The fipsmodule is still separate as that's a lot of build mess. (Though
that too may be worth pulling in eventually. CMake usually has different
opinions on generated files if they're in the same directory. We might
be able to avoid the set_source_properties(GENERATED) thing.)
Change-Id: Ie1f9345009044d4f0e7541ca779e01bdc5ad62f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31586
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The fuzzer found another place where it could cause a timeout by
providing a huge PBKDF2 iteration count. This change bounds another two
places where we parse out iteration counts and that's hopefully all of
them.
BUG=oss-fuzz:9853
Change-Id: I037fa09d2bee79e7435a9d40cbd89c07b4a9d443
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30944
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Our test data uses values to up 2048 so the 1024 limit was causing tests
to fail in fuzzing mode.
Change-Id: I71b97be26376a04c13d1f438e5e36a5ffff1c1a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30484
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The previous limit was |UINT_MAX|. Windows limits to 600K, but that's
already causing issues. This seems like a balance between being
completely crazy and still large enough not to have to worry for a long
time. It's still probably too large for backend systems wanting to
process arbitrary PKCS#12, but I don't think any fixed value will
satisfy all desires.
Change-Id: I01a3f78d5f2df086f8dbc0e8bacfb95153738f55
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(Otherwise the fuzzer will discover that it can trigger extremely large
amounts of computation and start timing out.)
BUG=oss-fuzz:9767
Change-Id: Ibc1da5a90da169c7caf522f792530d1020f8cb54
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CBS_asn1_ber_to_der was a little cumbersome to use. While it, in theory,
allowed callers to consistently advance past the element, no caller
actually did so consistently. Instead they would advance if conversion
happened, and not if it was already DER. For the PKCS7_* functions, this
was even caller-exposed.
Change-Id: I658d265df899bace9ba6616cb465f19c9e6c3534
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29304
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL staples each certificate's friendly name to the X509 with
X509_alias_set1. Mimic this. pyOpenSSL expects to find it there.
Update-Note: We actually parse some attributes now. PKCS#12 files with
malformed ones may not parse.
Change-Id: I3b78958eedf195509cd222ea4f0c884be3753770
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PKCS#12 encodes passwords as NUL-terminated UCS-2, so the empty password
is encoded as {0, 0}. Some implementations use the empty byte array for
"no password". OpenSSL considers a non-NULL password as {0, 0} and a
NULL password as {}. It then, in high-level PKCS#12 parsing code, tries
both options.
Match this behavior to appease pyOpenSSL's tests.
Change-Id: I07ef91d54454b6f2647f86b7eb9b13509b2876d3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28550
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PyOpenSSL calls this function these days. Tested by roundtripping with
ourselves and also manually confirming our output interoperates with
OpenSSL. (For anyone repeating this experiment, the OpenSSL
command-line tool has a bug and does not correctly output friendlyName
attributes with non-ASCII characters. I'll send them a PR to fix this
shortly.)
Between this and the UTF-8 logic earlier, the theme of this patch series
seems to be "implement in C something I last implemented in
JavaScript"...
Change-Id: I258d563498d82998c6bffc6789efeaba36fe3a5e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28328
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This is not very useful without PKCS12_create, which a follow-up change
will implement.
Change-Id: I355ccd22a165830911ae189871ab90a6101f42ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28327
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This aligns with OpenSSL 1.1.0's behavior, which deviated from OpenSSL
1.0.2. OpenSSL 1.0.2 effectively assumed input passwords were always
Latin-1.
Update-Note: If anyone was using PKCS#12 passwords with non-ASCII
characters, this changes them from being encoding-confused to hopefully
interpretting "correctly". If this breaks anything, we can add a
fallback to PKCS12_get_key_and_certs/PKCS12_parse, but OpenSSL 1.1.0
does not have such behavior. It only implements a fallback in the
command-line tool, not the APIs.
Change-Id: I0aa92db26077b07a40f85b89f4d3e0f6b0d7be87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28326
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chromium's OCSP code needs the OIDs and we already have them on hand.
Change-Id: Icab012ba4ae15ce029cbfe3ed93f89470137e7f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20724
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crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL
style.
Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19504
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Change-Id: Ic22ea72b0134aa7884f1e75433dd5c18247f57ab
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BUG=129
Change-Id: I1fef45d662743e7210f93e4dc1bae0c55f75d3fe
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These will be used by Chromium's crypto::ECPrivateKey to work with
EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structures.
Note this comes with a behavior change: PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt
will no longer preserve PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo attributes. However, those
functions are only called by Chromium which does not care. They are also
called by the PEM code, but not in a way which exposes attributes.
The PKCS#12 PFX code is made to use PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key
because it's cleaner (no more tossing X509_SIG around) and to ease
decoupling that in the future.
crypto/pkcs8's dependency on the legacy ASN.1 stack is now limited to
pkcs8_x509.c.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I173e605d175e982c6b0250dd22187b73aca15b1a
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PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt still need to be split. The code for
processing PKCS#12 files is, for now, placed entirely in pkcs8_x509.c.
If we need to split it up, it should be straightforward to do so.
(Introduce a CRYPTO_BUFFER version of PKCS12_get_key_and_certs and go
from there.)
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9c87e916ec29ee14dbbd81c4d3fc10ac8a461f1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14214
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0c, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
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This isn't strictly necessary for Chromium yet, but we already have a
decoupled version of hash algorithm parsing available. For now, don't
export it but eventually we may wish to use it for OCSP.
