Now that WebRTC honors packet boundaries (https://crbug.com/447431), we
can start enforcing them correctly. Configuring read-ahead now does
nothing. Instead DTLS will always set "read-ahead" and also correctly
enforce packet boundaries when reading records. Add tests to ensure that
badly fragmented packets are ignored. Because such packets don't fail
the handshake, the tests work by injecting an alert in the front of the
handshake stream and ensuring the DTLS implementation ignores them.
ssl3_read_n can be be considerably unraveled now, but leave that for
future cleanup. For now, make it correct.
BUG=468889
Change-Id: I800cfabe06615af31c2ccece436ca52aed9fe899
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4820
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Currently far from passing and I haven't even tried with a leak checker yet.
Also bn_test is slow.
Change-Id: I4fe2783aa5f7897839ca846062ae7e4a367d2469
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4794
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than duplicate all the various modifiers, which is quite
error-prone, write all the tests to a temporary array and then apply
modifiers afterwards.
Change-Id: I19bfeb83b722ed34e973f17906c5e071471a926a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4782
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We should be testing asynchronous renego.
BUG=429450
Change-Id: Ib7a5d42f2ac728f9ea0d80158eef63ad77cd77a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4781
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Since we hope to eventually lose server-side renegotiation support
altogether, get the client-side version of those tests. We should have
had those anyway to test that the default is to allow it.
BUG=429450
Change-Id: I4a18f339b55f3f07d77e22e823141e10a12bc9ff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
DH groups less than 1024 bits are clearly not very safe. Ideally servers
would switch to ECDHE because 1024 isn't great either, but this will
serve for the short term.
BUG=490240
Change-Id: Ic9aac714cdcdcbfae319b5eb1410675d3b903a69
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4813
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We can't actually catch this with MSan because it requires all code be
instrumented, so it needs a NO_ASM build which no disables that code. valgrind
doesn't notice either, possibly because there's some computation being done on
it. Still, we shouldn't use uninitialized memory.
Also get us closer to being instrumentable by MSan, but the runner tests will
need to build against an instrumented STL and I haven't tried that yet.
Change-Id: I2d65697a3269b5b022899f361730a85c51ecaa12
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4760
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_get_current_cipher is documented by upstream to return the cipher actually
being used. However, because it reads s->session, it returns information
pertaining to the session to be offered if queried before ServerHello or early
in an abbreviated handshake.
Logic around s->session needs more comprehensive cleanup but for just this
function, defining it to be the current outgoing cipher is close to the current
semantics but for fixing the initial state (s->session->cipher is populated
when sending CCS). Store it in the SSL_AEAD_CTX which seems a natural place to
associate state pertaining to a connection half.
BUG=484744
Change-Id: Ife8db27a16615d0dbb2aec65359537243e08af7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4733
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This cuts down on one config knob as well as one case in the renego
combinatorial explosion. Since the only case we care about with renego
is the client auth hack, there's no reason to ever do resumption.
Especially since, no matter what's in the session cache:
- OpenSSL will only ever offer the session it just established,
whether or not a newer one with client auth was since established.
- Chrome will never cache sessions created on a renegotiation, so
such a session would never make it to the session cache.
- The new_session + SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
logic had a bug where it would unconditionally never offer tickets
(but would advertise support) on renego, so any server doing renego
resumption against an OpenSSL-derived client must not support
session tickets.
This also gets rid of s->new_session which is now pointless.
BUG=429450
Change-Id: I884bdcdc80bff45935b2c429b4bbc9c16b2288f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4732
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As of crbug.com/484543, Chromium's SSLClientSocket is not sensitive to whether
renegotiation is enabled or not. Disable it by default and require consumers to
opt into enabling this protocol mistake.
BUG=429450
Change-Id: I2329068284dbb851da010ff1fd398df3d663bcc3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4723
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With DTLSv1_get_timeout de-ctrl-ified, the type checker complains about
OPENSSL_timeval. Existing callers all use the real timeval.
Now that OPENSSL_timeval is not included in any public structs, simply
forward-declare timeval itself in ssl.h and pull in winsock2.h in internal
headers.
