The under 32 constraint is silly; it's to check for duplicate curves in
library-supplied configuration. That API is new as of 1.0.2. It doesn't seem
worth bothering; if the caller supplies a repeated value, may as well emit a
repeated one and so be it. (Probably no one will ever call that function
outside of maybe test code anyway.)
While I'm here, remove the 0 constraint too. It's not likely to change, but
removing the return value overload seems easier than keeping comments about it
comments about it.
Change-Id: I01d36dba1855873875bb5a0ec84b040199e0e9bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2844
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only implement four curves (P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521) and only
advertise the latter three by default. Don't maintain entries corresponding to
all the unimplemented curves.
Change-Id: I1816a10c6f849ca1d9d896bc6f4b64cd6b329481
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2843
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They both happen to be zero, but OBJ_undef is a type error; OBJ_foo expands to
a comma-separated list of integers.
Change-Id: Ia5907dd3bc83240b7cc98af6456115d2efb48687
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2842
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from
SRP login and SRTP profile.
(Imported from upstream's 4f605ccb779e32a770093d687e0554e0bbb137d3)
More state that should be systematically reset across handshakes. Add a reset
on the ServerHello end too since that was missed.
Change-Id: Ibb4549acddfd87caf7b6ff853e2adbfa4b7e7856
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2838
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This lets us fold away the SSLv3-specific generate_master_secret. Once SSLv3
uses AEADs, others will fold away as well.
Change-Id: I27c1b75741823bc6db920d35f5dd5ce71b6fdbb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2697
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids needing a should_add_to_finished_hash boolean on do_write. The
logic in do_write was a little awkward because do_write would be called
multiple times if the write took several iterations. This also gets complex if
DTLS retransmits are involved. (At a glance, it's not obvious the
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED case actually works.)
Doing it as the handshake message is being prepared avoids this concern. It
also gives a natural point for the extended master secret logic which needs to
do work after the finished hash has been sampled.
As a bonus, we can remove s->d1->retransmitting which was only used to deal
with this issue.
Change-Id: Ifedf23ee4a6c5e08f960d296a6eb1f337a16dc7a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2604
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's an undefined one not used anywhere. The others ought to be const. Also
move the forward declaration to ssl.h so we don't have to use the struct name.
Change-Id: I76684cf65255535c677ec19154cac74317c289ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2561
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's no need to make that conditional.
Change-Id: Idac1aba42b22e3fe8e7731ae4ecb5ebc4183336c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2550
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some code predated the RFCs themselves, but the RFCs now exist. Also remove
now obsolete comments and some unused #defines.
See upstream's cffeacd91e70712c99c431bf32a655fa1b561482. (Though this predates
it; I just remembered I never uploaded it.)
Change-Id: I5e56f0ab6b7f558820f72e84dfdbc71a8c23cb91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2475
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The ClientHello record is padded to 1024 bytes when
fastradio_padding is enabled. As a result, the 3G cellular radio
is fast forwarded to DCH (high data rate) state. This mechanism
leads to a substantial redunction in terms of TLS handshake
latency, and benefits mobile apps that are running on top of TLS.
Change-Id: I3d55197b6d601761c94c0f22871774b5a3dad614
This is only used for EAP-FAST which we apparently don't need to support.
Remove it outright. We broke it in 9eaeef81fa by
failing to account for session misses.
If this changes and we need it later, we can resurrect it. Preferably
implemented differently: the current implementation is bolted badly onto the
handshake. Ideally use the supplied callbacks to fabricate an appropriate
SSL_SESSION and resume that with as much of the normal session ticket flow as
possible.
The one difference is that EAP-FAST seems to require the probing mechanism for
session tickets rather than the sane session ID echoing version. We can
reimplement that by asking the record layer to probe ahead for one byte.
Change-Id: I38304953cc36b2020611556a91e8ac091691edac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2360
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The ex_data index may fail to be allocated. Also don't leave a dangling pointer
in handshake_dgst if EVP_DigestInit_ex fails and check a few more init function
failures.
Change-Id: I2e99a89b2171c9d73ccc925a2f35651af34ac5fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2342
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
tls1_process_sigalgs now only determines the intersection between the peer
algorithms and those configured locally. That list is queried later to
determine the hash algorithm to use when signing CertificateVerify or
ServerKeyExchange.
This is needed to support client auth on Windows where smartcards or CAPI may
not support all hash functions.
As a bonus, this does away with more connection-global state. This avoids the
current situation where digests are chosen before keys are known (for
CertificateVerify) or for slots that don't exist.
Change-Id: Iec3619a103d691291d8ebe08ef77d574f2faf0e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CERT_PKEY_SIGN isn't meaningful since, without strict mode, we always fall back
to SHA-1 anyway. So the digest is never NULL when CERT_PKEY_SIGN is computed.
