The other codepath is Linux-specific. This should get tidied up a bit but, in
the meantime, fix the Chromium iOS (NO_ASM) build. Even when the assembly gets
working, it seems iOS prefers you make fat binaries rather than detect features
at runtime, so this is what we want anyway.
BUG=548539
Change-Id: If19b2e380a96918b07bacc300a3a27b885697b99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6380
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was submitted to check that it worked on all the builders but, in
normal usage, we should build without OPENSSL_SMALL so that everything
is compiled.
Change-Id: I31ac899862e3b31c55bf265a7ec5ff0cc9770b48
The previous commit fixed a signed/unsigned warning but, on 32-bit
systems, long is only 32 bits, so the fix was incorrect there.
Change-Id: I6afe340164de0e176c7f710fcdd095b2a4cddee4
1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or
computing anything.
2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|.
3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used.
4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section.
Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
These functions ultimately return the result of |BN_num_bits|, and that
function's return type is |unsigned|. Thus, these functions' return
type should also be |unsigned|.
Change-Id: I2cef63e6f75425857bac71f7c5517ef22ab2296b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6170
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This came up and I wasn't sure which it was without source-diving.
Change-Id: Ie659096e0f42a7448f81dfb1006c125d292fd7fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6354
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Intel's P-256 code has very large tables and things like Chromium just
don't need that extra size. However, servers generally do so this change
adds an OPENSSL_SMALL define that currently just drops the 64-bit P-224
but will gate Intel's P-256 in the future too.
Change-Id: I2e55c6e06327fafabef9b96d875069d95c0eea81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6362
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
QUIC has a complex relationship with BoringSSL owing to it living both
in Chromium and the Google-internal repository. In order for it to
handle the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD switch more easily this change gives
the unsuffixed name to the old AEAD, for now.
Once QUIC has moved to the “_old” version the unsuffixed name can be
given to the new version.
Change-Id: Id8a77be6e3fe2358d78e022413fe088e5a274dca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6361
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
If the application is only using the P-256 implementation in p256-64.c,
then the WNAF code would all be dead code. The change reorganizes the
code so that all modern toolchains should be able to recognize that
fact and eliminate the WNAF-based code when it is unused.
Change-Id: I9f94bd934ca7d2292de4c29bb89e17c940c7cd2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6173
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
None of these methods vary per group. Factoring these out of
|EC_METHOD| should help some toolchains to do a better job optimizing
the code for size.
Change-Id: Ibd22a52992b4d549f12a8d22bddfdb3051aaa891
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6172
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The tests in crypto/cipher/test/chacha20_poly1305_deprecated_tests.txt
were adapted to the RFC 7539 AEAD construction by recalculating the tags.
Also a few additional vectors were added. These vectors were verified
against nettle. See
feb7292bf1.
Change-Id: Ib3f2797d5825bc1e32c55f845b5070b6993e4aff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6144
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This change reduces unnecessary copying and makes the pre-RFC-7539
nonces 96 bits just like the AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and RFC 7539
ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites. Also, all the symbols related to
the pre-RFC-7539 cipher suites now have "_OLD" appended, in
preparation for adding the RFC 7539 variants.
Change-Id: I1f85bd825b383c3134df0b6214266069ded029ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The new function |CRYPTO_chacha_96_bit_nonce_from_64_bit_nonce| can be
used to adapt code from that uses 64 bit nonces, in a way that is
compatible with the old semantics.
Change-Id: I83d5b2d482e006e82982f58c9f981e8078c3e1b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It seems OS X actually cares about symbol resolution and dependencies
when you create a dylib. Probably because they do two-level name
resolution.
(Obligatory disclaimer: BoringSSL does not have a stable ABI and is thus
not suitable for a traditional system-wide library.)
BUG=539603
Change-Id: Ic26c4ad23840fe6c1f4825c44671e74dd2e33870
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6131
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Also, organize the links in BUILDING.md sensibly.
Change-Id: Ie9c65750849fcdab7a6a6bf11d1c9cdafb53bc00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6140
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
gcm_test.cc needs to access the internal GCM symbols. This is
unfortunate because it means that they have to be marked OPENSSL_EXPORT
just for this.
To compensate, modes.h is removed and its contents copied into
crypto/modes/internal.h.
Change-Id: I1777b2ef8afd154c43417137673a28598a7ec30e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6360
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This reverts commit b9c26014de.
The win64 bot seems unhappy. Will sniff at it tomorrow. In
the meantime, get the tree green again.
Change-Id: I058ddb3ec549beee7eabb2f3f72feb0a4a5143b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6353
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This removes the confusion about whether |gcm128_context| copies the
key (it didn't) or whether the caller is responsible for keeping the
key alive for the lifetime of the |gcm128_context| (it was).
