When building node with boringssl, `SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version` and
`SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version` are used. Openssl exposes those; this
change adds support for boringssl.
For this to work right in DTLS, we switch conf_{min,max}_version to store wire
versions, rather than our internal normalized versions.
Change-Id: I282ed224806c41f69e6f166ca97c6cc05ff51f17
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/35404
Reviewed-by: Nitish Sakhawalkar <nitsakh@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Unfortunately, it's not enough to be able to turn it on thanks to the
PURE_VIRTUAL macro. But it gets us most of the way there.
Change-Id: Ie6ad5119fcfd420115fa49d7312f3586890244f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34949
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I0c648340ac7bb134fcda42c56a83f4815bbaa557
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34884
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
For now, this is off by default and controlled by SSL_set_enforce_rsa_key_usage.
This may be set as late as certificate verification so we may start by enforcing
it for known roots.
Generalizes ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage to check any part of the
key_usage, and adds a new error KEY_USAGE_BIT_INCORRECT for the generalized
method.
Bug: chromium:795089
Change-Id: Ifa504c321bec3263a4e74f2dc48513e3b895d3ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34604
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This allows sharing SSL_CTX between TCP and QUIC connections, such that
common settings can be configured without having to duplicate the
context.
Change-Id: Ie920e7f2a772dd6c6c7b63fdac243914ac5b7b26
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33904
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I84abfedc30e4c34e42285f3c366c2f504a3b9cf2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/34144
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Whether the host has a valid certificate or private key may depend on
the handshake parameters and not just its configuration. For example,
negotiating the delegated credential extension (see
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts) requires an
alternate private key for the handshake.
Change-Id: I11cea1d11e731aa4018d980c010b8d8ebaa64c31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33664
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie9825634f0f290aa3af0e88477013f62e2e0c246
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33724
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This function allows a client to send a TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate message.
Change-Id: I69935253795a79d65a8c85b652378bf04b7058e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33706
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change includes support for a variant of [HRSS], a post-quantum KEM
based on NTRU. It includes changes suggested in [SXY]. This is not yet
ready for any deployment: some breaking changes, like removing the
confirmation hash, are still planned.
(CLA for HRSS's assembly code noted in b/119426559.)
[HRSS] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/667.pdf
[SXY] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1005.pdf
Change-Id: I85d813733b066d5c578484bdd248de3f764194db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33105
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
JDK 11 shipped with a TLS 1.3 implementation enabled by default.
Unfortunately, that implementation does not work and fails to send the
SNI extension on resumption. See
https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806.
This means servers which enable TLS 1.3 will see JDK 11 clients work on
the first connection and then fail on all subsequent connections. Add
SSL_set_jdk11_workaround which configures a workaround to fingerprint
JDK 11 and disable TLS 1.3 with the faulty clients.
JDK 11 also implemented the downgrade signal, which means that
connections that trigger the workaround also must not send the downgrade
signal. Unfortunately, the downgrade signal's security properties are
sensitive to the existence of any unmarked TLS 1.2 ServerHello paths. To
salvage this, pick a new random downgrade marker for this scenario and
modify the client to treat it as an alias of the standard one.
Per the link above, JDK 11.0.2 will fix this bug. Hopefully the
workaround can be retired sometime after it is released.
Change-Id: I0627609a8cadf7cc214073eb7f1e880acdf613ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33284
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Having to lazily create it is a little wordy, and we append to it in
three places now. V2ClientHello makes this slightly finicky, but I think
this is still clearer.
Change-Id: If931db0b56efd7f0728c0b7d119886864dd7933a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32824
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
A split SSL handshake may involve 2 binaries, potentially built at
different versions: call them the "handoff/handback" binary and the
"handshake" binary. We would like to guarantee that the
handoff/handback binary does not make any promises that the handshake
binary cannot keep.
d2ed382 serialized |kCiphers|; this commit extends the same approach
to |kNamedGroups|.
Change-Id: Idb13e54e9b189236309f6054a36872c5a4d96985
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32825
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
A split SSL handshake may involve 2 binaries, potentially built at
different versions: call them the "handoff/handback" binary and the
"handshake" binary. We would like to guarantee that the
handoff/handback binary does not make any promises that the handshake
binary cannot keep.
As a start, this commit serializes |kCiphers| to the handoff message.
