f64a6eeaf0
Most importantly, this version of delocate works for ppc64le. It should also work for x86-64, but will need significant testing to make sure that it covers all the cases that the previous delocate.go covered. It's less stringtastic than the old code, however the parser isn't as nice as I would have liked. I thought that the reason we put up with AT&T syntax with Intel is so that assembly syntax could be somewhat consistent across platforms. At least for ppc64le, that does not appear to be the case. Change-Id: Ic7e3c6acc3803d19f2c3ff5620c5e39703d74212 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/16464 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
301 lines
7.9 KiB
C
301 lines
7.9 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
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#define _GNU_SOURCE /* needed for syscall() on Linux. */
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#endif
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_FUCHSIA) && \
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!defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE) && !defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#if defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../delocate.h"
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#include "../../internal.h"
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#if defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
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#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
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#define EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom 318
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#elif defined(OPENSSL_X86)
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#define EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom 355
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#elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
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#define EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom 278
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#elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM)
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#define EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom 384
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#elif defined(OPENSSL_PPC64LE)
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#define EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom 359
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#endif
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#if defined(EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom)
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#define USE_SYS_getrandom
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#if defined(SYS_getrandom)
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#if SYS_getrandom != EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom
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#error "system call number for getrandom is not the expected value"
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#endif
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#else /* SYS_getrandom */
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#define SYS_getrandom EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom
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#endif /* SYS_getrandom */
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#endif /* EXPECTED_SYS_getrandom */
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#if !defined(GRND_NONBLOCK)
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#define GRND_NONBLOCK 1
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#endif
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#endif /* OPENSSL_LINUX */
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/* rand_lock is used to protect the |*_requested| variables. */
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DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(rand_lock);
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/* The following constants are magic values of |urandom_fd|. */
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static const int kUnset = 0;
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static const int kHaveGetrandom = -3;
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/* urandom_fd_requested is set by |RAND_set_urandom_fd|. It's protected by
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* |rand_lock|. */
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DEFINE_BSS_GET(int, urandom_fd_requested);
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/* urandom_fd is a file descriptor to /dev/urandom. It's protected by |once|. */
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DEFINE_BSS_GET(int, urandom_fd);
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DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(rand_once);
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#if defined(USE_SYS_getrandom) || defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
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/* message writes |msg| to stderr. We use this because referencing |stderr|
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* with |fprintf| generates relocations, which is a problem inside the FIPS
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* module. */
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static void message(const char *msg) {
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ssize_t r;
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do {
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r = write(2, msg, strlen(msg));
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} while (r == -1 && errno == EINTR);
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}
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#endif
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/* init_once initializes the state of this module to values previously
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* requested. This is the only function that modifies |urandom_fd| and
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* |urandom_buffering|, whose values may be read safely after calling the
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* once. */
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static void init_once(void) {
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CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(rand_lock_bss_get());
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int fd = *urandom_fd_requested_bss_get();
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CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(rand_lock_bss_get());
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#if defined(USE_SYS_getrandom)
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uint8_t dummy;
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long getrandom_ret =
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syscall(SYS_getrandom, &dummy, sizeof(dummy), GRND_NONBLOCK);
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if (getrandom_ret == 1) {
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*urandom_fd_bss_get() = kHaveGetrandom;
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return;
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} else if (getrandom_ret == -1 && errno == EAGAIN) {
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message(
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"getrandom indicates that the entropy pool has not been initialized. "
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"Rather than continue with poor entropy, this process will block until "
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"entropy is available.\n");
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do {
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getrandom_ret =
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syscall(SYS_getrandom, &dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0 /* no flags */);
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} while (getrandom_ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
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if (getrandom_ret == 1) {
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*urandom_fd_bss_get() = kHaveGetrandom;
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return;
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}
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}
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#endif /* USE_SYS_getrandom */
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if (fd == kUnset) {
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do {
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fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
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} while (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
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}
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if (fd < 0) {
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abort();
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}
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assert(kUnset == 0);
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if (fd == kUnset) {
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/* Because we want to keep |urandom_fd| in the BSS, we have to initialise
