Reduce the maximum RSA exponent size to 33 bits, regardless of modulus
size, for public key operations.
Change-Id: I88502b1033d8854696841531031298e8ad96a467
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6901
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All the signature algorithm logic depends on X509_ALGOR. This also
removes the X509_ALGOR-based EVP functions which are no longer used
externally. I think those APIs were a mistake on my part. The use in
Chromium was unnecessary (and has since been removed anyway). The new
X.509 stack will want to process the signatureAlgorithm itself to be
able to enforce policies on it.
This also moves the RSA_PSS_PARAMS bits to crypto/x509 from crypto/rsa.
That struct is also tied to crypto/x509. Any new RSA-PSS code would
have to use something else anyway.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I6c4b4573b2800a2e0f863d35df94d048864b7c41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Currently, we correctly refuse to parse version 0 multi-prime keys, but we
still parse version 1 two-prime keys. Both should be rejected.
I missed an additional clause in the spec originally. It seems otherPrimeInfos
is marked OPTIONAL not because it is actually optional, but because they wanted
the two RSAPrivateKey forms to share one definition. The prose rules following
the definition imply that otherPrimeInfos' presence is entirely determined by
the version:
* version is the version number, for compatibility with future
revisions of this document. It shall be 0 for this version of the
document, unless multi-prime is used, in which case it shall be 1.
Version ::= INTEGER { two-prime(0), multi(1) }
(CONSTRAINED BY
{-- version must be multi if otherPrimeInfos present --})
and:
* otherPrimeInfos contains the information for the additional primes
r_3, ..., r_u, in order. It shall be omitted if version is 0 and
shall contain at least one instance of OtherPrimeInfo if version
is 1.
Change-Id: I458232a2e20ed68fddcc39c4c45333f33441f70b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7143
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
An i2d compatibility function is rather long, so add CBB_finish_i2d for
part of it. It takes a CBB as input so only a 'marshal' function is
needed, rather than a 'to_bytes' one.
Also replace the *inp d2i update pattern with a slightly shorter one.
Change-Id: Ibb41059c9532f6a8ce33460890cc1afe26adc97c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6868
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C has implicit conversion of |void *| to other pointer types so these
casts are unnecessary. Clean them up to make the code easier to read
and to make it easier to find dangerous casts.
Change-Id: I26988a672e8ed4d69c75cfbb284413999b475464
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7102
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I guess the comment "just a reference" was intended to mean that the
|mod| member is a weak reference to a |BIGNUM| owned by something else.
However, it is actually owned by the |bn_blinding_st|, as one can see
by reading |BN_BLINDING_new| and |BN_BLINDING_free|.
Change-Id: If2a681fc9d9db536170e0efb11fdab93e4f0baba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7112
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The |_ex| versions of these functions are unnecessary because when they
are used, they are always passed |NULL| for |r|, which is what the
non-|_ex| versions do. Just use the non-|_ex| versions instead and
remove the |_ex| versions.
Also, drop the unused flags mechanism.
Change-Id: Ida4cb5a2d4c89d9cd318e06f71867aea98408d0d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7110
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
There's many ways to serialize a BIGNUM, so not including asn1 in the name is
confusing (and collides with BN_bn2cbb_padded). Since BN_asn12bn looks
ridiculous, match the parse/marshal naming scheme of other modules instead.
Change-Id: I53d22ae0537a98e223ed943e943c48cb0743cf51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6822
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
After its initial assignment, |e| is immediately reassigned another
value and so the initial assignment from |BN_CTX_get| is useless. If
that were not the case, then the |BN_free(e)| at the end of the
function would be very bad.
Change-Id: Id63a172073501c8ac157db9188a22f55ee36b205
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6951
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
rsa_default_encrypt allowed an RSA modulus 8 times larger than the
intended maximum size due to bits vs. bytes confusion.
Further, as |rsa_default_encrypt| got this wrong while
|rsa_default_verify_raw| got it right, factor out the duplicated logic
so that such inconsistencies are less likely to occur.
BUG=576856
Change-Id: Ic842fadcbb3b140d2ba4295793457af2b62d9444
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6900
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This check was fixed a while ago, but it could have been much simpler.
In the RSA key exchange, the expected size of the output is known, making the
padding check much simpler. There isn't any use in exporting the more general
RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2. (Without knowing the expected size, any
integrity check or swap to randomness or other mitigation is basically doomed
to fail.)
Verified with the valgrind uninitialized memory trick that we're still
constant-time.
Also update rsa.h to recommend against using the PKCS#1 v1.5 schemes.
Thanks to Ryan Sleevi for the suggestion.
Change-Id: I4328076b1d2e5e06617dd8907cdaa702635c2651
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6613
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We should reject RSA public keys with exponents of less than 3.
This change also rejects even exponents, although the usefulness
of such a public key is somewhat questionable.
