The SNI extension may be ACKed by the server. This is kind of pointless,
but make sure we cover these codepaths.
Change-Id: I14b25ab865dd6e35a30f11ebc9027a1518bbeed9
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Change-Id: I878dfb9f5d3736c3ec0d5fa39052cca58932dbb7
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Change-Id: I38cd04fa40edde4e4dd31fdc16bbf92985430198
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The TLS 1.2 and 1.3 state machines do the exact same thing at the
beginning. Let them process the ClientHello extensions, etc., and
finalize the certificate in common code. Once we start picking
parameters, we begin to diverge. Everything before this point is
arguably part of setting up the configuration, which is
version-agnostic.
BUG=128
Change-Id: I293ea3087ecbc3267bd8cdaa011c98d26a699789
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13562
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In TLS 1.2, resumption's benefits are more-or-less subsumed by False
Start. TLS 1.2 resumption lifetime is bounded by how much traffic we are
willing to encrypt without fresh key material, so the lifetime is short.
Renewal uses the same key, so we do not allow it to increase lifetimes.
In TLS 1.3, resumption unlocks 0-RTT. We do not implement psk_ke, so
resumption incorporates fresh key material into both encrypted traffic
(except for early data) and renewed tickets. Thus we are both more
willing to and more interested in longer lifetimes for tickets. Renewal
is also not useless. Thus in TLS 1.3, lifetime is bound separately by
the lifetime of a given secret as a psk_dhe_ke authenticator and the
lifetime of the online signature which authenticated the initial
handshake.
This change maintains two lifetimes on an SSL_SESSION: timeout which is
the renewable lifetime of this ticket, and auth_timeout which is the
non-renewable cliff. It also separates the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 timeouts.
The old session timeout defaults and configuration apply to TLS 1.3, and
we define new ones for TLS 1.3.
Finally, this makes us honor the NewSessionTicket timeout in TLS 1.3.
It's no longer a "hint" in 1.3 and there's probably value in avoiding
known-useless 0-RTT offers.
BUG=120
Change-Id: Iac46d56e5a6a377d8b88b8fa31f492d534cb1b85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13503
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix this and add a test. Otherwise enabling TLS 1.3 will cause a server
to blow through its session cache.
Change-Id: I67edbc468faedfd94a6c30cf842af085a6543b50
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Change-Id: I44202457841f06a899e140f78ae8afa7ac720283
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Until we've gotten it fully working, we should not mint any of these
SSL_SESSIONs, to avoid constraining future versions of our client code.
Notably, if any of our TLS 1.3 clients today serialized sessions, we
would need to rev the serialization format. Without opting into 0-RTT, a
TLS 1.3 client will create SSL_SESSIONs tagged as 0-RTT-capable but
missing important fields (ALPN, etc.). When that serialized session
makes its way to a future version of our client code, it would disagree
with the server about the ALPN value stored in the ticket and cause
interop failures.
I believe the only client code enabling TLS 1.3 right now is Chrome, and
the window is small, so it should be fine. But fix this now before it
becomes a problem.
Change-Id: Ie2b109f8d158017a6f3b4cb6169050d38a66b31c
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It's not completely clear to me why select_cetificate_cb behaves the way it
does, however not only is it confusing, but it makes assumptions about the
application using BoringSSL (it's not always possible to implement custom
logic outside of the callbacks provided by libssl), that make this callback
somewhat useless.
Case in point, the callback can be used for changing min/max protocol versions
based on per-site policies, and select_certificate_cb is the only place where
SSL_set_min/max_proto_version() can be used (e.g. you can't call them in
cert_cb because it's too late), but the decision on the specific versions to
use might depend on configuration that needs retrieving asynchronously from
over the network, which requires re-running the callback multiple times.
Change-Id: Ia8e151b163628545373e7fd1f327e9af207478a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13000
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Before RFC 7539 we had a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite that had a 64/64
nonce/counter split (as DJB's original ChaCha20 did). RFC 7539 changed
that to 96/32 and we've supported both for some time.
This change removes the old version and the TLS cipher suites that used
it.
BUG=chromium:682816
Change-Id: I2345d6db83441691fe0c1ab6d7c6da4d24777849
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13203
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This reverts commit def9b46801.
(I should have uploaded a new version before sending to the commit queue.)
Change-Id: Iaead89c8d7fc1f56e6294d869db9238b467f520a
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Before RFC 7539 we had a ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite that had a 64/64
nonce/counter split (as DJB's original ChaCha20 did). RFC 7539 changed
that to 96/32 and we've supported both for some time.
