Change-Id: I18cee423675d6a686f83b4ef4b38696cb618392c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11683
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I0bd7fdd276e7461ef08b8055bf3d0387f756739f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11682
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BUG=103
Change-Id: I9a49fbaf66af73978ce264d27926f483e1e44766
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11620
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Channel ID for TLS 1.3 uses the same digest construction as
CertificateVerify. This message is signed with the Channel ID key and
put in the same handshake message (with the same format) as in TLS 1.2.
BUG=103
Change-Id: Ia5b2dffe5a39c39db0cecb0aa6bdc328e53accc2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11420
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Nodejs 6.9.0 calls this function.
Change-Id: I375f222cb819ebcb9fdce0a0d63df6817fa2dcae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11625
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
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This code reportedly upsets VC++'s static analysis. Make it clear that,
yes, we want to count backwards.
Change-Id: I5caba219a2b87750d1a9d69b46d336a98c5824c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11624
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
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{sha1, ecdsa} is virtually nonexistent. {sha512, ecdsa} is pointless
when we only accept P-256 and P-384. See Chromium Intent thread here:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/kWwLfeIQIBM/9chGZ40TCQAJ
This tweaks the signature algorithm logic slightly so that sign and
verify preferences are separate.
BUG=chromium:655318
Change-Id: I1097332600dcaa38e62e4dffa0194fb734c6df3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11621
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Macros need a healthy dose of parentheses to avoid expression-level
misparses. Most of this comes from the clang-tidy CL here:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/235696/
Also switch most of the macros to use do { ... } while (0) to avoid all
the excessive comma operators and statement-level misparses.
Change-Id: I4c2ee51e347d2aa8c74a2d82de63838b03bbb0f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11660
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I missed this function, which was unfortunate.
Change-Id: I8bcea1738a50aa3297d09a59a86437351ff5f84a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11623
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I167d8ebfa7f2c08ba9f532df96ce5abd432c47c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11622
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If SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs or
SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs are
called multiple times for the same cert, the
previous cert->sigalgs will leak.
Free the existing sigalgs before setting a new one.
Change-Id: I73cdb366a8f47d8cc0baae986fd0aa80b60300e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11640
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BUG=6
Change-Id: I463f5daa0bbf0f65269c52da25fa235ee2aa6ffb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11240
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There were some logic errors that were revealed by testing at TLS 1.3.
Also explicitly test GetClientHelloLen at TLS 1.2 (rather than relying
on the default) since the TLS 1.3 ClientHello is too large.
Change-Id: I907cb6ac04b40f845e99593bad06739132ca56b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11605
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We run with a few more arguments, we may as well pass them in.
Change-Id: Icd7196fc50983f77d500b96e0cc4f9bc583671bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11603
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We have bool here. Also the comments were a mix of two styles.
Change-Id: I7eb6814b206efa960ae7e6e1abc14d64be6d61cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11602
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This reverts commit 7b9bbd9639. This seems
to cause some problem linking with gold in Chromium:
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'free'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'malloc'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: warning: Cannot export local symbol 'realloc'
../../third_party/binutils/Linux_x64/Release/bin/ld.gold: error: treating warnings as errors
The same error in https://crbug.com/368351 implies we're actually
causing the compiler to make some assumptions it shouldn't make. The
obvious fix of marking things as visible causes crashes when built with
ASan (ASan's malloc interceptors and ours are conflicting somehow).
Revert this for now. We should study how ASan's interceptors work and
figure out how to make these two coexist.
BUG=655938
Change-Id: Iaad245d1028c442bd924d46519b20115d37a57c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11604
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Data allocated in one fuzzer iteration and then freed in the next
complicates the leak checker. Avoid this by dropping hidden global state
at the end of each run.
Change-Id: Ice79704f2754a6b1f40e288df9b97ddd5b3b97d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11600
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I3476d3ba7cf90e023f6ad2ff9264a31c59a74e6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11584
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Some new tests needed to be suppressed.
Change-Id: I4474d752c338a18440efb213e0795ae81ad754fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11583
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This should land in the same group of revisions as the two parent
commits.
Change-Id: Id9d769b890b3308ea70b705e7241c73cb1930ede
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11581
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We'll never send cookies, but we'll echo them on request. Implement it
in runner as well and test.
BUG=98
Change-Id: Idd3799f1eaccd52ac42f5e2e5ae07c209318c270
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11565
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This doesn't currently honor the required KeyUpdate response. That will
be done in a follow-up.
BUG=74
Change-Id: I750fc41278736cb24230303815e839c6f6967b6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11412
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
They take a const pointer. See
http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html#building
BUG=chromium:655016
Change-Id: Id6c7584c7a875e822b1fbff72163c888d02a9f44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11580
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These too must be rejected. Test both unknown extensions and extensions
in the wrong context.
