The ClientHello record is padded to 1024 bytes when
fastradio_padding is enabled. As a result, the 3G cellular radio
is fast forwarded to DCH (high data rate) state. This mechanism
leads to a substantial redunction in terms of TLS handshake
latency, and benefits mobile apps that are running on top of TLS.
Change-Id: I3d55197b6d601761c94c0f22871774b5a3dad614
We forgot to add those when we implemented the features. (Also relevant because
they will provide test coverage later for configuring features when using the
generic method tables rather than *_client_method.)
Change-Id: Ie08b27de893095e01a05a7084775676616459807
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2410
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This implements session IDs in client and server in runner.go.
Change-Id: I26655f996b7b44c7eb56340ef6a415d3f2ac3503
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2350
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Just the negotiation portion as everything else is external. This feature is
used in WebRTC.
Change-Id: Iccc3983ea99e7d054b59010182f9a56a8099e116
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2310
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Clients all consistently reject mismatches. If a different version was
negotiated, a server should ignore the resumption. This doesn't actually affect
current tests. We really want to be making this change in BoringSSL (and then
upstream), but get the Go half into shape first.
Change-Id: Ieee7e141331d9e08573592e661889bd756dccfa9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2243
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds support to the Go code for renegotiation as a client,
meaning that we can test BoringSSL's renegotiation as a server.
Change-Id: Iaa9fb1a6022c51023bce36c47d4ef7abee74344b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2082
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Only the three plain PSK suites for now. ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 will
be in a follow-up.
Change-Id: Iafc116a5b2798c61d90c139b461cf98897ae23b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Notably, this would have caught ed8270a55c
(although, apart from staring at code coverage, knowing to set resumeSession on
the server test isn't exactly obvious). Perhaps we should systematically set it
on all extension server tests; ClientHello extension parsing happens after
resumption has been determined and is often sensitive to it.
Change-Id: Ie83f294a26881a6a41969e9dbd102d0a93cb68b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This check got refactored in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and broke in the process. Fix this
and add a test. Otherwise things like client auth can get slightly confused; it
will try to sign the MD5/SHA-1 hash, but the TLS 1.2 cipher suite may not use
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT, so those digests won't be available.
Based on upstream's 226751ae4a1f3e00021c43399d7bb51a99c22c17.
Change-Id: I5b864d3a696f3187b849c53b872c24fb7df27924
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1696
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Maintain a handshake buffer in prf.go to implement TLS 1.2 client auth. Also
use it for SSL 3. This isn't strictly necessary as we know the hash functions,
but Go's hash.Hash interface lacks a Copy method.
Also fix the server-side tests which failed to test every TLS version.
Change-Id: I98492c334fbb9f2f0f89ee9c5c8345cafc025600
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1664
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
RFC 6347 changed the meaning of server_version in HelloVerifyRequest. It should
now always be 1.0 with version negotiation not happening until ServerHello. Fix
runner.go logic and remove #if-0'd code in dtls1_get_hello_verify.
Enforce this in the runner for when we get DTLS 1.2 tests.
Change-Id: Ice83628798a231df6bf268f66b4c47b14a519386
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1552
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than switching the order of the ServerHello and HelloVerifyRequest
states and processing each twice, have the states follow the protocol order.
HelloVerifyRequest reading is optional and ServerHello is strict. Use the
send_cookie bit to determine whether we're expecting a cookie or not.
Fix the dtls1_stop_timer call in these states to consistently hit the end of a
server flight; the previous flight should not be cleared from the retransmit
buffer until the entire next flight is received. That said, OpenSSL doesn't
appear to implement the part where, on receipt of the previous peer flight, the
buffered flight is retransmitted. (With the exception of a SSL3_MT_FINISHED
special-case in dtls1_read_bytes.) So if the peer is also OpenSSL, this doesn't
do anything.
Also fix the DTLS test which wasn't actually asserting that the ClientHello
matched.
Change-Id: Ia542190972dbffabb837d32c9d453a243caa90b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Run against openssl s_client and openssl s_server. This seems to work for a
start, although it may need to become cleverer to stress more of BoringSSL's
implementation for test purposes.
In particular, it assumes a reliable, in-order channel. And it requires that
the peer send handshake fragments in order. Retransmit and whatnot are not
implemented. The peer under test will be expected to handle a lossy channel,
but all loss in the channel will be controlled. MAC errors, etc., are fatal.
Change-Id: I329233cfb0994938fd012667ddf7c6a791ac7164
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1390
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Didn't have coverage for abbreviated handshakes with NewSessionTicket. Also add
some missing resumeSession flags so the tests match the comments.
Change-Id: Ie4d76e8764561f3f1f31e1aa9595324affce0db8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1453
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now that the flag is set accurately, use it to enforce that the handshake and
CCS synchronization. If EXPECT_CCS is set, enforce that:
(a) No handshake records may be received before ChangeCipherSpec.
(b) There is no pending handshake data at the point EXPECT_CCS is set.
Change-Id: I04b228fe6a7a771cf6600b7d38aa762b2d553f08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1299
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Test both when the peer doesn't support session tickets and when the server
promises a NewSessionTicket message but doesn't deliver.
Change-Id: I48f338094002beac2e6b80e41851c72822b3b9d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1300
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some test code to insert a bogus session ticket was retained. Also,
decryptTicket mutated its input, in turn, mutating the ClientHello,
breaking the Finished hash.
The latter fix should probably be merged upstream.
Change-Id: I6949f842c67e19df8742561fb0b849af9f5f099d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1290
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change can probably be ported over to upstream crypto/tls. The current Go
TLS implementation ignores the signature and hash algorithm lists in
CertificateVerify and CertificateRequest. Take these into account so that our
tests assert OpenSSL fills them out correctly.
Also fix a bug in the original code where 'err' within the switch block get
shadowed.
Change-Id: I5d9c0b31ebb4662ecc767ed885a20707f0e86216
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1253
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They pass, but this is an error case that is probably worth a test.
Change-Id: I37b2eec34a1781fa8342eea57ee4f9da81ce17ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1257
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Missing ServerKeyExchange is handled, but only because it hits an
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange in trying to find the
server ECDH parameters. Be strict about requiring it for ECDHE.
Change-Id: Ifce5b73c8bd14746b8a2185f479d550e9e3f84df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1157
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This works, but there's enough shared codepaths that it's worth a test to
ensure it stays that way.
Change-Id: I5d5a729811e35832170322957258304213204e3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1155
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
ClientHello and ServerHello are not allowed to include duplicate extensions.
Add a new helper function to check this and call as appropriate. Remove ad-hoc
per-extension duplicate checks which are no unnecessary.
Add runner.go tests to verify such message correctly rejected.
Change-Id: I7babd5b642dfec941459512869e2dd6de26a831c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With this change, calling SSL_enable_fallback_scsv on a client SSL* will
cause the fallback SCSV to be sent.
This is intended to be set when the client is performing TLS fallback
after a failed connection. (This only happens if the application itself
implements this behaviour: OpenSSL does not do fallback automatically.)
The fallback SCSV indicates to the server that it should reject the
connection if the version indicated by the client is less than the
version supported by the server.
See http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv-02.
Change-Id: I478d6d5135016f1b7c4aaa6c306a1a64b1d215a6
Initial fork from f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867 (1.0.2 beta).
(This change contains substantial changes from the original and
effectively starts a new history.)