This change removes the old version and the TLS cipher suites that used
it.
Change-Id: Icd9c2117c657f3aa6df55990c618d562194ef0e8
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This gives coverage over needing to fragment something over multiple
records.
Change-Id: I2373613608ef669358d48f4e12f68577fa5a40dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13101
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 doesn't support renegotiation in the first place, but so callers
don't report TLS 1.3 servers as missing it, always report it as
(vacuously) protected against this bug.
BUG=chromium:680281
Change-Id: Ibfec03102b2aec7eaa773c331d6844292e7bb685
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08b65f4e31 introduced a memory leak and
also got enums confused. Also fix a codepath that was missing an error
code.
Thanks to OSS-Fuzz which appears to have found it in a matter of hours.
Change-Id: Ia9e926c28a01daab3e6154d363d0acda91209a22
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This adds support for setting 0-RTT mode on tickets minted by
BoringSSL, allowing for testing of the initial handshake knowledge.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ic199842c03b5401ef122a537fdb7ed9e9a5c635a
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As long as we still have this code, we should make sure it doesn't
regress.
Change-Id: I0290792aedcf667ec49b251d747ffbc141c0cec4
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The write path for TLS is going to need some work. There are some fiddly
cases when there is a write in progress. Start adding tests to cover
this logic.
Later I'm hoping we can extend this flag so it drains the unfinished
write and thus test the interaction of read/write paths in 0-RTT. (We
may discover 1-RTT keys while we're in the middle of writing data.)
Change-Id: Iac2c417e4b5e84794fb699dd7cbba26a883b64ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13049
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Channel ID is already enabled on the SSL. This dates to
49c7af1c42 which converted an instance of
tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new to it, but tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new
meant "if Channel ID is enabled, use the new one", not "enable Channel
ID".
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for catching this.
Change-Id: I2d5a82b930ffcbe5527a62a9aa5605ebb71a6b9f
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Upstream accidentally started rejecting server-sent point formats in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/2133. Our own test coverage
here is also lacking, so flesh it out.
Change-Id: I99059558bd28d3a540c9687649d6db7e16579d29
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Change-Id: Ie4c566c29c20faac7a9a5e04c88503fc2e1ff4db
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This extension will be used to test whether
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/762 is deployable against
middleboxes. For simplicity, it is mutually exclusive with 0-RTT. If
client and server agree on the extension, TLS 1.3 records will use the
format in the PR rather than what is in draft 18.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I1372ddf7b328ddf73d496df54ac03a95ede961e1
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Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
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We were only asserting on the shim-side error code.
Change-Id: Idc08c253a7723a2a7fd489da761a56c72f7a3b96
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It should probably have a TLS 1.3 in the name to be clear that's what
it's testing.
Change-Id: I50b5f503a8038715114136179bde83e7da064e9b
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There are no longer any consumers of these APIs.
These were useful back when the CBC vs. RC4 tradeoff varied by version
and it was worth carefully tuning this cutoff. Nowadays RC4 is
completely gone and there's no use in configuring these anymore.
To avoid invalidating the existing ssl_ctx_api corpus and requiring it
regenerated, I've left the entries in there. It's probably reasonable
for new API fuzzers to reuse those slots.
Change-Id: I02bf950e3828062341e4e45c8871a44597ae93d5
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The loop is getting a little deeply nested and hard to read.
Change-Id: I3a99fba54c2f352850b83aef91ab72d5d9aabfb8
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Also fix the error code. It's a missing extension, not an unexpected
one.
Change-Id: I48e48c37e27173f6d7ac5e993779948ead3706f2
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So we can report it cleanly out of DevTools, it should behave like
SSL_get_curve_id and be reported on resumption too.
BUG=chromium:658905
Change-Id: I0402e540a1e722e09eaebadf7fb4785d8880c389
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Also test that TLS 1.3 can be resumed at a different curve.
Change-Id: Ic58e03ad858c861958b7c934813c3e448fb2829c
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Nothing calls this anymore. DHE is nearly gone. This unblocks us from
making key_exchange_info only apply to the curve.
Change-Id: I3099e7222a62441df6e01411767d48166a0729b1
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This currently only works for certificates parsed from the network, but
if making several connections that share certificates, some KB of memory
might be saved.