Change-Id: Ia0ad0a8223e664381fbbfb56570b2545f51cad9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The key is never modified through the key pointer member, and the
calling code relies on that fact for maintaining its own
const-correctness.
Change-Id: I63946451aa7c400cd127895a61c30d9a647b1b8c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6040
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
MSVC was warning about the assignment in the |if| condition. Also, the
formatting of the negative number made it look like a subtraction.
Finally, what was being calculated was unclear.
Change-Id: If56c672302c638aac6a87f715e8dcbb87ecb56ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6212
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This removes a hard link-time dependency on the SHA-1 code. The code
was self-contradictory in whether it defaulted to SHA-1 or refused to
default to SHA-1.
Change-Id: I5ad7949bdd529df568904f87870313e3d8a57e72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5833
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
∙ host:port parsing, where unavoidable, is now IPv6-friendly.
∙ |BIO_C_GET_CONNECT| is simply removed.
∙ bssl -accept now listens on both IPv6 and IPv4.
Change-Id: I1cbd8a79c0199bab3ced4c4fd79d2cc5240f250c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6214
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It's very annoying having to remember the right incant every time I want
to switch around between my build, build-release, build-asan, etc.,
output directories.
Unfortunately, this target is pretty unfriendly without CMake 3.2+ (and
Ninja 1.5+). This combination gives a USES_TERMINAL flag to
add_custom_target which uses Ninja's "console" pool, otherwise the
output buffering gets in the way. Ubuntu LTS is still on an older CMake,
so do a version check in the meantime.
CMake also has its own test mechanism (CTest), but this doesn't use it.
It seems to prefer knowing what all the tests are and then tries to do
its own output management and parallelizing and such. We already have
our own runners. all_tests.go could actually be converted tidily, but
generate_build_files.py also needs to read it, and runner.go has very
specific needs.
Naming the target ninja -C build test would be nice, but CTest squats
that name and CMake grumps when you use a reserved name, so I've gone
with run_tests.
Change-Id: Ibd20ebd50febe1b4e91bb19921f3bbbd9fbcf66c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6270
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Since we pre-generate our perlasm, having the output of these files be
sensitive to the environment the run in is unhelpful. It would be bad to
suddenly change what features we do or don't compile in whenever workstations'
toolchains change.
Enable all compiler-version-gated features as they should all be runtime-gated
anyway. This should align with what upstream's files would have produced on
modern toolschains. We should assume our assemblers can take whatever we'd like
to throw at them. (If it turns out some can't, we'd rather find out and
probably switch the problematic instructions to explicit byte sequences.)
This actually results in a fairly significant change to the assembly we
generate. I'm guessing upstream's buildsystem sets the CC environment variable,
while ours doesn't and so the version checks were all coming out conservative.
diffstat of generated files:
linux-x86/crypto/sha/sha1-586.S | 1176 ++++++++++++
linux-x86/crypto/sha/sha256-586.S | 2248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
linux-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-avx2.S | 1644 +++++++++++++++++
linux-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.S | 638 ++++++
linux-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont.S | 332 +++
linux-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.S | 1130 ++++++++++++
linux-x86_64/crypto/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.S | 754 ++++++++
linux-x86_64/crypto/modes/ghash-x86_64.S | 475 +++++
linux-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha1-x86_64.S | 1121 ++++++++++++
linux-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha256-x86_64.S | 1062 +++++++++++
linux-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha512-x86_64.S | 2241 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
mac-x86/crypto/sha/sha1-586.S | 1174 ++++++++++++
mac-x86/crypto/sha/sha256-586.S | 2248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
mac-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-avx2.S | 1637 +++++++++++++++++
mac-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.S | 638 ++++++
mac-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont.S | 331 +++
mac-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.S | 1130 ++++++++++++
mac-x86_64/crypto/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.S | 750 ++++++++
mac-x86_64/crypto/modes/ghash-x86_64.S | 475 +++++
mac-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha1-x86_64.S | 1121 ++++++++++++
mac-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha256-x86_64.S | 1062 +++++++++++
mac-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha512-x86_64.S | 2241 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
win-x86/crypto/sha/sha1-586.asm | 1173 ++++++++++++
win-x86/crypto/sha/sha256-586.asm | 2248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
win-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-avx2.asm | 1858 +++++++++++++++++++-
win-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.asm | 638 ++++++
win-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont.asm | 352 +++
win-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.asm | 1184 ++++++++++++
win-x86_64/crypto/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.asm | 933 ++++++++++
win-x86_64/crypto/modes/ghash-x86_64.asm | 515 +++++
win-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha1-x86_64.asm | 1152 ++++++++++++
win-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha256-x86_64.asm | 1088 +++++++++++
win-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha512-x86_64.asm | 2499 ++++++
SHA* gets faster. RSA and AES-GCM seem to be more of a wash and even slower
sometimes! This is a little concerning. Though when I repeated the latter two,
it's definitely noisy (RSA in particular), so we may wish to repeat in a more
controlled environment. We could also flip some of these toggles to something
other than the highest setting if it seems some of the variants aren't
desirable. We just shouldn't have them enabled or disabled on accident. This
aligns us closer to upstream though.
