163c95691a
Changing parameters on renegotiation makes all our APIs confusing. This one has no reason to change, so lock it down. In particular, our preference to forbid Token Binding + renego may be overridden at the IETF, even though it's insane. Loosening it will be a bit less of a headache if EMS can't change. https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg00690.html claims that this is already in the specification and enforced by NSS. I can't find anything to this effect in the specification. It just says the client MUST disable renegotiation when EMS is missing, which is wishful thinking. At a glance, NSS doesn't seem to check, though I could be misunderstanding the code. Nonetheless, locking this down is a good idea anyway. Accurate or not, take the email as an implicit endorsement of this from Mozilla. Change-Id: I236b05991d28bed199763dcf2f47bbfb9d0322d7 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10721 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> |
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asn1.errordata | ||
bio.errordata | ||
bn.errordata | ||
cipher.errordata | ||
CMakeLists.txt | ||
conf.errordata | ||
dh.errordata | ||
digest.errordata | ||
dsa.errordata | ||
ec.errordata | ||
ecdh.errordata | ||
ecdsa.errordata | ||
engine.errordata | ||
err_data_generate.go | ||
err_test.cc | ||
err.c | ||
evp.errordata | ||
hkdf.errordata | ||
obj.errordata | ||
pem.errordata | ||
pkcs8.errordata | ||
rsa.errordata | ||
ssl.errordata | ||
x509.errordata | ||
x509v3.errordata |