Commit a3d9528e9e has a bug that could
cause counters to be reused if |$avx=2| were set in the AES-NI AES-GCM
assembly code, if the EVP interface were used with certain coding
patterns, as demonstrated by the test cases added in
a5ee83f67e.
This changes the encryption code in the same way the decryption code
was changed in a3d9528e9e.
This doesn't have any effect currently since the AES-NI AES-GCM code
has |$avx=0| now, so |aesni_gcm_encrypt| doesn't change the counter.
Change-Id: Iba69cb4d2043d1ea57c6538b398246af28cba006
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7193
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Taken from 6b2ebe4332e22b4eb7dd6fadf418e3da7b926ca4. These don't do anything
right now but are checked in unmodified to make diffs easier to see.
Change-Id: I4f5bdb7b16f4ac27e7ef175f475540c481b8d593
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL upstream's SIMD assembly is rather complex. This pattern of update
calls should be sufficient to stress all the codepaths.
Change-Id: I50dea8351e4203b6b2cd9b23456eb4a592d31b5e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7223
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also avoid using "i" in X509_cert_verify as a loop counter, trust
outcome and as an error ordinal.
(Imported from upstream's a3baa171053547488475709c7197592c66e427cf)
Change-Id: I4b0b542ffacf7fa861c93c8124b334c0aacc3c17
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7222
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 402fb1896b2aab5cf887127bbce964554b9c8113)
Change-Id: I80c1f952085c8fc9062d3395f211a525151c404d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7219
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also avoid using "i" in X509_cert_verify as a loop counter, trust
outcome and as an error ordinal.
(Imported from upstream's a3baa171053547488475709c7197592c66e427cf)
Change-Id: I492afdbaa5017bcf00a0412033cf99fca3fe9401
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7218
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It is only used by |bn_div_rem_words|.
Change-Id: I57627091d8db5890d7fea34d8560897717008646
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7128
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Create a |bn_div_rem_words| that is used for double-word/single-word
divisions and division-with-remainder. Remove all implementations of
|bn_div_words| except for the implementation needed for 64-bit MSVC.
This allows more code to be shared across platforms and also removes
an instance of the dangerous pattern wherein the |div_asm| macro
modified a variable that wasn't passed as a parameter.
Also, document the limitations of the compiler-generated code for the
non-asm code paths more fully. Compilers indeed have not improved in
this respect.
Change-Id: I5a36a2edd7465de406d47d72dcd6bf3e63e5c232
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7127
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Callers of this function are not checking for the -1 result. Change
the semantics to match their expectations and to match the common
semantics of most other parts of BoringSSL.
Change-Id: I4ec537d7619e20e8ddfee80c72125e4c02cfaac1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7125
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Note that this structure has a weak pointer to the key, which was a
problem corrected in the AES-GCM code in
0f8bfdeb33. Also, it uses |void *|
instead of |const AES_KEY *| to refer to that key.
Change-Id: I70e632e3370ab27eb800bc1c0c64d2bd36b7cafb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7123
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY keeps the invariant.
(Imported from upstream's a38a159bfcbc94214dda00e0e6b1fc6454a23b78)
Change-Id: I4cb35615d76b77929915e370dbb7fec1455da069
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7214
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change causes cipher_test to test the EVP cipher interfaces with
various chunk sizes and adds a couple of large tests of GCM. This is
sufficient to uncover the issue that would have been caused by a3d9528e,
had the AVX code been enabled.
Change-Id: I58d4924c0bcd11a0999c24a0fb77fc5eee71130f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7192
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(imported from upstream's 2b80d00e3ac652377ace84c51b53f51a1b7e1ba2)
Change-Id: Iee5a8d85d276033b6ac8bc9ac87e157916a1a29a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7212
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Calling SSL_shutdown while in init previously gave a "1" response,
meaning everything was successfully closed down (even though it
wasn't). Better is to send our close_notify, but fail when trying to
receive one.
The problem with doing a shutdown while in the middle of a handshake
is that once our close_notify is sent we shouldn't really do anything
else (including process handshake/CCS messages) until we've received a
close_notify back from the peer. However the peer might send a CCS
before acting on our close_notify - so we won't be able to read it
because we're not acting on CCS messages!
