Since any ALPN mismatch and other cause for early data rejection will
cause the server to revert to the non-early data path, this is safe to
flip on for all the fuzzers.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I573740ef8f455915820943d82247fb6bfc37ae41
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Previously we only needed to be able to serve P-224 certificates, but
now we anticipate a need to be able to connect and validate them also.
Since this requires advertising support for P-224 in the handshake, we
need to support P-224 ECDHE too.
P-224 support is disabled by default and so clients need to both set the
enabled curves explicitly and set a maximum version of TLS 1.2.
Change-Id: Idc69580f47334e0912eb431a0db0e78ee2eb5bbe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14225
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Allow the fuzzers to treat this situation, if they ever discover it,
as a bug.
Change-Id: Ie6f1562e9b185d49463cf1a6db28d28780169b11
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14424
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Change-Id: Ied6b73fde61eb133c9871b42a56aa5a64131b67b
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BUG=185
Change-Id: I4ce6735ca78cd687538a8c0fdbd78ee97b93585c
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This pulls in upstream's 0822d41b6d and a
portion of a285992763. The former, in
particular, fixes a crash on iOS.
Change-Id: I3c083975d8d11e58b5a2919fcabbf83628f36340
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When we refactored all the buffering logic, we retained upstream
OpenSSL's allocation patterns. In particular, we always allocated fixed
size write buffer, even though, unlike when reading, we trivially know a
tighter bound (namely however much we happen to be writing right now).
Since the cutoff for when Windows' malloc starts having a hard time is
just below the TLS maximum record size, do the more natural thing of
allocating what we need to hold outgoing ciphertext.
(This only does anything to the write half. Read half is a bit more
involved.)
BUG=chromium:524258
Change-Id: I0165f9ce822b9cc413f3c77e269e6154160537a7
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We now have another non-OpenSSL perlasm file.
Change-Id: Id5ab606089f22a4cb4c7d29f2cf7d140b66861f7
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Remove another remnant of the SSL3_PROTOCOL_METHOD hook.
Change-Id: If6bf055e2ee318420e4c5c40b8eb5356eadda68c
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BUG=76
Change-Id: I68bc1dce13af9155b385a7b589480aacf02ec0db
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BUG=76
Change-Id: Ie894ea5d327f88e66b234767de437dbe5c67c41d
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BUG=76
Change-Id: I43672ee82a50f8fe706a5d607ef774a6e96db252
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This ends up under half the size of the original file.
BUG=129
Change-Id: Idec69d9517bd57cee6b3b83bc0cce05396565b70
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OPENSSL_free will handle NULL.
Change-Id: I18593a015cd4a081c2eeebf0cd738a024d02a97d
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It still depends on crypto/x509, but we will need a CRYPTO_BUFFER
version of PKCS7_get_certificates for Chromium. Start with this.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I62dcb9ba768091ce37dc9fe819f4f14ac025219c
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Change-Id: I5e1302d75f863fb2e531d431a4e3ecfd90e0dca1
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This tests that the ticket age is measured from ticket issuance and not
the initial authentication. Specifically, that ssl_session_renew_timeout
also rebases the time.
Change-Id: Iba51efb49c691a44e6428d1cd35f0803ca3d396a
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Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT, so we gracefully decline 0-RTT
as a server and forbid their combination as a client. We'll keep this
logic around until Channel ID is removed.
Channel ID will be replaced by tokbind which currently uses custom
extensions. Those will need additional logic to work with 0-RTT.
This is not implemented yet so, for now, fail if both are ever
configured together at all. A later change will allow the two to
combine.
BUG=183
Change-Id: I46c5ba883ccd47930349691fb08074a1fab13d5f
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Change-Id: I0e2e4166ad2c57e3192af058f23374f014a2fcf4
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Once 0-RTT data is added to the current 0-RTT logic, the server will
trigger a write when processing incoming data via SSL_read. This means
SSL_read will block on transport write, which is something we've not
tried to avoid far (assuming no renegotiation).
The specification allows for tickets to be sent at half-RTT by
predicting the client Finished. By doing this we both get the tickets on
the wire sooner and avoid confusing I/O patterns. Moreover, we
anticipate we will need this mode for one of the QUIC stateless reject
patterns.
This is tested by always processing NewSessionTickets in the
ExpectHalfRTTData path on 0-RTT connections. As not other
implementations using BoGo may not do this, this is configurable via the
shim config.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ia0f56ae63f15078ff1cacceba972d2b99001947f
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These will be used by Chromium's crypto::ECPrivateKey to work with
EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structures.
Note this comes with a behavior change: PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt
will no longer preserve PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo attributes. However, those
functions are only called by Chromium which does not care. They are also
called by the PEM code, but not in a way which exposes attributes.
The PKCS#12 PFX code is made to use PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key
because it's cleaner (no more tossing X509_SIG around) and to ease
decoupling that in the future.
crypto/pkcs8's dependency on the legacy ASN.1 stack is now limited to
pkcs8_x509.c.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I173e605d175e982c6b0250dd22187b73aca15b1a
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This is a remnant of before we made the handshake write
flight by flight.
Change-Id: I94c0105bb071ffca9ff5aa4c4bf43311c750b49a
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PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt still need to be split. The code for
processing PKCS#12 files is, for now, placed entirely in pkcs8_x509.c.
If we need to split it up, it should be straightforward to do so.
(Introduce a CRYPTO_BUFFER version of PKCS12_get_key_and_certs and go
from there.)
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9c87e916ec29ee14dbbd81c4d3fc10ac8a461f1a
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This will make it easier to test 0-RTT later on.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I4d60b77c14bc9143ca9785d0a6b8169653a1b120
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It's not immediately obvious what's going on here.
