Built from:
45f4d3fa8a2f61cc092ae461aac4cac1bab4ac6706f98274ea7f314dd315c6d0 cmake-3.1.3.tar.gz
We're still waiting on infra before the buildbot master is up, but let's get
this ready for when we do; it should be fairly easy.
BUG=430237
Change-Id: I3a414743d44052e1aa48759fa5f125db4d4913b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3670
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The old test just sent an empty ServerKeyExchange which is sufficient as we
reject the message early. But be more thorough and implement the actual
ephemeral key logic in the test server.
Change-Id: I016658762e4502c928c051e14d69eea67b5a495f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3650
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They do the same thing. This removes all callers of EC_GROUP_copy outside
EC_GROUP_dup.
Change-Id: I65433ee36040de79e56483dfece774e01e2e2743
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3630
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts the non-ARM portions of 97999919bb.
x86_64 perlasm already makes .globl imply .hidden. (Confusingly, ARM does not.)
Since we don't need it, revert those to minimize divergence with upstream.
Change-Id: I2d205cfb1183e65d4f18a62bde187d206b1a96de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3610
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That might be a reasonable check to make, maybe.
DTLS handshake message reading has a ton of other bugs and needs a complete
rewrite. But let's fix this and get a test in now.
Change-Id: I4981fc302feb9125908bb6161ed1a18288c39e2b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3600
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Test both asynchronous and synchronous versions. This callback is somewhat
different from others. It's NOT called a second time when the handshake is
resumed. This appears to be intentional and not a mismerge from the internal
patch. The caller is expected to set up any state before resuming the handshake
state machine.
Also test the early callback returning an error.
Change-Id: If5e6eddd7007ea5cdd7533b4238e456106b95cbd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3590
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(I got this wrong when reading the OpenSSL code.)
Change-Id: Ib289ef41d0ab5a3157ad8b9454d2de96d1f86c22
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This gives a standard PERL_EXECUTABLE configuration knob which is useful for
specifying a perl to use without having it in PATH.
Change-Id: I4b196b77e0b4666081a3f291fee3654c47925844
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3570
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This involves more synchronization with child exits as the kernel no longer
closes the pre-created pipes for free, but it works on Windows. As long as
TCP_NODELAY is set, the performance seems comparable. Though it does involve
dealing with graceful socket shutdown. I couldn't get that to work on Windows
without draining the socket; not even SO_LINGER worked. Current (untested)
theory is that Windows refuses to gracefully shutdown a socket if the peer
sends data after we've stopped reading.
cmd.ExtraFiles doesn't work on Windows; it doesn't use fds natively, so you
can't pass fds 4 and 5. (stdin/stdout/stderr are special slots in
CreateProcess.) We can instead use the syscall module directly and mark handles
as inheritable (and then pass the numerical values out-of-band), but that
requires synchronizing all of our shim.Start() calls and assuming no other
thread is spawning a process.
PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_HANDLE_LIST fixes threading problems, but requires
wrapping more syscalls. exec.Cmd also doesn't let us launch the process
ourselves. Plus it still requires every handle in the list be marked
inheritable, so it doesn't help if some other thread is launching a process
with bInheritHandles TRUE but NOT using PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_HANDLE_LIST.
(Like Go, though we can take syscall.ForkLock there.)
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/oldnewthing/archive/2011/12/16/10248328.aspx
The more natively Windows option seems to be named pipes, but that too requires
wrapping more system calls. (To be fair, that isn't too painful.) They also
involve a listening server, so we'd still have to synchronize with shim.Wait()
a la net.TCPListener.
Then there's DuplicateHandle, but then we need an out-of-band signal.
All in all, one cross-platform implementation with a TCP sockets seems
simplest.
Change-Id: I38233e309a0fa6814baf61e806732138902347c0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3563
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Though this doesn't mean that masm becomes supported, the script is
still provided on don't-ask-in-case-of-doubt-use-nasm basis.
See RT#3650 for background.
(Imported from upstream's 2f8d82d6418c4de8330e2870c1ca6386dc9e1b34)
The data_word changes were already fixed with our
3e700bb3e8, but best to avoid diverging there.
Change-Id: Iab5455534e8bd632fb2b247ff792d411b105f17a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3581
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There is exactly one implementation and it doesn't fail. Plus a cleanup
function that can fail is very bad manners; the caller has no choice but to
leak at that point.
Change-Id: I5b524617ef37bc7d92273472fa742416ea7dfd43
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Align the DTLS and TLS implementations more. s3_pkt.c's version still has
remnants of fragmentable alerts and only one side marks some variables as
const. Also use warning/fatal constants rather than the numbers with comments.
Change-Id: Ie62d3af1747b6fe4336496c047dfccc9d71fde3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3562
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Saves making a temporary SSL_CTX and looking at its insides.
Change-Id: Ia351b9b91aec8b813ad7b6e373773396f0975f9a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3561
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These were added in upstream's 7e159e0133d28bec9148446e8f4dd86c0216d819 for
SCTP. As far as I can tell, they were a no-op there too. The corresponding RT
ticket makes no mention of them.
