This is just to reduce the diff with upstream's files so it's easier to
tell what's going on. Upstream's files have lots and lots of trailing
whitespace. We were also missing a comment.
Change-Id: Icfc3b52939823a046a3744fd8e619b5bd6160715
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11408
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ConflictingVersionNegotiation really should be about, say 1.1 and 1.2
since those may be negotiated via either mechanism. (Those two cases are
actually kinda weird and we may wish to change the spec. But, in the
meantime, test that we have the expected semantics.)
Also test that we ignore true TLS 1.3's number for now, until we use it,
and that TLS 1.3 suitably ignores ClientHello.version.
Change-Id: I76c660ddd179313fa68b15a6fda7a698bef4d9c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11407
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They weren't updated for the new version negotiation. (Though right now
they're just testing that we *don't* implement the downgrade detection
because it's a draft version.)
Change-Id: I4c983ebcdf3180d682833caf1e0063467ea41544
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11406
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Otherwise we panic. Thanks to EKR for reporting.
Change-Id: Ie4b6c2e18e1c77c7b660ca5d4c3bafb38a82cb6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11405
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than clear variables and break out of a loop that just ends up
returning anyway, just return. This makes all the abort points
consistent in this function.
Change-Id: I51d862e7c60a9e967773f15a17480b783af8c456
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11422
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Breaking from inside the inner loop doesn't do what the code wants.
Instead the outer loop will continue running and it's possible for it to
read off the end of the buffer. (Found with libFuzzer.)
Next change will update the other abort points in this code to match.
Change-Id: I006dca0cd4c31db1c4b5e84b996fe24b2f1e6c13
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11421
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Some projects (NGINX, OpenResty, ...) check for the, uhm, "alphabetic"
part of OpenSSL versions as well.
Change-Id: Iaa0809437756bc805235a1f53f4d62c900d22ca5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11440
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If asn1_item_ex_combine_new fails in one of the ASN1_template_new calls
just before the ASN1_OP_NEW_POST call, ASN1_item_ex_free will free the
temporary object which ultimately calls ASN1_OP_FREE_POST. This means
that ASN1_OP_FREE_POST needs to account for zero-initialized objects.
Change-Id: I56fb63bd5c015d9dfe3961606449bc6f5b1259e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11403
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I always forget this.
Change-Id: I9fa15cebb6586985ddc48cdbf9d184a49a8bfb02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11402
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ia020ea08431859bf268d828b5d72715295de26e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11401
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They just need a different name for the real malloc implementations.
Change-Id: Iee1aac1133113d628fd3f9f1ed0335d66c6def24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11400
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I3e3eb16d58c94926c68991c3a5a4abe67d5bb6f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11360
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
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This function is used by NGINX to enable specific curves for ECDH from a
configuration file. However when building with BoringSSL, since it's not
implmeneted, it falls back to using EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() wich doesn't
support X25519.
Change-Id: I533df4ef302592c1a9f9fc8880bd85f796ce0ef3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11382
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OpenSSL recently had a regression here (CVE-2016-6309). We're fine,
but so that we stay that way, add some tests.
Change-Id: I244d7ff327b7aad550f86408c5e5e65e6d1babe5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11321
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Not sure if version-dependant, but with CMake 3.6 "!" doesn't work.
Change-Id: I5f91234b27e340142b479b602d4102134ad55ccb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11381
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We've switched to the version extension, so refresh the corpus.
Change-Id: Ic50f58bd83d62dccae26063c9ea2d4a2c799da1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11326
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUG=106
Change-Id: Iaa12aeb67627f3c22fe4a917c89c646cb3dc1843
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11325
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Change-Id: Ia535741caa914072f31beeb02ad1d26f7ad692b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11324
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I73f9fd64b46f26978b897409d817b34ec9d93afd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11080
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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In order to align ppc64le with the existing code, 4467e59b changed the
prefix for both the ARM and ppc64le AES assembly code to be “aes_hw_”.
However, it didn't update aes.c as well.
Change-Id: I8e3c7dea1c49ddad8a613369af274e25d572a8fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11342
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This change adds AES and GHASH assembly from upstream, with the aim of
speeding up AES-GCM.
