Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be
triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug.
CVE-2015-3194
(Imported from upstream's c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e and test
data from 00456fded43eadd4bb94bf675ae4ea5d158a764f.)
Change-Id: Ic97059d42722fd810973ccb0c26c415c4eaae79a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6617
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Not content with signing negative RSA moduli, still other Estonian IDs have too
many leading zeros. Work around those too.
This workaround will be removed in six months.
BUG=534766
Change-Id: Ica23b1b1499f9dbe39e94cf7b540900860e8e135
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5980
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Target date for removal of the workaround is 6 months.
BUG=532048
Change-Id: I402f75e46736936725575559cd8eb194115ab0df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5910
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Estonian IDs issued between September 2014 to September 2015 are broken and use
negative moduli. They last five years and are common enough that we need to
work around this bug.
Add parallel "buggy" versions of BN_cbs2unsigned and RSA_parse_public_key which
tolerate this mistake, to align with OpenSSL's previous behavior. This code is
currently hooked up to rsa_pub_decode in RSA_ASN1_METHOD so that d2i_X509 is
tolerant. (This isn't a huge deal as the rest of that stack still uses the
legacy ASN.1 code which is overly lenient in many other ways.)
In future, when Chromium isn't using crypto/x509 and has more unified
certificate handling code, we can put client certificates under a slightly
different codepath, so this needn't hold for all certificates forever. Then in
September 2019, when the broken Estonian certificates all expire, we can purge
this codepath altogether.
BUG=532048
Change-Id: Iadb245048c71dba2eec45dd066c4a6e077140751
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5894
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes the version field from RSA and instead handles versioning
as part of parsing. (As a bonus, we now correctly limit multi-prime RSA
to version 1 keys.)
Most consumers are also converted. old_rsa_priv_{de,en}code are left
alone for now. Those hooks are passed in parameters which match the old
d2i/i2d pattern (they're only used in d2i_PrivateKey and
i2d_PrivateKey).
Include a test which, among other things, checks that public keys being
serialized as private keys are handled properly.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: Icdd5f0382c4a84f9c8867024f29756e1a306ba08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5273
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It carefully NULLs all references to the buffer, so the failure cases
still need to call OPENSSL_free.
Change-Id: Ia14341ecea81296f94e467325ab6eff1362e987e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5271
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now that much of EVP has been normalized to 0/1, a lot of code can just use
boolean operators. (As can some code which was already using them...)
Change-Id: I6bb17edfd6f67050bf1706d59d8f37df57535faa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3875
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is intended for TLS client auth with Windows CAPI- and CNG-backed keys
which implement sign over sign_raw and do not support all hash functions. Only
plumbed through RSA for now.
Change-Id: Ica42e7fb026840f817a169da9372dda226f7d6fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2250
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The only alias, EVP_PKEY_RSA2, is handled programmatically. ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS and
ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC are then unused and unexported and can be removed.
Change-Id: I990650636bac3b802c8b439257c67ce7a3f8bc70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2124
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The same library code applies for both the error and the function, so modules
cannot easily report errors from each other. Switch evp/algorithm.c's error
codes to the EVP library. Remove the original error codes so it's obvious some
changes are needed.
- X509_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED -> EVP_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED
ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED -> EVP_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED
(Actually, the X509 version of this error code doesn't exist in OpenSSL. It should
have been ASN1.)
- ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM -> EVP_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
- ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE -> EVP_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE
- ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM -> EVP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
Change-Id: I05b1a05b465d800c85f7d63ca74588edf40847b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1940
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Factor the AlgorithmIdentifier portions of ASN1_item_sign and ASN1_item_verify
out. This makes it possible to initialize a signature context from an
AlgorithmIdentifier without needing the data parsed into an ASN1_ITEM/void*
pair and reserialized.
Change-Id: Idc2e06b1310a3f801aa25de323d39d2b7a44ef50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1916
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only ever use the EVP_PKEY case, not the EVP_PKEY_CTX one.
Change-Id: Ibead854f793663da0a9e474599507d9c3ff920cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1915
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It should return 0 for failure, not -1; the call site was expecting 0 anyway.
Change-Id: I24ab5d3695b8ac438e40be1a4fd74ecd3b845f5a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1914
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Custom RSA and ECDSA keys may not expose the key material. Plumb and "opaque"
bit out of the *_METHOD up to EVP_PKEY. Query that in ssl_rsa.c to skip the
sanity checks for certificate and key matching.
Change-Id: I362a2d5116bfd1803560dfca1d69a91153e895fc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1255
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
