CERT_PKEY_SIGN isn't meaningful since, without strict mode, we always fall back
to SHA-1 anyway. So the digest is never NULL when CERT_PKEY_SIGN is computed.
The entire valid_flags is now back to it's pre-1.0.2 check of seeing if the
certificate and key are configured.
This finally removes the sensitivity between valid_flags and selecting the
digest, so we can defer choosing the digest all we like.
Change-Id: I9f9952498f512d7f0cc799497f7c5b52145a48af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2288
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It doesn't depend on the cipher now that export ciphers are gone. It need only
be called once. Also remove the valid bit; nothing ever reads it. Its output is
also only used within a function, so make mask_k and mask_a local variables.
So all the configuration-based checks are in one place, change the input
parameter from CERT to SSL and move the PSK and ECDHE checks to the mask
computation. This avoids having to evaluate the temporary EC key for each
cipher.
The remaining uses are on the client which uses them differently (disabled
features rather than enabled ones). Those too may as well be local variables,
so leave a TODO.
Change-Id: Ibcb574341795d4016ea749f0290a793eed798874
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2287
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is new in OpenSSL 1.0.2 so it isn't used anywhere. Cuts down slightly on
connection-global state associated with signature algorithm processing.
Repurposing the digest field to mean both "the digest we choose to sign with
this key" and "the digest the last signature we saw happened to use" is
confusing.
Change-Id: Iec4d5078c33e271c8c7b0ab221c356ee8480b89d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's not much point in retaining the identity hint in the SSL_SESSION. This
avoids the complexity around setting psk_identity hint on either the SSL or the
SSL_SESSION. Introduce a peer_psk_identity_hint for the client to store the one
received from the server.
This changes the semantics of SSL_get_psk_identity_hint; it now only returns
the value configured for the server. The client learns the hint through the
callback. This is compatible with the one use of this API in conscrypt (it
pulls the hint back out to pass to a callback).
Change-Id: I6d9131636b47f13ac5800b4451436a057021054a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2213
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is an experimental flag that dates back to SSLeay 0.8.1b or earlier. It's
never set internally and never set in consumers.
Change-Id: I922583635c9f3d8d93f08f1707531ad22a26ae6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2214
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Server-side support was removed in 77a942b7fe,
but client-side support was retained as it appeared NSS supported this.
However, this is not the case: ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange only allows a
ServerKeyExchange message if hs.ws is in an appropriate state.
ssl3_AuthCertificate only sets it to allow ServerKeyExchange if it is a key
exchange that normally uses it or if is_limited is set. is_limited is only set
for the export cipher suites.
Thus we can safely remove this without waiting on gathering UMA data.
BUG=chromium:400587
Change-Id: I9aefb742dbb2d99c13340ab48017e1ceee04bc2f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2230
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
State hanging off the SSL gets freed in two places.
Change-Id: I41a8d2a7cab35f0098396006e1f6380038ec471a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2212
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's no need to store them on the session. They're temporary handshake
state and weren't serialized in d2i_SSL_SESSION anyway.
Change-Id: I830d378ab49aaa4fc6c4c7a6a8c035e2263fb763
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1990
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This resolves a pile of MSVC warnings in Chromium.
Change-Id: Ib9a29cb88d8ed8ec4118d153260f775be059a803
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids the strange optional parameter thing by moving it to the client.
Also document what the functions should do.
Change-Id: I361266acadedfd2bfc4731f0900821fc2c2f954d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1843
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Splitting the strength mask between SSL_EXP_MASK and SSL_STRONG_MASK no longer
does anything. Also remove the SSL_NOT_EXP bit and condense the strength bits.
Change-Id: I9e61acdde008c3ce06bb37f78a72099fc53ed080
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1757
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove the old implementation which was excessively general. This mirrors the
SCT support and adds a single boolean flag to request an OCSP response with no
responder IDs, extensions, or frills. The response, if received, is stored on
the SSL_SESSION so that it is available for (re)validation on session
resumption; Chromium revalidates the saved auth parameters on resume.
Server support is unimplemented for now. This API will also need to be adjusted
in the future if we implement RFC 6961.
Change-Id: I533c029b7f7ea622d814d05f934fdace2da85cb1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1671
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get all this stuff out of the way.
- OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- OPENSSL_NO_EC
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- OPENSSL_NO_DH
- OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- OPENSSL_NO_RC4
- OPENSSL_NO_RSA
Also manually removed a couple instances of OPENSSL_NO_DSA that seemed to be
confused anyway. Did some minor manual cleanup. (Removed a few now-pointless
'if (0)'s.)
Change-Id: Id540ba97ee22ff2309ab20ceb24c7eabe766d4c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1662
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
DSA is not connected up to EVP, so it wouldn't work anyway. We shouldn't
advertise a cipher suite we don't support. Chrome UMA data says virtually no
handshakes end up negotiating one of these.
Change-Id: I874d934432da6318f05782ebd149432c1d1e5275
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1566
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are the variants where the CA signs a Diffie-Hellman keypair. They are
not supported by Chrome on NSS.