Change-Id: Ieaf110e141578488048c28cdadb14881301a2ce1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4682
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
“ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256” doesn't follow the standard naming
for OpenSSL: it was “-WITH-” in it and has a hyphen between “AES” and
“128”. This change fixes that.
Change-Id: I7465b1ec83e7d5b9a60d8ca589808aeee10c174e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4601
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This will be reverted in a minute. The bots should run both suites of tests and
report the names of all failing tests in the summary.
Change-Id: Ibe351017dfa8ccfd182b3c88eee413cd2cbdeaf0
This is a really dumb API wart. Now that we have a limited set of curves that
are all reasonable, the automatic logic should just always kick in. This makes
set_ecdh_auto a no-op and, instead of making it the first choice, uses it as
the fallback behavior should none of the older curve selection APIs be used.
Currently, by default, server sockets can only use the plain RSA key exchange.
BUG=481139
Change-Id: Iaabc82de766cd00968844a71aaac29bd59841cd4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4531
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See upstream's bd891f098b. It honestly seems
kinda dumb for a client to do this, but apparently the spec allows this.
Judging by code inspection, OpenSSL 1.0.1 also allowed this, so this avoids a
behavior change when switching from 1.0.1 to BoringSSL.
Add a test for this, which revealed that, unlike upstream's version, this
actually works with ecdh_auto since tls1_get_shared_curve also needs updating.
(To be mentioned in newsletter.)
Change-Id: Ie622700f17835965457034393b90f346740cfca8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4464
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Because RFC 6066 is obnoxious like that and IIS servers actually do this
when OCSP-stapling is configured, but the OCSP server cannot be reached.
BUG=478947
Change-Id: I3d34c1497e0b6b02d706278dcea5ceb684ff60ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4461
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I489d00bc4ee22a5ecad75dc1eb84776f044566e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4391
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This causes any unexpected handshake records to be met with a fatal
no_renegotiation alert.
In addition, restore the redundant version sanity-checks in the handshake state
machines. Some code would zero the version field as a hacky way to break the
handshake on renego. Those will be removed when switching to this API.
The spec allows for a non-fatal no_renegotiation alert, but ssl3_read_bytes
makes it difficult to find the end of a ClientHello and skip it entirely. Given
that OpenSSL goes out of its way to map non-fatal no_renegotiation alerts to
fatal ones, this seems probably fine. This avoids needing to account for
another source of the library consuming an unbounded number of bytes without
returning data up.
Change-Id: Ie5050d9c9350c29cfe32d03a3c991bdc1da9e0e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4300
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A previous change in BoringSSL renamed ERR_print_errors_fp to
BIO_print_errors_fp as part of refactoring the code to improve the
layering of modules within BoringSSL. Rename it back for better
compatibility with code that was using the function under the original
name. Move its definition back to crypto/err using an implementation
that avoids depending on crypto/bio.
Change-Id: Iee7703bb1eb4a3d640aff6485712bea71d7c1052
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4310
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The rest of ssl/ still includes things everywhere, but this at least fixes the
includes that were implicit from ssl/internal.h.
Change-Id: I7ed22590aca0fe78af84fd99a3e557f4b05f6782
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This drops in a copy of a subset of golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305 to implement
Poly1305. Hopefully this will keep them from regression as we rework the record
layer.
Change-Id: Ic1e0d941a0a9e5ec260151ced8acdf9215c4b887
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4257
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
After sharding the session cache for fallbacks, the numbers have been pretty
good; 0.03% on dev and 0.02% on canary. Stable is at 0.06% but does not have
the sharded session cache. Before sharding, stable, beta, and dev had been
fairly closely aligned. Between 0.03% being low and the fallback saving us in
all but extremely contrived cases, I think this should be fairly safe.
Add tests for both the cipher suite and protocol version mismatch checks.
BUG=441456
Change-Id: I2374bf64d0aee0119f293d207d45319c274d89ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3972
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This conceivably has a use, but NSS doesn't do this buffer either and it still
suffers from the same problems as the other uses of record_pqueue. This removes
the last use of record_pqueue. It also opens the door to removing pqueue
altogether as it isn't the right data structure for either of the remaining
uses either. (It's not clear it was right for record_pqueue either, but I don't
feel like digging into this code.)