SSL_get_error checks the retry flags of the BIO already. Specifically it checks
BIO_should_read and BIO_should_write, but those two automatically set
BIO_should_retry.
(Minor, but I noticed them idly. One less thing to think about when the state
machines finally unify.)
Change-Id: I17a956a51895fba383063dee574e0fbe3209f9b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3560
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
RC4_CHAR is a bit in the x86(-64) CPUID information that switches the
RC4 asm code from using an array of 256 uint32_t's to 256 uint8_t's. It
was originally written for the P4, where the uint8_t style was faster.
(On modern chips, setting RC4_CHAR took RC4-MD5 from 458 to 304 MB/s.
Although I wonder whether, on a server with many connections, using less
cache wouldn't be better.)
However, I'm not too worried about a slowdown of RC4 on P4 systems these
days (the last new P4 chip was released nine years ago) and I want the
code to be simplier.
Also, RC4_CHAR was set when the CPUID family was 15, but Intel actually
lists 15 as a special code meaning "also check the extended family
bits", which the asm didn't do.
The RC4_CHAR support remains in the RC4 asm code to avoid drift with
upstream.
Change-Id: If3febc925a83a76f453b9e9f8de5ee43759927c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3550
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
RC4_CHUNK is always defined, RC4_INT is always uint32_t and the
"register" keyword is an anachronism.
Change-Id: Ia752af30ba6bac0ee6216ce189fcf3888de73c6e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3544
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Which is just an exported wrapper around ssl3_get_cipher_by_value.)
Change-Id: Ibba166015ce59e337ff50963ba20237ac4949aaf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3543
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Upstream settled in this API, and it's also the one that we expect
internally and that third_party code will expect.
Change-Id: Id7af68cf0af1f2e4d9defd37bda2218d70e2aa7b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3542
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was a mistake to remove this in the first place.
Change-Id: Icd97b4db01e49151daa41dd892f9da573ddc2842
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3541
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This empty header file exists only to make older code compile. But I
named it incorrectly! Upstream doesn't have the underscore in the name.
Change-Id: I96654b7e17d84a5f2810e6eb20fe7bfb22f855fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3540
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We are leaking asm symbols in Android builds because the asm code isn't
affected by -fvisibility=hidden. This change hides all asm symbols.
This assumes that no asm symbols are public API and that should be true.
Some points to note:
In crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl there are |RC4_set_key| and
|RC4_options| functions which aren't getting marked as hidden. That's
because those functions aren't actually ever generated. (I'm just trying
to minimise drift with upstream here.)
In crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl there's |RC4_options| which is "public"
API, except that we've never had it in the header files. So I've just
deleted it. Since we have an internal caller, we'll probably have to put
it back in the future, but it can just be done in rc4.c to save
problems.
BUG=448386
Change-Id: I3846617a0e3d73ec9e5ec3638a53364adbbc6260
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3520
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We can pass the fragment pointer to dtls1_retransmit_message rather than
having it look it up again.
Change-Id: If6957428418a44e7ceac91a93f7c6032d331d9d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3510
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also move BIO_print_errors_fp up a level so it's less repetitive. There's
enough exit points now that it doesn't seem like adding a separate return exit
code for each has held up. (Maybe there should be a macro that samples
__LINE__...)
Change-Id: I120e59caaa96185e80cf51ea801a5e1f149b1b39
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3530
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is an import from ARM. Without this, one of the Android builds of
BoringSSL was failing with:
(sha512-armv4.o): requires unsupported dynamic reloc R_ARM_REL32; recompile with -fPIC
This is (I believe) a very misleading error message. The R_ARM_REL32
relocation type is the correct type for position independent code. But
unless the target symbol is hidden then the linker doesn't know that
it's not going to be overridden by a different ELF module.
Chromium probably gets away with this because of different default
compiler flags than Android.
Change-Id: I967eabc4d6b33d1e6635caaf6e7a306e4e77c101
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3471
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I think this is better wording for function documentation. Also note that C++
code uses Google C++ naming rather than OpenSSL, per
c273d2c537.
Change-Id: I7334296bf1490395b2ba02e8b6ce245635826df2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3500
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Tighten up the requirements for False Start. At this point, neither
AES-CBC or RC4 are something that we want to use unless we're sure that
the server wants to speak them.
Rebase of original CL at: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1980/
BUG=427721
Change-Id: I9ef7a596edeb8df1ed070aac67c315b94f3cc77f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3501
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also adds a flag to runner.go to make it more suitable for printing to a pipe.
Change-Id: I26fae21f3e4910028f6b8bfc4821c8c595525504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3490
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Built from:
45f4d3fa8a2f61cc092ae461aac4cac1bab4ac6706f98274ea7f314dd315c6d0 cmake-3.1.3.tar.gz
Also drop in an extraction script.
Change-Id: I3487e9d432290a7dbabf854b927412c58c35d12b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3492
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Severely trimmed version of Chrome infra's scripts.
