This should land in the same group of revisions as the two parent
commits.
Change-Id: Id9d769b890b3308ea70b705e7241c73cb1930ede
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We'll never send cookies, but we'll echo them on request. Implement it
in runner as well and test.
BUG=98
Change-Id: Idd3799f1eaccd52ac42f5e2e5ae07c209318c270
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This doesn't currently honor the required KeyUpdate response. That will
be done in a follow-up.
BUG=74
Change-Id: I750fc41278736cb24230303815e839c6f6967b6a
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These too must be rejected. Test both unknown extensions and extensions
in the wrong context.
Change-Id: I54d5a5060f9efc26e5e4d23a0bde3c0d4d302d09
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Change-Id: Ifcdbeab9291d1141605a09a1960702c792cffa86
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The server acknowledging a non-existent session is a particularly
interesting case since getting it wrong means a NULL crash.
Change-Id: Iabde4955de883595239cfd8e9d84a7711e60a886
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
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BUG=77
Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
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EnableAllCiphers is problematic since some (version, cipher)
combinations aren't even defined and crash. Instead, use the
SendCipherSuite bug to mask the true cipher (which is becomes arbitrary)
for failure tests. The shim should fail long before we get further.
This lets us remove a number of weird checks in the TLS 1.3 code.
This also fixes the UnknownCipher tests which weren't actually testing
anything. EnableAllCiphers is now AdvertiseAllConfiguredCiphers and
does not filter out garbage values.
Change-Id: I7102fa893146bb0d096739e768c5a7aa339e51a8
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This is another case where the specification failed to hammer things
down and OpenSSL messed it up as a result. Also fix the SCT test in TLS
1.3.
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Change-Id: I73f9fd64b46f26978b897409d817b34ec9d93afd
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This mirror's 2dc0204603 on the C side.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Iebb72df5a5ae98cb2fd8db519d973cd734ff05ea
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This is in preparation for implementing the version extension and is
probably what we should have done from the beginning as it makes
intolerance bugs simpler.
This means knobs like SendClientVersion and SendServerVersion deal with
the wire values while knobs like NegotiateVersion and MaxVersion deal
with logical versions. (This matches how the bugs have always worked.
SendFoo is just a weird post-processing bit on the handshake messages
while NegotiateVersion actually changes how BoGo behaves.)
BUG=90
Change-Id: I7f359d798d0899fa2742107fb3d854be19e731a4
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This GREASEs cipher suites, groups, and extensions. For now, we'll
always place them in a hard-coded position. We can experiment with more
interesting strategies later.
If we add new ciphers and curves, presumably we prefer them over current
ones, so place GREASE values at the front. This prevents implementations
from parsing only the first value and ignoring the rest.
Add two new extensions, one empty and one non-empty. Place the empty one
in front (IBM WebSphere can't handle trailing empty extensions) and the
non-empty one at the end.
Change-Id: If2e009936bc298cedf2a7a593ce7d5d5ddbb841a
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Apparently we never wrote one of those. Also send a decrypt_error alert
to be consistent with all the other signature checks.
Change-Id: Ib5624d098d1e3086245192cdce92f5df26005064
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11180
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The old numbers violate a MUST-level requirement in TLS 1.2 to not
advertise anonymous (0x0700 ends in 0x00). The spec has been updated
with new allocations which avoid these.
BUG=webrtc:6342
Change-Id: Ia5663ada98fa1ebf0f8a7f50fe74a0e9206c4194
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11131
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Found by libFuzzer and then one more mistake caught by valgrind. Add a
test for this case.
Change-Id: I92773bc1231bafe5fc069e8568d93ac0df4c8acb
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Plain PSK omits the ServerKeyExchange when there is no hint and includes
it otherwise (it should have always sent it), while other PSK ciphers
like ECDHE_PSK cannot omit the hint. Having different capabilities here
is odd and RFC 4279 5.2 suggests that all PSK ciphers are capable of
"[not] provid[ing] an identity hint".
Interpret this to mean no identity hint and empty identity hint are the
same state. Annoyingly, this gives a plain PSK implementation two
options for spelling an empty hint. The spec isn't clear and this is not
really a battle worth fighting, so I've left both acceptable and added a
test for this case.
See also https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/275217/. This is also
consistent with Android's PskKeyManager API, our only consumer anyway.
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/PskKeyManager.html
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It's easy to forget to check those. Unfortunately, it's also easy to
forget to check inner structures, which is going to be harder to stress,
but do these to start with. In doing, so fix up and unify some
error-handling, and add a missing check when parsing TLS 1.2
CertificateRequest.
This was also inspired by the recent IETF posting.
Change-Id: I27fe3cd3506258389a75d486036388400f0a33ba
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Not that this matters in the slightest, but the recent IETF mailing
reminded me we don't test this.
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Although RFC 6066 recommends against it, some servers send a warning
alert prior to ServerHello on SNI mismatch, and, per spec, TLS 1.2
allows it.
We're fine here, but add a test for it. It interacts interestingly with
TLS 1.3 forbidding warning alerts because it happens before version
negotiation.
Change-Id: I0032313c986c835b6ae1aa43da6ee0dad17a97c2
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Changing parameters on renegotiation makes all our APIs confusing. This
one has no reason to change, so lock it down. In particular, our
preference to forbid Token Binding + renego may be overridden at the
IETF, even though it's insane. Loosening it will be a bit less of a
headache if EMS can't change.
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg00690.html
claims that this is already in the specification and enforced by NSS. I
can't find anything to this effect in the specification. It just says
the client MUST disable renegotiation when EMS is missing, which is
wishful thinking. At a glance, NSS doesn't seem to check, though I could
be misunderstanding the code.
