Between TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, and the early callback, we've got a lot of
ClientHello parsers. Unify everything on the early callback's parser. As
a side effect, this means we can parse a ClientHello fairly succinctly
from any function which will let us split up ClientHello states where
appropriate.
Change-Id: I2359b75f80926cc7d827570cf33f93029b39e525
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This more accurately reflects the documented contract for
|BN_mod_inverse_odd|.
Change-Id: Iae98dabe3943231859eaa5e798d06ebe0231b9f1
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In OpenSSL 1.1.0, this API has been renamed to gain a BN prefix. Now
that it's no longer squatting on a namespace, provide the function so
wpa_supplicant needn't carry a BoringSSL #ifdef here.
BUG=91
Change-Id: Iac8e90238c816caae6acf0e359893c14a7a970f1
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The name of this has been annoying me every time I've seen it over the
past couple of days. Having a flag with a negation in the name isn't
always bad, but I think this case was.
Change-Id: I5922bf4cc94eab8c59256042a9d9acb575bd40aa
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The previous code was not an impressive demonstration of clear thinking
and could reject cases where STARTTLS was actually supported.
Change-Id: I27ce8b401447a49be93f58c9e4eb5c5d8e7b73d4
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This gets cURL building against both BoringSSL as it is and BoringSSL
with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER set to 1.1.0.
BUG=91
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The old one was rather confusing. Switch to returning 1/0 for whether
the padding is publicly invalid and then add an output argument which
returns a constant_time_eq-style boolean.
Change-Id: Ieba89d352faf80e9bcea993b716f4b2df5439d4b
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Add the following cases:
- Maximal padding
- Maximal padding with each possible byte position wrong.
- When the input is not publicly too short to find a MAC, but the
unpadded value is too short. (This tests that
EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding and EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac coordinate
correctly. EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding promises to also consider it
invalid padding if there is no room for a MAC.)
Change-Id: I8fe18121afb915e579a8236d0e3ef354f1f835bc
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Change-Id: I44bc5979cb8c15ad8c4f9bef17049312b6f23a41
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This is more progress in letting other stacks use the test runner.
You can provide a per-shim configuration file that includes:
- A list of test patterns to be suppressed (presumably because
they don't work). This setting is ignored if -test is used.
- A translation table of expected errors to shim-specific errors.
BUG=92
Change-Id: I3c31d136e35c282e05d4919e18ba41d44ea9cf2a
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Use a separate |size_t| variable for all logic that happens after the
special casing of the negative values of the signed parameter, to
minimize the amount of mixed signed/unsigned math used.
Change-Id: I4aeb1ffce47f889f340f9583684910b0fb2ca7c7
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There is a comment "Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to
be non-negative". Reorganize the code to make it more clear that that
is actually the case, especially in the case where sLen == -1.
Change-Id: I09a3dd99458e34102c42d8d3a2f22c16c684c673
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It was renamed to ticket_liftetime_hint in
1e6f11a7ff, which breaks Qt.
Change-Id: I9c6d3097fe96e669f06a4e0880bd4d7d82b03ba8
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Initial stab at moving contents of scoped_types.h into
include/openssl/c++ and into the |bssl| namespace.
Started with one file. Will do the remaining ones once this looks good.
Change-Id: I51e2f7c1acbe52d508f1faee7740645f91f56386
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EKR is unlikely to resolve this TODO anytime soon.
Change-Id: I2cf6b4ad4f643048d1a683d60b4b90e2b1230aae
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This makes it easier to understand the |sLen|-related logic.
Change-Id: I98da4f4f7c82d5481544940407e6cc6a963f7e5b
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We handle this correctly but never wrote a test for it. Noticed this in
chatting about the second ClientHello.version bug workaround with Eric
Rescorla.
Change-Id: I09bc6c995d07c0f2c9936031b52c3c639ed3695e
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The old implementation had a lot of size_t/int confusion. It also
accepted non-minimally-encoded OIDs. Unlike the old implementation, the
new one does not fall back to BIGNUMs and does not attempt to
pretty-print OIDs with components which do not fit in a uint64_t. Add
tests for these cases.
With this new implementation, hopefully we'll have a much easier time
enabling MSVC's size_t truncation warning later.
Change-Id: I602102b97cf9b02d874644f8ef67fe9bac70e45e
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This eliminates duplicate logic.