Change-Id: I378b68be670b74fe0518de5d66e0aa8b2d709f26
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3491
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's never called in outside code. This too seems to be a remnant of the DSA
PKIX optional parameter stuff. This is confirmed both by a removed comment and
by the brief documentation at http://www.umich.edu/~x509/ssleay/x509_pkey.html
RFC 5480 does not allow ECDSA keys to be missing parameters, so this logic is
incorrect for ECDSA anyway. It was also failing to check
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters' return value. And that logic looks pretty suspect if
you have a chain made up multiple certificate types.
Change-Id: Id6c60659a0162356c7f3eae5c797047366baae1c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3485
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I believe this is a remnant of DSA. The logic strangely fails to check for
failure and then goes out of its way to ERR_clear_error. I believe this is so
that keys that are missing parameters silently move on. This dates to
upstream's dfeab0689f69c0b4bd3480ffd37a9cacc2f17d9c, which is SSLeay 0.9.1b. At
that time, EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters only did anything for DSA. (Now it only
does anything for ECDSA.)
My read is that this comes from DSA in PKIX's "optional domain parameters"
craziness. RFC 3279 says:
If the DSA domain parameters are omitted from the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
AlgorithmIdentifier and the CA signed the subject certificate using a
signature algorithm other than DSA, then the subject's DSA domain parameters
are distributed by other means.
This was probably part of some weird thing where, if your certificate is
missing parameters, the server would know what to use based on the private key.
(Also this was making the malloc tests unhappy.)
Change-Id: I8d8122a9f50a19e2bbe067f311a8e2d30774935c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It may fail because the BIO_write to the memory BIO can allocate.
Unfortunately, this bubbles up pretty far up now that we've moved the handshake
hash to ssl3_set_handshake_header.
Change-Id: I58884347a4456bb974ac4783078131522167e29d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3483
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found while diagnosing some crashes and hangs in the malloc tests. This (and
the follow-up) get us further but does not quite let the malloc tests pass
quietly, even without valgrind. DTLS silently ignores some malloc failures
(confusion with silently dropping bad packets) which then translate to hangs.
Change-Id: Ief06a671e0973d09d2883432b89a86259e346653
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3482
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
False Start is the name it's known by now. Deprecate the old API and expose new
ones with the new name.
Change-Id: I32d307027e178fd7d9c0069686cc046f75fdbf6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3481
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I found no users of this. We can restore it if needbe, but I don't expect
anyone to find it useful in its current form. The API is suspect for the same
reasons DTLSv1_listen was. An SSL object is stateful and assumes you already
have the endpoint separated out.
If we ever need it, server-side HelloVerifyRequest and DTLSv1_listen should be
implemented by a separate stateless listener that statelessly handles
cookieless ClientHello + HelloVerifyRequest. Once a ClientHello with a valid
cookie comes in, it sets up a stateful SSL object and passes control along to
that.
Change-Id: I86adc1dfb6a81bebe987784c36ad6634a9a1b120
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3480
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I34ee66fcc53d3371591beee3373c46598c31b5c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3460
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reduces number of silly casts in OpenSSL code and likely most
applications. Consistent with (char *) for "peername" value from
X509_check_host() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername().
(Imported from upstream's e83c913723fac7432a7706812f12394aaa00e8ce.)
Change-Id: Id0fc11773a0cee8933978cd4bdbd8251fd7cfb5f
Pass address of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID peername to X509_check_host().
(Imported from upstream's 55fe56837a65ff505b492aa6aee748bf5fa91fec.)
Change-Id: Ic21bfb361b8eb25677c4c2175882fa95ea44fc31
(Imported from upstream's 8abffa4a73fcbf6536e0a42d736ed9211a8204ea,
9624b50d51de25bb2e3a72e81fe45032d80ea5c2 and
41e3ebd5abacfdf98461cdeb6fa97a4175b7aad3.)
Change-Id: Ic9099eb5704b19b4500229e89351371cc6184f9d
clang-format has changed a little. This is a semantic no-op but it makes
the diff in the next change smaller.
Change-Id: Ia492a81340a868b888d619a1c7740d1a86845e92
(This change is for a future change that increases the range of the
return values.)
(Imported from upstream's 3fc0b1edad0c75d7beb51fa77f63ffe817295e2c.)
Change-Id: I221d4ee0e90586f89f731e01ff4d813058173211
Just store NUL-terminated strings. This works better when we add
support for multiple hostnames.
(Imported from upstream's d93edc0aab98377f42dd19312248597a018a7889.)
Change-Id: Ib3bf8a8c654b829b4432782ba21ba55c3d4a0582
Caught by malloc valgrind tests on Basic-Client-Sync. Also one by inspection
and verified with valgrind. Those should pass now with the exception of
CRYPTO_free_ex_data being internally implemented with malloc.
(Clearly we next should make our malloc tests assert that the containing
function fails to catch when we fail to check for some error and things
silently move one.)
Change-Id: I56c51dc8a32a7d3c7ac907d54015dc241728c761
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3440
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