The entire valid_flags is now back to it's pre-1.0.2 check of seeing if the
certificate and key are configured.
This finally removes the sensitivity between valid_flags and selecting the
digest, so we can defer choosing the digest all we like.
Change-Id: I9f9952498f512d7f0cc799497f7c5b52145a48af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2288
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It doesn't depend on the cipher now that export ciphers are gone. It need only
be called once. Also remove the valid bit; nothing ever reads it. Its output is
also only used within a function, so make mask_k and mask_a local variables.
So all the configuration-based checks are in one place, change the input
parameter from CERT to SSL and move the PSK and ECDHE checks to the mask
computation. This avoids having to evaluate the temporary EC key for each
cipher.
The remaining uses are on the client which uses them differently (disabled
features rather than enabled ones). Those too may as well be local variables,
so leave a TODO.
Change-Id: Ibcb574341795d4016ea749f0290a793eed798874
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2287
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Many are now unused. Only two are currently considered in cipher selection:
CERT_PKEY_VALID and CERT_PKEY_SIGN. (As per previous commits, this is either
bizarre due to limited slots or redundant with ssl_early_callback_ctx. We can
probably prune this too.)
This also fixes a bug where DTLS 1.0 went through a TLS 1.2 codepath. As the
DTLS code is currently arranged, all version comparisons must be done via
macros like SSL_USE_SIGALGS. (Probably we should add functions to map from DTLS
to TLS versions and slowly move the library to using the TLS version as
in-memory representation.)
Change-Id: I89bcf5b7b9ea5cdecf54f4445156586377328fe0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's new in OpenSSL 1.0.2 so it's never set by existing code. This removes gobs
and gobs of complexity from tls1_check_chain. It only checks the local
certificate, not the peer certificate. The uses appear to be:
- Sanity-check configuration. Not worth the complexity.
- Guide in selecting ciphers based on ClientHello parameters and which
certificates in the CERT_PKEY are compatible. This isn't very useful one its
own since the CERT_PKEY array only stores one slot per type (e.g. you cannot
configure RSA/SHA-1 and RSA/SHA-256).
- For the (currently removed) SSL_check_chain to return more information based
on ClientHello parameters and guide selecting a certificate. This is
potentially useful but, as noted in the commit which removed it, redundant
with ssl_early_callback_ctx.
This CL is largely mechanical removing of dead codepaths. The follow-up will
clean up the now unnecessary parts of this function.
Change-Id: I2ebfa17e4f73e59aa1ee9e4ae7f615af2c6cf590
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2285
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get rid of now dead codepaths.
Change-Id: I3b5d49097cba70c5698a230cc6c1d79bdd0f0880
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2284
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Both of these are newly-exported in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so they cannot be used by
current consumers.
This was added in upstream's 18d7158809c9722f4c6d2a8af7513577274f9b56 to
support custom selection of certificates. The intent seems to be that you
listen to cert_cb and use SSL_check_chain to lean on OpenSSL to process
signature algorithms list for you.
Unfortunately, the implementation is slightly suspect: it uses the same
function as the codepath which mutates and refers to the CERT_PKEY of the
matching type. Some access was guarded by check_flags, but this is too
complex. Part of it is also because the matching digest is selected early and
we intend to connect this to EVP_PKEY_supports_digest so it is no longer a
property of just the key type.
Let's remove the hook for now, to unblock removing a lot of complexity. After
cleaning up this area, a function like this could be cleaner to support, but
we already have a version of this: select_certificate_cb and
ssl_early_callback_ctx.
Change-Id: I3add425b3996e5e32d4a88e14cc607b4fdaa5aec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2283
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is maintained just to distinguish whether the digest was negotiated or we
simply fell back to assuming SHA-1 support. No code is sensitive to this flag
and it adds complexity because it is set at a different time, for now, from the
rest of valid_flags.
The flag is new in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so nothing external could be sensitive to it.
Change-Id: I9304e358d56f44d912d78beabf14316d456bf389
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2282
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is new in OpenSSL 1.0.2 so it isn't used anywhere. Cuts down slightly on
connection-global state associated with signature algorithm processing.
Repurposing the digest field to mean both "the digest we choose to sign with
this key" and "the digest the last signature we saw happened to use" is
confusing.
Change-Id: Iec4d5078c33e271c8c7b0ab221c356ee8480b89d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's no need to store them on the session. They're temporary handshake
state and weren't serialized in d2i_SSL_SESSION anyway.
Change-Id: I830d378ab49aaa4fc6c4c7a6a8c035e2263fb763
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1990
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This resolves a pile of MSVC warnings in Chromium.
Change-Id: Ib9a29cb88d8ed8ec4118d153260f775be059a803
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We patch bugs into the runner implementation for testing, not our own.
