|SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| now takes an |SSL_CTX*|, from which it uses the
|X509_METHOD| and buffer pool. This is our API so we can do this.
This also requires adding an |SSL_CTX*| argument to |SSL_SESSION_new|
for the same reason. However, |SSL_SESSION_new| already has very few
callers (and none in third-party code that I can see) so I think we can
get away with this.
Change-Id: I1337cd2bd8cff03d4b9405ea3146b3b59584aa72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13584
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
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This picks up the short header stuff and any changes made in the
meantime.
Change-Id: Ia2ea680632f3f6c6c759a8f0606a9394ae85c92d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12972
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Change-Id: Ib777dcc80c7acd6dc1eda1c211b91e5428b83df1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12971
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
There are no longer any consumers of these APIs.
These were useful back when the CBC vs. RC4 tradeoff varied by version
and it was worth carefully tuning this cutoff. Nowadays RC4 is
completely gone and there's no use in configuring these anymore.
To avoid invalidating the existing ssl_ctx_api corpus and requiring it
regenerated, I've left the entries in there. It's probably reasonable
for new API fuzzers to reuse those slots.
Change-Id: I02bf950e3828062341e4e45c8871a44597ae93d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12880
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was done by running:
./fuzz/cert -merge=1 ../fuzz/cert_corpus ~/openssl/fuzz/corpora/x509
I bumped the max_len while doing so because some of those are rather
large.
Change-Id: Ic2caa09d5ff9ab05b46363940a91a03f270cbad8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12682
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie947ab176d10feb709c6e135d5241c6cf605b8e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This allows a consumer to disable Channel ID (for instance, it may be
enabled on the SSL_CTX and later disabled on the SSL) without reaching
into the SSL struct directly.
Deprecate the old APIs in favor of these.
BUG=6
Change-Id: I193bf94bc1f537e1a81602a39fc2b9a73f44c73b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12623
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Change-Id: I69cbb0679e1dbb6292a8f4737851736e58c17508
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12481
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is getting to be a nuisance to do by hand.
Change-Id: If3aa7c666c4cc0bf97615564f258ff740a561766
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12281
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Fuzzer mode explores the handshake, but at the cost of losing coverage
on the record layer. Add a separate build flag and client/server
corpora for this mode.
Note this requires tweaks in consumers' fuzzer build definitions.
BUG=111
Change-Id: I1026dc7301645e165a761068a1daad6eedc9271e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12108
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_CTX_set1_curves was being called with the size of the input data in
bytes rather than in ints.
BUG=chromium:659361
Change-Id: I90da1c6d60e92423c6b7d9efd744ae70ff589172
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11840
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Id41cf40b5087c6520c4d3c822d5a955b9fd32853
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11684
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I missed this function, which was unfortunate.
Change-Id: I8bcea1738a50aa3297d09a59a86437351ff5f84a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11623
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I167d8ebfa7f2c08ba9f532df96ce5abd432c47c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11622
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Data allocated in one fuzzer iteration and then freed in the next
complicates the leak checker. Avoid this by dropping hidden global state
at the end of each run.
Change-Id: Ice79704f2754a6b1f40e288df9b97ddd5b3b97d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11600
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I3476d3ba7cf90e023f6ad2ff9264a31c59a74e6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11584
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They take a const pointer. See
http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html#building
BUG=chromium:655016
Change-Id: Id6c7584c7a875e822b1fbff72163c888d02a9f44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11580
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Our implementation now expects draft 15.
Change-Id: I261a090763951110a6c9f03acfda4ae23cc14cfc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11502
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We've switched to the version extension, so refresh the corpus.
Change-Id: Ic50f58bd83d62dccae26063c9ea2d4a2c799da1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11326
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was done by first minimizing the existing set and then merging in a
fresh recording from runner. Glancing through LCOV output does not
reveal anything anomolous. Fuzzer mode seems to be working as expected.
Change-Id: Ife0959a5e16e3c7e2e5a2deb0c32539ff2bc740b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11229
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also IWYU the headers.
BUG=79
Change-Id: Iafee0444c9979496166885db6ba5009cb597cb4d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Corpus recorded from runner and merged into existing corpus with
libFuzzer's -merge flag.
BUG=79
Change-Id: I986a50976ffef141b63e31de3a81fdb4ed5c1348
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11130
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This code has caused a long history of problems. This change rewrites it
completely with something that is, hopefully, much simplier and robust
and adds more testing.
Change-Id: Ibeef51f9386afd95d5b73316e451eb3a2d7ec4e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8033
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We already had coverage for our new EVP_PKEY parsers, but it's good to have
some that cover them directly. The initial corpus was generated manually with
der-ascii and should cover most of the insanity around EC key serialization.
BUG=15
Change-Id: I7aaf56876680bfd5a89f5e365c5052eee03ba862
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7728
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These source files previously didn't have the ISC license on them.
Change-Id: Ic0a2047d23b28d9d7f0a85b2fedb67574bdcab25
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7735
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is a fairly common operation on an X509.
Change-Id: I1820f20b555f75c98ab7e3283b5530bc1c200e2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7611
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They now fuzz a lot more than just the initial flow.
Change-Id: Ib0b7eb66969442e539a937d7d87f5ba031fcbef3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7610
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Maintain the max_len values in foo.options files which ClusterFuzz can process.
Also recompute the recommended client and server lengths as they've since
gotten much more extensive.
Change-Id: Ie87a80d8a4a0c41e215f0537c8ccf82b38c4de09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7509
Reviewed-by: Mike Aizatsky <aizatsky@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Now that client.cc and server.cc run through application data, regenerate the
corpus.
Change-Id: I8278ebfe47fd2ba74f67db6f9b545aabf9fd1f84
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7301
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As long as the HTTP/1.1 client auth hack forces use to support renego, having
it on seems much more useful than having it off for fuzzing purposes. Also read
app data to exercise that code and, on the client, trigger renegotiations as
needed.
Change-Id: I1941ded6ec9bd764abd199d1518420a1075ed1b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7291
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also pass set -e instead of chaining things with &&. (One line was missing the
&&.)
Change-Id: Ia04e7f40f46688c9664101efefef1d1ea069de71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7300
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This results from running the fuzzers for a little while with both the
8bit-counters change and after taking the transcripts from the runner
tests as seeds for the `client` and `server` fuzzers.
Change-Id: I545a89d8dccd7ef69dd97546ed61610eea4a27a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7276
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If running the stack through a fuzzer, we would like execution to be
completely deterministic. This is gated on a
BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE #ifdef.
For now, this just uses the zero ChaCha20 key and a global counter. As
needed, we can extend this to a thread-local counter and a separate
ChaCha20 stream and counter per input length.
Change-Id: Ic6c9d8a25e70d68e5dc6804e2c234faf48e51395
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
crypto/x509 parses the SPKI on-demand, so we weren't actually exercising the
SPKI code.
Change-Id: I2e16045bd35dbe04d4b8d8b45939c8885e09a550
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7161
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
