536df07f72
parsing and printing to new syntax. Use -oldparser to parse the old syntax, use -oldprinter to print the old syntax. 2) Change default gofmt formatting settings to use tabs for indentation only and to use spaces for alignment. This will make the code alignment insensitive to an editor's tabwidth. Use -spaces=false to use tabs for alignment. 3) Manually changed src/exp/parser/parser_test.go so that it doesn't try to parse the parser's source files using the old syntax (they have new syntax now). 4) gofmt -w src misc test/bench 1st set of files. R=rsc CC=agl, golang-dev, iant, ken2, r https://golang.org/cl/180047
236 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
236 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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// The handshake goroutine reads handshake messages from the record processor
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// and outputs messages to be written on another channel. It updates the record
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// processor with the state of the connection via the control channel. In the
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// case of handshake messages that need synchronous processing (because they
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// affect the handling of the next record) the record processor knows about
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// them and either waits for a control message (Finished) or includes a reply
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// channel in the message (ChangeCipherSpec).
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rc4"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"io"
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)
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type cipherSuite struct {
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id uint16 // The number of this suite on the wire.
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hashLength, cipherKeyLength int
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// TODO(agl): need a method to create the cipher and hash interfaces.
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}
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var cipherSuites = []cipherSuite{
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cipherSuite{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 20, 16},
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}
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// A serverHandshake performs the server side of the TLS 1.1 handshake protocol.
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type serverHandshake struct {
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writeChan chan<- interface{}
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controlChan chan<- interface{}
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msgChan <-chan interface{}
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config *Config
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}
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func (h *serverHandshake) loop(writeChan chan<- interface{}, controlChan chan<- interface{}, msgChan <-chan interface{}, config *Config) {
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h.writeChan = writeChan
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h.controlChan = controlChan
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h.msgChan = msgChan
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h.config = config
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defer close(writeChan)
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defer close(controlChan)
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clientHello, ok := h.readHandshakeMsg().(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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h.error(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return
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}
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major, minor, ok := mutualVersion(clientHello.major, clientHello.minor)
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if !ok {
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h.error(alertProtocolVersion)
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return
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}
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finishedHash := newFinishedHash()
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finishedHash.Write(clientHello.marshal())
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hello := new(serverHelloMsg)
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// We only support a single ciphersuite so we look for it in the list
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// of client supported suites.
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//
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// TODO(agl): Add additional cipher suites.
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var suite *cipherSuite
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for _, id := range clientHello.cipherSuites {
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for _, supported := range cipherSuites {
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if supported.id == id {
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suite = &supported
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break
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}
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}
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}
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foundCompression := false
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// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
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for _, compression := range clientHello.compressionMethods {
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if compression == compressionNone {
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foundCompression = true
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break
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}
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}
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if suite == nil || !foundCompression {
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h.error(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return
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}
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hello.major = major
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hello.minor = minor
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hello.cipherSuite = suite.id
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currentTime := uint32(config.Time())
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hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
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hello.random[0] = byte(currentTime >> 24)
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hello.random[1] = byte(currentTime >> 16)
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hello.random[2] = byte(currentTime >> 8)
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hello.random[3] = byte(currentTime)
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_, err := io.ReadFull(config.Rand, hello.random[4:])
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if err != nil {
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h.error(alertInternalError)
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return
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}
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hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
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finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
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writeChan <- writerSetVersion{major, minor}
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writeChan <- hello
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if len(config.Certificates) == 0 {
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h.error(alertInternalError)
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return
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}
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certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
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certMsg.certificates = config.Certificates[0].Certificate
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finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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writeChan <- certMsg
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helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
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finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
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writeChan <- helloDone
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ckx, ok := h.readHandshakeMsg().(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
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if !ok {
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h.error(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return
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}
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finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
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preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
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_, err = io.ReadFull(config.Rand, preMasterSecret[2:])
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if err != nil {
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h.error(alertInternalError)
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return
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}
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err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(config.Rand, config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey, ckx.ciphertext, preMasterSecret)
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if err != nil {
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h.error(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return
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}
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// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
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// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
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// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
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// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
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// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
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// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.
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masterSecret, clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey :=
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keysFromPreMasterSecret11(preMasterSecret, clientHello.random, hello.random, suite.hashLength, suite.cipherKeyLength)
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_, ok = h.readHandshakeMsg().(changeCipherSpec)
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if !ok {
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h.error(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return
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}
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cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(clientKey)
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controlChan <- &newCipherSpec{cipher, hmac.New(sha1.New(), clientMAC)}
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clientFinished, ok := h.readHandshakeMsg().(*finishedMsg)
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if !ok {
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h.error(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return
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}
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verify := finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
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if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
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subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
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h.error(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return
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}
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controlChan <- ConnectionState{true, "TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA", 0}
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finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
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cipher2, _ := rc4.NewCipher(serverKey)
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writeChan <- writerChangeCipherSpec{cipher2, hmac.New(sha1.New(), serverMAC)}
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finished := new(finishedMsg)
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finished.verifyData = finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
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writeChan <- finished
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writeChan <- writerEnableApplicationData{}
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for {
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_, ok := h.readHandshakeMsg().(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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h.error(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return
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}
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// We reject all renegotication requests.
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writeChan <- alert{alertLevelWarning, alertNoRenegotiation}
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}
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}
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func (h *serverHandshake) readHandshakeMsg() interface{} {
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v := <-h.msgChan
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if closed(h.msgChan) {
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// If the channel closed then the processor received an error
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// from the peer and we don't want to echo it back to them.
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h.msgChan = nil
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return 0
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}
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if _, ok := v.(alert); ok {
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// We got an alert from the processor. We forward to the writer
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// and shutdown.
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h.writeChan <- v
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h.msgChan = nil
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return 0
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}
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return v
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}
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func (h *serverHandshake) error(e alertType) {
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if h.msgChan != nil {
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// If we didn't get an error from the processor, then we need
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// to tell it about the error.
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go func() {
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for _ = range h.msgChan {
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}
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}()
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h.controlChan <- ConnectionState{false, "", e}
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close(h.controlChan)
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h.writeChan <- alert{alertLevelError, e}
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}
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}
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