Change-Id: Ibbba80a6ff9ace4d88e89a42efc270b77b4fad12
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The tests all work fine under it except for tests where the shim shuts
down. (In those the shim calls SSL_shutdown as the first function, so it
wouldn't do anything useful.)
Change-Id: Ia2e811bb3c553a690df38d1fd7d3107ae7c9aa12
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The padding check functions will need to tweak their calling conventions
and the constant-time helpers, so leaving those alone for now. These
were the easy ones.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ia00e41e26a134de17d56be3def5820cb042794e1
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We've never allowed this as no good can come of it. Add a test for this.
Change-Id: I4b92372f58c1fe2054e33007adbe496d153a9251
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With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
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This isn't strictly necessary for Chromium yet, but we already have a
decoupled version of hash algorithm parsing available. For now, don't
export it but eventually we may wish to use it for OCSP.
BUG=54
Change-Id: If460d38d48bd47a2b4a853779f210c0cf7ee236b
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This adds support on the server and client to accept data-less early
data. The server will still fail to parse early data with any
contents, so this should remain disabled.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Id85d192d8e0360b8de4b6971511b5e8a0e8012f7
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The OPTIONAL prf field is an AlgorithmIdentifier, not an OID. I messed
this up in the recent rewrite.
Fix the parsing and add a test, produced by commenting out the logic in
OpenSSL to omit the field for hmacWithSHA1. (We don't currently support
any other PBKDF2, or I'd just add a test for that.)
Change-Id: I7d258bb01b93cd203a6fc1b8cccbddfdbc4dbbad
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This isn't something we need to fix, just an explanatory comment.
Change-Id: I284e6580d176f981c6b161e9951f367fef1b1be6
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We forgot to run the script at some point.
Change-Id: I0bd142fdd13d64c1ed81d9b1515449220d1c936b
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EVP_DigestUpdate can tolerate zero length inputs. Also properly clean up
ctx in all codepaths.
Change-Id: I90889c6236f6bf74625ba9f967de36949a9a6f83
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We still need to expose a suitable API for Chromium to consume, but the
core implementation itself should now be ready.
The supported cipher list is based on what EVP_get_cipherbynid currently
supports, excluding the entries which don't have OIDs.
BUG=54
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Playing around with the code, we seem to have sufficient positive test
vectors for the logic around the high bits, but not negative test
vectors. Add some. Also add a negative test vector for the trailing
byte.
(For future reference, use openssl rsautl -raw for raw RSA operations
and openssl pkeyutil for EVP_PKEY_sign.)
Change-Id: I36eddf048e51e037fd924902cd13dcb3c62bfd02
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The |select_certificate_cb| return values are somewhat confusing due
to the fact that they don't match the |cert_cb| ones, despite the
similarities between the two callbacks (they both have "certificate" in
the name! well, sort of).
This also documents the error return value (-1) which was previously
undocumented, and it expands the |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|
documentation regarding retrial (by shamelessly copying from
|SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method|).
Also updates other scattered documentation that was missed by previous
changes.
Change-Id: Ib962b31d08e6475e09954cbc3c939988b0ba13f7
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They can be restored by compiling with -DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_DHE_TLS.
This is similar to 9c8c4188 for RC4 ciphers.
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To remove the OID table from Chromium, we'll need to decouple a lot of
this code. In preparation for that, detach the easy cases from the OID
table. What remains is PBES, cipher, and digest OIDs which will be doing
in follow-up changes.
BUG=54
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If ret is allocated, it may be leaked on error.
(Imported from upstream's cdfb7809b6 and
ffcdb0e6efb6fb7033b2cd29e8cca2e2fe355c14.)
Change-Id: I50ed9ad072cf80461d9527d0834b596a8c32e3d3
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conf has the ability to expand variables in config files. Repeatedly doing
this can lead to an exponential increase in the amount of memory required.
This places a limit on the length of a value that can result from an
expansion.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this problem.
(Imported from upstream's 6a6213556a. This
also import's upstream's ee1ccd0a41 which
we had previously missed.)
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Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14316
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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(Imported from upstream's 04cf39207f94abf89b3964c7710f22f829a1a78f.)
The other half of the change was fixed earlier, but this logic was still
off. This code is kind of a mess and needs a rewrite, but import the
change to get it correct and sufficiently tested first.
(If we could take the sLen = -2 case away altogether, that would be
great...)
Change-Id: I5786e980f26648822633fc216315e8f77ed4d45b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14321
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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One test case is commented out, to be fixed in a follow-up.
Change-Id: I543c7f54e63837c6e8088fdcbb03226e0144b2e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14320
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These too appear to be unused now that the core parsers use CBS. They
also were buggy as they silently ignored sign bits. This removes all
ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS definitions. (The code to use them still exists as
we're not ready to diverge on tasn_*. Current thinking is we'll
eventually just ditch the code rather than do so.)
Change-Id: I8d20e2989460dd593d62368cfbd083d5de1ee2a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14324
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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These have no consumers remaining. Upstream recently had a long series
of bugfixes for these types (2cbd4d98673d99cd7cb10715656b6d3727342e77,
e5afec1831248c767be7c5844a88535dabecc01a,
9abe889702bdc73f9490f611f54bf9c865702554,
2e5adeb290). Rather than worry about this,
just remove the code.
Change-Id: I90f896aad096fc4979877e2006131e76c9ff023b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14323
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Import test data from:
ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1-vec.zip
This is a set of RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP test vectors including some edge cases
with unusual key sizes.
(Imported from upstream's 946a515a2b370dbadb1f8c39e3586a8f1e3cff1a.)
Change-Id: I1d8aa85a8578e47b26c74bb4e4c246975619d574
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14318
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Steven Valdez
Adam Langley
David Benjamin
Alessandro Ghedini
Steven Valdez
Matthew Braithwaite