(Imported from upstream's f73c737c7ac908c5d6407c419769123392a3b0a9)
Change-Id: Iaad5c5e38983456d3697c955522a89919628024b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7207
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
- bugfix: should not treat '--' as invalid domain substring.
- '-' should not be the first letter of a domain
(Imported from upstream's 15debc128ac13420a4eec9b4a66d72f1dfd69126)
Change-Id: Ifd8ff7cef1aab69da5cade8ff8c76c3a723f3838
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7205
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This depends on https://codereview.chromium.org/1730823002/. The bit was only
ever targetted to one (rather old) CPU. Disable NEON on it uniformly, so we
don't have to worry about whether any new NEON code breaks it.
BUG=589200
Change-Id: Icc7d17d634735aca5425fe0a765ec2fba3329326
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7211
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This imports a fix to x86gas.pl from upstream's
a98c648e40ea5158c8ba29b5a70ccc239d426a20. It's needed to get poly1305-x86.pl
working.
Confirmed that this is a no-op for our current assembly files.
Change-Id: I28de1dbf421b29a06147d1aea3ff3659372a78b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7210
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change makes the AEAD and EVP code paths use the same code for
AES-GCM. When AVX instructions are enabled in the assembly this will
allow them to use the stitched AES-GCM implementation.
Note that the stitched implementations are no-ops for small inputs
(smaller than 288 bytes for encryption; smaller than 96 bytes for
decryption). This means that only a handful of test cases with longish
inputs actually test the stitched code.
Change-Id: Iece8003d90448dcac9e0bde1f42ff102ebe1a1c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7173
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Otherwise we clobber things like -m32.
Change-Id: I9457e4b50dc3063643c31d19c7935276b8a312a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7209
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's 2966c2ec31e81187da3fbbe1499a6aa3acfd355f.
Change-Id: Iad0a0f11accb4fa2bd93667239dd7462f9fdbd7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7180
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes chacha_vec_arm.S and chacha_vec.c in favor of unifying on
upstream's code. Upstream's is faster and this cuts down on the number of
distinct codepaths. Our old scheme also didn't give vectorized code on
Windows or aarch64.
BoringSSL-specific modifications made to the assembly:
- As usual, the shelling out to $CC is replaced with hardcoding $avx. I've
tested up to the AVX2 codepath, so enable it all.
- I've removed the AMD XOP code as I have not tested it.
- As usual, the ARM file need the arm_arch.h include tweaked.
Speed numbers follow. We can hope for further wins on these benchmarks after
importing the Poly1305 assembly.
x86
---
Old:
Did 1422000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000433us (1421384.5 ops/sec): 22.7 MB/s
Did 123000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003803us (122534.0 ops/sec): 165.4 MB/s
Did 22000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000282us (21993.8 ops/sec): 180.2 MB/s
Did 1428000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000214us (1427694.5 ops/sec): 22.8 MB/s
Did 124000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1006332us (123219.8 ops/sec): 166.3 MB/s
Did 22000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1020771us (21552.3 ops/sec): 176.6 MB/s
New:
Did 1520000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000567us (1519138.6 ops/sec): 24.3 MB/s
Did 152000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004216us (151361.9 ops/sec): 204.3 MB/s
Did 31000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1009085us (30720.9 ops/sec): 251.7 MB/s
Did 1797000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000141us (1796746.7 ops/sec): 28.7 MB/s
Did 171000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003204us (170453.9 ops/sec): 230.1 MB/s
Did 31000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005349us (30835.1 ops/sec): 252.6 MB/s
x86_64, no AVX2
---
Old:
Did 1782000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000204us (1781636.5 ops/sec): 28.5 MB/s
Did 317000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001579us (316500.2 ops/sec): 427.3 MB/s
Did 62000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1012146us (61256.0 ops/sec): 501.8 MB/s
Did 1778000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000220us (1777608.9 ops/sec): 28.4 MB/s
Did 315000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1002886us (314093.5 ops/sec): 424.0 MB/s
Did 71000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014606us (69977.9 ops/sec): 573.3 MB/s
New:
Did 1866000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000019us (1865964.5 ops/sec): 29.9 MB/s
Did 399000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001017us (398594.6 ops/sec): 538.1 MB/s
