The server should not be allowed select a protocol that wasn't
advertised. Callers tend to not really notice and act as if some default
were chosen which is unlikely to work very well.
Change-Id: Ib6388db72f05386f854d275bab762ca79e8174e6
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These are probably a good idea to ship so long as we have the PSK
callbacks at all, but they're not *completely* standard yet and Android
tests otherwise need updating to know about them. We don't care enough
about PSK to be in a rush to ship them, and taking them out is an easier
default action until then.
Change-Id: Ic646053d29b69a114e2efea61d593d5e912bdcd0
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If cert_cb runs asynchronously, we end up repeating a large part of very
stateful ClientHello processing. This seems to be mostly fine and there
are few users of server-side cert_cb (it's a new API in 1.0.2), but it's
a little scary.
This is also visible to external consumers because some callbacks get
called multiple times. We especially should try to avoid that as there
is no guarantee that these callbacks are idempotent and give the same
answer each time.
Change-Id: I212b2325eae2cfca0fb423dace101e466c5e5d4e
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This is more progress in letting other stacks use the test runner.
You can provide a per-shim configuration file that includes:
- A list of test patterns to be suppressed (presumably because
they don't work). This setting is ignored if -test is used.
- A translation table of expected errors to shim-specific errors.
BUG=92
Change-Id: I3c31d136e35c282e05d4919e18ba41d44ea9cf2a
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We handle this correctly but never wrote a test for it. Noticed this in
chatting about the second ClientHello.version bug workaround with Eric
Rescorla.
Change-Id: I09bc6c995d07c0f2c9936031b52c3c639ed3695e
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Only X509_up_ref left (it's still waiting on a few external callers).
BUG=89
Change-Id: Ia2aec2bb0a944356cb1ce29f3b58a26bdb8a9977
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tls13_process_certificate can take a boolean for whether anonymous is
allowed. This does change the error on the client slightly, but I think
this is correct anyway. It is not a syntax error for the server to send
no certificates in so far as the Certificate message allows it. It's
just illegal.
Change-Id: I1af80dacf23f50aad0b1fbd884bc068a40714399
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We have tests for this as a server, but none as a client. Extend the
certificate verification tests here. This is in preparation for ensuring
that TLS 1.3 session resumption works correctly.
Change-Id: I9ab9f42838ffd69f73fbd877b0cdfaf31caea707
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Extend the DTLS mock clock to apply to sessions too and test that
resumption behaves as expected.
Change-Id: Ib8fdec91b36e11cfa032872b63cf589f93b3da13
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We will now send tickets as a server and accept them as a
client. Correctly offering and resuming them in the handshake will be
implemented in a follow-up.
Now that we're actually processing draft 14 tickets, bump the draft
version.
Change-Id: I304320a29c4ffe564fa9c00642a4ace96ff8d871
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As of https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/530, they're gone.
They're still allowed just before the ClientHello or ServerHello, which
is kind of odd, but so it goes.
BUG=86
Change-Id: I3d556ab45e42d0755d23566e006c0db9af35b7b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9114
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Change-Id: I998f69269cdf813da19ccccc208b476f3501c8c4
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In TLS 1.2, this was allowed to be empty for the weird SHA-1 fallback
logic. In TLS 1.3, not only is the fallback logic gone, but omitting
them is a syntactic error.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
SignatureScheme
supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
Change-Id: I4991e59bc4647bb665aaf920ed4836191cea3a5a
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We were sending decode_error, but the spec explicitly says (RFC 5246):
unsupported_extension
sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing
an extension that they did not put in the corresponding client
hello. This message is always fatal.
Also add a test for this when it's a known but unoffered extension. We
actually end up putting these in different codepaths now due to the
custom extensions stuff.
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
Change-Id: If6c8033d4cfe69ef8af5678b873b25e0dbadfc4f
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It seems much safer for the default value of |verify_result| to be an
error value.
Change-Id: I372ec19c41d77516ed12d0169969994f7d23ed70
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We managed to mix two comment styles in the Go license headers and
copy-and-paste it throughout the project.
Change-Id: Iec1611002a795368b478e1cae0b53127782210b1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9060
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BUG=74
Change-Id: I72d52c1fbc3413e940dddbc0b20c7f22459da693
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Change-Id: I5cc194fc0a3ba8283049078e5671c924ee23036c
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This finishes getting rid of ssl_read_bytes! Now we have separate
entry-points for the various cases. For now, I've kept TLS handshake
consuming records partially. When we do the BIO-less API, I expect that
will need to change, since we won't have the record buffer available.
(Instead, the ssl3_read_handshake_bytes and extend_handshake_buffer pair
will look more like the DTLS side or Go and pull the entire record into
init_buf.)
This change opts to make read_app_data drive the message to completion
in anticipation of DTLS 1.3. That hasn't been specified, but
NewSessionTicket certainly will exist. Knowing that DTLS necessarily has
interleave seems something better suited for the SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD
internals to drive.
It needs refining, but SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD is now actually a half-decent
abstraction boundary between the higher-level protocol logic and
DTLS/TLS-specific record-layer and message dispatchy bits.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I9b4626bb8a29d9cb30174d9e6912bb420ed45aff
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Regression tests for upstream's
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1298.
Also, given that we're now on our third generation of V2ClientHello
handling, I'm sure we'll have a fourth and fifth and one of these days
I'm going to mess this one up. :-)
Change-Id: I6fd8f311ed0939fbbfd370448b637ccc06145021
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Change-Id: I7e85a2677fe28a22103a975d517bbee900c44ac3
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We already forbid renego/app-data interleave. Forbid it within a
HelloRequest too because that's nonsense. No one would ever send:
[hs:HelloReq-] [app:Hello world] [hs:-uest]
Add tests for this case.
