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5753
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Apparently we left those as zero. Oh well. This only affects
SSL_CIPHER_get_bits, but so long as we have the field, it ought to be correct.
Change-Id: I2878ec22c2f5a6263f805e04d9fd8448994639b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5752
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This made sense when the cipher might have been standardized as-is, so a
DHE_RSA variant could appease the IETF. Since the standardized variant is going
to have some nonce tweaks anyway, there's no sense in keeping this around. Get
rid of one non-standard cipher suite value early. (Even if they were to be
standardized as-is, it's not clear we should implement new DHE cipher suites at
this point.)
Chrome UMA, unsurprisingly, shows that it's unused.
Change-Id: Id83d73a4294b470ec2e94d5308fba135d6eeb228
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The fact that |value_free| expects to free() value->section is
inconsistent with the behavior of |add_string|, which adds a reference
to an existing string.
Along the way, add a |CONF_VALUE_new| method to simplify things a bit.
Change-Id: I438abc80575394e4d8df62a4fe2ff1050e3ba039
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5744
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As I read it:
1. |_LHASH| contains
2. buckets of |LHASH_ITEMS|, which contain
3. |CONF_VALUE|s, which contain
4. various bits of data.
The previous code was freeing #1 and #2 in |lh_free|, and #4 in
|value_free_contents|, but was failing to free the |CONF_VALUE|s
themselves. The fix is to call |value_free| rather than
|value_free_contents|.
Change-Id: I1d5b48692ca9ac04df688e45d7fc113dc5cd6ddf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5742
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change makes |EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str|, which is used by
|PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey|, recognize "DSA" as well as "EC" and "RSA".
Change-Id: I39cce12f600cec6a71df75312a41f8395429af62
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5743
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MSAN appears to have a bug that causes this code to be miscompiled when
compiled with optimisations. In order to prevent that bug from holding
everything up, this change disables that code when MEMORY_SANITIZER is
defined. The generic elliptic-curve code can pick up the slack in that
case.
Change-Id: I7ce26969b3ee0bc0b0496506f06a8cf9b2523cfa
(I couldn't find an authoritative source of test data, including in
OpenSSL's source, so I used OpenSSL's implementation to produce the
test ciphertext.)
This benefits globalplatform.
Change-Id: Ifb79e77afb7efed1c329126a1a459bbf7ce6ca00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5725
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
