This code has caused a long history of problems. This change rewrites it
completely with something that is, hopefully, much simplier and robust
and adds more testing.
Change-Id: Ibeef51f9386afd95d5b73316e451eb3a2d7ec4e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8033
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Constants representing TLS 1.3 are added to allow for future work to be
flagged on TLS1_3_VERSION. To prevent BoringSSL from negotiating the
non-existent TLS 1.3 version, it is explicitly disabled using
SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3.
Change-Id: Ie5258a916f4c19ef21646c4073d5b4a7974d6f3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8041
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This renames the Channel ID EncryptedExtensions message to allow for
compatibility with TLS 1.3 EncryptedExtensions.
Change-Id: I5b67d00d548518045554becb1b7213fba86731f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8040
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL's bbio logic is kind of crazy. It would be good to eventually do the
buffering in a better way (notably, bbio is fragile, if not outright broken,
for DTLS). In the meantime, this fixes a number of bugs where the existence of
bbio was leaked in the public API and broke things.
- SSL_get_wbio returned the bbio during the handshake. It must always return
the BIO the consumer configured. In doing so, internal accesses of
SSL_get_wbio should be switched to ssl->wbio since those want to see bbio.
For consistency, do the same with rbio.
- The logic in SSL_set_rfd, etc. (which I doubt is quite right since
SSL_set_bio's lifetime is unclear) would get confused once wbio got wrapped.
Those want to compare to SSL_get_wbio.
- If SSL_set_bio was called mid-handshake, bbio would get disconnected and lose
state. It forgets to reattach the bbio afterwards. Unfortunately, Conscrypt
does this a lot. It just never ended up calling it at a point where the bbio
would cause problems.
- Make more explicit the invariant that any bbio's which exist are always
attached. Simplify a few things as part of that.
Change-Id: Ia02d6bdfb9aeb1e3021a8f82dcbd0629f5c7fb8d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8023
Reviewed-by: Kenny Root <kroot@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The 'elliptic_curves' extension is being renamed to 'supported_groups'
in the TLS 1.3 draft, and most of the curve-specific methods are
generalized to groups/group IDs.
Change-Id: Icd1a1cf7365c8a4a64ae601993dc4273802610fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7955
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
open_iscsi assumes that it can get |OPENSSL_malloc| after including only
pem.h and err.h. Since pem.h already includes quite a lot, this change
adds crypto.h to that set so that open_iscsi is happy.
Change-Id: I6dc06c27088ce3ca46c1ab53bb29650033cba267
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8031
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The key schedule in TLS 1.3 requires a separate Extract and Expand phase
for the cryptographic computations.
Change-Id: Ifdac1237bda5212de5d4f7e8db54e202151d45ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7983
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CECPQ1 is a new key exchange that concatenates the results of an X25519
key agreement and a NEWHOPE key agreement.
Change-Id: Ib919bdc2e1f30f28bf80c4c18f6558017ea386bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7962
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is consistent with the new convention in ssl_ecdh.c.
Along the way, change newhope_test.c to not iterate 1000 times over each
test.
Change-Id: I7a500f45b838eba8f6df96957891aa8e880ba089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8012
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We don't have any of these.
Change-Id: I8d12284fbbab0ff35ac32d35a5f2eba326ab79f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7981
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They're completely unused now. The handshake message reassembly logic should
not depend on the state machine. This should partially free it up (ugly as it
is) to be shared with a future TLS 1.3 implementation while, in parallel, it
and the layers below, get reworked. This also cuts down on the number of states
significantly.
Partially because I expect we'd want to get ssl_hash_message_t out of there
too. Having it in common code is fine, but it needs to be in the (supposed to
be) protocol-agnostic handshake state machine, not the protocol-specific
handshake message layer.
Change-Id: I12f9dc57bf433ceead0591106ab165d352ef6ee4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7949
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than this confusing coordination with the handshake state machine and
init_num changing meaning partway through, use the length field already in
BUF_MEM. Like the new record layer parsing, is no need to keep track of whether
we are reading the header or the body. Simply keep extending the handshake
message until it's far enough along.
ssl3_get_message still needs tons of work, but this allows us to disentangle it
from the handshake state.
Change-Id: Ic2b3e7cfe6152a7e28a04980317d3c7c396d9b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7948
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BUF_MEM is actually a rather silly API for the SSL stack. There's separate
length and max fields, but init_buf effectively treats length as max and max as
nothing.
We possibly don't want to be using it long-term anyway (if nothing else, the
char*/uint8_t* thing is irritating), but in the meantime, it'll be easier to
separately fix up get_message's book-keeping and state tracking from where the
handshake gets its messages from.
Change-Id: I9e56ea008173991edc8312ec707505ead410a9ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7947
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The existing logic gets confused in a number of cases around close_notify vs.
fatal alert. SSL_shutdown, while still pushing to the error queue, will fail to
notice alerts. We also get confused if we try to send a fatal alert when we've
already sent something else.