Did 84000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005645us (83528.5 ops/sec): 684.3 MB/s
Did 1881000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000325us (1880388.9 ops/sec): 30.1 MB/s
Did 404000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000004us (403998.4 ops/sec): 545.4 MB/s
Did 85000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1010048us (84154.4 ops/sec): 689.4 MB/s
x86_64, AVX2
---
Old:
Did 2375000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000282us (2374330.4 ops/sec): 38.0 MB/s
Did 448000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001865us (447166.0 ops/sec): 603.7 MB/s
Did 88000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005217us (87543.3 ops/sec): 717.2 MB/s
Did 2409000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000188us (2408547.2 ops/sec): 38.5 MB/s
Did 446000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001003us (445553.1 ops/sec): 601.5 MB/s
Did 90000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1006722us (89399.1 ops/sec): 732.4 MB/s
New:
Did 2622000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000266us (2621302.7 ops/sec): 41.9 MB/s
Did 794000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000783us (793378.8 ops/sec): 1071.1 MB/s
Did 173000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000176us (172969.6 ops/sec): 1417.0 MB/s
Did 2623000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000330us (2622134.7 ops/sec): 42.0 MB/s
Did 783000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000531us (782584.4 ops/sec): 1056.5 MB/s
Did 174000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000840us (173854.0 ops/sec): 1424.2 MB/s
arm, Nexus 4
---
Old:
Did 388550 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000580us (388324.8 ops/sec): 6.2 MB/s
Did 90000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003816us (89657.9 ops/sec): 121.0 MB/s
Did 19000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1045750us (18168.8 ops/sec): 148.8 MB/s
Did 398500 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000305us (398378.5 ops/sec): 6.4 MB/s
Did 90500 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000305us (90472.4 ops/sec): 122.1 MB/s
Did 19000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1043278us (18211.8 ops/sec): 149.2 MB/s
New:
Did 424788 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000641us (424515.9 ops/sec): 6.8 MB/s
Did 115000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001526us (114824.8 ops/sec): 155.0 MB/s
Did 27000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1033023us (26136.9 ops/sec): 214.1 MB/s
Did 447750 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000549us (447504.3 ops/sec): 7.2 MB/s
Did 117500 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001923us (117274.5 ops/sec): 158.3 MB/s
Did 27000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1025118us (26338.4 ops/sec): 215.8 MB/s
aarch64, Nexus 6p
(Note we didn't have aarch64 assembly before at all, and still don't have it
for Poly1305. Hopefully once that's added this will be faster than the arm
numbers...)
---
Old:
Did 145040 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1003065us (144596.8 ops/sec): 2.3 MB/s
Did 14000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1042605us (13427.9 ops/sec): 18.1 MB/s
Did 2618 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1093241us (2394.7 ops/sec): 19.6 MB/s
Did 148000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000709us (147895.1 ops/sec): 2.4 MB/s
Did 14000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1047294us (13367.8 ops/sec): 18.0 MB/s
Did 2607 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1090745us (2390.1 ops/sec): 19.6 MB/s
New:
Did 358000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000769us (357724.9 ops/sec): 5.7 MB/s
Did 45000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1021267us (44062.9 ops/sec): 59.5 MB/s
Did 8591 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1047136us (8204.3 ops/sec): 67.2 MB/s
Did 343000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000489us (342832.4 ops/sec): 5.5 MB/s
Did 44000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1008326us (43636.7 ops/sec): 58.9 MB/s
Did 8866 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1083341us (8183.9 ops/sec): 67.0 MB/s
Change-Id: I629fe195d072f2c99e8f947578fad6d70823c4c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7202
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most of the OPENSSL_armcap_P accesses in assembly use named constants from
arm_arch.h, but some don't. Consistently use the constants. The dispatch really
should be in C, but in the meantime, make it easier to tell what's going on.
I'll send this patch upstream so we won't be carrying a diff here.
Change-Id: I63c68d2351ea5ce11005813314988e32b6459526
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7203
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They won't be used as-is. This is just to make the diffs easier to see. Taken
from upstream's 4f16039efe3589aa4d63a6f1fab799d0cd9338ca.