BUG=chromium:671420
Change-Id: I1c7a71d84e1976138641f71830aafff87f795f9d
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This avoids needing a extra state around client certificates to avoid
calling the callbacks twice. This does, however, come with a behavior
change: configuring both callbacks won't work. No consumer does this.
(Except bssl_shim which needed slight tweaks.)
Change-Id: Ia5426ed2620e40eecdcf352216c4a46764e31a9a
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Change-Id: Iaac633616a54ba1ed04c14e4778865c169a68621
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Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
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Right now the only way to set an OCSP response is SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response
however this assumes that all the SSLs generated from a SSL_CTX share the
same OCSP response, which is wrong.
This is similar to the OpenSSL "function" SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
the main difference being that this doesn't take ownership of the OCSP buffer.
In order to avoid memory duplication in case SSL_CTX has its own response,
a CRYPTO_BUFFER is used for both SSL_CTX and SSL.
Change-Id: I3a0697f82b805ac42a22be9b6bb596aa0b530025
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This was useful when we were transitioning NPN off in Chromium, but now
there are no callers remaining.
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We've taken to writing bssl::UniquePtr in full, so it's not buying
us much.
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Change-Id: Ida26e32a700c68e1899f9f6ccff73e2fa5252313
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This allows a consumer to disable Channel ID (for instance, it may be
enabled on the SSL_CTX and later disabled on the SSL) without reaching
into the SSL struct directly.
Deprecate the old APIs in favor of these.
BUG=6
Change-Id: I193bf94bc1f537e1a81602a39fc2b9a73f44c73b
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It's our ClientHello representation. May as well name it accordingly.
Also switch away from calling the variable name ctx as that conflicts
with SSL_CTX.
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Change-Id: I1e28ba84de59336cab432d1db3dd9c6023909081
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Change-Id: Ie46d45cdb07c692a789594e13040a1ce9d6cf83d
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finishedHash should keep a running secret and incorporate entropy as is
available.
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Although we ignore all but the first identity, keep clients honest by
parsing the whole thing. Also explicitly check that the binder and
identity counts match.
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BUG=101
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This change causes SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list to check the
SCT list for shallow validity before allowing it to be set.
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Previously the option to retain only the SHA-256 hash of client
certificates could only be set at the |SSL_CTX| level. This change makes
|SSL| objects inherit the setting from the |SSL_CTX|, but allows it to
be overridden on a per-|SSL| basis.
Change-Id: Id435934af3d425d5f008d2f3b9751d1d0884ee55
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This changes our resumption strategy. Before, we would negotiate ciphers
only on fresh handshakes. On resumption, we would blindly use whatever
was in the session.
Instead, evaluate cipher suite preferences on every handshake.
Resumption requires that the saved cipher suite match the one that would
have been negotiated anyway. If client or server preferences changed
sufficiently, we decline the session.
This is much easier to reason about (we always pick the best cipher
suite), simpler, and avoids getting stuck under old preferences if
tickets are continuously renewed. Notably, although TLS 1.2 ticket
renewal does not work in practice, TLS 1.3 will renew tickets like
there's no tomorrow.
It also means we don't need dedicated code to avoid resuming a cipher
which has since been disabled. (That dedicated code was a little odd
anyway since the mask_k, etc., checks didn't occur. When cert_cb was
skipped on resumption, one could resume without ever configuring a
certificate! So we couldn't know whether to mask off RSA or ECDSA cipher
suites.)
Add tests which assert on this new arrangement.
BUG=116
Change-Id: Id40d851ccd87e06c46c6ec272527fd8ece8abfc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11847
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This simplifies a little code around EMS and PSK KE modes, but requires
tweaking the SNI code.
The extensions that are more tightly integrated with the handshake are
still processed inline for now. It does, however, require an extra state
in 1.2 so the asynchronous session callback does not cause extensions to
be processed twice. Tweak a test enforce this.
This and a follow-up to move cert_cb before resumption are done in
preparation for resolving the cipher suite before resumption and only
resuming on match.
Note this has caller-visible effects:
- The legacy SNI callback happens before resumption.
- The ALPN callback happens before resumption.
- Custom extension ClientHello parsing callbacks also cannot depend on
resumption state.
- The DoS protection callback now runs after all the extension callbacks
as it is documented to be called after the resumption decision.
BUG=116
Change-Id: I1281a3b61789b95c370314aaed4f04c1babbc65f
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As a client, we must tolerate this to avoid interoperability failures
with allowed server behaviors.