The PPC64LE assembly matches the interface of the ARMv8 assembly so I've
changed the prefix of both sets of asm functions to be the same
("aes_hw_").
Otherwise, the new assmebly files and Perlasm match exactly those from
upstream's c536b6be1a (from their master branch).
Before:
Did 1879000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000428us (1878196.1 ops/sec): 30.1 MB/s
Did 61000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1006660us (60596.4 ops/sec): 81.8 MB/s
Did 11000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1072649us (10255.0 ops/sec): 84.0 MB/s
Did 1665000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000591us (1664016.6 ops/sec): 26.6 MB/s
Did 52000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1006971us (51640.0 ops/sec): 69.7 MB/s
Did 8840 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1013294us (8724.0 ops/sec): 71.5 MB/s
After:
Did 4994000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000017us (4993915.1 ops/sec): 79.9 MB/s
Did 1389000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000073us (1388898.6 ops/sec): 1875.0 MB/s
Did 319000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000101us (318967.8 ops/sec): 2613.0 MB/s
Did 4668000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000149us (4667304.6 ops/sec): 74.7 MB/s
Did 1202000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000646us (1201224.0 ops/sec): 1621.7 MB/s
Did 269000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1002804us (268247.8 ops/sec): 2197.5 MB/s
Change-Id: Id848562bd4e1aa79a4683012501dfa5e6c08cfcc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11262
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We were never really testing this.
Change-Id: Ia953870053d16d3994ae48172017d384c7bc3601
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11341
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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One of Chromium's toolchains can't handle this for some reason. See also
empty_crls and empty in TestVerify.
Change-Id: I5e6a849f3042288da2e406882ae5cfec249a86ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11340
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This mirror's 2dc0204603 on the C side.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Iebb72df5a5ae98cb2fd8db519d973cd734ff05ea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11320
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This is in preparation for implementing the version extension and is
probably what we should have done from the beginning as it makes
intolerance bugs simpler.
This means knobs like SendClientVersion and SendServerVersion deal with
the wire values while knobs like NegotiateVersion and MaxVersion deal
with logical versions. (This matches how the bugs have always worked.
SendFoo is just a weird post-processing bit on the handshake messages
while NegotiateVersion actually changes how BoGo behaves.)
BUG=90
Change-Id: I7f359d798d0899fa2742107fb3d854be19e731a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11300
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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It didn't clean up |profiles| on error or check for
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push failures.
Change-Id: I44d7f64896ad73347fbb0fc79752be4de70d3ab7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11323
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also tidy up the logic slightly.
Change-Id: I708254406b2df52435ec434ac9806e8eb2cbe928
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11322
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The COMMANDs will “not necessarily composed into a stateful shell or
batch script” so the change directory needs to be linked with the
command that needs it. This fixes “make run_tests”.
Change-Id: I364530fe1331aba7fa9899616916f610981c2c95
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11263
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Change-Id: I49cab08b085dde187e9b1aaaee0e5aa44595f8b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11280
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If someone is still using EVP_PKEY_EC (I really should get on converting
Chromium...), don't silently skip the curve match check in TLS 1.3,
otherwise it may work on accident. Refuse to sign anything so this gets
caught.
Change-Id: I4ea46efb0b8f31a656771b9d2e5f882bba64eb99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11244
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This GREASEs cipher suites, groups, and extensions. For now, we'll
always place them in a hard-coded position. We can experiment with more
interesting strategies later.
If we add new ciphers and curves, presumably we prefer them over current
ones, so place GREASE values at the front. This prevents implementations
from parsing only the first value and ignoring the rest.
Add two new extensions, one empty and one non-empty. Place the empty one
in front (IBM WebSphere can't handle trailing empty extensions) and the
non-empty one at the end.
Change-Id: If2e009936bc298cedf2a7a593ce7d5d5ddbb841a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11241
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The high-level documentation for CBB describes using CBB_flush when a
child goes out of scope, but the function level documentation for
CBB_flush is less clear that CBB_flush will result in the CBB being
safe to use after the children go out of scope.
Change-Id: I58bf9e59a87d2be31a969097455aeeae6381efb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11261
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We used upstream's reformat script, but they had stuck hyphens
everywhere to tell indent to leave a comment alone. Fix this one since
it was especially hard to read.
