This is the last blocker within BoringSSL itself to opaquifying SSL.
(There are still blockers in consumers, of course.)
BUG=6
Change-Id: Ie3b8dcb78eeaa9aea7311406c5431a8625d60401
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 ciphers are now always enabled and come with a hard-coded
preference order.
BUG=110
Change-Id: Idd9cb0d75fb6bf2676ecdee27d88893ff974c4a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
HTTP/2 requires TLS 1.2 so the negotiated version should be available
during the ALPN callback.
Change-Id: Iea332808b531a6e5c917de5b8c8917c0aa7428a1
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They will get very confused about which key they're using. Any caller
using exporters must either (a) leave renegotiation off or (b) be very
aware of when renegotiations happen anyway. (You need to somehow
coordinate with the peer about which epoch's exporter to use.)
Change-Id: I921ad01ac9bdc88f3fd0f8283757ce673a47ec75
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12003
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The existing tests for this codepath require us to reconfigure the shim.
This will not work when TLS 1.3 cipher configuration is detached from
the old cipher language. It also doesn't hit codepaths like sessions
containing a TLS 1.3 version but TLS 1.2 cipher.
Instead, add some logic to the runner to rewrite tickets and build tests
out of that.
Change-Id: I57ac5d49c3069497ed9aaf430afc65c631014bf6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12024
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It is not ignored.
Change-Id: I2e607a6d6f7444838fc6fa65cd18e9aa142f139f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12023
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
HTTP/2 places requirements on the cipher suite. So that servers can
decline HTTP/2 when these requirements aren't met, defer ALPN
negotiation.
See also b/32553041.
Change-Id: Idbcf049f9c8bda06a8be52a0154fe76e84607268
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11982
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We were only testing one side.
Change-Id: Ieb755e27b235aaf1317bd2c8e5fb374cb0ecfdb3
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I87cbc12aeb399646c6426b7a099dbf13aafc2532
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11983
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d2i_X509_from_buffer parses an |X509| from a |CRYPTO_BUFFER| but ensures
that the |X509_CINF.enc| doesn't make a copy of the encoded
TBSCertificate. Rather the |X509| holds a reference to the given
|CRYPTO_BUFFER|.
Change-Id: I38a4e3d0ca69fc0fd0ef3e15b53181844080fcad
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Trim a few more bytes from the future QUIC ClientHello.
Change-Id: If23c5cd078889a9a26cf2231b51b17c2615a38ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12000
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Get some of the duplicate logic out of the way.
Change-Id: Iee7c64577e14d1ddfead7e1e32c42c5c9f2a310d
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TLS 1.3 also uses this extension and doesn't use any EC-based suites.
Always offering the extension is simpler. Also this gets an
SSL_get_ciphers call out of the way (that function is somewhat messy in
semantics).
Change-Id: I2091cb1046e0aea85caa76e73f50e8416e6ed94c
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This change is based on interpreting TLS 1.3 draft 18.
Change-Id: I727961aff2f7318bcbbc8bf6d62b7d6ad3e62da9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11921
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Bazel has moved their primary site to bazel.build.
(Thanks to Damien Martin-guillerez for the change.)
Change-Id: Ifb29dbb79f1e1d9611f40992a3e75e0fb5a3722a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11961
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This should never happen, but the SSL_AEAD_CTX_new layer should enforce
key sizes as it's not locally obvious at the call site the caller didn't
get confused. There's still a mess of asserts below, but those should be
fixed by cutting the SSL_CIPHER/SSL_AEAD_CTX boundary differently.
(enc_key_len is validated by virtue of being passed into EVP_AEAD.)
BUG=chromium:659593
Change-Id: I8c91609bcef14ca1509c87aab981bbad6556975f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11940
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Change-Id: I0aab9c94fcfa58b9cd46eaf716d9317f532f79a2
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These were forward-declared for SSL3_STATE but with that hidden, it's no
longer necessary.
Change-Id: I8c548822f56f6172b4033b2fa89c038adcec2caa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11860
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Later work is going to cause some turbulence here.
Change-Id: Iba98bcf56e81492ec0dca54a381b38d1c115247a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11843
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Tagging non-pointer return types const doesn't do anything and makes
some compilers grumpy. Thanks to Daniel Hirche for the report.
Change-Id: I157ddefd8f7e604b4d8317ffa2caddb8f0dd89de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11849
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Neither branch of the |if| statement is expected to touch |data_len|.
Clarify this by moving |data_len| after the |if| statement.
Change-Id: Ibbc81e5b0c006882672df18442a6e7987064ca6d
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This is still rather a mess with how it's tied to SSL_AEAD_CTX_new
(probably these should get encapsulated in an SSL_AEAD struct), but this
avoids running the TLS 1.3 nonce logic on fake AEADs. This is impossible
based on cipher version checks, but we shouldn't need to rely on it.
It's also a little tidier since out_mac_secret_len is purely a function
of algorithm_mac.
BUG=chromium:659593
Change-Id: Icc24d43c54a582bcd189d55958e2d232ca2db4dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11842
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This patch changes the urandom PRNG to read one byte from the
getrandom(2) Linux syscall on initialization in order to find any
unexpected behavior.
Change-Id: I8ef676854dc361e4f77527b53d1a14fd14d449a8
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These structures allow for blobs of data (e.g. certificates) to be
deduplicated in memory.
Change-Id: Iebfec90b85d55565848a178b6951562b4ccc083e
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This shouldn't happen, but it is good to check to avoid the potential
underflow in ssl_session_is_time_valid.
