These functions can be used to configure the signature algorithms. One
of them is a string mini-languaging parsing function, which we generally
dislike because it defeats static analysis. However, some dependent
projects (in this case TensorFlow) need it and we also dislike making
people patch.
Change-Id: I13f990c896a7f7332d78b1c351357d418ade8d11
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30304
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
I got an automated email from the previous config update to remove this.
Change-Id: I45586d3bda3241a513bf2f6a8ec3b2a87fc4f2f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30584
Reviewed-by: Ryan Tseng <hinoka@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We keep tripping it due to weird quirks in fuzzer mode.
Change-Id: Ie09113d42b24070b1749d38f56253bb7d9147f3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30564
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embed_test_data.go assumes that it's working with 8KB chunks. However,
if the input file contains a '\' then the Go code thinks that it counts
as a byte, but the C compiler will probably merge it with the following
char and thus that string will be slightly too short. ASAN will detect
the out-of-bounds read when 8192 bytes are copied from the string.
Change-Id: If40ccfd39ea013bd6935fcc313cfe188fe985f67
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Our test data uses values to up 2048 so the 1024 limit was causing tests
to fail in fuzzing mode.
Change-Id: I71b97be26376a04c13d1f438e5e36a5ffff1c1a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30484
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The previous limit was |UINT_MAX|. Windows limits to 600K, but that's
already causing issues. This seems like a balance between being
completely crazy and still large enough not to have to worry for a long
time. It's still probably too large for backend systems wanting to
process arbitrary PKCS#12, but I don't think any fixed value will
satisfy all desires.
Change-Id: I01a3f78d5f2df086f8dbc0e8bacfb95153738f55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30424
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(Otherwise the fuzzer will discover that it can trigger extremely large
amounts of computation and start timing out.)
BUG=oss-fuzz:9767
Change-Id: Ibc1da5a90da169c7caf522f792530d1020f8cb54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This change syncs several assembly files from upstream. The only meanful
additions are more CFI directives.
Change-Id: I6aec50b6fddbea297b79bae22cfd68d5c115220f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30364
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I believe that case was the only way that X509_check_purpose could
return anything other than zero or one. Thus eliminate the last use of
X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT.
Change-Id: If2f071dfa934b924491db2b615ec17390564e7de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30344
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
In fuzzing builds, session resumptions fail if the PRNG behaves the
same as in the initial session. Not sure of the reason, but a kick to
the PRNG fixes the problem and doesn't compromise determinism, so
... *shrug*?
Change-Id: I8181d98fdff16ae82255e9cda33ce5c4c40b5399
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30284
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This should hopefully fix a build failure on the fuzzers.
Change-Id: If8db8dee768a83538cf37a65ec23c3f68f2be6a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30264
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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OpenSSL 1.0.2 (and thus BoringSSL) accepts keyUsage certSign or a
Netscape CA certificate-type in lieu of basicConstraints in an
intermediate certificate (unless X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) is set.
Update-Note: This change tightens the code so that basicConstraints is required for intermediate certificates when verifying chains. This was previously only enabled if X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT was set, but that flag also has other effects.
Change-Id: I9e41f4c567084cf30ed08f015a744959982940af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30185
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
This change adds a new flag, X509_V_FLAG_REQUIRE_CA_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
which causes basicConstraints with isCA to be required for intermediate
CA certificates. Without this, intermediates are also acceptable if
they're missing basicConstraints, but include either a certSign
keyUsage, or a CA Netscape certificate type.
This is a short-term change for patching. I'll undo a lot of it and make
this the default in the next change.
Change-Id: I7f42ffd76c57de3037f054108951e230c1b4e415
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30184
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The runner currently expects split handshake tests to work is GOOS is
"linux", but that includes Android, which the shim doesn't support.
Rather than try to align these two conditions, have the runner ask the
shim whether it supports split handshakes or not.
Change-Id: I7bea0d94142c4b6ee42b8f54c67b8611da93feb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30204
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The new binary, called |handshaker|, allows split-handshakes to be
tested using shim and handshaker binaries built at different
revisions.
The shim now proxies traffic to the handshaker during the split
handshake. The handoff and handback steps serialize additional state
about the test being performed, and its results.
The proxy and handshaker make heavy use of Unix-isms, and so
split-handshake tests are now restricted to Linux.
Change-Id: I048f0540c3978a31b3e573e00da17caf41a8059e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29348
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Setting OPENSSL_NO_ASM skips enabling the “ASM” language in CMake.
However, the FIPS module fundamentally needs to build asm because
delocate works via textual assembly. Thus this combination is currently
broken with CMake.
This change ensures that support for building asm is enabled in CMake
for this combination.
Change-Id: I4516cf3a6f579ee7c72f04ac25d15785926cf125
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29884
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds a function so that an ECDH and the hashing of the
resulting 'x' coordinate can occur inside the FIPS boundary.
Change-Id: If93c20a70dc9dcbca49056f10915d3ce064f641f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30104
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Future versions of the Wycheproof vectors will specify the curve for a
group of tests, rather than for each test. This change works with both
the old and new style.
Change-Id: I0d9a503c8357eb4c617544e727d8f4a703c2c2b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
gcl is long deprecated, "git cl" is what this is used for now.
TBR: davidben
Change-Id: I5980b8ff3a7c384f4650e195eb6e4daf52da5ae2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30064
Reviewed-by: Ryan Tseng <hinoka@google.com>
Change-Id: I33c5259f066693c912ba751dff0205ae240f4a92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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MSan works by instrumenting memory accesses in the compiler. Accesses from
uninstrumented code, such as assembly, are invisible to it. MSan will
incorrectly report reads from assembly-initialized memory as uninitialized.
