The size of an int is 4, not 2. To avoid worrying about this, add a GetVector
counterpart to GetString that handles all this. Apply this uniformly to avoid
all the pointer casts. This is less important for vector<uint8_t>, but even
then we'll now notice a 1-byte OOB read since std::string is NUL-terminated.
Also it's shorter.
Change-Id: Ie96591cb8d8d52742f5fd30d70b6af0511109585
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30864
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list wants a NUL-terminated string, so we need to use
GetString to give it one.
Bug: oss-fuzz:9808
Change-Id: Id7f676aa514c36de9dea900763db3cbbf5c79a4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30804
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These functions can be used to configure the signature algorithms. One
of them is a string mini-languaging parsing function, which we generally
dislike because it defeats static analysis. However, some dependent
projects (in this case TensorFlow) need it and we also dislike making
people patch.
Change-Id: I13f990c896a7f7332d78b1c351357d418ade8d11
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30304
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
bssl::UniquePtr and FOO_up_ref do not play well together. Add a helper
to simplify this. This allows us to write things like:
foo->cert = UpRef(bar->cert);
instead of:
if (bar->cert) {
X509_up_ref(bar->cert.get());
}
foo->cert.reset(bar->cert.get());
This also plays well with PushToStack. To append something to a stack
while taking a reference, it's just:
PushToStack(certs, UpRef(cert))
Change-Id: I99ae8de22b837588a2d8ffb58f86edc1d03ed46a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29584
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL's d2i_X509 parser is amazingly slow. Only do about 10,000 of
them, not 1,000,000.
BUG=chromium:729419
Change-Id: I7034c3dde7d5c5681986af2ab5e516e54553d3c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16905
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The fuzzers are timing out on inputs that spam SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert
and SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs. In our current X509* caching
implementation, this can be quadratic. As this is an API fuzzer, not an
actual attack surface, this is not of much interest in itself, but
bounding this will let the fuzzers fuzz faster.
Change-Id: I3e27e938c413e5a0e8e6c7fad641f17c152dac39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16887
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
When writing tests and BoGo isn't available, it is useful to be able to
configure the set of signature algorithms accepted on the verify side.
Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Ic873189da7f8853e412acd68614df9d9a872a0c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15125
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The new APIs are SSL_CTX_set_strict_cipher_list() and
SSL_set_strict_cipher_list(). They have two motivations:
First, typos in cipher lists can go undetected for a long time, and
can have surprising consequences when silently ignored.
Second, there is a tendency to use superstition in the construction of
cipher lists, for example by "turning off" things that do not actually
exist. This leads to the corrosive belief that DEFAULT and ALL ought
not to be trusted. This belief is false.
Change-Id: I42909b69186e0b4cf45457e5c0bc968f6bbf231a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13925
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
There are no longer any consumers of these APIs.
These were useful back when the CBC vs. RC4 tradeoff varied by version
and it was worth carefully tuning this cutoff. Nowadays RC4 is
completely gone and there's no use in configuring these anymore.
To avoid invalidating the existing ssl_ctx_api corpus and requiring it
regenerated, I've left the entries in there. It's probably reasonable
for new API fuzzers to reuse those slots.
Change-Id: I02bf950e3828062341e4e45c8871a44597ae93d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12880
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_CTX_set1_curves was being called with the size of the input data in
bytes rather than in ints.
BUG=chromium:659361
Change-Id: I90da1c6d60e92423c6b7d9efd744ae70ff589172
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11840
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I missed this function, which was unfortunate.
Change-Id: I8bcea1738a50aa3297d09a59a86437351ff5f84a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11623
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I167d8ebfa7f2c08ba9f532df96ce5abd432c47c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11622
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Data allocated in one fuzzer iteration and then freed in the next
complicates the leak checker. Avoid this by dropping hidden global state
at the end of each run.
Change-Id: Ice79704f2754a6b1f40e288df9b97ddd5b3b97d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11600
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They take a const pointer. See
http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html#building
BUG=chromium:655016
Change-Id: Id6c7584c7a875e822b1fbff72163c888d02a9f44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11580
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Also IWYU the headers.
BUG=79
Change-Id: Iafee0444c9979496166885db6ba5009cb597cb4d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Corpus recorded from runner and merged into existing corpus with
libFuzzer's -merge flag.
BUG=79
Change-Id: I986a50976ffef141b63e31de3a81fdb4ed5c1348
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11130
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
These source files previously didn't have the ISC license on them.
Change-Id: Ic0a2047d23b28d9d7f0a85b2fedb67574bdcab25
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7735
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They now fuzz a lot more than just the initial flow.
Change-Id: Ib0b7eb66969442e539a937d7d87f5ba031fcbef3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7610
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
As long as the HTTP/1.1 client auth hack forces use to support renego, having
it on seems much more useful than having it off for fuzzing purposes. Also read
app data to exercise that code and, on the client, trigger renegotiations as
needed.
Change-Id: I1941ded6ec9bd764abd199d1518420a1075ed1b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7291
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If running the stack through a fuzzer, we would like execution to be
completely deterministic. This is gated on a
BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE #ifdef.
For now, this just uses the zero ChaCha20 key and a global counter. As
needed, we can extend this to a thread-local counter and a separate
ChaCha20 stream and counter per input length.
Change-Id: Ic6c9d8a25e70d68e5dc6804e2c234faf48e51395
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Adam Langley
Matthew Braithwaite
Mike Aizatsky