BUG=chromium:541257
Change-Id: I1499e9762ba40a7cf69155d21d55bc210cd6d273
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6710
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This callback is never used. The one caller I've ever seen is in Android
code which isn't built with BoringSSL and it was a no-op.
It also doesn't actually make much sense. A callback cannot reasonably
assume that it sees every, say, SSL_CTX created because the index may be
registered after the first SSL_CTX is created. Nor is there any point in
an EX_DATA consumer in one file knowing about an SSL_CTX created in
completely unrelated code.
Replace all the pointers with a typedef to int*. This will ensure code
which passes NULL or 0 continues to compile while breaking code which
passes an actual function.
This simplifies some object creation functions which now needn't worry
about CRYPTO_new_ex_data failing. (Also avoids bouncing on the lock, but
it's taking a read lock, so this doesn't really matter.)
BUG=391192
Change-Id: I02893883c6fa8693682075b7b130aa538a0a1437
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove the custom copy of those helpers.
Change-Id: I810c3ae8dbf7bc0654d3e9fb9900c425d36f64aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6611
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most functions can take this in as const. Note this changes an
RSA_METHOD hook, though one I would not expect anyone to override.
Change-Id: Ib70ae65e5876b01169bdc594e465e3e3c4319a8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6419
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Although those are only created by code owned by RSA_METHOD, custom RSA_METHODs
shouldn't be allowed to squat our internal fields and then change how you free
things.
Remove 'method' from their names now that they're not method-specific.
Change-Id: I9494ef9a7754ad59ac9fba7fd463b3336d826e0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6423
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This restores the original semantics of the finished hook.
Change-Id: I70da393c7e66fb6e3be1e2511e08b34bb54fc0b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6422
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Having a single RSA_METHOD means they all get pulled in. Notably, RSA key
generation pulls in the primality-checking code.
Change-Id: Iece480113754da090ddf87b64d8769f01e05d26c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6389
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I799e289a402612446e08f64f59e0243f164cf695
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6372
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's very annoying having to remember the right incant every time I want
to switch around between my build, build-release, build-asan, etc.,
output directories.
Unfortunately, this target is pretty unfriendly without CMake 3.2+ (and
Ninja 1.5+). This combination gives a USES_TERMINAL flag to
add_custom_target which uses Ninja's "console" pool, otherwise the
output buffering gets in the way. Ubuntu LTS is still on an older CMake,
so do a version check in the meantime.
CMake also has its own test mechanism (CTest), but this doesn't use it.
It seems to prefer knowing what all the tests are and then tries to do
its own output management and parallelizing and such. We already have
our own runners. all_tests.go could actually be converted tidily, but
generate_build_files.py also needs to read it, and runner.go has very
specific needs.
Naming the target ninja -C build test would be nice, but CTest squats
that name and CMake grumps when you use a reserved name, so I've gone
with run_tests.
Change-Id: Ibd20ebd50febe1b4e91bb19921f3bbbd9fbcf66c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6270
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
I was a little bit too lazy in error handling here.
Change-Id: I9954957d41d610e715c1976a921dedeb8cb49d40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6240
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init needs a CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup. Also a pile of problems
with x509_lu.c I noticed trying to import some upstream change.
Change-Id: I029a65cd2d30aa31f4832e8fbfe5b2ea0dbc66fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6346
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This extends 79c59a30 to |RSA_public_encrypt|, |RSA_private_encrypt|,
and |RSA_public_decrypt|. It benefits Conscrypt, which expects these
functions to have the same signature as |RSA_public_private_decrypt|.
Change-Id: Id1ce3118e8f20a9f43fd4f7bfc478c72a0c64e4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6286
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I48885402b88309bb514554d209e1827d31738756
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6211
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
- Pass in the right ciphertext length to ensure we're indeed testing
ciphertext corruption (and not truncation).
- Only test one mutation per byte to not make the test too slow.
- Add a separate test for truncated ciphertexts.
(Imported from upstream's 5f623eb61655688501cb1817a7ad0592299d894a.)
Change-Id: I425a77668beac9d391387e3afad8d15ae387468f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5945
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Not content with signing negative RSA moduli, still other Estonian IDs have too
many leading zeros. Work around those too.
This workaround will be removed in six months.
BUG=534766
Change-Id: Ica23b1b1499f9dbe39e94cf7b540900860e8e135
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5980
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Target date for removal of the workaround is 6 months.
BUG=532048
Change-Id: I402f75e46736936725575559cd8eb194115ab0df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5910
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Estonian IDs issued between September 2014 to September 2015 are broken and use
negative moduli. They last five years and are common enough that we need to
work around this bug.
Add parallel "buggy" versions of BN_cbs2unsigned and RSA_parse_public_key which
tolerate this mistake, to align with OpenSSL's previous behavior. This code is
currently hooked up to rsa_pub_decode in RSA_ASN1_METHOD so that d2i_X509 is
tolerant. (This isn't a huge deal as the rest of that stack still uses the
legacy ASN.1 code which is overly lenient in many other ways.)