Nonetheless, locking this down is a good idea anyway. Accurate or not,
take the email as an implicit endorsement of this from Mozilla.
Change-Id: I236b05991d28bed199763dcf2f47bbfb9d0322d7
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One less thing to keep track of.
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/549 got merged.
Change-Id: Ide66e547140f8122a3b8013281be5215c11b6de0
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The TLS 1.3 state machine is actually less in need of the aggressive
state machine coverage tests, but nonetheless, we should cover all
handshake shapes. PSK resumption and HelloRetryRequest were missing.
We were also accidentally running "DTLS" versions of the TLS 1.3 tests
but silently running TLS 1.2.
Change-Id: I65db4052b89d770db7e47738e73aaadde9634236
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Some version mismatch cases were not being covered due to TLS 1.2 and
TLS 1.3 having very different spellings for tickets resumption. Also
explicitly test that TLS 1.2 tickets aren't offered in the TLS 1.3 slot
and vice versa.
Change-Id: Ibe58386ea2004fb3c1af19342b8d808f13f737a9
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The server should not be allowed select a protocol that wasn't
advertised. Callers tend to not really notice and act as if some default
were chosen which is unlikely to work very well.
Change-Id: Ib6388db72f05386f854d275bab762ca79e8174e6
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We handle this correctly but never wrote a test for it. Noticed this in
chatting about the second ClientHello.version bug workaround with Eric
Rescorla.
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Change-Id: I998f69269cdf813da19ccccc208b476f3501c8c4
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We were sending decode_error, but the spec explicitly says (RFC 5246):
unsupported_extension
sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing
an extension that they did not put in the corresponding client
hello. This message is always fatal.
Also add a test for this when it's a known but unoffered extension. We
actually end up putting these in different codepaths now due to the
custom extensions stuff.
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
Change-Id: If6c8033d4cfe69ef8af5678b873b25e0dbadfc4f
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BUG=74
Change-Id: I72d52c1fbc3413e940dddbc0b20c7f22459da693
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This is in preparation for switching finish_handshake to a
release_current_message hook. finish_handshake in DTLS is also
responsible for releasing any memory associated with extra messages in
the handshake.
Except that's not right and we need to make it an error anyway. Given
that the rest of the DTLS dispatch layer already strongly assumes there
is only one message in epoch one, putting the check in the fragment
processing works fine enough. Add tests for this.
This will certainly need revising when DTLS 1.3 happens (perhaps just a
version check, perhaps bringing finish_handshake back as a function that
can fail... which means we need a state just before SSL_ST_OK), but DTLS
1.3 post-handshake messages haven't really been written down, so let's
do the easy thing for now and add a test for when it gets more
interesting.
This removes the sequence number reset in the DTLS code. That reset
never did anything becase we don't and never will renego. We should make
sure DTLS 1.3 does not bring the reset back for post-handshake stuff.
(It was wrong in 1.2 too. Penultimate-flight retransmits and renego
requests are ambiguous in DTLS.)
BUG=83
Change-Id: I33d645a8550f73e74606030b9815fdac0c9fb682
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Implemented in preparation for testing the C implementation. Tested
against itself.
BUG=74
Change-Id: Iec1b9ad22e09711fa4e67c97cc3eb257585c3ae5
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Also parse out the ticket lifetime which was previously ignored.
BUG=75
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Ridiculous as it is, the protocol does not forbid packing HelloRequest
and Finished into the same record. Add a test for this case.
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[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
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Change-Id: I92425d7c72111623ddfbe8391f2d2fa88f101ef3
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Change-Id: Ibde837040d2332bc8570589ba5be9b32e774bfcf
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There is no longer need for the Go code to implement 'fake TLS 1.3'. We
now implement real incomplete TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I8577100ef8c7c83ca540f37dadd451263f9f37e6
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
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Not only test that we can enforce the message type correctly (this is
currently in protocol-specific code though really should not be), but
also test that each individual message is checked correctly.
Change-Id: I5ed0f4033f011186f020ea46940160c7639f688b
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This will be used for writing the equivalent test in TLS 1.3 to the
recent DTLS change and similar.
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This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It
is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to
buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished.
When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we
will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong
encryption.
Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is
a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS
check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in
read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so
we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For
now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with
a proper check in TLS 1.3.)
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TLS 1.3 will go through very different code than everything else. Even
SSL 3.0 is somewhat special-cased now. Move the invalid signature tests
there and run at all versions.
Change-Id: Idd0ee9aac2939c0c8fd9af2ea7b4a22942121c60
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For now, skip the 1.2 -> 1.1 signal since that will affect shipping
code. We may as well enable it too, but wait until things have settled
down. This implements the version in draft-14 since draft-13's isn't
backwards-compatible.
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This way we can test failing client auth without having to worry about
first getting through server auth.
Change-Id: Iaf996d87ac3df702a17e76c26006ca9b2a5bdd1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8721
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Of course, it's still signing ServerKeyExchange messages since the
handshake's the old one.)
Change-Id: I35844a329d983f61ed0b5be20b333487406fe7e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8614
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Implement in both C and Go. To test this, route config into all the
sign.go functions so we can expose bugs to skip the check.
Unfortunately, custom private keys are going to be a little weird since
we can't check their curve type. We may need to muse on what to do here.
Perhaps the key type bit should return an enum that includes the curve?
It's weird because, going forward, hopefully all new key types have
exactly one kind of signature so key type == sig alg == sig alg prefs.
Change-Id: I1f487ec143512ead931e3392e8be2a3172abe3d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8701
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
{sha256,ecdsa} should not be silently accepted for an RSA key.
Change-Id: I0c0eea5071f7a59f2707ca0ea023a16cc4126d6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8697
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