Change-Id: I569a7ac58454bd3ed1cd5292d1f98499012cdf01
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In the fixed_ecdh case, it wasn't even implemented, but there was stub code for
it. It complicates the ClientKeyExchange (the client parameters become implicit
in the certificate) and isn't used.
Change-Id: I3627a37042539c90e05e59cd0cb3cd6c56225561
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1563
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This also removes the 'LOW' strength class.
Change-Id: Iffd2356dadb4a4875c1547a613d51061101358fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1562
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
To align with what Chrome sends on NSS, remove all 3DES cipher suites except
RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. This avoids having to order a PFS 3DES cipher
against a non-PFS 3DES cipher.
Remove the strength sort which wanted place AES_256_CBC ahead of AES_128_GCM
and is not especially useful (everything under 128 is either 3DES or DES).
Instead, explicitly order all the bulk ciphers. Continue to prefer PFS over
non-PFS and ECDHE over DHE.
This gives the following order in Chromium. We can probably prune it a bit
(DHE_DSS, DH_*) in a follow-up.
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcc14) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcc13) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcc15) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xa2) Forward Secrecy* 128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9e) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00a) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x39) Forward Secrecy 256
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x38) Forward Secrecy* 256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc009) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x33) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x32) Forward Secrecy* 128
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xc011) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0xc007) Forward Secrecy 128
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xa4) 128
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xa0) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9c) 128
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x37) 256
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x36) 256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x35) 256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x31) 128
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x30) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x2f) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0x5) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 (0x4) 128
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0xa) 112
BUG=405091
Change-Id: Ib8dd28469414a4eb496788a57a215e7e21f8c37f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1559
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This lets us put the SSL_CIPHER table in the data section. For type-checking,
make STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) cast everything to const SSL_CIPHER*.
Note that this will require some changes in consumers which weren't using a
const SSL_CIPHER *.
Change-Id: Iff734ac0e36f9e5c4a0f3c8411c7f727b820469c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1541
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Of the remaining implementations left, ssl3_, dtls1_, and ssl23_, dtls1_ is
redundant and can be folded into ssl3_. ssl23_ actually isn't; it sets 5
minutes rather than 2 hours. Two hours seems to be what everything else uses
and seems a saner default. Most consumers seem to override it anyway
(SSL_CTX_set_timeout). But it is a behavior change.
The method is called at two points:
- SSL_get_default_timeout
- SSL_CTX_new
Incidentally, the latter call actually makes the former never called internally
and the value it returns a lie. SSL_get_default_timeout returns the default
timeout of the /current/ method, but in ssl_get_new_session, the timeout is
shadowed by session_timeout on the context. That is initialized when
SSL_CTX_new is called. So, unless you go out of your way to
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(0), it always overrides. (And it actually used to a
difference because, for SSL23, the SSL_CTX's method is SSL23, but, when session
creation happens, the SSL's method is the version-specific one.)
Change-Id: I331d3fd69b726242b36492402717b6d0b521c6ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also remove SSL_eNULL ciphers. They were broken anyway in the initial import
because of a lost 'else', but just remove them altogether.
Change-Id: Ie71cf1b45f8fc6883e209801443eddf7f2d058ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1518
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so nothing can be depending on it yet. If we
really want a Suite B profile, it seems better to generate a configuration for
the rest of the system rather than pepper the codebase with checks.
Change-Id: I1be3ebed0e87cbfe236ade4174dcf5bbc7e10dd5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1517
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The protocols are pretty similar; they were all basically redundant. The free
of s->tlsext_session_ticket (more fallout from the EAP-FAST patch) was moved to
SSL_free because that object's attached to s, not s->s3. This is relevant if
SSL_set_ssl_method gets called.
Change-Id: I14a896ba8a6a2c34ab1cb5f65311b117051228da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1509
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Even if OPENSSL_free() now simply is defined to free(), it is
still nice to consistently use OPENSSL_free, so that they can
easily be replaced. Many embedded platforms still have slow
allocation and free functions.
Change-Id: Ie8781591311f12c7f69206dbad6fc4a0c89d88b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1490
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA has already been effectively defined, including in
opensslfeatures.h. This commit removes the last ifdef-protected code
guarded by OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA.
Change-Id: I58dc79dbe7a77843a641d9216f40f1d7d63fcc40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1380
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes the last case where the server generates an RSA key for the
ServerKeyExchange. Remove the code for this. Client support to accept them
still remains.
Leave the APIs for now, but they don't do anything anymore.
Change-Id: I84439e034cc575719f5bc9b3e501165e12b62107
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now the only case where temporary RSA keys are used on the server end is
non-signing keys.
Change-Id: I55f6c206e798dd28548c386fdffd555ccc395477
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1285
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes support code for a "stream_mac" mode only used by GOST. Also get
rid of this
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
comment next to it. It's not actually related to GOST (dates to OpenSSL initial
commit), but isn't especially helpful at this point.
Change-Id: Ib13c6e27e16e0d1fb59ed0142ddf913b9abc20b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Without SSLv2, all cipher suite values are 2 bytes. Represent them as a
uint16_t and make all functions pass those around rather than pointers.
