163c95691a
Changing parameters on renegotiation makes all our APIs confusing. This one has no reason to change, so lock it down. In particular, our preference to forbid Token Binding + renego may be overridden at the IETF, even though it's insane. Loosening it will be a bit less of a headache if EMS can't change. https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg00690.html claims that this is already in the specification and enforced by NSS. I can't find anything to this effect in the specification. It just says the client MUST disable renegotiation when EMS is missing, which is wishful thinking. At a glance, NSS doesn't seem to check, though I could be misunderstanding the code. Nonetheless, locking this down is a good idea anyway. Accurate or not, take the email as an implicit endorsement of this from Mozilla. Change-Id: I236b05991d28bed199763dcf2f47bbfb9d0322d7 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10721 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> |
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.. | ||
test | ||
CMakeLists.txt | ||
custom_extensions.c | ||
d1_both.c | ||
d1_lib.c | ||
d1_pkt.c | ||
d1_srtp.c | ||
dtls_method.c | ||
dtls_record.c | ||
handshake_client.c | ||
handshake_server.c | ||
internal.h | ||
s3_both.c | ||
s3_enc.c | ||
s3_lib.c | ||
s3_pkt.c | ||
ssl_aead_ctx.c | ||
ssl_asn1.c | ||
ssl_buffer.c | ||
ssl_cert.c | ||
ssl_cipher.c | ||
ssl_ecdh.c | ||
ssl_file.c | ||
ssl_lib.c | ||
ssl_rsa.c | ||
ssl_session.c | ||
ssl_stat.c | ||
ssl_test.cc | ||
t1_enc.c | ||
t1_lib.c | ||
tls13_both.c | ||
tls13_client.c | ||
tls13_enc.c | ||
tls13_server.c | ||
tls_method.c | ||
tls_record.c |