Change-Id: I9b1d217fbf1ee8a9c59efbebba60165b7de9689e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7952
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This function will return whether BoringSSL was built with
OPENSSL_NO_ASM. This will allow us to write a test in our internal
codebase which asserts that normal builds should always have assembly
code included.
Change-Id: Ib226bf63199022f0039d590edd50c0cc823927b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7960
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This function is only really useful for DSA signature verification,
which is something that isn't performance-sensitive. Replace its
optimized implementation with a naïve implementation that's much
simpler.
Note that it would be simpler to use |BN_mod_mul| in the new
implementation; |BN_mod_mul_montgomery| is used instead only to be
consistent with other work being done to replace uses of non-Montgomery
modular reduction with Montgomery modular reduction.
Change-Id: If587d463b73dd997acfc5b7ada955398c99cc342
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7732
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
sk_FOO_num may be called on const stacks. Given that was wrong, I suspect no
one ever uses a const STACK_OF(T)...
Other macros were correctly const, but were casting the constness a way (only
to have it come back again).
Also remove the extra newline after a group. It seems depending on which
version of clang-format was being used, we'd either lose or keep the extra
newline. The current file doesn't have them, so settle on that.
Change-Id: I19de6bc85b0a043d39c05ee3490321e9f0adec60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7946
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The array is of size two for the level and description, not because we allow
two alerts outstanding; we don't.
Change-Id: I25e42c059ce977a947397a3dc83e9684bc8f0595
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7940
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
|BN_mod_exp_mont_word| is only useful when the base is a single word
in length and timing side channel protection of the exponent is not
needed. That's never the case in real life.
Keep the function in the API, but removes its single-word-base
optimized implementation with a call to |BN_mod_exp_mont|.
Change-Id: Ic25f6d4f187210b681c6ee6b87038b64a5744958
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7731
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This allows an application to override the default of 1 second, which
is what's instructed in RFC 6347 but is not an absolute requirement.
Change-Id: I0bbb16e31990fbcab44a29325b6ec7757d5789e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7930
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also add a test.
This is the last of the openssl/asn1.h includes from the directories that are
to be kept in the core libcrypto library. (What remains is to finish sorting
out the crypto/obj stuff. We'll also want to retain a decoupled version of the
PKCS#12 stuff.)
Functions that need to be audited for reuse:
i2d_DHparams
BUG=54
Change-Id: Ibef030a98d3a93ae26e8e56869f14858ec75601b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7900
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The BORINGSSL_YYYYMM #defines have served well to coordinate short-term skews
in BoringSSL's public API, but some consumers (notably wpa_supplicant in
Android) wish to build against multiple versions for an extended period of
time. Consumers should not do this unless there is no alternative, but to
accommodate this, start a BORINGSSL_API_VERSION counter. In future, instead of
BORINGSSL_YYYYMM #defines, we'll simply increment the number.
This is specifically called an "API version" rather than a plain "version" as
this number does not denote any particular point in development or stability.
It purely counts how many times we found it convenient to let the preprocessor
observe a public API change up to now.
Change-Id: I39f9740ae8e793cef4c2b5fb5707b9763b3e55ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7870
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, the verification was only done when using the CRT method,
as the CRT method has been shown to be extremely sensitive to fault
attacks. However, there's no reason to avoid doing the verification
when the non-CRT method is used (performance-sensitive applications
should always be using the CRT-capable keys).
Previously, when we detected a fault (attack) through this verification,
libcrypto would fall back to the non-CRT method and assume that the
non-CRT method would give a correct result, despite having just
detecting corruption that is likely from an attack. Instead, just give
up, like NSS does.
Previously, the code tried to handle the case where the input was not
reduced mod rsa->n. This is (was) not possible, so avoid trying to
handle that. This simplifies the equality check and lets us use
|CRYPTO_memcmp|.
Change-Id: I78d1e55520a1c8c280cae2b7256e12ff6290507d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7582
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
(Imported from upstream's 9b08619cb45e75541809b1154c90e1a00450e537.)
Change-Id: Ib2e1e7cd086f9c3f0d689d61947f8ec3e9220049
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7842
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In the past we have needed the ability to deploy security fixes to our
frontend systems without leaking them in source code or in published
binaries.
This change adds a function that provides some infrastructure for
supporting this in BoringSSL while meeting our internal build needs. We
do not currently have any specific patch that requires this—this is
purely preparation.
Change-Id: I5c64839e86db4e5ea7419a38106d8f88b8e5987e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7849
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If we're to allow the buggy CPU workaround to fire when __ARM_NEON__ is set,
CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable also needs to be aware of it. Also add an API to export
this value out of BoringSSL, so we can get some metrics on how prevalent this
chip is.
BUG=chromium:606629
Change-Id: I97d65a47a6130689098b32ce45a8c57c468aa405
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7796
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts commits:
- 9158637142
- a90aa64302
- c0d8b83b44
It turns out code outside of BoringSSL also mismatches Init and Update/Final
functions. Since this is largely cosmetic, it's probably not worth the cost to
do this.
