This was noticed by observing we had one line of missing test coverage
in polyval.c. CRYPTO_POLYVAL_update_blocks acts 32 blocks at a time and
all existing test vectors are smaller than that.
Test vector obtained by just picking random values and seeing what our
existing implementation did if I modified CRYPTO_POLYVAL_update_blocks
to consume many more blocks at a time. Then I fixed the bug and ensured
the answer was still the same.
Change-Id: Ib7002dbc10952229ff42a17132c30d0e290d4be5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13041
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a memory error for anything other than LHASH_OF(char), which
does not exist.
No code outside the library creates (or even queries) an LHASH, so we
can change this module freely.
Change-Id: Ifbc7a1c69a859e07650fcfaa067bdfc68d83fbbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12978
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Use it to compare the contents of lh and dummy_lh are identical. Leave a
TODO for testing other LHASH cases.
Change-Id: Ifbaf17c196070fdff1530ba0e284030527855f5d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12977
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I0e8a24367cd33fa4aed2ca15bd369b8697f538e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12974
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Use a std::map as the dummy lhash and use unique_ptr. This also improves
the test to check on pointer equality; we wish to ensure the lhash
stores the particular pointer value we asked for.
dummy_lh now also owns the pointers. It makes things simpler and since
LHASH doesn't free things, we weren't getting anything out of testing
that.
Change-Id: I97159175ca79a5874586650f272a7846100395e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12976
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
No source changes, just a rename.
Change-Id: Iaef406d2a04dc8c68c94eb2a98eec6378eaeab66
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12975
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Rather than doing it right before outputing, treat this as a part of the
pipeline to finalize the certificate chain, and run it right after
cert_cb to modify the certificate configuration itself. This means
nothing else in the stack needs to worry about this case existing.
It also makes it easy to support in both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I6a088297a54449f1f5f5bb8b5385caa4e8665eb6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12966
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ibba0271efa86e1b1af97f2a08b73677dfd236b7a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12986
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BUG=97
Change-Id: I4799cc99511e73af44def1d4daa36a8b4699f62d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12904
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Get us a little closer to productionizing the coverage generation, which
will require taking all the logic out of the coverage script.
Change-Id: If410cc198a888ee87a84b1c2d532322682d3c44e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13043
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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We have this function now. Probably good to use it.
Change-Id: I00fe1f4cf5c8cb6f61a8f6600cac4667e95ad7f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13040
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Upstream accidentally started rejecting server-sent point formats in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/2133. Our own test coverage
here is also lacking, so flesh it out.
Change-Id: I99059558bd28d3a540c9687649d6db7e16579d29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12979
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This picks up the short header stuff and any changes made in the
meantime.
Change-Id: Ia2ea680632f3f6c6c759a8f0606a9394ae85c92d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12972
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ib777dcc80c7acd6dc1eda1c211b91e5428b83df1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12971
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ie4c566c29c20faac7a9a5e04c88503fc2e1ff4db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12970
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Change-Id: If565a5fdfa0f314422aa26c2e8f869965ca08c1b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12969
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Alas, wpa_supplicant relies on the auto-chaining feature, so we can't
easily remove it. Write tests for it to ensure it stays working.
These test currently do not work for TLS 1.3 because the feature is
broken in 1.3. A follow-up change will fix this.
BUG=70
Change-Id: I2c04f55b712d66f5af1556254a5b017ebc3244f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12965
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chaining doesn't make much sense. This means we have a discontinuity
when buffer BIOs are empty. For a general filter BIO, this isn't even
meaningful. E.g., the base64 BIO's next_bio doesn't use the same units
(There's one consumer which does call BIO_pending on a base64 BIO, hits
this case, and is only working on accident, I've left it alone for this
CL until we can fix that consumer.)
The DTLS code, notably, assumes BIO_wpending to only report what's in
the buffer BIO. Ideally we'd get rid of the buffer BIO (I'll work on
this next), but, in the meantime, get the sizing right. The immediate
motivation is ssl_test using a BIO pair for DTLS doesn't work. We've
just been lucky none of the tests have been near the MTU.
The buffer BIO is actually unused outside of the SSL stack, so this
shouldn't break external consumers. But for the base64 BIO consumer
mentioned above, I see nothing else which relies on this BIO_[w]pending
chaining.
Change-Id: I6764df8ede0f89fe73c774a8f7c9ae4c054d4184
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12964
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The perl script is a little nuts. obj_dat.pl actually parses the header
file that objects.pl emits to figure out what all the objects are.
Replace it all with a single Go script.