Change-Id: If8a43e7332b3cd11a78a516f3e8ebf828052316f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4239
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the key is missing, it seems the failure is assumed to be expected.
BUG=473924
Change-Id: I62edd9110fa74bee5e6425fd6786badf5398728c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4231
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Move the state to TestState rather than passing pointers to them everywhere.
Also move SSL_read and SSL_write retry loops into helper functions so they
aren't repeated everywhere. This also makes the SSL_write calls all
consistently account for partial writes.
Change-Id: I9bc083a03da6a77ab2fc03c29d4028435fc02620
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4214
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Extend the False Start tests to optionally send an alert (thus avoiding
deadlock) before waiting for the out-of-order app data. Based on whether the
peer shuts off the connection before or after sending app data, we can
determine whether the peer False Started by observing purely external effects.
Change-Id: I8b9fecc29668e0b0c34b5fd19d0f239545011bae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4213
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Based on whether -false-start is passed, we expect SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to or
not to fire. Also add a flag that asserts SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE does *not* fire
in any False Start test where the handshake fails after SSL_connect returns.
Change-Id: I6c5b960fff15e297531e15b16abe0b98be95bec8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4212
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That's a pretty obvious thing to test. I'm not sure how we forgot that one.
Change-Id: I7e1a7df6c6abbdd587e0f7723117f50d09faa5c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4211
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ASan's own malloc interceptor isn't compatible with this mechanism; it doesn't
see calls to __libc_malloc.
Change-Id: Ibac5aa05c6e40f1c72dcee3a2597e96deffca62c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4191
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is in preparation for using RAII in the unit tests. Those tests are built
in Chromium as well, but Chromium does not have C++11 library support across
all its toolchains. Compiler support is available, so add a partial
reimplementation of std::unique_ptr and std::move under crypto/test/. The
scopers for the crypto/ library are also moved there while the ones for ssl/
stay in ssl/test/.
Change-Id: I38f769acbc16a870db34649928575c7314b6e9f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4120
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MinGW on Linux needs lowercase include files. On Windows this doesn't
matter since the filesystems are case-insensitive, but building
BoringSSL on Linux with MinGW has case-sensitive filesystems.
Change-Id: Id9c120d819071b041341fbb978352812d6d073bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4090
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Partly inspired by the new state exposed in
dc3da938992d209a3b36acbd9695cfcab1fdf041, stress this codepath by spamming our
poor shim with warning alerts.
Change-Id: I876c6e52911b6eb57493cf3e1782b37ea96d01f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4112
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Google C++ style allows these. It's also considerably less tedious and
error-prone than defining an out-of-line constructor.
Change-Id: Ib76ccf6079be383722433046ac5c5d796dd1f525
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4111
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was failing only on 32-bit for some reason. Part of TestConfig wasn't
getting initialized.
Change-Id: I2a3747a347a47b47e2357f34d32f8db86d6cc629
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4110
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I'm guessing a previous iteration used dlsym to look up the real malloc.
Change-Id: I18be9ef4db4ed059400074c8507d4e2fea882fbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Both on the client and the server.
Change-Id: I9892c6dbbb29938154aba4f53b10e8b5231f9c47
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4071
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is really just scar tissue with https://crbug.com/468889 being the real
underlying problem. But the test is pretty easy.
Change-Id: I5eca18fdcbde8665c0e6c3ac419a28152647d66f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In verifying the fix for CVE-2015-0291, I noticed we don't actually have any
test coverage for full handshakes on renegotiation. All our tests always do
resumptions.
Change-Id: Ia9b701e8a50ba9353fefb8cc4fb86e78065d0b40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4050
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Noticed these as I was poking around.
Change-Id: I93833a152583feced374c9febf7485bec7abc1c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3973
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes test flakiness on Windows.
BUG=467767
Change-Id: Ie69b5b43ddd524aadb15c53705f6ec860e928786
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4001
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Brian Smith