This function is only called twice per ECDH or ECDSA operation, and
it only saves a few scalar multiplications and additions compared to
the alternative, so it doesn't need to be specialized.
As the TODO comment above the callers notes, the two calls can be
reduced to one. Implementing |ecp_nistz256_from_mont| in terms of
|ecp_nistz256_mul_mont| helps show that that change is safe.
This also saves a small amount of code size and improves testing and
verification efficiency.
Note that this is already how the function is implemented for targets
other than x86-64 in OpenSSL.
Change-Id: If1404951f1a787d2618c853afd1f0e99a019e012
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13021
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This re-applies 3f3358ac15 which was
reverted in c7fe3b9ac5 because the field
operations did not fully-reduce operands. This was fixed in
2f1482706fadf51610a529be216fde0721709e66.
Change-Id: I3913af4b282238dbc21044454324123f961a58af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12227
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Resolving the TODO here will be messier than the other implementations
but, to start with, remove this 'pivot element' thing. All that is just
to free some array contents without having to memset the whole thing to
zero.
Change-Id: Ifd6ee0b3815006d4f1f19c9db085cb842671c6dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13057
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Passing in an array of scalars was removed some time ago, but a few
remnants of it remain.
Change-Id: Id75abedf60b1eab59f24bf7232187675b63291ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13056
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Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Passing in an array of scalars was removed some time ago, but a few
remnants of it remain.
Change-Id: Ia51dcf1f85116ec663e657cc8dbef7f23ffa2edb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13055
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Instead, use BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime of p - 2. This removes two more
call sites sensitive to BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. We're down to just that last
BN_mod_inverse modulo φ(n). (Sort of. It's actually not sensitive
because even mod inverses always hit the other codepath. Perhaps we
should just leave it alone.)
Note this comes with a slight behavior change. The BN_MONT_CTXs are
initialized a little earlier. If a caller calls RSA_generate_* and then
reaches into the struct to scrap all the fields on it, they'll get
confused. Before, they had to perform an operation on it to get
confused. This is a completely ridiculous thing to do.
Since we do this a lot, this introduces some convenience functions for
doing the Fermat's Little Theorem mod inverse and fixes a leak in the
DSA code should computing kinv hit a malloc error.
BUG=125
Change-Id: Iafcae2fc6fd379d161f015c90ff7050e2282e905
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12925
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Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Most C standard library functions are undefined if passed NULL, even
when the corresponding length is zero. This gives them (and, in turn,
all functions which call them) surprising behavior on empty arrays.
Some compilers will miscompile code due to this rule. See also
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2016/06/26/nonnull.html
Add OPENSSL_memcpy, etc., wrappers which avoid this problem.
BUG=23
Change-Id: I95f42b23e92945af0e681264fffaf578e7f8465e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12928
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change includes C versions of some of the functions from the x86-64
P-256 code that are currently implemented in assembly. These functions
were part of the original submission by Intel and are covered by the ISC
license.
No semantic change; code is commented out.
Change-Id: Ifdd2fac6caeb73d375d6b125fac98f3945003b32
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This code wants something which can represent -128..127 or so, not
something about characters.
Change-Id: Icdbfec370317a5e03803939a3b8d1555f8efff1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12468
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
clang-format mangled this a little.
Change-Id: Ic4d8de0e1f6e926efbe8d14e390fe874b4a7cdcb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12467
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The compiler should be plenty smart enough to decide whether to inline a
static function called only once. We don't need to resort to so
unreadable a ternary chain.
Change-Id: Iacc8e0c4147fc69008806a0cc36d9e632169601a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12466
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT makes more sense than
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT here.
Change-Id: I0dbdc91bab59843d5c04f2d0e97600fe7644753e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12464
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If y is zero, there is no point with odd y, so the odd bit may not be
set, hence EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT. This code instead computed the
Kronecker symbol of x and changed the error code to
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT if not a square.
As the comment says, this was (intended to be) unreachable. But it
seems x was a typo for tmp1. It dates to before upstream's
6fb60a84dd1ec81953917e0444dab50186617432, when BN_mod_sqrt gave
garbage if its input was not square. Now it emits BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE.
Upstream's 48fe4d6233ac2d60745742a27f820dd88bc6689d then mapped
BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE to EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT.
Change-Id: Id9e02fa1c154b61cc0c3a768c9cfe6bd9674c378
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12463
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Otherwise the run_tests target sometimes gets confused.
Change-Id: If49e945bf5137c68db4927ab0f9845d25be63bac
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12315
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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A BN_ULONG[P256_LIMBS] can't represent a negative number and
bn_set_words won't produce one. We only need to compare against P.
Change-Id: I7bd1c9e8c162751637459f23f3cfc56884d85864
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12304
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
RT#4625
(Imported from upstream's e3057a57caf4274ea1fb074518e4714059dfcabf.)
Add a test in ec_test to cover the ecp_nistz256_points_mul change. Also
revise the low-level infinity tests to cover the changes in
ecp_nistz256_point_add. Upstream's 'infty' logic was also cleaned up to
be simpler and take advantage of the only cases where |p| is infinity.
Change-Id: Ie22de834bf79ecb6191e824ad9fc1bd6f9681b8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12225
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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We were using a fully-qualified name for nearly everything anyway.
