9b16066654
Until we've gotten it fully working, we should not mint any of these SSL_SESSIONs, to avoid constraining future versions of our client code. Notably, if any of our TLS 1.3 clients today serialized sessions, we would need to rev the serialization format. Without opting into 0-RTT, a TLS 1.3 client will create SSL_SESSIONs tagged as 0-RTT-capable but missing important fields (ALPN, etc.). When that serialized session makes its way to a future version of our client code, it would disagree with the server about the ALPN value stored in the ticket and cause interop failures. I believe the only client code enabling TLS 1.3 right now is Chrome, and the window is small, so it should be fine. But fix this now before it becomes a problem. Change-Id: Ie2b109f8d158017a6f3b4cb6169050d38a66b31c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13342 CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> |
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curve25519 | ||
poly1305 | ||
alert.go | ||
cert.pem | ||
chacha20_poly1305_test.go | ||
chacha20_poly1305.go | ||
channel_id_key.pem | ||
cipher_suites.go | ||
common.go | ||
conn.go | ||
deterministic.go | ||
dtls.go | ||
ecdsa_p256_cert.pem | ||
ecdsa_p256_key.pem | ||
ecdsa_p384_cert.pem | ||
ecdsa_p384_key.pem | ||
ecdsa_p521_cert.pem | ||
ecdsa_p521_key.pem | ||
fuzzer_mode.json | ||
handshake_client.go | ||
handshake_messages.go | ||
handshake_server.go | ||
hkdf_test.go | ||
hkdf.go | ||
key_agreement.go | ||
key.pem | ||
packet_adapter.go | ||
prf.go | ||
recordingconn.go | ||
rsa_1024_cert.pem | ||
rsa_1024_key.pem | ||
rsa_chain_cert.pem | ||
rsa_chain_key.pem | ||
runner_test.go | ||
runner.go | ||
shim_ticket.go | ||
sign.go | ||
test_output.go | ||
ticket.go | ||
tls.go |