In future, when Chromium isn't using crypto/x509 and has more unified
certificate handling code, we can put client certificates under a slightly
different codepath, so this needn't hold for all certificates forever. Then in
September 2019, when the broken Estonian certificates all expire, we can purge
this codepath altogether.
BUG=532048
Change-Id: Iadb245048c71dba2eec45dd066c4a6e077140751
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5894
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We were getting this because of C's defaults, but it's fragile to leave
it like this because someone may add another field at the end in the
future.
Change-Id: I8b2dcbbc7cee8062915d15101f99f5a1aae6ad87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5860
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
History has shown there are bugs in not setting the error code
appropriately, which makes any decision making based on
|ERR_peek_last_error|, etc. suspect. Also, this call was interfering
with the link-time optimizer's ability to discard the implementations of
many functions in crypto/err during dead code elimination.
Change-Id: Iba9e553bf0a72a1370ceb17ff275f5a20fca31ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5748
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
arm_arch.h is included from ARM asm files, but lives in crypto/, not
openssl/include/. Since the asm files are often built from a different
location than their position in the source tree, relative include paths
are unlikely to work so, rather than having crypto/ be a de-facto,
second global include path, this change moves arm_arch.h to
include/openssl/.
It also removes entries from many include paths because they should be
needed as relative includes are always based on the locations of the
source file.
Change-Id: I638ff43d641ca043a4fc06c0d901b11c6ff73542
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5746
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
RSA_PADDING_NONE is actually the important one for RSA_decrypt since OAEP isn't
used much and RSA_PKCS1_PADDING is unsafe to use due to timing constraints.
(The SSL stack uses RSA_PADDING_NONE and does the padding check separately.)
Change-Id: I5f9d168e7c34796a41bf01fc1878022742b63501
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5641
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The documentation for |BN_CTX_get| states: "Once |BN_CTX_get| has
returned NULL, all future calls will also return NULL until
|BN_CTX_end| is called." Some code takes advantage of that guarantee
by only checking the return value of the last call to |BN_CTX_get| in a
series of calls. That is correct and the most efficient way of doing
it. However, that pattern is inconsistent with most of the other uses
of |BN_CTX_get|. Also, static analysis tools like Coverity cannot
understand that pattern. This commit removes the instances of that
pattern that Coverity complained about when scanning *ring*.
Change-Id: Ie36d0223ea1caee460c7979547cf5bfd5fb16f93
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5611
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's never used. (Only used upstream as part of some CMS hooks.)
Change-Id: I7c59badc3e4771d7debbef0c3e0def93dc605e7b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5274
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes the version field from RSA and instead handles versioning
as part of parsing. (As a bonus, we now correctly limit multi-prime RSA
to version 1 keys.)
Most consumers are also converted. old_rsa_priv_{de,en}code are left
alone for now. Those hooks are passed in parameters which match the old
d2i/i2d pattern (they're only used in d2i_PrivateKey and
i2d_PrivateKey).
Include a test which, among other things, checks that public keys being
serialized as private keys are handled properly.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: Icdd5f0382c4a84f9c8867024f29756e1a306ba08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5273
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
While I'm here, make them consistent with the keys.
Change-Id: Ib2804dd4f18bbb3b3735fb7772fca590e0d6d624
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5266
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They weren't valid DER. Some lengths were encoded with one more byte
than necessary.
Change-Id: I94c8c525ade835fdeca115af98ab7e5910d2aeb2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5265
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Platform crypto APIs for PKCS#1 RSA signatures vary between expecting the
caller to prepend the DigestInfo prefix (RSA_sign_raw) and prepending it
internally (RSA_sign). Currently, Chromium implements sign or sign_raw as
appropriate. To avoid needing both variants, the new asynchronous methods will
only expose the higher-level one, sign.
To satisfy ports which previously implemented sign_raw, expose the DigestInfo
prefix as a utility function.
BUG=347404
Change-Id: I04c397b5e9502b2942f6698ecf81662a3c9282e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4940
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BN_copy can fail on malloc failure. The case in crypto/rsa was causing the
malloc tests in all_tests.go to infinite loop.
Change-Id: Id5900512013fba9960444d78a8c056aa4314fb2d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5110
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In doing so, check for malloc failures and use scopers as appropriate.
This should clear rsa_test for use with malloc tests. Also replace the
SetKey macro and exploded RSA keys with a DER RSAPrivateKey structure.
Much less tedious.
Change-Id: I3ce092ef67e7ac2af74f509abbdf84b7f2b6d45d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5043
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Mac wants a stdlib.h. Windows wants a void and doesn't like static const in
array declarations.
Change-Id: If1e8fb141e41200cf8a7348c6918c2f22465f5fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5030
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