Change-Id: I14e7b299172939f69ced2114be45ccba1dbbb704
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7793
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As with SHA512_Final, use the different APIs rather than store md_len.
Change-Id: Ie1150de6fefa96f283d47aa03de0f18de38c93eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7722
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than store md_len, factor out the common parts of SHA384_Final and
SHA512_Final and then extract the right state. Also add a missing
SHA384_Transform and be consistent about "1" vs "one" in comments.
This also removes the NULL output special-case which no other hash function
had.
Change-Id: If60008bae7d7d5b123046a46d8fd64139156a7c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7720
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There was only one function that required BoringSSL to know how to read
directories. Unfortunately, it does have some callers and it's not immediately
obvious whether the code is unreachable. Rather than worry about that, just
toss it all into decrepit.
In doing so, do away with the Windows and PNaCl codepaths. Only implement
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX on Linux.
Change-Id: Ie64d20254f2f632fadc3f248bbf5a8293ab2b451
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7661
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C and C++ disagree on the sizes of empty structs, which can be rather bad for
structs embedded in public headers. Stick a char in them to avoid issues. (It
doesn't really matter for CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX, but it's easier to add a char in
there too.)
Thanks to Andrew Chi for reporting this issue.
Change-Id: Ic54fff710b688decaa94848e9c7e1e73f0c58fd3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7760
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
aosp-master has been updated past the point that this is necessary. Sadly, all
the other hacks still are. I'll try to get things rolling so we can ditch the
others in time.
Change-Id: If7b3aad271141fb26108a53972d2d3273f956e8d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Due to Android's complex branching scheme, we have to keep building against a
snapshotted version of wpa_supplicant. wpa_supplicant, in preparation for
OpenSSL 1.1.0, added compatibility versions of some accessors that we, in
working towards opaquification, have imported. This causes a conflict (C does
not like having static and non-static functions share a name).
Add a hack in the headers to suppress the conflicting accessors when
BORINGSSL_SUPPRESS_ACCESSORS is defined. Android releases which include an
updated BoringSSL will also locally carry this #define in wpa_supplicant build
files. Once we can be sure releases of BoringSSL will only see a new enough
wpa_supplicant (one which includes a to-be-submitted patch), we can ditch this.
Change-Id: I3e27fde86bac1e59077498ee5cbd916cd880821e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Opaquifying SSL_SESSION is less important than the other structs, but this will
cause less turbulence in wpa_supplicant if we add this API too. Semantics and
name taken from OpenSSL 1.1.0 to match.
BUG=6
Change-Id: Ic39f58d74640fa19a60aafb434dd2c4cb43cdea9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7725
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Probably better to keep it out of the way for someone just trying to figure out
how to use the library. Notably, we don't really want people to think they need
to use the directioned init function.
Change-Id: Icacc2061071581abf46e38eb1d7a52e7b1f8361b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It has all of one function in there.
Change-Id: I86f0fbb76d267389c62b63ac01df685acb70535e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7723
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is avoids pulling in BIGNUM for doing a straight-forward addition on a
block-sized value, and avoids a ton of mallocs. It's also -Wconversion-clean,
unlike the old one.
In doing so, this replaces the HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK with EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE.
By having the maximum block size available, most of the temporary values in the
key derivation don't need to be malloc'd.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I940a62bba4ea32bf82b1190098f3bf185d4cc7fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7688
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Also switch the EVP_CIPHER copy to cut down on how frequently we need to cast
back and forth.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I9af1e586ca27793a4ee6193bbb348cf2b28a126e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7689
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The EVP_MD versions do, so the types should bubble up.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ibccbc9ff35bbfd3d164fc28bcdd53ed97c0ab338
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7687
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reduces the chance of double-frees.
BUG=10
Change-Id: I11a240e2ea5572effeddc05acb94db08c54a2e0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7583
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We do not need to support engine-provided verification methods.
Change-Id: Iaad8369d403082b728c831167cc386fdcabfb067
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7311
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In OpenSSL, socket BIOs only used recv/send on Windows and read/write on POSIX.
Align our socket BIOs with that behavior. This should be a no-op, but avoids
frustrating consumers overly sensitive to the syscalls used now that SSL_set_fd
has switched to socket BIOs to align with OpenSSL. b/28138582.
Change-Id: Id4870ef8e668e587d6ef51c5b5f21e03af66a288
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This currently doesn't prefix assembly symbols since they don't pull in
openssl/base.h
BUG=5
Change-Id: Ie0fdc79ae73099f84ecbf3f17604a1e615569b3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7681
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Both the header-level and section-level documentation define curve25519 which
is a little odd.
Change-Id: I81aa2b74e8028d3cfd5635e1d3cfda402ba1ae38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is needed by trousers. As with the PSS function, the version that
assumes SHA-1 is put into decrepit.
Change-Id: I153e8ea0150e48061b978384b600a7b990d21d03
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7670
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
