7e06de5d2d
This follows up on cedc6f18 by removing support for the
-DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_DHE_TLS compile flag, and the code needed to
support it.
Change-Id: I53b6aa7a0eddd23ace8b770edb2a31b18ba2ce26
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14886
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
825 lines
30 KiB
C
825 lines
30 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/buf.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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/* An SSL_SESSION is serialized as the following ASN.1 structure:
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*
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* SSLSession ::= SEQUENCE {
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* version INTEGER (1), -- session structure version
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* sslVersion INTEGER, -- protocol version number
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* cipher OCTET STRING, -- two bytes long
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* sessionID OCTET STRING,
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* masterKey OCTET STRING,
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* time [1] INTEGER, -- seconds since UNIX epoch
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* timeout [2] INTEGER, -- in seconds
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* peer [3] Certificate OPTIONAL,
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* sessionIDContext [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* verifyResult [5] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- one of X509_V_* codes
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* hostName [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* -- from server_name extension
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* pskIdentity [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* ticketLifetimeHint [9] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- client-only
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* ticket [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- client-only
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* peerSHA256 [13] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* originalHandshakeHash [14] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* signedCertTimestampList [15] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* -- contents of SCT extension
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* ocspResponse [16] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* -- stapled OCSP response from the server
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* extendedMasterSecret [17] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
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* groupID [18] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
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* -- For historical reasons, for static RSA
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-- ciphers, this field contains another
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-- value to be discarded.
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* certChain [19] SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL,
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* ticketAgeAdd [21] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* isServer [22] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
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* peerSignatureAlgorithm [23] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
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* ticketMaxEarlyData [24] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
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* authTimeout [25] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- defaults to timeout
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* earlyALPN [26] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* }
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*
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* Note: historically this serialization has included other optional
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* fields. Their presence is currently treated as a parse error:
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*
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* keyArg [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* pskIdentityHint [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* compressionMethod [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* srpUsername [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
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* ticketFlags [20] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
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*/
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static const unsigned kVersion = 1;
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static const int kTimeTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1;
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static const int kTimeoutTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2;
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static const int kPeerTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3;
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static const int kSessionIDContextTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 4;
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static const int kVerifyResultTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 5;
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static const int kHostNameTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 6;
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static const int kPSKIdentityTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 8;
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static const int kTicketLifetimeHintTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 9;
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static const int kTicketTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 10;
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static const int kPeerSHA256Tag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 13;
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static const int kOriginalHandshakeHashTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 14;
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static const int kSignedCertTimestampListTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 15;
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static const int kOCSPResponseTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 16;
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static const int kExtendedMasterSecretTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 17;
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static const int kGroupIDTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 18;
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static const int kCertChainTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 19;
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static const int kTicketAgeAddTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 21;
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static const int kIsServerTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 22;
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static const int kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 23;
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static const int kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 24;
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static const int kAuthTimeoutTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 25;
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static const int kEarlyALPNTag =
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CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 26;
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static int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
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size_t *out_len, int for_ticket) {
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CBB cbb, session, child, child2;
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if (in == NULL || in->cipher == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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CBB_zero(&cbb);
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if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&session, kVersion) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&session, in->ssl_version) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_u16(&child, (uint16_t)(in->cipher->id & 0xffff)) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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/* The session ID is irrelevant for a session ticket. */
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, in->session_id,