When the handoff message is applied to an |SSL|, any configured
ciphers not listed in the handoff message will be removed, in order to
prevent them from being negotiated.
Subsequent commits will apply the same approach to other lists of features.
Change-Id: Idf6dbeadb750c076ab0509c09b9d3f22eb162b9c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/29264
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
0-RTT support and APIs to consume NewSessionTicket will be added in a
follow-up.
Change-Id: Ib2b2c6b618b3e33a74355fb53fdbd2ffafcc5c56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/31744
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
As with sk_*, this. This doesn't fix the function pointer casts. Those
will be done in a follow-up change. Also add a test for lh_*_doall so we
cover both function pointer shapes.
Update-Note: This reworks how LHASH_OF(T) is implemented and also only
pulls in the definitions where used, but LHASH_OF(T) is never used
externally, so I wouldn't expect this to affect things.
Change-Id: I7970ce8c41b8589d6672b71dd03658d0e3bd89a7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32119
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Due to non-compliant middleboxes, it is possible we'll need to do some
surgery to this mechanism. Making it per-SSL is a little more flexible
and also eases some tests in Chromium until we get its SSL_CTX usage
fixed up.
Also fix up BoringSSL tests. We forgot to test it at TLS 1.0 and use the
-expect-tls13-downgrade flag.
Bug: 226
Change-Id: Ib39227e74e2d6f5e1fbc1ebcc091e751471b3cdc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32424
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This was added to support the no_certificate warning alert in SSLv3. That has
since been removed. In the long run, I would like for ssl_send_alert to go
through a flow similar to add_alert so the BIO-free APIs work right and avoid a
host of strangeness surrounding wpend_buf. For now, remove the unused hook.
Change-Id: I1995028b8af4ffa836028794e6b33b2cd1b2435b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31984
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
- In base.h, if BORINGSSL_PREFIX is defined, include
boringssl_prefix_symbols.h
- In all .S files, if BORINGSSL_PREFIX is defined, include
boringssl_prefix_symbols_asm.h
- In base.h, BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN and BSSL_NAMESPACE_END are
defined with appropriate values depending on whether
BORINGSSL_PREFIX is defined; these macros are used in place
of 'namespace bssl {' and '}'
- Add util/make_prefix_headers.go, which takes a list of symbols
and auto-generates the header files mentioned above
- In CMakeLists.txt, if BORINGSSL_PREFIX and BORINGSSL_PREFIX_SYMBOLS
are defined, run util/make_prefix_headers.go to generate header
files
- In various CMakeLists.txt files, add "global_target" that all
targets depend on to give us a place to hook logic that must run
before all other targets (in particular, the header file generation
logic)
- Document this in BUILDING.md, including the fact that it is
the caller's responsibility to provide the symbol list and keep it
up to date
- Note that this scheme has not been tested on Windows, and likely
does not work on it; Windows support will need to be added in a
future commit
Change-Id: If66a7157f46b5b66230ef91e15826b910cf979a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31364
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Update-Note: If not explicitly configured to use tls13_all, callers that enable
TLS 1.3 will now only enable the final standard version.
Change-Id: Ifcfc65a9d8782c983df6e002925e8f77f45b6e53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31384
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I2d1671a4f21a602191fd0c9b932244a376ac5713
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31104
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This isn't actually shorter, but there is a bunch of slicing up of the ticket,
which Span makes a little easier to follow.
Change-Id: I7ea4dfe025641a3b88e2c9b8e34246fefc23412f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fixed up the comment about ssl_version. There's one line which I
manually edited:
int (*check_client_CA_list)(STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names);
where clang-format puts spaces on both sides of the second *.
Change-Id: Id1c0bd02f664df14b1e5bbd8abaf2687fb9179db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31004
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Works in the 1.3 and 1.2 client handshakes, not implemented on the
server for now.
Creates an SSL_CTX option to reverify the server certificate on session
resumption. Reverification only runs the client's certificate verify callback.
Adds new states to the client handshakes: state_reverify_server_certificate in
TLS 1.2, and state_server_certificate_reverify in TLS 1.3.
Adds a negative test to make sure that by default we don't verify the
certificate on resumption, and positive tests that make sure we do when the
new option is set.