BUG=117
Change-Id: I9c40a2a048282e2e63ab5ee1d40773fc2eda110a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12311
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Draft 18 sadly loosens the requirements to only requiring the PRF hash
stay fixed.
BUG=117
Change-Id: Ic94d53fd9cabaee611fcf36b0071558075e10728
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12310
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This is generally much cleaner and makes it possible to implement the
more lax cipher matching in draft 18.
BUG=117
Change-Id: I595d7619d60bc92e598d75b43945286323c0b72b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12309
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It doesn't particular matter, but AcceptAnySession should only skip the
things that would cause us to note accept a ticket. ExpectTicketAge is
an assertion, not part of protocol logic. Accordingly, fix the text.
Change-Id: I3bea9c58f4d5f912308252ec8834f183287d632f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12308
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The version check should run if AcceptAnyVersion is *not* set.
Change-Id: I4c137564f91a86cb5e6a26e09fd4670cce8f1dcb
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When debugging a flaky test, it's useful to be able to run a given test
over and over.
Change-Id: I1a7b38792215550b242eb8238214d873d41becb6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12301
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The draft 18 implementation did not compute scts_requested correctly. As
a result, it always believed SCTs were requested. Fix this and add tests
for unsolicited OCSP responses and SCTs at all versions.
Thanks to Daniel Hirche for the report.
Change-Id: Ifc59c5c4d7edba5703fa485c6c7a4055b15954b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12305
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Thanks to Eric Rescorla for catching this.
Change-Id: Id0a024d7f705519cfe76d350e0ef2688dbd11a22
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12303
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Having that logic in two different places is a nuisance when we go to
add new checks like resumption stuff. Along the way, this adds missing
tests for the ClientHello cipher/session consistency check. (We'll
eventually get it for free once the cipher/resumption change is
unblocked, but get this working in the meantime.)
This also fixes a bug where the session validity checks happened in the
wrong order relative to whether tickets_supported or renew_ticket was
looked at. Fix that by lifting that logic closer to the handshake.
Change-Id: I3f4b59cfe01064f9125277dc5834e62a36e64aae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12230
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was removed a while ago. As of -18, the early data indication
extension is just a boolean.
Change-Id: I328b9abfafad326d4c2a3b5fe981af111f8401ad
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We missed that the TLS 1.3 code was inconsistent with the TLS 1.2 code.
Only on the server did we push an error code. But consistency between
client and server is probably worthwhile so, fix the 1.2 code to match
for now.
Change-Id: I17952c72048697dc66eacf0f144a66ced9cb3be8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12260
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Change-Id: I07c4b67206440d169b314f24e1b3c1c697dda24f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12204
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Certificate chain with intermediate taken from Chromium's tests. Though
it doesn't really matter because the runner tests don't verify
certificates.
BUG=70
Change-Id: I46fd1d4be0f371b5bfd43370b97d2c8053cfad60
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We used to enforce after the version was set, but stopped enforcing with
TLS 1.3. NSS enforces the value for encrypted records, which makes sense
and avoids the problems gating it on have_version. Add tests for this.
Change-Id: I7fb5f94ab4a22e8e3b1c14205aa934952d671727
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We have AEAD-level coverage for these, but we should also test this in
the TLS stack, and at maximum size per upstream's CVE-2016-7054.
Change-Id: I1f4ad0356e793d6a3eefdc2d55a9c7e05ea08261
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12187
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3c6a1ea674 switched what layer handled
the DTLS version mapping but forgot to correct the HelloVerifyRequest
logic to account for this.
Thanks to Jed Davis for noticing this.
Change-Id: I94ea18fc43a7ba15dd7250bfbcf44dbb3361b3ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11984
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is the last blocker within BoringSSL itself to opaquifying SSL.
(There are still blockers in consumers, of course.)
BUG=6
Change-Id: Ie3b8dcb78eeaa9aea7311406c5431a8625d60401
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 ciphers are now always enabled and come with a hard-coded
preference order.
BUG=110
Change-Id: Idd9cb0d75fb6bf2676ecdee27d88893ff974c4a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They will get very confused about which key they're using. Any caller
using exporters must either (a) leave renegotiation off or (b) be very
aware of when renegotiations happen anyway. (You need to somehow
coordinate with the peer about which epoch's exporter to use.)
Change-Id: I921ad01ac9bdc88f3fd0f8283757ce673a47ec75
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12003
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The existing tests for this codepath require us to reconfigure the shim.
