Commit Graph

18 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Brian Smith
a432757acb Use BN_mod_inverse_odd instead of |BN_mod_inverse| for ECC.
BN_mod_inverse_odd was always being used on 64-bit platforms and was being used
for all curves with an order of 450 bits or smaller (basically, everything but
P-521). We generally don't care much about minor differences in the speed of
verifying signatures using curves other than P-256 and P-384. It is better to
always use the same algorithm.

This also allows |bn_mod_inverse_general|, |bn_mod_inverse_no_branch|, and
|BN_mod_inverse| to be dropped from programs that can somehow avoid linking in
the RSA key generation and RSA CRT recovery code.

Change-Id: I79b94bff23d2b07d5e0c704f7d44538797f8c7a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9103
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2016-08-05 22:09:35 +00:00
Brian Smith
92d60c2059 Use Fermat's Little Theorem when converting points to affine.
Fermat's Little Theorem is already used for the custom curve implementations.
Use it, for the same reasons, for the ec_montgomery-based implementations.

I tested the performance (only) on x86-64 Windows.

Change-Id: Ibf770fd3f2d3e2cfe69f06bc12c81171624ff557
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2016-07-28 18:29:32 +00:00
David Benjamin
4186b711f4 Don't bother storing the cofactor.
It's always one. We don't support other kinds of curves with this framework.
(Curve25519 uses a much simpler API.) This also allows us to remove the
check_pub_key_order logic.

Change-Id: Ic15e1ecd68662b838c76b1e0aa15c3a93200d744
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8350
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-06-20 17:26:02 +00:00
Brian Smith
97770d17d8 Use only Montgomery math in |ec_GFp_mont_point_get_affine_coordinates|.
Use only Montgomery math in |ec_GFp_mont_point_get_affine_coordinates|.
In particular, avoid |BN_mod_sqr| and |BN_mod_mul|.

Change-Id: I05c8f831d2865d1b105cda3871e9ae67083f8399
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7586
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-04-20 22:51:34 +00:00
Brian Smith
95cc3bea3b Remove dead code from |ec_GFp_mont_point_get_affine_coordinates|.
This code is only used in ec_montgomery.c, so |field_encode| and
|field_decode| are never NULL.

Change-Id: I42a3ad5744d4ed6f0be1707494411e7efcf930ff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7585
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-28 17:22:29 +00:00
Brian Smith
a00f845434 Move & rename |ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates|.
It is only used in ec_montgomery.c, so move it there.

Change-Id: Ib189d5579d6363bdc1da89b775ad3df824129758
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7584
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-28 17:21:32 +00:00
Brian Smith
081e3f34a2 Remove |EC_POINT::Z_is_one|.
Having |Z_is_one| be out of sync with |Z| could potentially be a very
bad thing, and in the past there have been multiple bugs of this sort,
including one currently in p256-x86_64.c (type confusion: Montgomery-
encoded vs unencoded). Avoid the issue entirely by getting rid of
|Z_is_one|.

Change-Id: Icb5aa0342df41d6bc443f15f952734295d0ee4ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6576
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-09 18:58:43 +00:00
David Benjamin
9bf1b1b440 Remove group_clear_finish EC_GROUP hooks.
These are never called. Group parameters are not secret anyway. This is
a remnant of upstream's EC_GROUP_clear_free.

Change-Id: I23a4076eae8e4561abddbe74d0ba72641532f229
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6823
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-01-28 00:17:43 +00:00
Brian Smith
533a273871 Add |EC_METHOD| method for verifying public key order.
In some cases it would be good to restrict the input range of scalars
given to |EC_METHOD::mul| to be [0, order-1]. This is a first step
towards that goal.

Change-Id: I58a25db06f6c7a68a0ac1fe79794b04f7a173b23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6562
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 18:39:07 +00:00
Brian Smith
9b26297608 Make |EC_GROUP_precompute_mult|/|EC_KEY_precompute_mult| no-ops.
This moves us closer to having |EC_GROUP| and |EC_KEY| being immutable.
The functions are left as no-ops for backward compatibility.

Change-Id: Ie23921ab0364f0771c03aede37b064804c9f69e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6485
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 00:27:39 +00:00
Brian Smith
f0523e9f20 Avoid hard-coded linkage of WNAF-based multiplication.
If the application is only using the P-256 implementation in p256-64.c,
then the WNAF code would all be dead code. The change reorganizes the
code so that all modern toolchains should be able to recognize that
fact and eliminate the WNAF-based code when it is unused.

Change-Id: I9f94bd934ca7d2292de4c29bb89e17c940c7cd2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6173
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 16:38:25 +00:00
Brian Smith
80c5fabc63 Simplify |EC_METHOD| by removing invariant methods.
None of these methods vary per group. Factoring these out of
|EC_METHOD| should help some toolchains to do a better job optimizing
the code for size.

Change-Id: Ibd22a52992b4d549f12a8d22bddfdb3051aaa891
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6172
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 15:55:47 +00:00
David Benjamin
3570d73bf1 Remove the func parameter to OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR.
Much of this was done automatically with
  find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+, ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/'
  find . -name '*.c' | xargs sed -E -i '' -e 's/(OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR\([a-zA-Z_0-9]+, )[a-zA-Z_0-9]+,  ([a-zA-Z_0-9]+\);)/\1\2/'

BUG=468039

Change-Id: I4c75fd95dff85ab1d4a546b05e6aed1aeeb499d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5276
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-07-16 02:02:37 +00:00
David Benjamin
cfaf7ff9bf Remove unnecessary NULL checks, part 2.
Stuff in crypto/ec.

Change-Id: I3bd238c365c4766ed8abc6f835a107478b43b159
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4515
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-05-04 23:08:22 +00:00
Brian Smith
0acef5ec27 Simplify ec_group_st on the assumption it is used for GF(p) only.
Change-Id: I90e8f9ce7b996471daed129794eb1b0fa80a27cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4272
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-04-13 20:53:20 +00:00
David Benjamin
c35fb014d9 Fix more memory leaks on malloc failure.
Caught by malloc valgrind tests on Basic-Client-Sync. Also one by inspection
and verified with valgrind. Those should pass now with the exception of
CRYPTO_free_ex_data being internally implemented with malloc.

(Clearly we next should make our malloc tests assert that the containing
function fails to catch when we fail to check for some error and things
silently move one.)

Change-Id: I56c51dc8a32a7d3c7ac907d54015dc241728c761
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3440
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-02-13 18:43:01 +00:00
David Benjamin
9ab14e00d5 Add in missing curly braces part 2.
ECC code.

Change-Id: I1a960620edbb30e10dcbab0e8053a1deb9db3262
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3402
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-02-11 23:14:04 +00:00
Adam Langley
95c29f3cd1 Inital import.
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).

(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
2014-06-20 13:17:32 -07:00