Change-Id: I0a8ac73eaeb70db131c01a0fd9c84f258589a884
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Use the newly split out tls1_check_point_format. Also don't condition it on
s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist which is unrelated and made this code never run.
Change-Id: I9d77654c8eaebde07079d989cd60fbcf06025d75
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1844
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids the strange optional parameter thing by moving it to the client.
Also document what the functions should do.
Change-Id: I361266acadedfd2bfc4731f0900821fc2c2f954d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1843
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Switch all of SRTP code to the standard return value convention with two
exceptions. Unfortunately, OpenSSL exposed API with the wrong error code. Keep
the public API flipped and document.
Change-Id: I43ac82513f4f52bb36a0b54aba9b9e0fa285730e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1691
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Denis Denisov for noting that |host_name| could be used while
uninitialised in the resumption case.
While in the area, this change also renames |servername_done| to
something more reasonable and removes a documented value that was never
used. Additionally, the SNI ack was only sent when not resuming so
calculating whether it should be sent when processing ClientHello
extensions (which is after s->hit has been set) is superfluous.
Lastly, since SNI is only acked by servers, there's no need to worry
about the SNI callback returning NOACK in the client case.
Change-Id: Ie4ecfc347bd7afaf93b12526ff9311cc45da4df6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the
SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no
responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on
the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session
resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume.
Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted
in the future if we implement RFC 6961.
Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get all this stuff out of the way.
- OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- OPENSSL_NO_EC
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- OPENSSL_NO_DH
- OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- OPENSSL_NO_RSA
Also manually removed a couple instances of OPENSSL_NO_DSA that seemed to be
confused anyway. Did some minor manual cleanup. (Removed a few now-pointless
'if (0)'s.)
Change-Id: Id540ba97ee22ff2309ab20ceb24c7eabe766d4c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1662
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove all the logic managing key types that aren't being used anymore.
Change-Id: I101369164588048e64ba1c84a6b8aac8f3a221cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1567
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
DSA is not connected up to EVP, so it wouldn't work anyway. We shouldn't
advertise a cipher suite we don't support. Chrome UMA data says virtually no
handshakes end up negotiating one of these.
Change-Id: I874d934432da6318f05782ebd149432c1d1e5275
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1566
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are the variants where the CA signs a Diffie-Hellman keypair. They are
not supported by Chrome on NSS.
Change-Id: I569a7ac58454bd3ed1cd5292d1f98499012cdf01
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This lets us put the SSL_CIPHER table in the data section. For type-checking,
make STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) cast everything to const SSL_CIPHER*.
Note that this will require some changes in consumers which weren't using a
const SSL_CIPHER *.
Change-Id: Iff734ac0e36f9e5c4a0f3c8411c7f727b820469c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1541
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so nothing can be depending on it yet. If we
really want a Suite B profile, it seems better to generate a configuration for
the rest of the system rather than pepper the codebase with checks.
Change-Id: I1be3ebed0e87cbfe236ade4174dcf5bbc7e10dd5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1517
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The protocols are pretty similar; they were all basically redundant. The free
of s->tlsext_session_ticket (more fallout from the EAP-FAST patch) was moved to
SSL_free because that object's attached to s, not s->s3. This is relevant if
SSL_set_ssl_method gets called.
Change-Id: I14a896ba8a6a2c34ab1cb5f65311b117051228da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1509
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They weren't updated to account for DTLS 1.2.
Change-Id: I81b3bfcb84a46d7b233bb567976a7de37bc46b92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1503
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows doesn't have ssize_t, sadly. There's SSIZE_T, but defining an
OPENSSL_SSIZE_T seems worse than just using an int.
Change-Id: I09bb5aa03f96da78b619e551f92ed52ce24d9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1352
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CVE-2014-3509
(Imported from upstream's 92aa73bcbfad44f9dd7997ae51537ac5d7dc201e)
Change-Id: Ibc681897251081ae5ebfea0ff6ca9defd73fe0f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1441
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The length is the number of elements now, not the size in bytes. Caught by
ASan.
Change-Id: I4c5ccee61711e8d2e272b9bacd292dbff04b5133
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1336
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Slightly cleaner; it means we can use CBS_stow.
Change-Id: I074aa2d73a79648013dea025ee531beeea2af4a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1287
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Don't retain curve IDs in serialized form; serialization only happens when
writing and reading from the wire. The internal representation is a uint16_t
which matches the range of the value and avoids all the checks for the first
byte being 0.
This also fixes a bug in tls1_check_ec_tmp_key's suite B logic; the || should
have been &&, though now it's gone.