Change-Id: I3a47ff3eacb3099df4db4c5bc57f7c801ceea8f1
Bug: chromium:347402
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29984
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
These functions can be used to configure the signature algorithms. One
of them is a string mini-languaging parsing function, which we generally
dislike because it defeats static analysis. However, some dependent
projects (in this case TensorFlow) need it and we also dislike making
people patch.
Change-Id: I13f990c896a7f7332d78b1c351357d418ade8d11
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30304
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This helps with creating a separate binary to perform split
handshakes, in that the test state must be communicated to, and
retrieved from, the handshaker binary using a socket.
Change-Id: I9d70a9bb3d97dd339aab4f51c6de75f71e4fe72d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29704
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Mostly in comments, but there is one special-case around renegotiation_info
that can now be removed.
Change-Id: I2a9114cbff05e0cfff95fe93270fe42379728012
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29824
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
With SSL 3.0 gone, there's no need to split up MD5 and SHA-1.
Change-Id: Ia4236c738dfa6743f1028c2d53761c95cba96288
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29744
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
While I'm here, remove the silly "tlsext_" prefix. At this point it's no
longer novel that a feature is encoded in an extension.
Change-Id: Ib5fbd2121333a213bdda0332885a8c90036ebc4d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29592
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This doesn't actually make use of much of C++ yet. (SSL_CTX and
SSL/SSL_CONFIG carry analogous versions of a number of fields. It's
difficult to switch them to UniquePtr separately.)
Change-Id: Ia948f539c5c90e2d8301193f719604a31be17fc4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29589
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This doesn't give them a destructor yet, just shifts things around. In
doing so, it reveals that we inconsistently allowed internal code, but
not external code, to call functions like bssl::SSL_CTX_set_handoff_mode
without a namespace because of ADL. External code doesn't get to do
this because it doesn't see that ssl_ctx_st has a base class in
namespace bssl.
Change-Id: I2ab3b00fff2d6369e850606eed63017e4f8cf8c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29588
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's 2018, but passing STL objects across the API boundary turns out to
still be more bother than it's worth. Since we're dropping UniquePtr in
the API anyway, go the whole way and make it a plain-C API.
Change-Id: Ic0202012e5d81afe62d71b3fb57e6a27a8f63c65
Update-note: this will need corresponding changes to the internal use of SSL_CTX_add_cert_compression_alg.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29564
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Previously we'd partially attempted the ssl_st / bssl::SSLConnection
subclassing split, but that gets messy when we actually try to add a
destructor, because CRYPTO_EX_DATA's cleanup function needs an ssl_st*,
not a bssl::SSLConnection*. Downcasting is technically undefined at this
point and will likely offend some CFI-like check.
Moreover, it appears that even with today's subclassing split,
New<SSL>() emits symbols like:
W ssl_st*& std::forward<ssl_st*&>(std::remove_reference<ssl_st*&>::type&)
The compiler does not bother emitting them in optimized builds, but it
does suggest we can't really avoid claiming the ssl_st type name at the
symbol level, short of doing reinterpret_casts at all API boundaries.
And, of course, we've already long claimed it at the #include level.
So I've just left this defining directly on ssl_session_st. The cost is
we need to write some silly "bssl::" prefixes in the headers, but so it
goes. In the likely event we change our minds again, we can always
revise this.
Change-Id: Ieb429e8eaabe7c2961ef7f8d9234fb71f19a5e2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29587
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
lh_FOO_retrieve is often called with a dummy instance of FOO that has
only a few fields filled in. This works fine for C, but a C++
SSL_SESSION with destructors is a bit more of a nuisance here.
Instead, teach LHASH to allow queries by some external key type. This
avoids stack-allocating SSL_SESSION. Along the way, fix the
make_macros.sh script.
Change-Id: Ie0b482d4ffe1027049d49db63274c7c17f9398fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29586
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL3_VERSION) now fails.
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 is now zero. Internal SSL3-specific "AEAD"s are gone.
Change-Id: I34edb160be40a5eea3e2e0fdea562c6e2adda229
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The last libssl struct is now opaque! (Promote the SSL_MAX_* constants
as folks use them pretty frequently.)
Update-Note: SSL_SESSION is now opaque. I believe everything handles
this now.
Bug: 6
Change-Id: I8cd29d16173e4370f3341c0e6f0a56e00ea188e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28964
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