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for_ticket ? 0 : in->session_id_length) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, in->master_key, in->master_key_length) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->time) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeoutTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->timeout)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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/* The peer certificate is only serialized if the SHA-256 isn't
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* serialized instead. */
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if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs) > 0 && !in->peer_sha256_valid) {
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const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(in->certs, 0);
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerTag) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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/* Although it is OPTIONAL and usually empty, OpenSSL has
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* historically always encoded the sid_ctx. */
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kSessionIDContextTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx_length)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kVerifyResultTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->verify_result)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->tlsext_hostname) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kHostNameTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->tlsext_hostname,
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strlen(in->tlsext_hostname))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->psk_identity) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPSKIdentityTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->psk_identity,
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strlen(in->psk_identity))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketLifetimeHintTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->tlsext_tick && !for_ticket) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->tlsext_tick, in->tlsext_ticklen)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->peer_sha256_valid) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSHA256Tag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->peer_sha256, sizeof(in->peer_sha256))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kOriginalHandshakeHashTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->original_handshake_hash,
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in->original_handshake_hash_len)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length > 0) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kSignedCertTimestampListTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
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in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->ocsp_response_length > 0) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kOCSPResponseTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->ocsp_response, in->ocsp_response_length)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->extended_master_secret) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kExtendedMasterSecretTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) ||
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!CBB_add_u8(&child2, 0xff)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->group_id > 0 &&
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(!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kGroupIDTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->group_id))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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/* The certificate chain is only serialized if the leaf's SHA-256 isn't
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* serialized instead. */
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if (in->certs != NULL &&
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!in->peer_sha256_valid &&
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs) >= 2) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kCertChainTag)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs); i++) {
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const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(in->certs, i);
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if (!CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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}
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|
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if (in->ticket_age_add_valid) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketAgeAddTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_u32(&child2, in->ticket_age_add)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (!in->is_server) {
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kIsServerTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) ||
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!CBB_add_u8(&child2, 0x00)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (in->peer_signature_algorithm != 0 &&
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(!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->peer_signature_algorithm))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (in->ticket_max_early_data != 0 &&
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(!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->ticket_max_early_data))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (in->timeout != in->auth_timeout &&
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(!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kAuthTimeoutTag) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->auth_timeout))) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (in->early_alpn) {
|
|
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kEarlyALPNTag) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->early_alpn,
|
|
in->early_alpn_len)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, out_data, out_len)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
|
|
size_t *out_len) {
|
|
if (in->not_resumable) {
|
|
/* If the caller has an unresumable session, e.g. if |SSL_get_session| were
|
|
* called on a TLS 1.3 or False Started connection, serialize with a
|
|
* placeholder value so it is not accidentally deserialized into a resumable
|
|
* one. */
|
|
static const char kNotResumableSession[] = "NOT RESUMABLE";
|
|
|
|
*out_len = strlen(kNotResumableSession);
|
|
*out_data = BUF_memdup(kNotResumableSession, *out_len);
|
|
if (*out_data == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(in, out_data, out_len, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
|
|
size_t *out_len) {
|
|
return SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(in, out_data, out_len, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp) {
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(in, &out, &len)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len > INT_MAX) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(out);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pp) {
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(*pp, out, len);
|
|
*pp += len;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(out);
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
|
|
* explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and saves it in |*out|. On
|
|
* entry, if |*out| is not NULL, it frees the existing contents. If
|
|
* the element was not found, it sets |*out| to NULL. It returns one
|
|
* on success, whether or not the element was found, and zero on
|
|
* decode error. */
|
|
static int SSL_SESSION_parse_string(CBS *cbs, char **out, unsigned tag) {
|
|
CBS value;
|
|
int present;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, &present, tag)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (present) {
|
|
if (CBS_contains_zero_byte(&value)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!CBS_strdup(&value, out)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(*out);
|
|
*out = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
|
|
* explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and stows it in |*out_ptr|
|
|
* and |*out_len|. If |*out_ptr| is not NULL, it frees the existing
|
|
* contents. On entry, if the element was not found, it sets
|
|
* |*out_ptr| to NULL. It returns one on success, whether or not the
|
|
* element was found, and zero on decode error. */
|
|
static int SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(CBS *cbs, uint8_t **out_ptr,
|
|
size_t *out_len, unsigned tag) {
|
|
CBS value;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!CBS_stow(&value, out_ptr, out_len)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string parses an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
|
|
* explicitly tagged with |tag| of size at most |max_out|. */
|
|
static int SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
|
|
CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_len, uint8_t max_out, unsigned tag) {
|
|
CBS value;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&value) > max_out) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, CBS_data(&value), CBS_len(&value));
|
|
*out_len = (uint8_t)CBS_len(&value);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int SSL_SESSION_parse_long(CBS *cbs, long *out, unsigned tag,
|
|
long default_value) {
|
|
uint64_t value;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
|
|
(uint64_t)default_value) ||
|
|
value > LONG_MAX) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*out = (long)value;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out, unsigned tag,
|
|
uint32_t default_value) {
|
|
uint64_t value;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
|
|
(uint64_t)default_value) ||
|
|
value > 0xffffffff) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*out = (uint32_t)value;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out, unsigned tag,
|
|
uint16_t default_value) {
|
|
uint64_t value;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
|
|
(uint64_t)default_value) ||
|
|
value > 0xffff) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*out = (uint16_t)value;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_parse(CBS *cbs, const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method,
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION *ret = ssl_session_new(x509_method);
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS session;
|
|
uint64_t version, ssl_version;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &version) ||
|
|
version != kVersion ||
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &ssl_version)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret->ssl_version = ssl_version;
|
|
|
|
CBS cipher;
|
|
uint16_t cipher_value;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &cipher, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16(&cipher, &cipher_value) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&cipher) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret->cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value);
|
|
if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS session_id, master_key;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &session_id, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH ||
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &master_key, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&master_key) > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id));
|
|
ret->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->master_key, CBS_data(&master_key), CBS_len(&master_key));
|
|
ret->master_key_length = CBS_len(&master_key);
|
|
|
|
CBS child;
|
|
uint64_t timeout;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeTag) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &ret->time) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeoutTag) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &timeout) ||
|
|
timeout > UINT32_MAX) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret->timeout = (uint32_t)timeout;
|
|
|
|
CBS peer;
|
|
int has_peer;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &peer, &has_peer, kPeerTag) ||
|
|
(has_peer && CBS_len(&peer) == 0)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* |peer| is processed with the certificate chain. */
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
|
|
&session, ret->sid_ctx, &ret->sid_ctx_length, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx),
|
|
kSessionIDContextTag) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_long(&session, &ret->verify_result, kVerifyResultTag,
|
|
X509_V_OK) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_hostname,
|
|
kHostNameTag) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->psk_identity,
|
|
kPSKIdentityTag) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint,
|
|
kTicketLifetimeHintTag, 0) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick,
|
|
&ret->tlsext_ticklen, kTicketTag)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&session, kPeerSHA256Tag)) {
|
|
CBS peer_sha256;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSHA256Tag) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_asn1(&child, &peer_sha256, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&peer_sha256) != sizeof(ret->peer_sha256) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->peer_sha256, CBS_data(&peer_sha256),
|
|
sizeof(ret->peer_sha256));
|
|
ret->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret->peer_sha256_valid = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
|
|
&session, ret->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
&ret->original_handshake_hash_len,
|
|
sizeof(ret->original_handshake_hash), kOriginalHandshakeHashTag) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(
|
|
&session, &ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
|
|
&ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length,
|
|
kSignedCertTimestampListTag) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(
|
|
&session, &ret->ocsp_response, &ret->ocsp_response_length,
|
|
kOCSPResponseTag)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int extended_master_secret;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_bool(&session, &extended_master_secret,
|
|
kExtendedMasterSecretTag,
|
|
0 /* default to false */)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret->extended_master_secret = !!extended_master_secret;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t value;
|
|
if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &value, kGroupIDTag, 0)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Historically, the group_id field was used for key-exchange-specific
|
|
* information. Discard all but the group ID. */
|
|
if (ret->cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
value = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (value > 0xffff) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret->group_id = (uint16_t)value;
|
|
|
|
CBS cert_chain;
|
|
CBS_init(&cert_chain, NULL, 0);
|
|
int has_cert_chain;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &cert_chain, &has_cert_chain,
|
|
kCertChainTag) ||
|
|
(has_cert_chain && CBS_len(&cert_chain) == 0)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (has_cert_chain && !has_peer) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (has_peer || has_cert_chain) {
|
|
ret->certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
|
|
if (ret->certs == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (has_peer) {
|
|
/* TODO(agl): this should use the |SSL_CTX|'s pool. */
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&peer, pool);
|
|
if (buffer == NULL ||
|
|
!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret->certs, buffer)) {
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&cert_chain) > 0) {
|
|
CBS cert;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_any_asn1_element(&cert_chain, &cert, NULL, NULL) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&cert) == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(agl): this should use the |SSL_CTX|'s pool. */
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&cert, pool);
|
|
if (buffer == NULL ||
|
|
!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret->certs, buffer)) {
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!x509_method->session_cache_objects(ret)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS age_add;
|
|
int age_add_present;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(&session, &age_add, &age_add_present,
|
|
kTicketAgeAddTag) ||
|
|
(age_add_present &&
|
|
!CBS_get_u32(&age_add, &ret->ticket_age_add)) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&age_add) != 0) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret->ticket_age_add_valid = age_add_present;
|
|
|
|
int is_server;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_bool(&session, &is_server, kIsServerTag,
|
|
1 /* default to true */)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* TODO: in time we can include |is_server| for servers too, then we can
|
|
enforce that client and server sessions are never mixed up. */
|
|
|
|
ret->is_server = is_server;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(&session, &ret->peer_signature_algorithm,
|
|
kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag, 0) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->ticket_max_early_data,
|
|
kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag, 0) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->auth_timeout, kAuthTimeoutTag,
|
|
ret->timeout) ||
|
|
!SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->early_alpn,
|
|
&ret->early_alpn_len, kEarlyALPNTag) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&session) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
|
|
const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
CBS cbs;
|
|
CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
|
|
SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_SESSION_parse(&cbs, ctx->x509_method, ctx->pool);
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|