This required tweaking the mock clock in bssl_shim to stop going back in
time.
Change-Id: Id3ab8755139e989190d0b53d4bf90fe1ac203022
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11841
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BUG=chromium:659593
Change-Id: I73a4751609b85df7cd40f0f60dc3f3046a490940
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11861
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We currently preferentially sign the largest hash available and
advertise such a preference for signatures we accept. We're just as
happy with SHA-256 and, all else equal, a smaller hash would be epsilon
more performant. We also currently claim, in TLS 1.3, we prefer P-384
over P-256 which is off.
Instead order SHA-256 first, next the larger SHA-2 hashes, and leave
SHA-1 at the bottom. Within a hash, order ECDSA > RSA-PSS > RSA-PKCS1.
This has the added consequence that we will preferentially pair P-256
with SHA-256 in signatures we generate instead of larger hashes that get
truncated anyway.
Change-Id: If4aee068ba6829e8c0ef7948f56e67a5213e4c50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11821
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_CTX_set1_curves was being called with the size of the input data in
bytes rather than in ints.
BUG=chromium:659361
Change-Id: I90da1c6d60e92423c6b7d9efd744ae70ff589172
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At some point, we'll forget to look in the commit message.
Change-Id: I3153aab679209f4f11f56cf3f883c4c74a17af1d
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clang-cl now supports enough of `#pragma intrinsic` that
it can use SecureZeroMemory() without an explicit intrin.h include.
This reverts https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/8320/
BUG=chromium:592745
Change-Id: Ib766133f1713137bddd07654376a3b4888d4b0fb
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SSL_write has messy semantics around retries. As a sanity-check, it does
pointer and length checks and requires the original and retry SSL_write
pass the same buffer pointer.
In some cases, buffer addresses may change but still include the
original data as a prefix on the retry. Callers then set
SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER to skip the pointer check. But, in
that case, the pointer may have been freed so doing a comparison is
undefined behavior.
Short-circuiting the pointer equality check avoids this problem.
Change-Id: I76cb8f7d45533504cd95287bc53897ca636af51d
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I missed these in the last round.
Change-Id: I9b47216eef87c662728e454670e9e516de71ca21
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11740
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The EVP_PKEY attribute functions in x509.h are unimplemented.
Change-Id: Idcf2d81e58b04d0829d25567a145f87801a980d1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10343
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I51e5a7dac3ceffc41d3a7a57157a11258e65bc42
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Unhandled critical CRL extensions were not detected if they appeared
after the handled ones. (Upstream GitHub issue 1757). Thanks to John
Chuah for reporting this.
(Imported from upstream's 3ade92e785bb3777c92332f88e23f6ce906ee260.)
This additionally adds a regression test for this issue, generated with
der-ascii. The signatures on the CRLs were repaired per notes in
https://github.com/google/der-ascii/blob/master/samples/certificates.md
Change-Id: I74a77f92710e6ef7f46dcde5cb6ae9350084ddcb
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Change-Id: I4e61dc57d1ec65e892b1933f35663db164f017eb
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On the client we'll leave it off by default until the change has made it
through Chrome's release process. For TLS 1.3, there is no existing
breakage risk, so always do it. This saves us the trouble of having to
manually turn it on in servers.
See [0] for a data point of someone getting it wrong.
[0] https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/9dbc21b1c3cc
Change-Id: I74daad9e7efd2040e9d66d72d558b31f145e6c4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11680
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It's possible that a BIO implementation could return a negative number
(say -1) for BIO_CTRL_PENDING or BIO_CTRL_WPENDING. Assert that this
doesn't happen and map it to zero if it happens anyway in NDEBUG builds.
Change-Id: Ie01214e80ff19acc1c7681a1125bbbf2038679c3
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Change-Id: Id41cf40b5087c6520c4d3c822d5a955b9fd32853
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11684
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I18cee423675d6a686f83b4ef4b38696cb618392c
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Change-Id: I0bd7fdd276e7461ef08b8055bf3d0387f756739f
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BUG=103
Change-Id: I9a49fbaf66af73978ce264d27926f483e1e44766
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Channel ID for TLS 1.3 uses the same digest construction as
CertificateVerify. This message is signed with the Channel ID key and
put in the same handshake message (with the same format) as in TLS 1.2.
BUG=103
Change-Id: Ia5b2dffe5a39c39db0cecb0aa6bdc328e53accc2
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Nodejs 6.9.0 calls this function.
Change-Id: I375f222cb819ebcb9fdce0a0d63df6817fa2dcae
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This code reportedly upsets VC++'s static analysis. Make it clear that,
yes, we want to count backwards.
Change-Id: I5caba219a2b87750d1a9d69b46d336a98c5824c9
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{sha1, ecdsa} is virtually nonexistent. {sha512, ecdsa} is pointless
when we only accept P-256 and P-384. See Chromium Intent thread here:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/kWwLfeIQIBM/9chGZ40TCQAJ
This tweaks the signature algorithm logic slightly so that sign and
verify preferences are separate.
BUG=chromium:655318
Change-Id: I1097332600dcaa38e62e4dffa0194fb734c6df3f
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Macros need a healthy dose of parentheses to avoid expression-level
misparses. Most of this comes from the clang-tidy CL here:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/235696/
Also switch most of the macros to use do { ... } while (0) to avoid all
the excessive comma operators and statement-level misparses.
Change-Id: I4c2ee51e347d2aa8c74a2d82de63838b03bbb0f9
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