To avoid confusing downstream consumers with false positives, catch this at
compile-time with a more useful error.
Update-Note: BoringSSL with MSan and assembly doesn't work, but now rather than
crashing at runtime, it will fail to build altogether. It's possible someone
was building BoringSSL with MSan and either not running it at all or just not
exercising the codepaths that break.
Bug: 252
Change-Id: I0c8b0fa3c2d1e584b3f40d532a668a8c9be06cb7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29928
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There were some subtleties in this one. I'm not sure if TSan covers it all, but
it's better than nothing.
Change-Id: I239e3aee2fea84caa2e48f555d08c6d89f430402
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29927
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This covers some of the session cache bits and the SSL_CTX_get0_certificate
quirk.
Change-Id: Ia2a5e93075de43aaf5fce086e376954f58671536
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29926
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The business with cached Montgomery contexts is not trivial.
Change-Id: I60d34ed5f55509372c82534d1c2233a4ad67ab34
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29925
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Confirmed that, if the locks are commented out, TSan catches the threading
error.
Change-Id: I3e4ef9a7ca85fdbacf8c8b13694a5a54c6d5f99b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Otherwise, if the output BIGNUM was previously negative, we'd incorrectly give
a negative result. Thanks to Guide Vranken for reporting this issue!
Fortunately, this does not appear to come up in any existing caller. This isn't
all that surprising as negative numbers never really come up in cryptography.
Were it not for OpenSSL historically designing a calculator API, we'd just
delete the bit altogether. :-(
Bug: chromium:865924
Change-Id: I28fdc986dfaba3e38435b14ebf07453d537cc60a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29944
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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rather than twice, with the second call overriding the first.
Change-Id: Ieb139928edcbe75f1d2e7c2c52c46950d6343a6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29904
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This helps with creating a separate binary to perform split
handshakes, in that the test state must be communicated to, and
retrieved from, the handshaker binary using a socket.
Change-Id: I9d70a9bb3d97dd339aab4f51c6de75f71e4fe72d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29704
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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In particular, although CertificateRequest comes before Certificate and
CertificateVerify in TLS 1.3, we must not resolve the CertificateRequest until
afterwards. (This is rather annoying ordering, but does mean the
CertificateRequest is covered in the signature, which is nice to have.)
Change-Id: Iab95813de5efd674aa8e2459cfc7456b146ee754
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29826
Reviewed-by: Jesse Selover <jselover@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Mostly in comments, but there is one special-case around renegotiation_info
that can now be removed.
Change-Id: I2a9114cbff05e0cfff95fe93270fe42379728012
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29824
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Thanks to Tom Thorogood for catching this.
Change-Id: I09fa5d9822b9ba13b106add251e26c6ebee21b03
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29825
Reviewed-by: Tom Thorogood <me+google@tomthorogood.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This commit is to allow Tensorflow to build with boringssl on ppc64le
and RHEL7.5/gcc 4.8.5.
All the instructions used by linux_x86_64 also need to bet set for
linux_ppc64le
Change-Id: I4ccf8a61fe3bdd0a49944b48ce7863b97f957a85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Callers who use SSL_get0_certificate_types today will find an empty list
in TLS 1.3, which removed it. To provide feature parity, add an accessor
for the signature algorithms list. SSL_get_signature_algorithm_key_type
can be used to map it to a key type.
"Peer signature algorithms" was already taken in the public API by
SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm to refer to which the peer selected, so
I named this matching SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs.
Change-Id: I12d411d7350e744ed9f88c610df48e0d9fc13256
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They've since added new files that split up ECDH and RSA. The former especially
could be useful. A later commit will switch to those. Along the way, fix the
aes_cmac_test.json entry in the convert_wycheproof.go which got lost at some
point.
Change-Id: I9c4a2e5fc5f3e0935482f583c5466c1b64fe325e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29686
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This makes the shim code read more naturally, in that the split-
handshake special case now lives in its own file.
This helps with creating a separate binary to perform split
handshakes.
Change-Id: I7970a8f368417791d18d4d44eeb379ef4b46c960
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29347
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Delocate failed with some versions of Clang that reference
OPENSSL_ia32cap_P with an orq instruction.
Change-Id: I448d291594f5f147424e6f7014a681c4201b0aee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29764
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
With SSL 3.0 gone, there's no need to split up MD5 and SHA-1.
Change-Id: Ia4236c738dfa6743f1028c2d53761c95cba96288
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Change-Id: Id7f5ef9932c4c491bd15085e3c604ebfcf259b7c
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I436cc772eb975ad989035ee154a2e050c65e2961
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In f2bc5f4 davidben pointed out that this function seems unnecessary
in my desired end-state. In fact, I think it may have been
unnecessary since 56986f90. (This was easier to miss at the time,
since at the time the function was part of MoveExData(), having not
yet been factored out.)
Change-Id: Ia9b4a909c93cb595666bcf7356a9f9a085901455
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29604
Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Previously we used thread-local state objects in rand.c. However, for
applications with large numbers of threads, this can lead to excessive
memory usage.
This change causes us to maintain a mutex-protected pool of state
objects where the size of the pool equals the maximum concurrency of
|RAND_bytes|. This might lead to state objects bouncing between CPUs
more often, but should help the memory usage problem.
Change-Id: Ie83763d3bc139e64ac17bf7e015ad082b2f8a81a
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