BUG=54
Change-Id: If460d38d48bd47a2b4a853779f210c0cf7ee236b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14211
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
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The OPTIONAL prf field is an AlgorithmIdentifier, not an OID. I messed
this up in the recent rewrite.
Fix the parsing and add a test, produced by commenting out the logic in
OpenSSL to omit the field for hmacWithSHA1. (We don't currently support
any other PBKDF2, or I'd just add a test for that.)
Change-Id: I7d258bb01b93cd203a6fc1b8cccbddfdbc4dbbad
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We still need to expose a suitable API for Chromium to consume, but the
core implementation itself should now be ready.
The supported cipher list is based on what EVP_get_cipherbynid currently
supports, excluding the entries which don't have OIDs.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I3befca0a34b330ec1f663a029a8fbf049a4406bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14212
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To remove the OID table from Chromium, we'll need to decouple a lot of
this code. In preparation for that, detach the easy cases from the OID
table. What remains is PBES, cipher, and digest OIDs which will be doing
in follow-up changes.
BUG=54
Change-Id: Ie205d23d042e21114ca1faf68917fdc870969d09
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These were added in an attempt to deal with the empty vs. NULL confusion
in PKCS#12. Instead, PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt already treated
NULL special. Since we're stuck with supporting APIs like those anyway,
Chromium has been converted to use that feature. This cuts down on the
number of APIs we need to decouple from crypto/asn1.
BUG=54
Change-Id: Ie2d4798d326c5171ea5d731da0a2c11278bc0241
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Mercifully, PKCS#12 does not actually make ContentInfo and SafeBag
mutually recursive. The top-level object in a PKCS#12 is a SEQUENCE of
data or encrypted data ContentInfos. Their payloads are a SEQUENCE of
SafeBags (aka SafeContents).
SafeBag is a similar structure to ContentInfo but not identical (it has
attributes in it which we ignore) and actually carries the objects.
There is only recursion if the SafeContents bag type is used, which we
do not process.
This means we don't need to manage recursion depth. This also no longer
allows trailing data after the SEQUENCE and removes the comment about
NSS. The test file still passes, so I'm guessing something else was
going on?
Change-Id: I68e2f8a5cc4b339597429d15dc3588bd39267e0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13071
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie9a0039931a1a8d48a82c11ef5c58d6ee084ca4c
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Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using
the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to
the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency,
this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from
Chromium.
This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites
we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to
setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It
then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an
EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code
determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt
code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to
decrypt_init.
Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back
out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story
to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can
invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out
entirely.
Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This
makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although
PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very
related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own
AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1
one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding
scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing
on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes
anyway.)
This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration
count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the
common code.
BUG=54
Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This gets us closer to decoupling from crypto/asn1.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I06ec04ed3cb47c2f56a94c6defa97398bfd0e013
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13066
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This is not quite an end state (it still outputs an X509_ALGOR, the way
the generated salt is fed into key derivation is odd, and it uses the
giant OID table), but replaces a large chunk of it.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I0a0cca13e44e6a09dfaf6aed3b357cb077dc46d1
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Many of these parameters are constants.
Change-Id: I148dbea0063e478a132253f4e9dc71d5d20320c2
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This is a very basic test, but it's something.
Change-Id: Ic044297e97ce5719673869113ce581de4621ebbd
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Change-Id: Iad9b0898b3a602fc2e554c4fd59a599c61cd8ef7
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They're not called externally. Unexporting these will make it easier to
rewrite the PKCS{5,8,12} code to use CBS/CBB rather than X509_ALGOR.
Getting rid of those callers in Chromium probably won't happen for a
while since it's in our on-disk formats. (And a unit test for some NSS
client cert glue uses it.)
BUG=54
Change-Id: Id4148a2ad567484782a6e0322b68dde0619159fc
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This includes examples with both the NULL and empty passwords, thanks to
PKCS#12's password ambiguity.
Change-Id: Iae31840c1d31929fa9ac231509acaa80ef5b74bb
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Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
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This was done just by grepping for 'size_t i;' and 'size_t j;'. I left
everything in crypto/x509 and friends alone.
There's some instances in gcm.c that are non-trivial and pulled into a
separate CL for ease of review.
Change-Id: I6515804e3097f7e90855f1e7610868ee87117223
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For consistency and to avoid a pedantic GCC warning (even though it's
mostly old legacy code).
Change-Id: Iea63eb0a82ff52914adc33b83e48450f4f6a49ef
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Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
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Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
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This reverts commits:
8d79ed674019fdcb52348d79ed6740
Because WebRTC (at least) includes our headers in an extern "C" block,
which precludes having any C++ in them.
Change-Id: Ia849f43795a40034cbd45b22ea680b51aab28b2d
This change scatters the contents of the two scoped_types.h files into
the headers for each of the areas of the code. The types are now in the
|bssl| namespace.
Change-Id: I802b8de68fba4786b6a0ac1bacd11d81d5842423
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We currently have the situation where the |tool| and |bssl_shim| code
includes scoped_types.h from crypto/test and ssl/test. That's weird and
shouldn't happen. Also, our C++ consumers might quite like to have
access to the scoped types.
Thus this change moves some of the template code to base.h and puts it
all in a |bssl| namespace to prepare for scattering these types into
their respective headers. In order that all the existing test code be
able to access these types, it's all moved into the same namespace.
Change-Id: I3207e29474dc5fcc344ace43119df26dae04eabb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8730
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