Change-Id: I283273ae152f3644df4384558ee4a021f8c2d454
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BN_mod_inverse_odd was always being used on 64-bit platforms and was being used
for all curves with an order of 450 bits or smaller (basically, everything but
P-521). We generally don't care much about minor differences in the speed of
verifying signatures using curves other than P-256 and P-384. It is better to
always use the same algorithm.
This also allows |bn_mod_inverse_general|, |bn_mod_inverse_no_branch|, and
|BN_mod_inverse| to be dropped from programs that can somehow avoid linking in
the RSA key generation and RSA CRT recovery code.
Change-Id: I79b94bff23d2b07d5e0c704f7d44538797f8c7a0
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The main RSA public modulus size of concern is 2048 bits.
bn_mod_inverse_odd is already used for public moduli of 2048 bits and
smaller on 64-bit platforms, so for 64-bit it is a no-op. For 32-bit
x86, this seems to slightly decrease the speed of RSA signing, but not
by a lot, and plus we don't care about RSA signing performance much on
32-bit platforms. It's better to have all platforms using the same
algorithms.
Change-Id: I869dbfc98994e36a04a535c1fe63b14a902a4f13
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This is a step towards exposing |bn_mod_inverse_odd| for use outside
of crypto/bn/gcd.c.
Change-Id: I2968f1e43306c03775b3573a022edd92f4e91df2
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This is in preparation for factoring out the binary Euclidean
implementation (the one used for odd numbers that aren't too big) for
direct use from outside of crypto/bn/gcd.c. The goal is to make the
resultant |BN_mod_inverse_odd|'s signature similar to
|BN_mod_inverse_blinded|. Thus, the logic for reducing the final result
isn't factored out because that yet-to-be-created |BN_mod_inverse_odd|
will need to do it itself.
Change-Id: Iaecb79fb17d13c774c4fb6ade8742937780b0006
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This is very far from all of it, but I did some easy ones before I got
bored. Snapshot the progress until someone else wants to continue this.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I2609e9766d883a273e53e01a75a4b1d4700e2436
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Only X509_up_ref left (it's still waiting on a few external callers).
BUG=89
Change-Id: Ia2aec2bb0a944356cb1ce29f3b58a26bdb8a9977
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Inch towards OpenSSL 1.1.0 compatibility.
BUG=91
Change-Id: Ia45b6bdb5114d0891fdffdef0b5868920324ecec
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Fix non-standard variable names, return value convention, unsigned vs
size_t, etc. This also fixes one size_t truncation warning.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ibe083db90e8dac45d64da9ead8f519dd2fea96ea
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OBJ_obj2txt's implementation is kind of scary. Also it casts between int
and size_t a lot. In preparation for rewriting it, add a test.
Change-Id: Iefb1d0cddff58d67e5b04ec332477aab8aa687b6
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We're starting to get quite a lot of these ALL-CAPS.md documents.
There's been enough questions around how to properly use types like
EVP_MD_CTX that we probably should write down some of these common
rules.
Change-Id: I125f4e82efb168a071b54ff76c5af34c42ff4800
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tls13_process_certificate can take a boolean for whether anonymous is
allowed. This does change the error on the client slightly, but I think
this is correct anyway. It is not a syntax error for the server to send
no certificates in so far as the Certificate message allows it. It's
just illegal.
Change-Id: I1af80dacf23f50aad0b1fbd884bc068a40714399
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We have tests for this as a server, but none as a client. Extend the
certificate verification tests here. This is in preparation for ensuring
that TLS 1.3 session resumption works correctly.
Change-Id: I9ab9f42838ffd69f73fbd877b0cdfaf31caea707
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No sense in having it in both the 1.2 and 1.3 code.
Change-Id: Ib3854714afed24253af7f4bcee26d25e95a10211
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While the sanity check isn't insane (one should arrange for sessions to
be invalidated once client auth settings change, and a sid_ctx is one
way to do it), this check lives in a poor place to enforce configuration
mistakes. To be effective, it needs to happen at the start of the
handshake, independent of the ClientHello from the peer.
But the benefit this check gives is low compared to the trouble it will
be to continually maintain this difference from OpenSSL (our own
ssl_test and bssl_shim forget to set a dummy sid_ctx). Instead, remove
it so we don't have to duplicate it across TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. Also so
we don't have weird failures which only manifest once a resuming client
connects.