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* it to zero. But zero is a valid file descriptor too. Thus if open
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* returns zero for /dev/urandom, we dup it to get a non-zero number. */
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fd = dup(fd);
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close(kUnset);
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if (fd <= 0) {
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abort();
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}
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}
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
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/* In FIPS mode we ensure that the kernel has sufficient entropy before
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* continuing. This is automatically handled by getrandom, which requires
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* that the entropy pool has been initialised, but for urandom we have to
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* poll. */
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for (;;) {
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int entropy_bits;
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if (ioctl(fd, RNDGETENTCNT, &entropy_bits)) {
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message(
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"RNDGETENTCNT on /dev/urandom failed. We cannot continue in this "
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"case when in FIPS mode.\n");
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abort();
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}
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static const int kBitsNeeded = 256;
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if (entropy_bits >= kBitsNeeded) {
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break;
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}
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usleep(250000);
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}
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#endif
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int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
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if (flags == -1) {
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/* Native Client doesn't implement |fcntl|. */
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if (errno != ENOSYS) {
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abort();
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}
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} else {
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flags |= FD_CLOEXEC;
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if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags) == -1) {
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abort();
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}
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}
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*urandom_fd_bss_get() = fd;
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}
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void RAND_set_urandom_fd(int fd) {
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fd = dup(fd);
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if (fd < 0) {
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abort();
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}
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assert(kUnset == 0);
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if (fd == kUnset) {
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/* Because we want to keep |urandom_fd| in the BSS, we have to initialise
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* it to zero. But zero is a valid file descriptor too. Thus if dup
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* returned zero we dup it again to get a non-zero number. */
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fd = dup(fd);
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close(kUnset);
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if (fd <= 0) {
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abort();
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}
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}
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CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(rand_lock_bss_get());
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*urandom_fd_requested_bss_get() = fd;
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CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(rand_lock_bss_get());
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CRYPTO_once(rand_once_bss_get(), init_once);
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if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() == kHaveGetrandom) {
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close(fd);
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} else if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() != fd) {
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abort(); // Already initialized.
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}
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}
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#if defined(USE_SYS_getrandom) && defined(OPENSSL_MSAN)
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void __msan_unpoison(void *, size_t);
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#endif
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/* fill_with_entropy writes |len| bytes of entropy into |out|. It returns one
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* on success and zero on error. */
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static char fill_with_entropy(uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
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while (len > 0) {
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ssize_t r;
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if (*urandom_fd_bss_get() == kHaveGetrandom) {
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#if defined(USE_SYS_getrandom)
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do {
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r = syscall(SYS_getrandom, out, len, 0 /* no flags */);
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} while (r == -1 && errno == EINTR);
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#if defined(OPENSSL_MSAN)
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if (r > 0) {
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/* MSAN doesn't recognise |syscall| and thus doesn't notice that we
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* have initialised the output buffer. */
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__msan_unpoison(out, r);
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}
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#endif /* OPENSSL_MSAN */
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#else /* USE_SYS_getrandom */
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abort();
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#endif
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} else {
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do {
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r = read(*urandom_fd_bss_get(), out, len);
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} while (r == -1 && errno == EINTR);
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}
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if (r <= 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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out += r;
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len -= r;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* CRYPTO_sysrand puts |requested| random bytes into |out|. */
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void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
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if (requested == 0) {
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return;
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}
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CRYPTO_once(rand_once_bss_get(), init_once);
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if (!fill_with_entropy(out, requested)) {
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abort();
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}
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_BREAK_CRNG)
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// This breaks the "continuous random number generator test" defined in FIPS
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// 140-2, section 4.9.2, and implemented in rand_get_seed().
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OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, requested);
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#endif
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}
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#endif /* !OPENSSL_WINDOWS && !defined(OPENSSL_FUCHSIA) && \
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!BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE && !OPENSSL_TRUSTY */
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