BUG=16
Change-Id: Ib1492e22dbe4cf9cf84db7648612b156bcec8e63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12963
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This extension will be used to test whether
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/762 is deployable against
middleboxes. For simplicity, it is mutually exclusive with 0-RTT. If
client and server agree on the extension, TLS 1.3 records will use the
format in the PR rather than what is in draft 18.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I1372ddf7b328ddf73d496df54ac03a95ede961e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12684
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I thought I'd rewritten this, but apparently didn't. The old version
dated to a prior iteration which used macros.
Change-Id: Idefbdb2c11700a44dd5b0733b98efec102b10dd2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12968
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We were only asserting on the shim-side error code.
Change-Id: Idc08c253a7723a2a7fd489da761a56c72f7a3b96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12923
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This avoids having more generated bits. The table is quite small,
especially so when we take out anything we don't implement. There's no
real need to do the binary search. (Exotic things like GOST, the legacy
NID_rsa and NID_dsa_2 spellings of RSA and DSA, and hash functions we
don't implement.)
Mostly this saves me from having to reimplement obj_xref.pl.
(obj_xref.pl processes nid.h, formerly obj_mac.h, so we can't just use
the existing one and still change nid.h.)
Change-Id: I90911277e691a8b04ea8930f3f314d517f314d29
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12962
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Chromium on Linux builds against libstdc++'s debug mode which makes
clang unhappy due to:
../crypto/bytestring/bytestring_test.cc:910:7: error: chosen constructor
is explicit in copy-initialization
{},
^~
/usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-linux-gnu/4.8/../../../../include/c++/4.8/debug/vector:79:7:
note: constructor declared here
vector(const _Allocator& __a = _Allocator())
^
I believe this was fixed here, but it's too recent:
36f540c70b
Change-Id: I2942d153e1278785c3b81294bc99b86f297cf719
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12967
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
X509_STORE_set0_additional_untrusted allows one to set a stack of
additional untrusted certificates that can be used during chain
building. These will be merged with the untrusted certificates set on
the |X509_STORE_CTX|.
Change-Id: I3f011fb0854e16a883a798356af0a24cbc5a9d68
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It should probably have a TLS 1.3 in the name to be clear that's what
it's testing.
Change-Id: I50b5f503a8038715114136179bde83e7da064e9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12961
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Notably, Conscrypt uses SSL_SESSION_get_version, so we should have tests
for it.
Change-Id: I670f1b1b9951f840f27cb62dd36ef4f05042c974
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Simplify the code, and in particular make |BN_div|, |BN_mod|, and
|BN_nnmod| insensitive to |BN_FLG_CONSTTIME|. This improves the
effectiveness of testing by reducing the number of branches that are
likely to go untested or less tested.
There is no performance-sensitive code that uses BN_div but doesn't
already use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME except RSA signature verification and
EC_GROUP creation. RSA signature verification, ECDH, and ECDSA
performance aren't significantly different with this change.
Change-Id: Ie34c4ce925b939150529400cc60e1f414c7676cd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9105
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is in preparation for implementing 0-RTT where, like
with client_traffic_secret_0, client_handshake_secret must
be derived slightly earlier than it is used. (The secret is
derived at ServerHello, but used at server Finished.)
Change-Id: I6a186b84829800704a62fda412992ac730422110
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12920
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This only works with Clang, and MSAN seems to have a false-positive for
me in libstdc++, but it can be helpful to test with these
Change-Id: I068edabcda69c9239ee4f0247f5d8f873dea77bb
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There are no longer any consumers of these APIs.
These were useful back when the CBC vs. RC4 tradeoff varied by version
and it was worth carefully tuning this cutoff. Nowadays RC4 is
completely gone and there's no use in configuring these anymore.
To avoid invalidating the existing ssl_ctx_api corpus and requiring it
regenerated, I've left the entries in there. It's probably reasonable
for new API fuzzers to reuse those slots.
Change-Id: I02bf950e3828062341e4e45c8871a44597ae93d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12880
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MSAN doesn't hook |syscall| and thus doesn't know that the kernel has
filled the output buffer when |getrandom| is called.
This change tells MSAN to trust that the memory that |getrandom| writes
to has been initialised. This should avoid false-positives when code
operates on |RAND_bytes| output.
Change-Id: I0a74ebb21bcd1de1f28eda69558ee27f82db807a
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This reverts commit 97db926cf7,
effectively unreverting the two changes that it contained. A subsequent
change will fix this code for MSAN.
Change-Id: I54a82b667b7a4208c7a960aa28b01cb246bc78c7
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Get one step closer to removing the dependency on |BN_div| from most
programs. Also get one step closer to a constant-time implementation of
|BN_MONT_CTX_set|; we now "just" need to create a constant-time variant
of |BN_mod_lshift1_quick|.