Change-Id: I9f43bd57dbcf66b79b775ad10ee67867d815ed33
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11243
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This was done by first minimizing the existing set and then merging in a
fresh recording from runner. Glancing through LCOV output does not
reveal anything anomolous. Fuzzer mode seems to be working as expected.
Change-Id: Ife0959a5e16e3c7e2e5a2deb0c32539ff2bc740b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11229
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Get us a little bit more room here.
BUG=79
Change-Id: Ifadad94ead7794755a33f02d340111694b3572af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11228
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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That is an extremely confusing name. It should be NPN-Declined-TLS13.
Change-Id: I0e5fa50a3ddb0b80e88a8bc10d0ef87d0fff0a54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11227
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We recently added a three-connection option, but the transcripts were
still assuming just -Normal and -Resume.
Change-Id: I8816bce95dd7fac779af658e3eb86bc78bb95c91
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11226
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Also IWYU the headers.
BUG=79
Change-Id: Iafee0444c9979496166885db6ba5009cb597cb4d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11225
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This allows the fuzzer to discover server-side resumption paths by
simply supplying what we'd like the ticket to decrypt to in the clear.
We also have a natural way to get transcripts out of runner. We record
the runner-side transcripts, so all resumption handshakes will replay
the shim-created unencrypted tickets.
BUG=104
Change-Id: Icf9cbf4af520077d38e2c8c2766b6f8bfa3c9ab5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11224
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Both the C and Go code were sampling the real clock. With this, two
successive iterations of runner transcripts give the same output.
Change-Id: I4d9e219e863881bf518c5ac199dce938a49cdfaa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11222
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We want to ensure -fuzzer passes tests, except for the tests it
intentionally fails on. This ensures that we don't lose our ability to
refresh the fuzzer transcripts.
Change-Id: I761856c30379a3934fd46a24627ef8415b136f93
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11221
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Apparently we never wrote one of those. Also send a decrypt_error alert
to be consistent with all the other signature checks.
Change-Id: Ib5624d098d1e3086245192cdce92f5df26005064
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11180
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
SSL_peek works fine for us, but OpenSSL 1.1.0 regressed this
(https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1563), and we don't have
tests either. Fix this.
SSL_peek can handle all weird events that SSL_read can, so use runner
and tell bssl_shim to do a SSL_peek + SSL_peek + SSL_read instead of
SSL_read. Then add tests for all the events we may discover.
Change-Id: I9e8635e3ca19653a02a883f220ab1332d4412f98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11090
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream makes 0 mean "min/max supported version". Match that behavior,
although call it "default" instead. It shouldn't get you TLS 1.3 until
we're ready to turn it on everywhere.
BUG=90
Change-Id: I9f122fceb701b7d4de2ff70afbc1ffdf370cb97e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11181
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We'd previously been assuming we'd want to predict P-256 and X25519 but,
on reflection, that's nonsense. Although, today, P-256 is widespread and
X25519 is less so, that's not the right question to ask. Those servers
are all 1.2.
The right question is whether we believe enough servers will get to TLS
1.3 before X25519 to justify wasting 64 bytes on all other connections.
Given that OpenSSL has already shipped X25519 and Microsoft was doing
interop testing on X25519 around when we were shipping it, I think the
answer is no.
Moreover, if we are wrong, it will be easier to go from predicting one
group to two rather than the inverse (provided we send a fake one with
GREASE). I anticipate prediction-miss HelloRetryRequest logic across the
TLS/TCP ecosystem will be largely untested (no one wants to pay an RTT),
so taking a group out of the predicted set will likely be a risky
operation.
Only predicting one group also makes things a bit simpler. I haven't
done this here, but we'll be able to fold the 1.2 and 1.3 ecdh_ctx's
together, even.
Change-Id: Ie7e42d3105aca48eb9d97e2e05a16c5379aa66a3
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The old numbers violate a MUST-level requirement in TLS 1.2 to not
advertise anonymous (0x0700 ends in 0x00). The spec has been updated
with new allocations which avoid these.
BUG=webrtc:6342
Change-Id: Ia5663ada98fa1ebf0f8a7f50fe74a0e9206c4194
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11131
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
