This reverts commit ba70118d8e. Reverting this
did not resolve the regression and the cause is now known.
BUG=593963
Change-Id: Ic5e24b74e8f16b01d9fdd80f267a07ef026c82cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7454
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
People seem to condition on these a lot. Since this code has now been moved
twice, just make them all cross-module errors rather than leave a trail of
renamed error codes in our wake.
Change-Id: Iea18ab3d320f03cf29a64a27acca119768c4115c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7431
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If the values of any of the coordinates in the output point |r| were
negative during nistz256 multiplication, then the calls to
|bn_set_word| would result in the wrong coordinates being returned
(the negatives of the correct coordinates would be returned instead).
Fix that.
Change-Id: I6048e62f76dca18f625650d11ef5a051c9e672a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7442
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The (internal) constant-time callers of this function already do a
constant-time reduction before calling. And, nobody should be calling
this function with out-of-range coordinates anyway. So, just require
valid coordinates as input.
Further, this function is rarely called, so don't bother with the
optimization to avoid encoding Montgomery encoding of 1 for the Z
coordinate.
Change-Id: I637ffaf4d39135ca17214915b9a8582ea052eea8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7441
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Don't try to fix a bad |x| coordinate by reducing it. Instead, just
fail. This also makes the code clearer; in particular, it was confusing
why |x_| was used for some calculations when it seems like |x| was just
as good or better.
Change-Id: I9a6911f0d2bd72852a26b46f3828eb5ba3ef924f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7440
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We never heap-allocate a GCM128_CONTEXT.
Change-Id: I7e89419ce4d81c1598a4b3a214c44dbbcd709651
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7430
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Although exactly one iteration of cmov_cached will always initialize selected,
it ends up messing with uninitialized memory. Initialize |selected| before the
loop.
BUG=593540
Change-Id: I5921843f68c6dd1dc7f752538825bc43ba75df4a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7415
Reviewed-by: Arnar Birgisson <arnarb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The points are only converted to affine form when there are at least
three points being multiplied (in addition to the generator), but there
never is more than one point, so this is all dead code.
Also, I doubt that the comments "...point at infinity (which normally
shouldn't happen)" in the deleted code are accurate. And, the
projective->affine conversions that were removed from p224-64.c and
p256-64.c didn't seem to properly account for the possibility that any of
those points were at infinity.
Change-Id: I611d42d36dcb7515eabf3abf1857e52ff3b45c92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7100
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If the function returns early due to an error, then the coordinates of the
result will have their |top| value set to a value beyond what has actually
been been written. Fix that, and make it easier to avoid such issues in the
future by refactoring the code.
As a bonus, avoid a false positive MSVC 64-bit opt build "potentially
uninitialized value used" warning.
Change-Id: I8c48deb63163a27f739c8797962414f8ca2588cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6579
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Having |Z_is_one| be out of sync with |Z| could potentially be a very
bad thing, and in the past there have been multiple bugs of this sort,
including one currently in p256-x86_64.c (type confusion: Montgomery-
encoded vs unencoded). Avoid the issue entirely by getting rid of
|Z_is_one|.
Change-Id: Icb5aa0342df41d6bc443f15f952734295d0ee4ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6576
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This could live in decrepit, but it's tiny and having it makes the
interface more uniform that what we have for MD5 so I put it in the main
code. This is to more easily support nmap.
Change-Id: Ia098cc7ef6e00a90d2f3f56ee7deba8329c9a82e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7400
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reverts commit b944882f26.
Recent Chrome canaries show a visible jump in ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR which
coincided with a DEPS roll that included this change. Speculatively revert it
to see if they go back down afterwards.
Change-Id: I067798db144c348d666985986dfb9720d1153b7a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7391
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This removes a hard dependency on |BN_mod_exp|, which will allow the
linker to drop it in programs that don't use other features that
require it.
Also, remove the |mont| member of |bn_blinding_st| in favor of having
callers pass it when necssaary. The |mont| member was a weak reference,
and weak references tend to be error-prone.
Finally, reduce the scope of some parts of the blinding code to
|static|.
Change-Id: I16d8ccc2d6d950c1bb40377988daf1a377a21fe6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7111
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See also 1b0c438e1a.
Change-Id: Ifcfe15caa4d0db8ef725f8dacd0e8c5c94b00a09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7390
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Instead of crashing when an empty key is passed to
EVP_marshal_public_key(), return with an
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM_ERROR. This brings e.g. X509_PUBKEY_set()
closer to how it behaved before 68772b31 (previously, it returned an
error on an empty public key rather than dereferencing pkey->ameth).
Change-Id: Ieac368725adb7f22329c035d9d0685b44b885888
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7351
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I went with NID_x25519 to match NID_sha1 and friends in being lowercase.
