I had a brain-fart and had in mind that strings.Index(x[i:], _) would
return a value relative to the beginning of |x|, which is impossible.
Change-Id: I905ea1fa3469ea13f2e3b782c4baf2431b615a2f
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This also fixes TestGetUint to actually test CBS_get_last_u8's behavior.
Right now it can't distinguish CBS_get_last_u8 and CBS_get_u8.
BUG=129
Change-Id: Ie431bb1a828f1c6877938ba7e75c82305b54cf13
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BUG=129
Change-Id: If91d97ea653177d55d5c703f091366ddce24da60
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This is otherwise rather annoying when testing things against a browser
which will usually throw up a cert error or so.
Change-Id: Ia587efae65764430e39e3eb604e434b5919530cb
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This is not actually sensible, but it seemed really funny. PEM files
sometimes carry private keys so, in principle, we'd probably prefer not
to leak the contents when we encode or decode them?
Change-Id: I7b056612bd7f22c28853bc89f56aee1f5103b8fb
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Change-Id: Ie515386b7f3555a5acf42e37b49e9a831571cb4a
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
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When writing tests and BoGo isn't available, it is useful to be able to
configure the set of signature algorithms accepted on the verify side.
Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Ic873189da7f8853e412acd68614df9d9a872a0c8
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DHE ciphers no longer exist!
Change-Id: Id3826ae49164cc1071bc40ea4cf1c5aa451245d6
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FIPS 186-4 prescribes a particular ECDSA nonce selection algorithm,
implemented by BN_range_range_ex. Recast our nonce hardening mechanism
as additional data to be passed into the RBG during that algorithm.
Change-Id: Ic16a10cd58fd7deb7461f0c109a698ea80faff00
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Rather than comparing against both min and max, FIPS prefers comparing
with max - min and adding min. It also does not believe in using
3*range. Align with it, though our old algorithm trivially produces the
same probability distribution on values.
Change-Id: I447cc3608b92ba93706489d702b8d6a68047f491
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FIPS requires that the output of the entropy source be checked to ensure
that no two n-bit blocks are equal.
Change-Id: Ia086ca5c888770e0fd71ee052278f77b544b9983
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14926
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We already do this in the case that getrandom is supported. This change
adds a polling loop for the case where we are using /dev/urandom.
This makes FIPS imply Linux, which I think is fine for the time being.
Change-Id: I9bf5c0f51a908621655cbcc47fc86b0366168b97
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Fork-unsafe buffering was a mode that could be enabled by applications
that were sure that they didn't need to worry about state duplication.
It saved reads to urandom.
Since everything is now going through the CTR-DRBG, we can get the same
effect by simply not reading additional data from urandom in this case.
This change drops the buffering from urandom.c and, instead, implements
fork-unsafe buffering as a mode that skips reading additional data from
urandom, which only happened when RDRAND wasn't available anyway.
Since we expect the power-on self-tests to call into the PRNG, this
change also makes the flag capable of changing at any point by using a
mutex rather than a once. This is split into a separate file so that it
doesn't have to go into the FIPS module—since it uses r/w data that
would be a pain.
Change-Id: I5fd0ead0422e770e35758f080bb1cffa70d0c8da
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This isn't actually used yet, but implements CTR-DRBG from SP 800-90Ar1.
Specifically, it always uses AES-256 and no derivation function.
Change-Id: Ie82b829590226addd7c165eac410a5d584858bfd
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DHE ciphers are gone, so we no longer need to clear drop the "group_id"
field there. That leaves static RSA, but:
- We mass-invalidated every serialized client session in
364f7a6d21, long after we stopped
filling in key_exchange_info on the client.
- Server sessions were not mass-invalidated, but static RSA
key_exchange_info never worked on the server.
This means it is safe to remove this logic.
Change-Id: Id43b233cca066a81686be7c056c530ba8e89f761
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Change-Id: I73213b5d9f3ac67bab70e3d9a36a4b67c558f3f5
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Otherwise the order changes each time, which will make the build
egregiously non-deterministic.
Change-Id: Idd501ecd118c61a27566eafc61157715e48758bc
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References to global symbols generate relocations, which breaks the
integrity check.
Change-Id: If6fa06d5d924294ab496c32e7f082a1ae60fdb24
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Some assembly code references “OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip)” etc, which
slipped by the previous check.
Change-Id: I22c3fbf9883aea695e8584857bf9c0e3113f9a77
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Since only the consumers knows whether an EC key will be used for
ECDSA or ECDHE, it is part of the FIPS policy for the consumer to
check the validity of the generated key before signing with it.
Change-Id: Ie250f655c8fcb6a59cc7210def1e87eb958e9349
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This moves the kinv computation next to k generation and adds a check for group
size as per 186-4 B.5.2.
Change-Id: I8744080d3961bc9e29054985280fc835e3f1e25c
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It's not obvious how to make ASAN happy with the integrity test but this
will let us test FIPS-only code with ASAN at least.