Change-Id: Ia7f88711701afde5e26b7782c2264ce78dccc89b
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We'd gotten rid of the macros, but not the underlying asn1_GetSequence
which is unused. Sadly this doesn't quite get rid of ASN1_(const_)?CTX.
There's still some code in the rest of crypto/asn1 that uses it.
Change-Id: I2ba8708ac5b20982295fbe9c898fef8f9b635704
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Extend the DTLS mock clock to apply to sessions too and test that
resumption behaves as expected.
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We almost forgot to handle this in TLS 1.3, so add a test for it.
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We broke this to varying degrees ages ago.
This is the logic to implement the variations of rules in TLS to discard
sessions after a failed connection, where a failed connection could be
one of:
- A connection that was not cleanly shut down.
- A connection that received a fatal alert.
The first one is nonsense since close_notify does not actually work in
the real world. The second is a vaguely more plausible but...
- A stateless ticket-based server can't drop sessions anyway.
- In TLS 1.3, a client may receive many tickets over the lifetime of a
single connection. With an external session cache like ours which may,
in theory, but multithreaded, this will be a huge hassle to track.
- A client may well attempt to establish a connection and reuse the
session before we receive the fatal alert, so any application state we
hope to manage won't really work.
- An attacker can always close the connection before the fatal alert, so
whatever security policy clearing the session gave is easily
bypassable.
Implementation-wise, this has basically never worked. The
ssl_clear_bad_session logic called into SSL_CTX_remove_session which
relied on the internal session cache. (Sessions not in the internal
session cache don't get removed.) The internal session cache was only
useful for a server, where tickets prevent this mechanism from doing
anything. For a client, we since removed the internal session cache, so
nothing got removed. The API for a client also did not work as it gave
the SSL_SESSION, not the SSL, so a consumer would not know the key to
invalidate anyway.
The recent session state splitting change further broke this.
Moreover, calling into SSL_CTX_remove_session logic like that is
extremely dubious because it mutates the not_resumable flag on the
SSL_SESSION which isn't thread-safe.
Spec-wise, TLS 1.3 has downgraded the MUST to a SHOULD.
Given all that mess, just remove this code. It is no longer necessary to
call SSL_shutdown just to make session caching work.
Change-Id: Ib601937bfc5f6b40436941e1c86566906bb3165d
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Save a little bit of typing at the call site.
Change-Id: I818535409b57a694e5e0ea0e9741d89f2be89375
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We will now send tickets as a server and accept them as a
client. Correctly offering and resuming them in the handshake will be
implemented in a follow-up.
Now that we're actually processing draft 14 tickets, bump the draft
version.
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As of https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/530, they're gone.
They're still allowed just before the ClientHello or ServerHello, which
is kind of odd, but so it goes.
BUG=86
Change-Id: I3d556ab45e42d0755d23566e006c0db9af35b7b6
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Change-Id: Id6a7443246479c62cbe0024e2131a2013959e21e
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TLS 1.3 requires callers use the callback rather than SSL_get_session.
Change-Id: I2caae70e641b102ce93256c847c178871bf78bac
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Change-Id: I057e19a9547a14b3950395db4318eaf0da01ec13
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OpenSSL 1.1.0 added a function to tell if an SSL* is DTLS or not. This
is probably a good idea, especially since SSL_version returns
non-normalized versions.
BUG=91
Change-Id: I25c6cf08b2ebabf0c610c74691de103399f729bc
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|BN_mod_exp_mont| uses |BN_nnmod| so it seems like
|BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime| should too. Further, I created
these test vectors by doing the math by hand, and the tests
passed for |BN_mod_exp_mont| but failed for
|BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime| without this change.
Change-Id: I7cffa1375e94dd8eaee87ada78285cd67fff1bac
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Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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None of the SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT codepaths will ever be
reached if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset. If we've gotten as far as getting a
Certificate message, consider SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT alone
significant grounds for rejecting no peer certificate.
Change-Id: I2c6be4269d65b2467b86b1fc7d76ac47ca735553
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9070
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Change-Id: I998f69269cdf813da19ccccc208b476f3501c8c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8991
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We'll need to update it on occasion, but we should not update our
default ClientHello without noticing.
Change-Id: I19ca52fdbe10e3ac14413fecd16be2e58af5a1f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9075
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