However, upstream seems to have since chosen NID_X25519. Match their
name.
Change-Id: Icc7b183a2e2dfbe42c88e08e538fcbd242478ac3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7331
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
C is still kind of unsure about the whole two's complement thing and leaves
left-shifting of negative numbers undefined. Sadly, some sanitizers believe in
teaching the controversy and complain when code relies on the theory of two's
complement.
Shushing these sanitizers in this case is easier than fighting with build
configuration, so replace the shifts with masks. (This is equivalent as the
left-shift was of a value right-shifted by the same amount. Instead, we store
the unshifted value in carry0, etc., and mask off the bottom bits.) A few other
places get casts to unsigned types which, by some miracle, C compilers are
forbidden from miscompiling.
This is imported from upstream's b95779846dc876cf959ccf96c49d4c0a48ea3082 and
5b7af0dd6c9315ca76fba16813b66f5792c7fe6e.
Change-Id: I6bf8156ba692165940c0c4ea1edd5b3e88ca263e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7320
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The coverage tool revealed that we weren't testing all codepaths of the ChaCha
assembly. Add a standalone test as it's much easier to iterate over all lengths
when there isn't the entire AEAD in the way.
I wasn't able to find a really long test vector, so I generated a random one
with the Go implementation we have in runner.
This test gives us full coverage on the ChaCha20_ssse3 variant. (We'll see how
it fares on the other codepaths when the multi-variant test harnesses get in. I
certainly hope there isn't a more novel way to call ChaCha20 than this...)
Change-Id: I087e421c7351f46ea65dacdc7127e4fbf5f4c0aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7299
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Only the 32-bit AVX2 code path needs this, but upstream choose to harmonize all
vector code paths.
RT#4346
(Imported from 1ea8ae5090f557fea2e5b4d5758b10566825d74b.)
Tested the new code manually on arm and aarch64, NEON and non-NEON. Steven
reports that all variants pass on x86 and x86-64 too.
I've left the 32-bit x86 AVX2 code disabled since valgrind can't measure the
code coverage, but this avoids diff with upstream. We can enable it if we ever
end up caring.
Change-Id: Id9becc2adfbe44b84764f8e9c1fb5e8349c4d5a8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7295
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The |fprintf| dependency is quite heavyweight for small targets. Also,
using |fprintf| on a closed file dsecriptor is undefined behavior, and
there's no way that this code can know whether |stderr| has already
been closed. So, just don't do it.
Change-Id: I1277733afe0649ae1324d11cac84826a1056e308
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6812
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If running the stack through a fuzzer, we would like execution to be
completely deterministic. This is gated on a
BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE #ifdef.
For now, this just uses the zero ChaCha20 key and a global counter. As
needed, we can extend this to a thread-local counter and a separate
ChaCha20 stream and counter per input length.
Change-Id: Ic6c9d8a25e70d68e5dc6804e2c234faf48e51395
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There was some uncertainty about what the code is doing with |$end0|
and whether it was necessary for |$len| to be a multiple of 16 or 96.
Hopefully these added comments make it clear that the code is correct
except for the caveat regarding low memory addresses.
Change-Id: Iea546a59dc7aeb400f50ac5d2d7b9cb88ace9027
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7194
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was dropped in d27441a9cb due to lack
of use, but node.js now needs it.
Change-Id: I1e207d4b46fc746cfae309a0ea7bbbc04ea785e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7270
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See also upstream's dc22d6b37e8058a4334e6f98932c2623cd3d8d0d. (Though I'm not
sure why they didn't need to fix cmov.)
Change-Id: I2a194a8aea1734d4c1e7f6a0536a636379381627
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 64333004a41a9f4aa587b8e5401420fb70d00687.)
RT#4284.
This case should be impossible to hit because |EC_POINT_add| doesn't use
this function and trying to add equal inputs should never occur during a
multiplication. Support for this exists because the pattern has been
copied from the first 64-bit P-224 and P-256 work that Emilia, Bodo and
I did. There it seemed like a reasonable defense-in-depth in case the
code changed in the future.
Change-Id: I7ff138669c5468b7d7a5153429bec728cb67e338
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7246
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 515f3be47a0b58eec808cf365bc5e8ef6917266b)
Additional hardening following on from CVE-2016-0702.
Change-Id: I19a6739b401887a42eb335fe5838379dc8d04100
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7245
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 25d14c6c29b53907bf614b9964d43cd98401a7fc.)
At the same time remove miniscule bias in final subtraction. Performance
penalty varies from platform to platform, and even with key length. For
rsa2048 sign it was observed to be 4% for Sandy Bridge and 7% on
Broadwell.
(This is part of the fix for CVE-2016-0702.)
Change-Id: I43a13d592c4a589d04c17c33c0ca40c2d7375522
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7244
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 08ea966c01a39e38ef89e8920d53085e4807a43a)
Performance penalty is 2%.
