BUG=59
Change-Id: If3a788ec1328226d69293996845fa1d14690bf40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9068
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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SSL_set_bio is a nightmare.
In f715c42322, we noticed that, among
other problems, SSL_set_bio's actual behavior did not match how
SSL_set_rfd was calling it due to an asymmetry in the rbio/wbio
handling. This resulted in SSL_set_fd/SSL_set_rfd calls to crash. We
decided that SSL_set_rfd's believed semantics were definitive and
changed SSL_set_bio.
Upstream, in 65e2d672548e7c4bcb28f1c5c835362830b1745b, decided that
SSL_set_bio's behavior, asymmetry and all, was definitive and that the
SSL_set_rfd crash was a bug in SSL_set_rfd. Accordingly, they switched
the fd callers to use the side-specific setters, new in 1.1.0.
Align with upstream's behavior and add tests for all of SSL_set_bio's
insanity. Also export the new side-specific setters in anticipation of
wanting to be mostly compatible with OpenSSL 1.1.0.
Change-Id: Iceac9508711f79750a3cc2ded081b2bb2cbf54d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9064
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If two CRLs are equivalent then use the one with a later lastUpdate field:
this will result in the newest CRL available being used.
(Imported from upstream's 325da8231c8d441e6bb7f15d1a5a23ff63c842e5 and
3dc160e9be6dcaeec9345fbb61b1c427d7026103.)
Change-Id: I8c722663b979dfe08728d091697d8b8204dc265c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8947
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Negative zeros are nuts, but it will probably be a while before we've
fixed everything that can create them. Fix both to consistently print
'-0' rather than '0' so failures are easier to diagnose (BN_cmp believes
the values are different.)
Change-Id: Ic38d90601b43f66219d8f44ca085432106cf98e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9073
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Simplify the calculation of the Montgomery constants in
|BN_MONT_CTX_set|, making the inversion constant-time. It should also
be faster by avoiding any use of the |BIGNUM| API in favor of using
only 64-bit arithmetic.
Now it's obvious how it works. /s
Change-Id: I59a1e1c3631f426fbeabd0c752e0de44bcb5fd75
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9031
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A caller using EVP_Digest* which a priori knows tighter bounds on the
hash function used (perhaps because it is always a particular hash) can
assume the function will not write more bytes than the size of the hash.
The letter of the rules before vaguely[*] allowed for more than
EVP_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes written which made for some unreasonable code in
Chromium. Officially clarify this and add tests which, when paired with
valgrind and ASan prove it.
BUG=59
[*] Not really. I think it already promised the output length will be
both the number of bytes written and the size of the hash and the size
of the hash is given by what the function promises to compute. Meh.
Change-Id: I736d526e81cca30475c90897bca896293ff30278
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9066
Reviewed-by: Eric Roman <ericroman@google.com>
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Change-Id: Idf9db184348140972e57b2a8fa30dc9cb8b2e0f2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9065
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In TLS 1.2, this was allowed to be empty for the weird SHA-1 fallback
logic. In TLS 1.3, not only is the fallback logic gone, but omitting
them is a syntactic error.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
SignatureScheme
supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
Change-Id: I4991e59bc4647bb665aaf920ed4836191cea3a5a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9062
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We were sending decode_error, but the spec explicitly says (RFC 5246):
unsupported_extension
sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing
an extension that they did not put in the corresponding client
hello. This message is always fatal.
Also add a test for this when it's a known but unoffered extension. We
actually end up putting these in different codepaths now due to the
custom extensions stuff.
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
Change-Id: If6c8033d4cfe69ef8af5678b873b25e0dbadfc4f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9061
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As of a recent change, test_support always included the headers, which
causes Android's new build-system to be unhappy. It doesn't want to
include headers. Split them into test_support_headers and test_support
to match the other keys.
Then fix up references:
- Android's new build system only wants the sources. Fix this.
- Chromium's GN and GYP theoretically want the sources and headers, but
we've never supplied the headers because this isn't enforced at all.
Fix this. Headers are selected based on what target the header
"belongs to".