This removes SSL_CIPHER_find as it's unused.
Change-Id: Iea0b75abee4352a8333a4b8e39a161430ae55ea6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1259
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Don't retain curve IDs in serialized form; serialization only happens when
writing and reading from the wire. The internal representation is a uint16_t
which matches the range of the value and avoids all the checks for the first
byte being 0.
This also fixes a bug in tls1_check_ec_tmp_key's suite B logic; the || should
have been &&, though now it's gone.
This doesn't relieve some of the other assumptions about curve IDs:
tls1_set_curves still assumes that all curve IDs are under 32, and
tls1_ec_curve_id2nid still assumes 0 is not a valid curve ID. Add a
compile-time assert and a comment to document this. We're up to 28 now, so this
may well need to be revised sooner or later.
Remove SSL_get_shared_curve as it's new and unused API, using it in a loop is
O(N^3), and lets us simplify a function.
Change-Id: I82778cb82648d82f7b5de8c5341e0e1febdf5611
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1256
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is the first of reorganizing state between connection state and handshake
state. The existing set are retained in cert_st for the server; they are server
configuration. The client gets a copy in s->s3->tmp alongside other handshake
state.
With other handshake state moved there, hopefully we can reset that state in
one go and possibly not even maintain it when there is no handshake in
progress. Rather than currently where we sometimes confused connection state
and handshake state and have to reset as appropriate on renegotiate.
While I'm here, document the fields and name them something more useful than
'ctypes'.
Change-Id: Ib927579f0004fc5c6854fce2127625df669b2b6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1113
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We handle it externally now.
Change-Id: Ib561f64078809645195fd1a859b3256499038847
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1098
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Along the way, clean up the certificate types code to not have the
hard-coded fixed-size array.
Change-Id: If3e5978f7c5099478a3dfa37a0a7059072f5454a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Building without RSA support is unreasonable. Changes were made by
running
find . -type f -name *.c | xargs unifdef -m -U OPENSSL_NO_RSA
find . -type f -name *.h | xargs unifdef -m -U OPENSSL_NO_RSA
using unifdef 2.10 and some newlines were removed manually.
Change-Id: Iea559e2d4b3d1053f28a4a9cc2f7a3d1f6cabd61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1095
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found no users of the functions which control the feature. (Also I don't
particularly want to port all of that to CBS...)
Change-Id: I55da42c44d57252bd47bdcb30431be5e6e90dc56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This code doesn't even get built unless you go out of your way to pass an
extension value at build time.
Change-Id: I92ffcdfb18505c96e5ef390c8954a54cee19967f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1063
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds the infrastructure to use stateful AEADs in ssl/ and
specifically wires in the stitched, RC4-MD5 AEAD. Over time, all
cipher suites will be supported via the AEAD interface and the old
EVP_CIPHER code will die off.
Change-Id: I44ed3ca2672e1342c6b632be08fee9272d113f8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1044
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL added SSL_get0_certificate_types and fixed the truncation (and
subsequent parse error) by adding an alternate copy of the data.
http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=9f27b1eec3175305e62eed87faa80e231f319ca0
Make SSL_get_client_certificate_types call SSL_get0_certificate_types to query
the new list. Remove when Chromium is switched over.
Also remove a now unnecessary cast because SSL_get_client_certificate_types
fixed the type of tmp.ctypes. Further fix it to use a size_t and match the
cert_st copy OpenSSL added.
BUG=388000
Change-Id: Ic6653e10e5a3c3ac6b3fe2a2322f388d6ffb0a06
With this change, calling SSL_enable_fallback_scsv on a client SSL* will
cause the fallback SCSV to be sent.
This is intended to be set when the client is performing TLS fallback
after a failed connection. (This only happens if the application itself
implements this behaviour: OpenSSL does not do fallback automatically.)
The fallback SCSV indicates to the server that it should reject the
connection if the version indicated by the client is less than the
version supported by the server.
See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv-02.
Change-Id: I478d6d5135016f1b7c4aaa6c306a1a64b1d215a6
If an application calls the macro SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
return either the old "shared" extra certificates or those associated
with the current certificate.
This means applications which call SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file
and retrieve the additional chain using SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
will still work. An application which only wants to check the shared
extra certificates can call the new macro
SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only
(Imported from upstream's e0d4272a583c760ce008b661b79baf8b3ff24561 and
3bff195dca617c4ec1630945fef93b792b418cc8)
This change implements equal-preference groups of cipher suites. This
allows, for example, a server to prefer one of AES-GCM or ChaCha20
ciphers, but to allow the client to pick which one. When coupled with
clients that will boost AES-GCM in their preferences when AES-NI is
present, this allows us to use AES-GCM when the hardware exists and
ChaCha20 otherwise.
(Called "cut through" for historical reasons in this patch.)
Enables SSL3+ clients to send application data immediately following the
Finished message even when negotiating full-handshakes. With this
patch, clients can negotiate SSL connections in 1-RTT even when
performing full-handshakes.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