(This is part of the fix for CVE-2016-0702.)
Change-Id: Id3b6262c5d3201dd64b93bdd34601a51794a9275
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7243
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's ef98503eeef5c108018081ace902d28e609f7772.)
Performance penalty is 2% on Linux and 5% on Windows.
(This is part of the fix for CVE-2016-0702.)
Change-Id: If82f95131c93168282a46ac5a35e2b007cc2bd67
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7242
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 708dc2f1291e104fe4eef810bb8ffc1fae5b19c1.)
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even key
length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to reach almost 10%.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2016-0702.
Change-Id: Ie0860bf3e531196f03102db1bc48eeaf30ab1d58
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7241
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 10c639a8a56c90bec9e332c7ca76ef552b3952ac)
Change-Id: Ia8203eeae9d274249595a6e352ec2f77a97ca5d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7227
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If d2i_PrivateKey hit the PKCS#8 codepath, it didn't enforce that the key was
of the specified type.
Note that this requires tweaking d2i_AutoPrivateKey slightly. A PKCS #8
PrivateKeyInfo may have 3 or 4 elements (optional attributes), so we were
relying on this bug for d2i_AutoPrivateKey to work.
Change-Id: If50b7a742f535d208e944ba37c3a585689d1da43
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7253
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They fail the newly-added in-place tests. Since we don't have bots for them
yet, verified manually that the arm and aarch64 code is fine.
Change-Id: Ic6f4060f63e713e09707af05e6b7736b7b65c5df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7252
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Cases where the input and output buffers overlap are always a little
odd. This change adds a test to ensures that the (generic) AEADs
function in these situations.
Change-Id: I6f1987a5e10ddef6b2b8f037a6d50737a120bc99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7195
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Forgot to delete a line.
Change-Id: Ia1fb2904398816d495045dc237337f0be5b09272
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7250
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 04f2a0b50d219aafcef2fa718d91462b587aa23d)
Change-Id: Ie840edeb1fc9d5a4273f137467e3ef16528c9668
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7234
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This isn't a problem when called from EVP, since the buffer is
aligned in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX. The increment counter code is also
fixed to deal with overflow.
(Imported from upstream's 6533a0b8d1ed12aa5f7dfd7a429eec67c5486bb5)
Change-Id: I8d7191c3d3873db254a551085d2358d90bc8397a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7233
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
While we're here, may as well test others.
Change-Id: I711528641a3f7dd035c696c3c1d6b035437c91cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7239
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The high bits of the type get used for the V_ASN1_NEG bit, so when used with
ASN1_ANY/ASN1_TYPE, universal tags become ambiguous. This allows one to create
a negative zero, which should be impossible. Impose an upper bound on universal
tags accepted by crypto/asn1 and add a test.
BUG=590615
Change-Id: I363e01ebfde621c8865101f5bcbd5f323fb59e79
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7238
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's e9cf5f03666bb82f0184e4f013702d0b164afdca and
29305f4edc886db349f2beedb345f9dd93311c09)
Change-Id: I0fa019e9d337676a84a7a6c103d2c4e14e18aede
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7240
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's 3661bb4e7934668bd99ca777ea8b30eedfafa871.)
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.
Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and Hanno Böck
<hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.
BUG=590615
Change-Id: I8959e8ae01510a5924862a3f353be23130eee554
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7199
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reduce the maximum RSA exponent size to 33 bits, regardless of modulus
size, for public key operations.
Change-Id: I88502b1033d8854696841531031298e8ad96a467
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6901
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's not used anywhere else, in the library or consumers (Google ones or
ones I could find on Debian codesearch). This is a sufficiently
specialized function that the risk of a third-party library newly
depending on it is low. This removes the last include of asn1.h or
x509.h in crypto/evp.
(This is almost entirely cosmetic because it wasn't keeping the static linker
from doing the right thing anyway. But if we were want to separate the legacy
ASN.1 stack into its own decrepit-like target, we'll need to be pickier about
separation.)
Change-Id: I9be97c9321572e3a2ed093e1d50036b7654cff41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7080
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A number of values have fallen off now that code's been shuffled
around.
Change-Id: I5eac1d3fa4a9335c6aa72b9876d37bb9a9a029ac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7029
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Functions which lose object reuse and need auditing:
- d2i_PrivateKey
This removes evp_asn1.c's dependency on the old stack. (Aside from
obj/.) It also takes old_priv_decode out of EVP_ASN1_METHOD in favor of
calling out to the new-style function. EVP_ASN1_METHOD no longer has any
old-style type-specific serialization hooks, only the PKCS#8 and SPKI
ones.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: Ic142dc05a5505b50e4717c260d3893b20e680194
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7027
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