Change-Id: I34d8be409f9c8f15b8a6da4b2d98ba3e60aa2210
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7200
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Gisle Vanem for pointing out that this code was broken and
could never have compiled. Since it has never worked, and thus has never
been used, remove it.
Change-Id: Ic274eaf187928765a809690eda8d790b79f939a5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7190
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See OpenSSL df057ea6c8a20e4babc047689507dfafde59ffd6.
Change-Id: Ife10dc13ca335cd51434d7769ff85c6929f10226
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7172
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Currently, we correctly refuse to parse version 0 multi-prime keys, but we
still parse version 1 two-prime keys. Both should be rejected.
I missed an additional clause in the spec originally. It seems otherPrimeInfos
is marked OPTIONAL not because it is actually optional, but because they wanted
the two RSAPrivateKey forms to share one definition. The prose rules following
the definition imply that otherPrimeInfos' presence is entirely determined by
the version:
* version is the version number, for compatibility with future
revisions of this document. It shall be 0 for this version of the
document, unless multi-prime is used, in which case it shall be 1.
Version ::= INTEGER { two-prime(0), multi(1) }
(CONSTRAINED BY
{-- version must be multi if otherPrimeInfos present --})
and:
* otherPrimeInfos contains the information for the additional primes
r_3, ..., r_u, in order. It shall be omitted if version is 0 and
shall contain at least one instance of OtherPrimeInfo if version
is 1.
Change-Id: I458232a2e20ed68fddcc39c4c45333f33441f70b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7143
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That was probably more complexity than we needed. Nothing uses it
anymore, now that getting to the PKCS#8 logic isn't especially tedious.
Change-Id: I4f0393b1bd75e71664f65e3722c14c483c13c5cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6867
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As with SPKI parsers, the intent is make EVP_PKEY capture the key's
constraints in full fidelity, so we'd have to add new types or store the
information in the underlying key object if people introduce variant key
types with weird constraints on them.
Note that because PKCS#8 has a space for arbitrary attributes, this
parser must admit a hole. I'm assuming for now that we don't need an API
that enforces no attributes and just ignore trailing data in the
structure for simplicity.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I6fc641355e87136c7220f5d7693566d1144a68e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6866
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, OpenSSL supported many different DSA PKCS#8 encodings. Only
support the standard format. One of the workaround formats (SEQUENCE of
private key and public key) seems to be a workaround for an old Netscape
bug. From inspection, NSS seems to have fixed this from the first open
source commit.
Change-Id: I1e097b675145954b4d7a0bed8733e5a25c25fd8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7074
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are all the type-specific serializations rather than something
tagged with a type. i2d_PrivateKey's PKCS#8 codepath was unreachable
because every EVP_PKEY type has an old_priv_encode function.
To prune EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD further, replace i2d_PrivateKey into a
switch case so we don't need to keep old_priv_encode around. This cuts
down on a case of outside modules reaching into crypto/evp method
tables.
Change-Id: I30db2eed836d560056ba9d1425b960d0602c3cf2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They're only used by a pair of PEM functions, which are never used.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I89731485c66ca328c634efbdb7e182a917f2a963
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6863
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each
with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can
get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints
in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library
representation of an SPKI.
This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and
EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and
implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been
intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with
full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this.
This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose
EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies
acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and
the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check
key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX
implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would
later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems
unlikely.
Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may
have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or
not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate
EVP_PKEY type.)
DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for
now. This isn't any worse than before.
Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task.
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This imports upstream's ea6b07b54c1f8fc2275a121cdda071e2df7bd6c1 along
with a bugfix in 987157f6f63fa70dbeffca3c8bc62f26e9767ff2.
In an SPKI, a DSA key is only an INTEGER, with the group information in
the AlgorithmIdentifier. But a standalone DSAPublicKey is more complex
(and apparently made up by OpenSSL). OpenSSL implemented this with a
write_params boolean and making DSAPublicKey a CHOICE.
Instead, have p_dsa_asn1.c encode an INTEGER directly. d2i_DSAPublicKey
only parses the standalone form. (That code will be replaced later, but
first do this in preparation for rewriting the DSA ASN.1 code.)