Change-Id: Iac983787e04cb86a158e4416c410d9b2d1e5e03f
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FIPS is not compatible with multiprime RSA. Any multiprime RSA private
keys will fail to parse after this change.
Change-Id: I8d969d668bf0be4f66c66a30e56f0e7f6795f3e9
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FIPS prescribes a slightly different key generation algorithm than we
use. Specifically:
- Rather than using BN_RAND_TOP_TWO (so using 1.5 as an upper bound for
sqrt(2)), it prescribes using sqrt(2) itself. To avoid unnecessary
squaring, we do a comparison against a hard-coded approximation for
sqrt(2) good enough for the largest FIPS key size. I went ahead and
made it constant-time since it was easy, but all this is far from
constant-time.
- FIPS requires a check that |p-q| is sufficiently large.
- FIPS requires a check that d is sufficiently large.
- BN_generate_prime_ex adds some delta to clear a table of prime
numbers. FIPS does not specify any of that, so implement a separate
routine here.
The primality test itself will be aligned in a follow-up. For now, it is
left unchanged, except that trial division is turned back on. That makes
things faster and is analogous the original algorithm's delta-munging
logic.
Change-Id: If32f0635bfb67a8c4740dedd7781d00647bbf60b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14948
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Previously, inject-hash would run the FIPS module in order to trigger a
failure and then extract the calculated hash value from the output. This
makes cross-compiling difficult because the build process needs to run a
binary for the target platform.
This change drops this step. Instead, inject-hash.go parses the object
file itself and calculates the hash without needing to run the module.
Change-Id: I2593daa03094b0a17b498c2e8be6915370669596
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In some cases, consumers may include a BoringSSL header without setting
up include paths. This risks pulling in system OpenSSL headers instead.
For almost every BoringSSL header, the first #include is base.h, which
does not exist upstream, thus the mistake will be caught.
The exception is base.h itself which naturally does not include itself.
Have it include an empty is_boringssl.h header to catch this mistake.
Change-Id: Ia96586ecc627ff46867d8af8b68138185866f074
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The FIPS RSA generation algorithm is unkind to keys with funny bit
sizes. Odd numbers of bits are especially inconvenient, but the sqrt(2)
bound is much simpler if the key size is a multiple of 128 (thus giving
prime sizes a multiple of 64, so the sqrt(2) bound is easier to work
with).
Also impose a minimum RSA key size. 255-bit RSA is far too small as it
is and gives small enough primes that the p-q FIPS bound (2^(n/2-100))
starts risking underflow.
Change-Id: I4583c90b67385e53641ccee9b29044e79e94c920
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This is just some idle cleanup. The padding functions already must
handle size checks. Swap out the error code in the low-level portions to
keep that unchanged.
Also remove an old TODO(fork) about constant-time-ness. Signature
verification padding checks don't need to be constant time, and
decryption ones should be resolved now.
Change-Id: I20e7affdb7f2dce167a304afe707bfd537dd412a
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This change makes util/all_tests.go run as many test binaries
concurrently as there are cores on the current system. This can be
overridden with -num-workers=1.
Change-Id: Ia3a5e336d208039be9276261a0ac03f7fb774677
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This follows up on cedc6f18 by removing support for the
-DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_DHE_TLS compile flag, and the code needed to
support it.
Change-Id: I53b6aa7a0eddd23ace8b770edb2a31b18ba2ce26
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Our test certificate files in ssl/test/runner (which I often use out of
laziness) are not specified in a way compatible with the bssl tool.
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Later CLs will unwind the rest of multiprime RSA support. Start with key
generation.
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That file was getting too huge and we only need to de-static a single
function to do it.
Change-Id: Ie2c0bc90a7e538a74318c364a136c337ce8d9bbb
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As a precursor to removing the code entirely later, disable the protocol
by default. Callers must use SSL_CTX_set_min_version to enable it.
This change also makes SSLv3_method *not* enable SSL 3.0. Normally
version-specific methods set the minimum and maximum version to their
version. SSLv3_method leaves the minimum at the default, so we will
treat it as all versions disabled. To help debugging, the error code is
switched from WRONG_SSL_VERSION to a new NO_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_ENABLED.
This also defines OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 and OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD to kick in
any no-ssl3 build paths in consumers which should provide a convenient
hook for any upstreaming changes that may be needed. (OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
existed in older versions of OpenSSL, so in principle one may encounter
an OpenSSL with the same settings.)
Change-Id: I96a8f2f568eb77b2537b3a774b2f7108bd67dd0c
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Change-Id: I92419b7d2d8ded8f4868588ad3c24b70ac7f7b1b
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Also remove TODO about post-handshake authentication. The only sensible
way to handle unexpected post-handshake authentication is a fatal error
(dropping them would cause a deadlock), and we treat all post-handshake
authentication as unexpected.
BUG=74
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There was a case we were not covering.
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This function is particularly messy as it had a mix of goto err and
return -1, so if we added a cleanup, we may not have noticed a leak.
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Change-Id: I3134b2ed1b2000bf2413c066c6560832c0ff03ae
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