This will not work when TLS 1.3 cipher configuration is detached from
the old cipher language. It also doesn't hit codepaths like sessions
containing a TLS 1.3 version but TLS 1.2 cipher.
Instead, add some logic to the runner to rewrite tickets and build tests
out of that.
Change-Id: I57ac5d49c3069497ed9aaf430afc65c631014bf6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12024
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change is based on interpreting TLS 1.3 draft 18.
Change-Id: I727961aff2f7318bcbbc8bf6d62b7d6ad3e62da9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11921
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Later work is going to cause some turbulence here.
Change-Id: Iba98bcf56e81492ec0dca54a381b38d1c115247a
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This shouldn't happen, but it is good to check to avoid the potential
underflow in ssl_session_is_time_valid.
This required tweaking the mock clock in bssl_shim to stop going back in
time.
Change-Id: Id3ab8755139e989190d0b53d4bf90fe1ac203022
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11841
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BUG=chromium:659593
Change-Id: I73a4751609b85df7cd40f0f60dc3f3046a490940
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11861
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On the client we'll leave it off by default until the change has made it
through Chrome's release process. For TLS 1.3, there is no existing
breakage risk, so always do it. This saves us the trouble of having to
manually turn it on in servers.
See [0] for a data point of someone getting it wrong.
[0] https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/9dbc21b1c3cc
Change-Id: I74daad9e7efd2040e9d66d72d558b31f145e6c4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I18cee423675d6a686f83b4ef4b38696cb618392c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11683
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
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BUG=103
Change-Id: I9a49fbaf66af73978ce264d27926f483e1e44766
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11620
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Channel ID for TLS 1.3 uses the same digest construction as
CertificateVerify. This message is signed with the Channel ID key and
put in the same handshake message (with the same format) as in TLS 1.2.
BUG=103
Change-Id: Ia5b2dffe5a39c39db0cecb0aa6bdc328e53accc2
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{sha1, ecdsa} is virtually nonexistent. {sha512, ecdsa} is pointless
when we only accept P-256 and P-384. See Chromium Intent thread here:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/kWwLfeIQIBM/9chGZ40TCQAJ
This tweaks the signature algorithm logic slightly so that sign and
verify preferences are separate.
BUG=chromium:655318
Change-Id: I1097332600dcaa38e62e4dffa0194fb734c6df3f
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Some new tests needed to be suppressed.
Change-Id: I4474d752c338a18440efb213e0795ae81ad754fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11583
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This should land in the same group of revisions as the two parent
commits.
Change-Id: Id9d769b890b3308ea70b705e7241c73cb1930ede
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We'll never send cookies, but we'll echo them on request. Implement it
in runner as well and test.
BUG=98
Change-Id: Idd3799f1eaccd52ac42f5e2e5ae07c209318c270
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This doesn't currently honor the required KeyUpdate response. That will
be done in a follow-up.
BUG=74
Change-Id: I750fc41278736cb24230303815e839c6f6967b6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11412
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These too must be rejected. Test both unknown extensions and extensions
in the wrong context.
Change-Id: I54d5a5060f9efc26e5e4d23a0bde3c0d4d302d09
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This clears the last of Android's build warnings from BoringSSL. These
pragmas aren't actually no-ops, but it just means that MinGW consumers
(i.e. just Android) need to explicitly list the dependency (which they
do).
There may be something to be said for removing those and having everyone
list dependencies, but I don't really want to chase down every
consumer's build files. Probably not worth the trouble.
Change-Id: I8fcff954a6d5de9471f456db15c54a1b17cb937a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11573
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This is part of TLS 1.3 draft 16 but isn't much of a wire format change,
so go ahead and add it now. When rolling into Chromium, we'll want to
add an entry to the error mapping.
Change-Id: I8fd7f461dca83b725a31ae19ef96c890d603ce53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We need to retain a pair of Finished messages for renegotiation_info.
SSL 3.0's is actually larger than TLS 1.2's (always 12 bytes). Take
renegotiation out in preparation for trimming them to size.
Change-Id: I2e238c48aaf9be07dd696bc2a6af75e9b0ead299
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11570
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ifcdbeab9291d1141605a09a1960702c792cffa86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11561
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Change-Id: I5d4fc0d3204744e93d71a36923469035c19a5b10
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The server acknowledging a non-existent session is a particularly
interesting case since getting it wrong means a NULL crash.
Change-Id: Iabde4955de883595239cfd8e9d84a7711e60a886
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11500
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
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BUG=77
Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
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