Change-Id: I6fbe298d2723b9816806e9c196c724359b9ffd63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7021
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Functions which lose object reuse and need auditing:
- d2i_ECParameters
- d2i_ECPrivateKey
This adds a handful of bytestring-based APIs to handle EC key
serialization. Deprecate all the old serialization APIs. Notes:
- An EC_KEY has additional state that controls its encoding, enc_flags
and conv_form. conv_form is left alone, but enc_flags in the new API
is an explicit parameter.
- d2i_ECPrivateKey interpreted its T** argument unlike nearly every
other d2i function. This is an explicit EC_GROUP parameter in the new
function.
- The new specified curve code is much stricter and should parse enough
to uniquely identify the curve.
- I've not bothered with a new version of i2d_ECParameters. It just
writes an OID. This may change later when decoupling from the giant
OID table.
- Likewise, I've not bothered with new APIs for the public key since the
EC_POINT APIs should suffice.
- Previously, d2i_ECPrivateKey would not call EC_KEY_check_key and it
was possible for the imported public and private key to mismatch. It
now calls it.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I30b4dd2841ae76c56ab0e1808360b2628dee0615
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6859
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In c0d9484902, we had to add support for
recognizing specified versions of named curves. I believe the motivation
was an ECPrivateKey encoded by OpenSSL without the EC_KEY's asn1_flag
set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE. Annoyingly, it appears OpenSSL's API
defaulted to the specified form while the tool defaulted to the named
form.
Add tests for this at the ECPrivateKey and the PKCS#8 level. The latter
was taken from Chromium's ec_private_key_unittest.cc which was the
original impetus for this.
Change-Id: I53a80c842c3fc9598f2e0ee7bf2d86b2add9e6c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7072
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The function |ge_frombytes_negate_vartime|, as the name suggests,
negates its output. This change converts it to |ge_frombytes_vartime|
and, instead, does the negation explicitly when verifying signatures.
The latter function is more generally useful.
Change-Id: I465f8bdf5edb101a80ab1835909ae0ff41d3e295
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7142
Reviewed-by: Arnar Birgisson <arnarb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
An i2d compatibility function is rather long, so add CBB_finish_i2d for
part of it. It takes a CBB as input so only a 'marshal' function is
needed, rather than a 'to_bytes' one.
Also replace the *inp d2i update pattern with a slightly shorter one.
Change-Id: Ibb41059c9532f6a8ce33460890cc1afe26adc97c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6868
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CBS_asn1_ber_to_der currently uses heuristics because implicitly-tagged
constructed strings in BER are ambiguous with implicitly-tagged sequences. It's
not possible to convert BER to DER without knowing the schema.
Fortunately, implicitly tagged strings don't appear often so instead split the
job up: CBS_asn1_ber_to_der fixes indefinite-length elements and constructed
strings it can see. Implicitly-tagged strings it leaves uncoverted, but they
will only nest one level down (because BER kindly allows one to nest
constructed strings arbitrarily!).
CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string then performs the final concatenation at parse
time. This isn't much more complex and lets us parse BER more accurately and
also reject a number of mis-encoded values (e.g. constructed INTEGERs are not a
thing) we'd previously let through. The downside is the post-conversion parsing
code must be aware of this limitation of CBS_asn1_ber_to_der. Fortunately,
there's only one implicitly-tagged string in our PKCS#12 code.
(In the category of things that really really don't matter, but I had spare
cycles and the old BER converter is weird.)
Change-Id: Iebdd13b08559fa158b308ef83a5bb07bfdf80ae8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C has implicit conversion of |void *| to other pointer types so these
casts are unnecessary. Clean them up to make the code easier to read
and to make it easier to find dangerous casts.
Change-Id: I26988a672e8ed4d69c75cfbb284413999b475464
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7102
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I guess the comment "just a reference" was intended to mean that the
|mod| member is a weak reference to a |BIGNUM| owned by something else.
However, it is actually owned by the |bn_blinding_st|, as one can see
by reading |BN_BLINDING_new| and |BN_BLINDING_free|.
Change-Id: If2a681fc9d9db536170e0efb11fdab93e4f0baba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7112
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