Note that this version might actually increase the side channel signal,
since the variance in timing in |BN_div| is probably less than the variance
from the many conditional reductions in the new method.
On one Windows x64 machine, the speed of RSA verification using the new
version is not too different from the speed of the old code. However,
|BN_div| is generally slow on Windows x64 so I expect this isn't faster
on all platforms. Regardless, we generally consider ECDSA/EdDSA
signature verification performance to be adaquate and RSA signature
verification is much, much faster even with this change.
For RSA signing the performance is not a significant factor since
performance-sensitive applications will cache the |RSA| structure and
the |RSA| structure will cache the Montgomery contexts.
Change-Id: Ib14f1a35c99b8da435e190342657f6a839381a1a
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Call |RSA_check_key| after parsing an RSA private key in order to
verify that the key is consistent. This is consistent with ECC key
parsing, which does a similar key check.
Call |RSA_check_key| after key generation mostly as a way of
double-checking the key generation was done correctly. A similar check
was not added to |EC_KEY_generate| because |EC_KEY_generate| is used
for generating ephemeral ECDH keys, and the check would be too
expensive for that use.
Change-Id: I5759d0d101c00711bbc30f81a3759f8bff01427c
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-2 is really weird. On sign, it's maximal length. On verify, it actually
accepts all lengths. This sounds somewhat questionable to me, but just
document the state of the world for now. Also add a recommendation to
use -1 (match digest length) to align with TLS 1.3, tokbind, and QUIC
Crypto. Hopefully the first two is sufficient that the IETF will forever
use this option and stop the proliferation of RSA-PSS parameters.
Change-Id: Ie0ad7ad451089df0e18d6413d1b21c5aaad9d0f2
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This is imported from upstream's
71bbc79b7d3b1195a7a7dd5f547d52ddce32d6f0 and test vectors taken
initially from 2d7bbd6c9fb6865e0df480602c3612652189e182 (with a handful
more added).
The tests are a little odd because OpenSSL supports this "salt length
recovery" mode and they go through that codepath for all verifications.
Change-Id: I220104fe87e2a1a1458c99656f9791d8abfbbb98
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This reverts commits 36ca21415a and
7b668a873e. We believe that we need to
update ASAN to be aware of getrandom before we can use it. Otherwise it
believes that the memory with the entropy from this syscall is
uninitialised.
Change-Id: I1ea1c4d3038b3b2cd080be23d7d8b60fc0c83df2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12901
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This change includes C versions of some of the functions from the x86-64
P-256 code that are currently implemented in assembly. These functions
were part of the original submission by Intel and are covered by the ISC
license.
No semantic change; code is commented out.
Change-Id: Ifdd2fac6caeb73d375d6b125fac98f3945003b32
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* -loop on the server allows it to keep accepting connections.
* -resume on the client waits to receive a session from the server
and starts a new connection using the previous session.
Change-Id: I27a413c7c1d64edbca94aecc6f112d8d15afbce2
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This dates to
62d05888d1
which intended to be removed in a later Android release once X25519 was
added. That has since happened.
This intentionally leaves the P-521 hooked up for now. Detaching it
completely is a more aggressive change (since it's slightly tied up with
SHA-512) that should wait until removing ECDSA+SHA512 has stuck in Chrome.
Change-Id: I04553c3eddf33a13b6e3e9a6e7ac4c4725676cb0
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This gives a 15-16% perf boost for 1024-bit RSA keys, but 1024-bit RSA
keys are no longer important enough for this code to carry its weight.
Change-Id: Ia9f0e7fec512c28e90754ababade394c1f11984d
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These are regression tests for
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/12525/ that target the
RSAZ-512 code rather than the disabled RSAZ-1024 code.
These were created by extracting p and dmp1 from
ssl/test/rsa_1024_key.pem and creating similar test vectors as with the
AVX2 test vectors. They currently fail, but pass if the RSAZ-512 code is
disabled.
Change-Id: I99dd3f385941ddbb1cc64b5351f4411081b42dd7
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Note that this adds new non-constant-time code into the RSAZ-based
code path.
Change-Id: Ibca3bc523ede131b55c70ac5066c0014df1f5a70
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The input base, |a|, isn't reduced mod |m| in the RSAZ case so
incorrect results are given for out-of-range |a| when the RSAZ
implementation is used. On the other hand, the RSAZ implementation is
more correct as far as constant-time operation w.r.t. |a| is concerned.
Change-Id: Iec4d0195cc303ce442ce687a4b7ea42fb19cfd06
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