- Bazel has no change except to sort test_support_sources.
Change-Id: I85809e70a71236b5e91d87f87bb73bc2ea289251
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9044
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It seems much safer for the default value of |verify_result| to be an
error value.
Change-Id: I372ec19c41d77516ed12d0169969994f7d23ed70
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9063
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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We managed to mix two comment styles in the Go license headers and
copy-and-paste it throughout the project.
Change-Id: Iec1611002a795368b478e1cae0b53127782210b1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9060
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BUG=74
Change-Id: I72d52c1fbc3413e940dddbc0b20c7f22459da693
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8981
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I5cc194fc0a3ba8283049078e5671c924ee23036c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8980
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To prevent configuration/established session confusion, the handshake
session state is separated into the configured session (ssl->session)
and the newly created session (ssl->s3->new_session). Upon conclusion of
the handshake, the finalized session is stored
in (ssl->s3->established_session). During the handshake, any requests
for the session (SSL_get_session) return a non-resumable session, to
prevent resumption of a partially filled session. Sessions should only
be cached upon the completion of the full handshake, using the resulting
established_session. The semantics of accessors on the session are
maintained mid-renego.
Change-Id: I4358aecb71fce4fe14a6746c5af1416a69935078
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This finishes getting rid of ssl_read_bytes! Now we have separate
entry-points for the various cases. For now, I've kept TLS handshake
consuming records partially. When we do the BIO-less API, I expect that
will need to change, since we won't have the record buffer available.
(Instead, the ssl3_read_handshake_bytes and extend_handshake_buffer pair
will look more like the DTLS side or Go and pull the entire record into
init_buf.)
This change opts to make read_app_data drive the message to completion
in anticipation of DTLS 1.3. That hasn't been specified, but
NewSessionTicket certainly will exist. Knowing that DTLS necessarily has
interleave seems something better suited for the SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD
internals to drive.
It needs refining, but SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD is now actually a half-decent
abstraction boundary between the higher-level protocol logic and
DTLS/TLS-specific record-layer and message dispatchy bits.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I9b4626bb8a29d9cb30174d9e6912bb420ed45aff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9001
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Regression tests for upstream's
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1298.
Also, given that we're now on our third generation of V2ClientHello
handling, I'm sure we'll have a fourth and fifth and one of these days
I'm going to mess this one up. :-)
Change-Id: I6fd8f311ed0939fbbfd370448b637ccc06145021
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9040
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Yo dawg I herd you like blinding so I put inversion blinding in your
RSA blinding so you can randomly mask your random mask.
This improves upon the current situation where we pretend that
|BN_mod_inverse_no_branch| is constant-time, and it avoids the need to
exert a lot of effort to make a actually-constant-time modular
inversion function just for RSA blinding.
Note that if the random number generator weren't working correctly then
the blinding of the inversion wouldn't be very effective, but in that
case the RSA blinding itself would probably be completely busted, so
we're not really losing anything by relying on blinding to blind the
blinding.
Change-Id: I771100f0ad8ed3c24e80dd859ec22463ef2a194f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8923
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Change-Id: I7e85a2677fe28a22103a975d517bbee900c44ac3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9050
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This also adds a missing OPENSSL_EXPORT.
Change-Id: I6c2400246280f68f51157e959438644976b1171b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9041
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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There are many cases where we need |BN_rand_range| but with a minimum
value other than 0. |BN_rand_range_ex| provides that.
Change-Id: I564326c9206bf4e20a37414bdbce16a951c148ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8921
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We already forbid renego/app-data interleave. Forbid it within a
HelloRequest too because that's nonsense. No one would ever send:
[hs:HelloReq-] [app:Hello world] [hs:-uest]
Add tests for this case.
This is in preparation for our more complex TLS 1.3 post-handshake logic
which is going to go through the usual handshake reassembly logic and,
for sanity, will want to enforce this anyway.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I80eb9f3333da3d751f98f25d9469860d1993a97a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9000
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Per request from EKR. Also we have a lot of long test names, so this
seems generally a good idea.
