This more accurately reflects the documented contract for
|BN_mod_inverse_odd|.
Change-Id: Iae98dabe3943231859eaa5e798d06ebe0231b9f1
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In OpenSSL 1.1.0, this API has been renamed to gain a BN prefix. Now
that it's no longer squatting on a namespace, provide the function so
wpa_supplicant needn't carry a BoringSSL #ifdef here.
BUG=91
Change-Id: Iac8e90238c816caae6acf0e359893c14a7a970f1
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The name of this has been annoying me every time I've seen it over the
past couple of days. Having a flag with a negation in the name isn't
always bad, but I think this case was.
Change-Id: I5922bf4cc94eab8c59256042a9d9acb575bd40aa
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This gets cURL building against both BoringSSL as it is and BoringSSL
with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER set to 1.1.0.
BUG=91
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The old one was rather confusing. Switch to returning 1/0 for whether
the padding is publicly invalid and then add an output argument which
returns a constant_time_eq-style boolean.
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Add the following cases:
- Maximal padding
- Maximal padding with each possible byte position wrong.
- When the input is not publicly too short to find a MAC, but the
unpadded value is too short. (This tests that
EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding and EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac coordinate
correctly. EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding promises to also consider it
invalid padding if there is no room for a MAC.)
Change-Id: I8fe18121afb915e579a8236d0e3ef354f1f835bc
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Change-Id: I44bc5979cb8c15ad8c4f9bef17049312b6f23a41
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Use a separate |size_t| variable for all logic that happens after the
special casing of the negative values of the signed parameter, to
minimize the amount of mixed signed/unsigned math used.
Change-Id: I4aeb1ffce47f889f340f9583684910b0fb2ca7c7
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There is a comment "Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to
be non-negative". Reorganize the code to make it more clear that that
is actually the case, especially in the case where sLen == -1.
Change-Id: I09a3dd99458e34102c42d8d3a2f22c16c684c673
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Initial stab at moving contents of scoped_types.h into
include/openssl/c++ and into the |bssl| namespace.
Started with one file. Will do the remaining ones once this looks good.
Change-Id: I51e2f7c1acbe52d508f1faee7740645f91f56386
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This makes it easier to understand the |sLen|-related logic.
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The old implementation had a lot of size_t/int confusion. It also
accepted non-minimally-encoded OIDs. Unlike the old implementation, the
new one does not fall back to BIGNUMs and does not attempt to
pretty-print OIDs with components which do not fit in a uint64_t. Add
tests for these cases.
With this new implementation, hopefully we'll have a much easier time
enabling MSVC's size_t truncation warning later.
Change-Id: I602102b97cf9b02d874644f8ef67fe9bac70e45e
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This eliminates duplicate logic.
Change-Id: I283273ae152f3644df4384558ee4a021f8c2d454
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BN_mod_inverse_odd was always being used on 64-bit platforms and was being used
for all curves with an order of 450 bits or smaller (basically, everything but
P-521). We generally don't care much about minor differences in the speed of
verifying signatures using curves other than P-256 and P-384. It is better to
always use the same algorithm.
This also allows |bn_mod_inverse_general|, |bn_mod_inverse_no_branch|, and
|BN_mod_inverse| to be dropped from programs that can somehow avoid linking in
the RSA key generation and RSA CRT recovery code.
Change-Id: I79b94bff23d2b07d5e0c704f7d44538797f8c7a0
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The main RSA public modulus size of concern is 2048 bits.
bn_mod_inverse_odd is already used for public moduli of 2048 bits and
smaller on 64-bit platforms, so for 64-bit it is a no-op. For 32-bit
x86, this seems to slightly decrease the speed of RSA signing, but not
by a lot, and plus we don't care about RSA signing performance much on
32-bit platforms. It's better to have all platforms using the same
algorithms.
Change-Id: I869dbfc98994e36a04a535c1fe63b14a902a4f13
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This is a step towards exposing |bn_mod_inverse_odd| for use outside
of crypto/bn/gcd.c.
Change-Id: I2968f1e43306c03775b3573a022edd92f4e91df2
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This is in preparation for factoring out the binary Euclidean
implementation (the one used for odd numbers that aren't too big) for
direct use from outside of crypto/bn/gcd.c. The goal is to make the
resultant |BN_mod_inverse_odd|'s signature similar to
|BN_mod_inverse_blinded|. Thus, the logic for reducing the final result
isn't factored out because that yet-to-be-created |BN_mod_inverse_odd|
will need to do it itself.