This is in preparation for our more complex TLS 1.3 post-handshake logic
which is going to go through the usual handshake reassembly logic and,
for sanity, will want to enforce this anyway.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I80eb9f3333da3d751f98f25d9469860d1993a97a
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Per request from EKR. Also we have a lot of long test names, so this
seems generally a good idea.
Change-Id: Ie463f5367ec7d33005137534836005b571c8f424
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9021
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This is in preparation for switching finish_handshake to a
release_current_message hook. finish_handshake in DTLS is also
responsible for releasing any memory associated with extra messages in
the handshake.
Except that's not right and we need to make it an error anyway. Given
that the rest of the DTLS dispatch layer already strongly assumes there
is only one message in epoch one, putting the check in the fragment
processing works fine enough. Add tests for this.
This will certainly need revising when DTLS 1.3 happens (perhaps just a
version check, perhaps bringing finish_handshake back as a function that
can fail... which means we need a state just before SSL_ST_OK), but DTLS
1.3 post-handshake messages haven't really been written down, so let's
do the easy thing for now and add a test for when it gets more
interesting.
This removes the sequence number reset in the DTLS code. That reset
never did anything becase we don't and never will renego. We should make
sure DTLS 1.3 does not bring the reset back for post-handshake stuff.
(It was wrong in 1.2 too. Penultimate-flight retransmits and renego
requests are ambiguous in DTLS.)
BUG=83
Change-Id: I33d645a8550f73e74606030b9815fdac0c9fb682
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Right now they're RSA PRIVATE KEY or EC PRIVATE KEY which requires a bit
more effort to parse. It means the PEM header is necessary to parse
these. OpenSSL and Go automagically convert the format, but other shims
(namely NSS) may not.
Change-Id: I9fa2767dcf1fe6ceeea546390759e1c364a8f16f
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Implemented in preparation for testing the C implementation. Tested
against itself.
BUG=74
Change-Id: Iec1b9ad22e09711fa4e67c97cc3eb257585c3ae5
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We still don't do anything useful with them, but we know not to put them
in the session ticket field.
In doing so, fix a bug in the CorruptTicket option where it would crash
if tickets are exactly 40 byets in length.
BUG=75
Change-Id: Id1039a58ed314a67d0af4f2c7e0617987c2bd6b5
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Also parse out the ticket lifetime which was previously ignored.
BUG=75
Change-Id: I6ba92017bd4f1b31da55fd85d2af529fd592de11
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We have no intention of implementing FFDHE and the DHE ciphers currently
don't work in the 1.3 handshake anyway. Cipher suite negotiation is to
be refactored in the spec so these cipher values won't be used for FFDHE
anyway.
Change-Id: I51547761d70a397dc3dd0391b71db98189f1a844
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This change allows the shim to return a magic error code (89) to
indicate that it doesn't implement some of the given flags for a test.
Unimplemented tests are, by default, an error. The --allow-unimplemented
flag to the test runner causes them to be ignored.
This is done in preparation for non-BoringSSL shims.
Change-Id: Iecfd545b9cf44df5e25b719bfd06275c8149311a
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WebRTC want to be able to send a random alert. Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Id3113d68f25748729fd9e9a91dbbfa93eead12c3
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Ridiculous as it is, the protocol does not forbid packing HelloRequest
and Finished into the same record. Add a test for this case.
Change-Id: I8e1455b261f56169309070bf44d14d40a63eae50
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Alas, we will need a version fallback for TLS 1.3 again.
This deprecates SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV. Rather than supplying a
boolean, have BoringSSL be aware of the real maximum version so we can
change the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade logic to kick in, even when
max_version is set to 1.2.
The fallback version replaces the maximum version when it is set for
almost all purposes, except for downgrade protection purposes.
BUG=chromium:630165
Change-Id: I4c841dcbc6e55a282b223dfe169ac89c83c8a01f
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[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
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Change-Id: I92425d7c72111623ddfbe8391f2d2fa88f101ef3
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Change-Id: Ibde837040d2332bc8570589ba5be9b32e774bfcf
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We never had coverage for that codepath.
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Change-Id: I0fdd6db9ea229d394b14c76b6ba55f6165a6a806
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There is no longer need for the Go code to implement 'fake TLS 1.3'. We
now implement real incomplete TLS 1.3.
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This is basically the same as BadECDHECurve-TLS13. That the client picks
a share first but the server picks the curve type means there's less
redundancy to deal with.
Change-Id: Icd9a4ecefe8e0dfaeb8fd0b062ca28561b05df98
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Change-Id: Iad572f44448141c5e2be49bf25b42719c625a97a
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
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Change-Id: I1132103bd6c8b01c567b970694ed6b5e9248befb
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Not only test that we can enforce the message type correctly (this is
currently in protocol-specific code though really should not be), but
also test that each individual message is checked correctly.
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This will be used for writing the equivalent test in TLS 1.3 to the
recent DTLS change and similar.
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This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It
is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to
buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished.
When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we
will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong
encryption.
Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is
a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS
check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in
read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so
we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For
now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with
a proper check in TLS 1.3.)
Change-Id: Ia52b0b81e7db53e9ed2d4f6d334a1cce13e93297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8790
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Keep our C implementation honest.
Change-Id: I9e9e686b7f730b61218362450971afdd82b0b640
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8782
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
It tests the same thing right now with Fake TLS 1.3, but we'll need this
tested in real TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Iacd32c2d4e56d341e5709a2ccd80fed5d556c94d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8783
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