Change-Id: Ie463f5367ec7d33005137534836005b571c8f424
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9021
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With the previous DTLS change, the dispatch layer only cares about the
end of the handshake to know when to drop the current message. TLS 1.3
post-handshake messages will need a similar hook, so convert it to this
lower-level one.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I4c8c3ba55ba793afa065bf261a7bccac8816c348
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8989
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This is in preparation for switching finish_handshake to a
release_current_message hook. finish_handshake in DTLS is also
responsible for releasing any memory associated with extra messages in
the handshake.
Except that's not right and we need to make it an error anyway. Given
that the rest of the DTLS dispatch layer already strongly assumes there
is only one message in epoch one, putting the check in the fragment
processing works fine enough. Add tests for this.
This will certainly need revising when DTLS 1.3 happens (perhaps just a
version check, perhaps bringing finish_handshake back as a function that
can fail... which means we need a state just before SSL_ST_OK), but DTLS
1.3 post-handshake messages haven't really been written down, so let's
do the easy thing for now and add a test for when it gets more
interesting.
This removes the sequence number reset in the DTLS code. That reset
never did anything becase we don't and never will renego. We should make
sure DTLS 1.3 does not bring the reset back for post-handshake stuff.
(It was wrong in 1.2 too. Penultimate-flight retransmits and renego
requests are ambiguous in DTLS.)
BUG=83
Change-Id: I33d645a8550f73e74606030b9815fdac0c9fb682
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8988
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was only used so we knew when we had a current message to discard
and when we didn't. With init_msg being tracked better, we can use that
instead.
As part of this, switch the V2ClientHello hack to not using
reuse_message. Otherwise we have to fill in init_msg and friends in two
places.
The next change will require that we have a better handle on the "is
there a current message" boolean.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I917efacbad10806d492bbe51eda74c0779084d60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8987
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Somewhat clearer what it's for than just 4.
Change-Id: Ie7bb89ccdce188d61741da203acd624b49b69058
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8986
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
For TLS 1.3, we will need to process more complex post-handshake
messages. It is simplest if we use the same mechanism. In preparation,
allow ssl3_get_message to be called at any point.
Note that this stops reserving SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH in init_buf
right off the bat. Instead it will grow as-needed to accomodate the
handshake. SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH is rather larger than we probably
need to receive, particularly as a server, so this seems a good plan.
BUG=83
Change-Id: Id7f4024afc4c8a713b46b0d1625432315594350e
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Right now they're RSA PRIVATE KEY or EC PRIVATE KEY which requires a bit
more effort to parse. It means the PEM header is necessary to parse
these. OpenSSL and Go automagically convert the format, but other shims
(namely NSS) may not.
Change-Id: I9fa2767dcf1fe6ceeea546390759e1c364a8f16f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9020
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Change-Id: I6d552d26b3d72f6fffdc4d4d9fc3b5d82fb4e8bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9010
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This API needs to be improved but, for the time being, keep the
invariant reasonable.
Change-Id: If94d41e7e7936e44de5ecb36da45f89f80df7784
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8984
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Implemented in preparation for testing the C implementation. Tested
against itself.
BUG=74
Change-Id: Iec1b9ad22e09711fa4e67c97cc3eb257585c3ae5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8873
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
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Fermat's Little Theorem is already used for the custom curve implementations.
Use it, for the same reasons, for the ec_montgomery-based implementations.
I tested the performance (only) on x86-64 Windows.
Change-Id: Ibf770fd3f2d3e2cfe69f06bc12c81171624ff557
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Zero is only a valid input to or output of |BN_mod_inverse| when the
modulus is one. |BN_MONT_CTX_set| actually depends on this, so test
that this works.
Change-Id: Ic18f1fe786f668394951d4309020c6ead95e5e28
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8922
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We still don't do anything useful with them, but we know not to put them
in the session ticket field.
In doing so, fix a bug in the CorruptTicket option where it would crash
if tickets are exactly 40 byets in length.
BUG=75
Change-Id: Id1039a58ed314a67d0af4f2c7e0617987c2bd6b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8872
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Also parse out the ticket lifetime which was previously ignored.