Change-Id: Iaecb79fb17d13c774c4fb6ade8742937780b0006
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This is very far from all of it, but I did some easy ones before I got
bored. Snapshot the progress until someone else wants to continue this.
BUG=22
Change-Id: I2609e9766d883a273e53e01a75a4b1d4700e2436
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Fix non-standard variable names, return value convention, unsigned vs
size_t, etc. This also fixes one size_t truncation warning.
BUG=22
Change-Id: Ibe083db90e8dac45d64da9ead8f519dd2fea96ea
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OBJ_obj2txt's implementation is kind of scary. Also it casts between int
and size_t a lot. In preparation for rewriting it, add a test.
Change-Id: Iefb1d0cddff58d67e5b04ec332477aab8aa687b6
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We'd gotten rid of the macros, but not the underlying asn1_GetSequence
which is unused. Sadly this doesn't quite get rid of ASN1_(const_)?CTX.
There's still some code in the rest of crypto/asn1 that uses it.
Change-Id: I2ba8708ac5b20982295fbe9c898fef8f9b635704
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|BN_mod_exp_mont| uses |BN_nnmod| so it seems like
|BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime| should too. Further, I created
these test vectors by doing the math by hand, and the tests
passed for |BN_mod_exp_mont| but failed for
|BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime| without this change.
Change-Id: I7cffa1375e94dd8eaee87ada78285cd67fff1bac
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Have |bn_correct_top| fix |bn->neg| if the input is zero so that we
don't have negative zeros lying around.
Thanks to Brian Smith for noticing.
Change-Id: I91bcadebc8e353bb29c81c4367e85853886c8e4e
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BUG=59
Change-Id: If3a788ec1328226d69293996845fa1d14690bf40
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If two CRLs are equivalent then use the one with a later lastUpdate field:
this will result in the newest CRL available being used.
(Imported from upstream's 325da8231c and
3dc160e9be6dcaeec9345fbb61b1c427d7026103.)
Change-Id: I8c722663b979dfe08728d091697d8b8204dc265c
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Negative zeros are nuts, but it will probably be a while before we've
fixed everything that can create them. Fix both to consistently print
'-0' rather than '0' so failures are easier to diagnose (BN_cmp believes
the values are different.)
Change-Id: Ic38d90601b43f66219d8f44ca085432106cf98e3
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Simplify the calculation of the Montgomery constants in
|BN_MONT_CTX_set|, making the inversion constant-time. It should also
be faster by avoiding any use of the |BIGNUM| API in favor of using
only 64-bit arithmetic.
Now it's obvious how it works. /s
Change-Id: I59a1e1c3631f426fbeabd0c752e0de44bcb5fd75
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A caller using EVP_Digest* which a priori knows tighter bounds on the
hash function used (perhaps because it is always a particular hash) can
assume the function will not write more bytes than the size of the hash.
The letter of the rules before vaguely[*] allowed for more than
EVP_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes written which made for some unreasonable code in
Chromium. Officially clarify this and add tests which, when paired with
valgrind and ASan prove it.
BUG=59
[*] Not really. I think it already promised the output length will be
both the number of bytes written and the size of the hash and the size
of the hash is given by what the function promises to compute. Meh.
Change-Id: I736d526e81cca30475c90897bca896293ff30278
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We managed to mix two comment styles in the Go license headers and
copy-and-paste it throughout the project.
Change-Id: Iec1611002a795368b478e1cae0b53127782210b1
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Yo dawg I herd you like blinding so I put inversion blinding in your
RSA blinding so you can randomly mask your random mask.
This improves upon the current situation where we pretend that
|BN_mod_inverse_no_branch| is constant-time, and it avoids the need to
exert a lot of effort to make a actually-constant-time modular
inversion function just for RSA blinding.
Note that if the random number generator weren't working correctly then
the blinding of the inversion wouldn't be very effective, but in that
case the RSA blinding itself would probably be completely busted, so
we're not really losing anything by relying on blinding to blind the
blinding.
Change-Id: I771100f0ad8ed3c24e80dd859ec22463ef2a194f
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This also adds a missing OPENSSL_EXPORT.
Change-Id: I6c2400246280f68f51157e959438644976b1171b
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There are many cases where we need |BN_rand_range| but with a minimum
value other than 0. |BN_rand_range_ex| provides that.