$ /tmp/bssl.old speed SHA-
Did 5028000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 1000048us (5027758.7 ops/sec): 80.4 MB/s
Did 1708000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 1000257us (1707561.2 ops/sec): 437.1 MB/s
Did 73000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 1008406us (72391.5 ops/sec): 593.0 MB/s
Did 3041000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 1000311us (3040054.5 ops/sec): 48.6 MB/s
Did 779000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 1000820us (778361.7 ops/sec): 199.3 MB/s
Did 26000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 1009875us (25745.8 ops/sec): 210.9 MB/s
Did 1837000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 1000251us (1836539.0 ops/sec): 29.4 MB/s
Did 803000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 1000969us (802222.6 ops/sec): 205.4 MB/s
Did 41000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 1016768us (40323.8 ops/sec): 330.3 MB/s
$ /tmp/bssl.new speed SHA-
Did 5354000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 1000104us (5353443.2 ops/sec): 85.7 MB/s
Did 1779000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 1000121us (1778784.8 ops/sec): 455.4 MB/s
Did 87000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 1012641us (85914.0 ops/sec): 703.8 MB/s
Did 3517000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 1000114us (3516599.1 ops/sec): 56.3 MB/s
Did 935000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 1000096us (934910.2 ops/sec): 239.3 MB/s
Did 38000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 1004476us (37830.7 ops/sec): 309.9 MB/s
Did 2930000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 1000259us (2929241.3 ops/sec): 46.9 MB/s
Did 1008000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 1000509us (1007487.2 ops/sec): 257.9 MB/s
Did 45000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 1000593us (44973.3 ops/sec): 368.4 MB/s
$ /tmp/bssl.old speed RSA
Did 820 RSA 2048 signing operations in 1017008us (806.3 ops/sec)
Did 27000 RSA 2048 verify operations in 1015400us (26590.5 ops/sec)
Did 1292 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) signing operations in 1008185us (1281.5 ops/sec)
Did 65000 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) verify operations in 1011388us (64268.1 ops/sec)
Did 120 RSA 4096 signing operations in 1061027us (113.1 ops/sec)
Did 8208 RSA 4096 verify operations in 1002717us (8185.8 ops/sec)
$ /tmp/bssl.new speed RSA
Did 760 RSA 2048 signing operations in 1003351us (757.5 ops/sec)
Did 25900 RSA 2048 verify operations in 1028931us (25171.8 ops/sec)
Did 1320 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) signing operations in 1040806us (1268.2 ops/sec)
Did 63000 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) verify operations in 1016042us (62005.3 ops/sec)
Did 104 RSA 4096 signing operations in 1008718us (103.1 ops/sec)
Did 6875 RSA 4096 verify operations in 1093441us (6287.5 ops/sec)
$ /tmp/bssl.old speed GCM
Did 5316000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000082us (5315564.1 ops/sec): 85.0 MB/s
Did 712000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000252us (711820.6 ops/sec): 961.0 MB/s
Did 149000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1003182us (148527.4 ops/sec): 1216.7 MB/s
Did 5919750 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000016us (5919655.3 ops/sec): 94.7 MB/s
Did 800000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000951us (799239.9 ops/sec): 1079.0 MB/s
Did 152000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000765us (151883.8 ops/sec): 1244.2 MB/s
$ /tmp/bssl.new speed GCM
Did 5315000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000125us (5314335.7 ops/sec): 85.0 MB/s
Did 755000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000878us (754337.7 ops/sec): 1018.4 MB/s
Did 151000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005655us (150150.9 ops/sec): 1230.0 MB/s
Did 5913500 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000041us (5913257.6 ops/sec): 94.6 MB/s
Did 782000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001484us (780841.2 ops/sec): 1054.1 MB/s
Did 121000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1006389us (120231.8 ops/sec): 984.9 MB/s
Change-Id: I0efb32f896c597abc7d7e55c31d038528a5c72a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6260
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
We haven't tested it yet, but it was only disabled on 64-bit. Disable it on
32-bit as well until we're ready to turn it on.
Change-Id: I50e74aef2c5c3ba539a868c2bb6fb90fdf28a5f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6271
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
We missed 7eb9680ae1bf5dd9aeb61c401f2c3bd900ac9aeb. This is a no-op as we don't
set shaext right now anyway. This also includes some cosmetic changes to
minimize the diff with upstream. ("cosmetic". Upstream's perl doesn't like
spaces.)