BUG=75
Change-Id: I6ba92017bd4f1b31da55fd85d2af529fd592de11
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8871
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We have no intention of implementing FFDHE and the DHE ciphers currently
don't work in the 1.3 handshake anyway. Cipher suite negotiation is to
be refactored in the spec so these cipher values won't be used for FFDHE
anyway.
Change-Id: I51547761d70a397dc3dd0391b71db98189f1a844
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8874
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Some gerrit git hook says this is necessary.
Change-Id: I8a7a0a0e6732688c965b43824fe54b2db79a4919
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8990
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This change allows the shim to return a magic error code (89) to
indicate that it doesn't implement some of the given flags for a test.
Unimplemented tests are, by default, an error. The --allow-unimplemented
flag to the test runner causes them to be ignored.
This is done in preparation for non-BoringSSL shims.
Change-Id: Iecfd545b9cf44df5e25b719bfd06275c8149311a
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|BN_mod_inverse| is expensive and leaky. In this case, we can avoid
it completely by taking advantage of the fact that we already have
the two values that are supposed to be inverses of each other.
Change-Id: I2230b4166fb9d89c7445f9f7c045a4c9e4c377b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8925
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Besides reducing code duplication, also move the relative location of
the check of |count|. Previously, the code was generating a random
value and then terminating the loop without using it if |count| went
to zero. Now the wasted call to |BN_rand| is not made.
Also add a note about the applicability of the special case logic for
|range| of the form |0b100...| to RSA blinding.
Change-Id: Iaa33b9529f1665ac59aefcc8b371fa32445e7578
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8960
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One less random environment variable for us to be sensitive to. (We
should probably unwind all this proxy cert stuff. I don't believe they
are ever enabled.)
Change-Id: I74993178679ea49e60c81d8416e502cbebf02ec9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8948
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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(Imported from upstream's a9b23465243b6d692bb0b419bdbe0b1f5a849e9c,
5e102f96eb6fcdba1db2dba41132f92fa492aea0, and
9bda72880113b2b2262d290b23bdd1d3b19ff5b3.)
Change-Id: Ib608acb86cc128cacf20811c21bf6b38b0520106
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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tag2nbyte had -1 at 18th position, but underlying ASN1_mbstring_copy
supports NumericString. tag2nbyte is also used in do_print_ex which will
not be broken by setting 1 at 18th position of tag2nbyte
(Imported from upstream's bd598cc405e981de259a07558e600b5a9ef64bd6.)
Change-Id: Ie063afcaac8a7d5046cdb385059b991b92cd6659
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8946
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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WebRTC want to be able to send a random alert. Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Id3113d68f25748729fd9e9a91dbbfa93eead12c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8950
Reviewed-by: Taylor Brandstetter <deadbeef@webrtc.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The selector field could be omitted because it has a DEFAULT value.
In this case *sfld == NULL (sfld can never be NULL). This was not
noticed because this was never used in existing ASN.1 modules.
(Imported from upstream's c4210673313482edacede58d92e92c213d7a181a.)
svaldez and I stared at this for a while and we believe this change is
correct. It's also irrelevant because our only remaining ADB (ANY
DEFINED BY) table is POLICYQUALINFO which does not allow its selector to
be omitted. Also, if it did, it would be a slight change in behavior.
We'd switch from using POLICYQUALINFO's default_tt (filling in an
ASN1_ANY) to its null_tt (which doesn't exist, so error).
Change-Id: If6a929e3dafca18431775b01958d0dae1c09f3b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8943
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This imports upstream's b62e9bf5cbbe278b7e0017c9234999dae68ee867 and
c3bc7f498815b355533d96b54b9a09e030d4130c. This is a no-op since we don't
use the XTS bits though keep the files in sync so long as we have them.
Comparing to master, we're now up-to-date on that file except for
a285992763f3961f69a8d86bf7dfff020a08cef9. (I've left that alone since
that touches lots of files and we should probably get better test
configuration before importing something scary like #undef __thumb2__.)
Change-Id: Ie0556757c954ef559e03a6d62c940d5901ca704a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8945
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