This doesn't relieve some of the other assumptions about curve IDs:
tls1_set_curves still assumes that all curve IDs are under 32, and
tls1_ec_curve_id2nid still assumes 0 is not a valid curve ID. Add a
compile-time assert and a comment to document this. We're up to 28 now, so this
may well need to be revised sooner or later.
Remove SSL_get_shared_curve as it's new and unused API, using it in a loop is
O(N^3), and lets us simplify a function.
Change-Id: I82778cb82648d82f7b5de8c5341e0e1febdf5611
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1256
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Per spec, the server sends it iff it sends the extension in ServerHello. There
is no need to probe for whether Finished is or isn't sent. NSS is strict about
this (wait_new_session_ticket never transitions to wait_change_cipher without a
NewSessionTicket message), so this is safe.
Reset tlsext_ticket_expected in ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext to ensure state
from the initial handshake doesn't confuse renegotiation. This is another one
of those per-handshake states that should be systematically reset on each
handshake. For now, reset it properly at least.
Change-Id: I7d16439ce632b9abf42f62d5d8e1303cb6f0be1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1296
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This one in code that's not compiled though.
Change-Id: I8fb6c2df4669a70223889d31b233b577cf3e6b22
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1211
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids having to do the CBS_skip dance and is better about returning the
right alert.
Change-Id: Id84eba307d7c67269ccbc07a38d9044b6f4f7c6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1169
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also tidy up some variable names and update RSA_verify call for it no longer
returning -1. Add CBS helper functions for dealing with C strings.
Change-Id: Ibc398d27714744f5d99d4f94ae38210cbc89471a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1164
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is the first of reorganizing state between connection state and handshake
state. The existing set are retained in cert_st for the server; they are server
configuration. The client gets a copy in s->s3->tmp alongside other handshake
state.
With other handshake state moved there, hopefully we can reset that state in
one go and possibly not even maintain it when there is no handshake in
progress. Rather than currently where we sometimes confused connection state
and handshake state and have to reset as appropriate on renegotiate.
While I'm here, document the fields and name them something more useful than
'ctypes'.
Change-Id: Ib927579f0004fc5c6854fce2127625df669b2b6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1113
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Resolve one of the TODOs since it's quick. Adjust the
-expect-server-name test to assert it both in the normal codepath and
in the early callback, to provide test coverage for
SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get.
Change-Id: I4d71158b9fd2f4fbb54d3e51184bd25d117bdc91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1120
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ClientHello and ServerHello are not allowed to include duplicate extensions.
Add a new helper function to check this and call as appropriate. Remove ad-hoc
per-extension duplicate checks which are no unnecessary.
Add runner.go tests to verify such message correctly rejected.
Change-Id: I7babd5b642dfec941459512869e2dd6de26a831c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The function names are wrong.
Change-Id: Icbaeb541a2dcc504f69af81a7505e5cfbeed91f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1101
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We handle it externally now.
Change-Id: Ib561f64078809645195fd1a859b3256499038847
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1098
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Done with unifdef with some manual edits to remove empty lines.
Change-Id: I40d163539cab8ef0e01e45b7dc6a1a0a37733c3e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1097
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Along the way, clean up the certificate types code to not have the
hard-coded fixed-size array.
Change-Id: If3e5978f7c5099478a3dfa37a0a7059072f5454a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Building without RSA support is unreasonable. Changes were made by
running
find . -type f -name *.c | xargs unifdef -m -U OPENSSL_NO_RSA
find . -type f -name *.h | xargs unifdef -m -U OPENSSL_NO_RSA
using unifdef 2.10 and some newlines were removed manually.
Change-Id: Iea559e2d4b3d1053f28a4a9cc2f7a3d1f6cabd61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1095
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found no users of the functions which control the feature. (Also I don't
particularly want to port all of that to CBS...)
Change-Id: I55da42c44d57252bd47bdcb30431be5e6e90dc56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This code doesn't even get built unless you go out of your way to pass an
extension value at build time.
Change-Id: I92ffcdfb18505c96e5ef390c8954a54cee19967f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1063
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If we need an extension, we can implement it in-library.
Change-Id: I0eac5affcd8e7252b998b6c86ed2068234134b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This gives us systematic bounds-checking on all the parses. Also adds a
convenience function, CBS_memdup, for saving the current contents of a CBS.
Change-Id: I17dad74575f03121aee3f771037b8806ff99d0c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1031
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(Imported from upstream's 7e840163c06c7692b796a93e3fa85a93136adbb2)
Move ECC SSL extensions to the end.
WebSphere Application Server 7.0 appears to be intolerant of an empty
extension at the end. To that end, also ensure we never send an empty
padding extension.
Fix limit checks in ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext and
ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext.
Some of the limit checks reference p rather than ret. p is the original
buffer position, not the current one. Fix those and rename p to orig so
it's clearer.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