Change-Id: I17fa663ddaa38c27854d4f59fb83960528d9ba78
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6250
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
I was a little bit too lazy in error handling here.
Change-Id: I9954957d41d610e715c1976a921dedeb8cb49d40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6240
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Right whether NPN is advertised can only be configured globally on the SSL_CTX.
Rather than adding two pointers to each SSL*, add an options bit to disable it
so we may plumb in a field trial to disable NPN.
Chromium wants to be able to route a bit in to disable NPN, but it uses SSL_CTX
incorrectly and has a global one, so it can't disconnect the callback. (That
really needs to get fixed. Although it's not clear this necessarily wants to be
lifted up to SSL_CTX as far as Chromium's SSLClientSocket is concerned since
NPN doesn't interact with the session cache.)
BUG=526713
Change-Id: I49c86828b963eb341c6ea6a442557b7dfa190ed3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6351
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
There's still a size_t/int cast due to the mass of legacy code, but at
least avoid the most egregious case.
Change-Id: Icc1741366e09190216e762ca7ef42ecfc3215edc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6345
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
One less exported function. Nothing ever stack-allocates them, within BoringSSL
or in consumers. This avoids the slightly odd mechanism where BN_MONT_CTX_free
might or might not free the BN_MONT_CTX itself based on a flag.
(This is also consistent with OpenSSL 1.1.x which does away with the _init
variants of both this and BIGNUM so it shouldn't be a compatibility concern
long-term either.)
Change-Id: Id885ae35a26f75686cc68a8aa971e2ea6767ba88
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6350
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Missed a few the last time around.
Change-Id: I42fd57566d64fa1c41cba14573742d42468cc07d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6349
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.
(Imported from upstream's ea9de25f2f577db69d67c39e5cf60be7da17c931.)
This only affects the various config file parsing bits.
Change-Id: I530c09be81bfb40bca931c064c39cbc93dfd454f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6348
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
See also upstream's b62a2f8a373d1889672599834acf95161f2883ce, though
upstream left the lock calls in by accident. Otherwise, the change
appears to be correct. I see no side effects of x509_object_idx_cnt
beyond the return value and *pnmatch, both of which are discarded.
Change-Id: Ic2124a733a61591bd1b264164726ce6c69ce10c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6347
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init needs a CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup. Also a pile of problems
with x509_lu.c I noticed trying to import some upstream change.
Change-Id: I029a65cd2d30aa31f4832e8fbfe5b2ea0dbc66fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6346
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
See also upstream's b62a2f8a373d1889672599834acf95161f2883ce.
Change-Id: I430be5ec21198484b8a874460b224e15bafafe48
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6344
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
SSL_set_renegotiate_mode to avoid my original double-negative confusion.
Change-Id: I23537aeac53c4969fd81307a676f33d6768da55f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6322
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The internal session cache is keyed on session ID, so this is completely
useless for clients (indeed we never look it up internally). Along the way,
tidy up ssl_update_cache to be more readable. The slight behavior change is
that SSL_CTX_add_session's return code no longer controls the external
callback. It's not clear to me what that could have accomplished. (It can only
fail on allocation error. We only call it for new sessions, so the duplicate
case is impossible.)
The one thing of value the internal cache might have provided is managing the
timeout. The SSL_CTX_flush_sessions logic would flip the not_resumable bit and
cause us not to offer expired sessions (modulo SSL_CTX_flush_sessions's delay
and any discrepancies between the two caches). Instead, just check expiration
when deciding whether or not to offer a session.
This way clients that set SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT blindly don't accidentally
consume gobs of memory.
BUG=531194
Change-Id: If97485beab21874f37737edc44df24e61ce23705
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6321
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The original logic was rather confusing.
Change-Id: I097e57817ea8ec2dd65a413c8751fba1682e928b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6320
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
In doing so, fix the documentation for SSL_CTX_add_session and
SSL_CTX_remove_session. I misread the code and documented the behavior
on session ID collision wrong.
Change-Id: I6f364305e1f092b9eb0b1402962fd04577269d30
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6319
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
A random 32-byte (so 256-bit) session ID is never going to collide with
an existing one. (And, if it does, SSL_CTX_add_session does account for
this, so the server won't explode. Just attempting to resume some
session will fail.)
That logic didn't completely work anyway as it didn't account for
external session caches or multiple connections picking the same ID in
parallel (generation and insertion happen at different times) or
multiple servers sharing one cache. In theory one could fix this by
passing in a sufficiently clever generate_session_id, but no one does
that.
I found no callers of these functions, so just remove them altogether.
Change-Id: I8500c592cf4676de6d7194d611b99e9e76f150a7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6318
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