Change-Id: I54d5a5060f9efc26e5e4d23a0bde3c0d4d302d09
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11501
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This clears the last of Android's build warnings from BoringSSL. These
pragmas aren't actually no-ops, but it just means that MinGW consumers
(i.e. just Android) need to explicitly list the dependency (which they
do).
There may be something to be said for removing those and having everyone
list dependencies, but I don't really want to chase down every
consumer's build files. Probably not worth the trouble.
Change-Id: I8fcff954a6d5de9471f456db15c54a1b17cb937a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11573
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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MinGW has two different versions of printf. We want the format string
warnings to match. This silences some warnings in the Android build.
See:
https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/wiki2/gnu%20printf/
Note this assumes that, for external calls of these functions, the build
configuration of the consumer and BoringSSL match in this regard. (But
it doesn't actually matter because the issue is only on XP.)
Change-Id: I7f12ad2fc94130edd984feac5914f8ca6c88b8d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11572
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was a remnant of the old cipher suite setup.
Change-Id: Ibc79b81200a52d45fbd69b9c04060c38ad4707f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11564
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is part of TLS 1.3 draft 16 but isn't much of a wire format change,
so go ahead and add it now. When rolling into Chromium, we'll want to
add an entry to the error mapping.
Change-Id: I8fd7f461dca83b725a31ae19ef96c890d603ce53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: Id8099cc3a250e36e62b8a48e74706b75e5fa127c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11566
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only save them at TLS 1.0 through 1.2. This saves 104 bytes of
per-connection memory.
Change-Id: If397bdc10e40f0194cba01024e0e9857d6b812f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11571
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We need to retain a pair of Finished messages for renegotiation_info.
SSL 3.0's is actually larger than TLS 1.2's (always 12 bytes). Take
renegotiation out in preparation for trimming them to size.
Change-Id: I2e238c48aaf9be07dd696bc2a6af75e9b0ead299
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11570
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We only need one copy, not two. This trims 130 bytes of per-connection
memory.
Change-Id: I334aa7b1f8608e72426986bfa68534d416f3bda9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11569
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
tls-unique isn't defined at TLS 1.3 yet. (Given that it was too small in
1.2, they may just define a new one entirely?) SSL_get_(peer_)finished
doesn't work at 1.3 and is only used in lieu of computing tls-unique,
also undefined at SSL 3.0.
This is in preparation for trimming the copies of the Finished messages
we retain.
Change-Id: Iace99f2baea92c511c4041c592300dfbbe7226e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11568
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
SSL_HANDSHAKE is dropped after the handshake, so I've removed the logic
around smaller sizes. It's much simpler when we can use CBS_stow and
CBB_finish without extra bounds-checking.
Change-Id: Idafaa5d69e171aed9a8759f3d44e52cb01c40f39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11567
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Now not only the pointers but also the list itself is released after the
handshake completes.
Change-Id: I8b568147d2d4949b3b0efe58a93905f77a5a4481
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11528
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's weird and makes things more confusing. Only use it for local
preferences as there is a default. Peer preferences can be read
directly. Also simplify the logic for requiring a non-empty peer group
list for ECDHE. The normal logic will give us this for free.
Change-Id: I1916155fe246be988f20cbf0b1728380ec90ff3d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11527
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This function is now only ever called as a client, so there are no peer
preferences to check against. It is also now only called on peer curves,
so it only needs to be compared against local preferences.
Change-Id: I87f5b10cf4fe5fef9a9d60aff36010634192e90c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11526
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These functions are only called once. It ends up being not much code if
just done inline.
Change-Id: Ic432b313a6f7994ff9f51436cffbe0c3686a6c7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11525
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is in preparation for simplifying tls1_check_group_id, called by
tls1_check_ec_cert, which, in turn, is in preparation for moving the
peer group list to SSL_HANDSHAKE.
It also helps with bug #55. Move the key usage check to the certificate
configuration sanity check. There's no sense in doing it late. Also
remove the ECDSA peer curve check as we configure certificates
externally. With only one certificate, there's no sense in trying to
remove it.
BUG=55
Change-Id: I8c116337770d96cc9cfd4b4f0ca7939a4f05a1a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11524
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: Ifcdbeab9291d1141605a09a1960702c792cffa86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11561
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I5d4fc0d3204744e93d71a36923469035c19a5b10
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11560
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib499b3393962a4d41cf9694e055ed3eb869d91a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11504
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Our implementation now expects draft 15.
Change-Id: I261a090763951110a6c9f03acfda4ae23cc14cfc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11502
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The server acknowledging a non-existent session is a particularly
interesting case since getting it wrong means a NULL crash.
Change-Id: Iabde4955de883595239cfd8e9d84a7711e60a886
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11500
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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