Change-Id: I564326c9206bf4e20a37414bdbce16a951c148ce
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Change-Id: I6d552d26b3d72f6fffdc4d4d9fc3b5d82fb4e8bb
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Fermat's Little Theorem is already used for the custom curve implementations.
Use it, for the same reasons, for the ec_montgomery-based implementations.
I tested the performance (only) on x86-64 Windows.
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Zero is only a valid input to or output of |BN_mod_inverse| when the
modulus is one. |BN_MONT_CTX_set| actually depends on this, so test
that this works.
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Some gerrit git hook says this is necessary.
Change-Id: I8a7a0a0e6732688c965b43824fe54b2db79a4919
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|BN_mod_inverse| is expensive and leaky. In this case, we can avoid
it completely by taking advantage of the fact that we already have
the two values that are supposed to be inverses of each other.
Change-Id: I2230b4166fb9d89c7445f9f7c045a4c9e4c377b3
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Besides reducing code duplication, also move the relative location of
the check of |count|. Previously, the code was generating a random
value and then terminating the loop without using it if |count| went
to zero. Now the wasted call to |BN_rand| is not made.
Also add a note about the applicability of the special case logic for
|range| of the form |0b100...| to RSA blinding.
Change-Id: Iaa33b9529f1665ac59aefcc8b371fa32445e7578
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One less random environment variable for us to be sensitive to. (We
should probably unwind all this proxy cert stuff. I don't believe they
are ever enabled.)
Change-Id: I74993178679ea49e60c81d8416e502cbebf02ec9
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(Imported from upstream's a9b23465243b6d692bb0b419bdbe0b1f5a849e9c,
5e102f96eb6fcdba1db2dba41132f92fa492aea0, and
9bda72880113b2b2262d290b23bdd1d3b19ff5b3.)
Change-Id: Ib608acb86cc128cacf20811c21bf6b38b0520106
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tag2nbyte had -1 at 18th position, but underlying ASN1_mbstring_copy
supports NumericString. tag2nbyte is also used in do_print_ex which will
not be broken by setting 1 at 18th position of tag2nbyte
(Imported from upstream's bd598cc405e981de259a07558e600b5a9ef64bd6.)
Change-Id: Ie063afcaac8a7d5046cdb385059b991b92cd6659
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The selector field could be omitted because it has a DEFAULT value.
In this case *sfld == NULL (sfld can never be NULL). This was not
noticed because this was never used in existing ASN.1 modules.
(Imported from upstream's c4210673313482edacede58d92e92c213d7a181a.)
svaldez and I stared at this for a while and we believe this change is
correct. It's also irrelevant because our only remaining ADB (ANY
DEFINED BY) table is POLICYQUALINFO which does not allow its selector to
be omitted. Also, if it did, it would be a slight change in behavior.
We'd switch from using POLICYQUALINFO's default_tt (filling in an
ASN1_ANY) to its null_tt (which doesn't exist, so error).
Change-Id: If6a929e3dafca18431775b01958d0dae1c09f3b4
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This imports upstream's b62e9bf5cb and
c3bc7f4988. This is a no-op since we don't
use the XTS bits though keep the files in sync so long as we have them.
Comparing to master, we're now up-to-date on that file except for
a285992763. (I've left that alone since
that touches lots of files and we should probably get better test
configuration before importing something scary like #undef __thumb2__.)
Change-Id: Ie0556757c954ef559e03a6d62c940d5901ca704a
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All other CBB_add_u<N> functions take a narrowed type, but not every
uint32_t may fit in a u24. Check for this rather than silently truncate.
Change-Id: I23879ad0f4d2934f257e39e795cf93c6e3e878bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8940
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
It's only called in one place. The comment about stack-allocated BIOs no
longer applies.
Change-Id: I5a3cec30bcb46bf1ee2bffd6117485383520b314
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8902
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
BN_mod_mul_montgomery has a problem where the modulus is much smaller
than one of the arguments. While bn_test.cc knows this and reduces the
inputs before testing |BN_mod_mul_montgomery|, none of the previous test
vectors actually failed without this. (Except those that passed negative
vaules.)
This change adds tests where M ≪ A and B.
Change-Id: I53b5188ea5fb5e48d0d197718ed33c644cde8477
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8890
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Martin Kreichgauer
Brian Smith
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Alessandro Ghedini
Eric Roman