Change-Id: Ia32c68975ed4126feeab7b420f12b726ad6b89b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12226
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The other field operations have an explicit _mont suffix to denote their
inputs and outputs are in the Montgomery domain, aside from
ecp_nistz256_neg which works either way. Do the same here.
Change-Id: I63741adaeba8140e29fb0b45dff72273e231add7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12224
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The file is util-64.c in BoringSSL.
Change-Id: I51891103254ae1541ea4c30f92c41d5d47c2ba55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12223
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
For the most part, this is with random test data which isn't
particularly good. But we'll be able to add more interesting test
vectors as they come up.
Change-Id: I9c50db7ac2c4bf978d4901000ab32e3642aea82b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12222
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.
(Imported from upstream's b62b2454fadfccaf5e055a1810d72174c2633b8f and
d3034d31e7c04b334dd245504dd4f56e513ca115.)
See also this thread.
https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-dev/2016-August/008179.html
Change-Id: I3731f949e2e2ef539dec656c58f1820cc09a56a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11409
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Macros need a healthy dose of parentheses to avoid expression-level
misparses. Most of this comes from the clang-tidy CL here:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/235696/
Also switch most of the macros to use do { ... } while (0) to avoid all
the excessive comma operators and statement-level misparses.
Change-Id: I4c2ee51e347d2aa8c74a2d82de63838b03bbb0f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11660
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is just to reduce the diff with upstream's files so it's easier to
tell what's going on. Upstream's files have lots and lots of trailing
whitespace. We were also missing a comment.
Change-Id: Icfc3b52939823a046a3744fd8e619b5bd6160715
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11408
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was done just by grepping for 'size_t i;' and 'size_t j;'. I left
everything in crypto/x509 and friends alone.
There's some instances in gcm.c that are non-trivial and pulled into a
separate CL for ease of review.
Change-Id: I6515804e3097f7e90855f1e7610868ee87117223
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10801
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Now that we have the extern "C++" trick, we can just embed them in the
normal headers. Move the EVP_CIPHER_CTX deleter to cipher.h and, in
doing so, take away a little bit of boilerplate in defining deleters.
Change-Id: I4a4b8d0db5274a3607914d94e76a38996bd611ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10804
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
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Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10521
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I85216184f9277ce0c0caae31e379b638683e28c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10703
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The weird function thing is a remnant of OpenSSL and I think something
weird involving Windows and symbols exported from dlls. These aren't
exposed in the public API, so have everything point to the tables
directly.
This is in preparation for making built-in EC_GROUPs static. (The static
EC_GROUPs won't be able to call a function wrapper.)
BUG=20
Change-Id: If33888430f32e51f48936db4046769aa1894e3aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10346
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The old one was written somewhat weirdly.
Change-Id: I414185971a7d70105fded558da6d165570429d31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10345
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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A lot of codepaths are unreachable since the EC_GROUP is known to be
blank.
Change-Id: I5829934762e503241aa73f833c982ad9680d8856
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10344
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BN_mod_inverse_odd was always being used on 64-bit platforms and was being used
for all curves with an order of 450 bits or smaller (basically, everything but
P-521). We generally don't care much about minor differences in the speed of
verifying signatures using curves other than P-256 and P-384. It is better to
always use the same algorithm.
This also allows |bn_mod_inverse_general|, |bn_mod_inverse_no_branch|, and
|BN_mod_inverse| to be dropped from programs that can somehow avoid linking in
the RSA key generation and RSA CRT recovery code.
Change-Id: I79b94bff23d2b07d5e0c704f7d44538797f8c7a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9103
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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There are many cases where we need |BN_rand_range| but with a minimum
value other than 0. |BN_rand_range_ex| provides that.
Change-Id: I564326c9206bf4e20a37414bdbce16a951c148ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8921
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Fermat's Little Theorem is already used for the custom curve implementations.
Use it, for the same reasons, for the ec_montgomery-based implementations.
I tested the performance (only) on x86-64 Windows.
Change-Id: Ibf770fd3f2d3e2cfe69f06bc12c81171624ff557
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8924
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Revert 3f3358ac15. Add documentation
clarifying the misunderstanding that lead to the mistake, and make use
of the recently-added |bn_set_words|.
Change-Id: I58814bace3db3b0b44e2dfe09c44918a4710c621
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8831
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This reverts commits:
8d79ed674019fdcb52348d79ed6740
Because WebRTC (at least) includes our headers in an extern "C" block,
which precludes having any C++ in them.
Change-Id: Ia849f43795a40034cbd45b22ea680b51aab28b2d
This change scatters the contents of the two scoped_types.h files into
the headers for each of the areas of the code. The types are now in the
|bssl| namespace.
Change-Id: I802b8de68fba4786b6a0ac1bacd11d81d5842423
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We currently have the situation where the |tool| and |bssl_shim| code
includes scoped_types.h from crypto/test and ssl/test. That's weird and
shouldn't happen. Also, our C++ consumers might quite like to have
access to the scoped types.
Thus this change moves some of the template code to base.h and puts it
all in a |bssl| namespace to prepare for scattering these types into
their respective headers. In order that all the existing test code be
able to access these types, it's all moved into the same namespace.
Change-Id: I3207e29474dc5fcc344ace43119df26dae04eabb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8730
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Depending on architecture, perlasm differed on which one or both of:
perl foo.pl flavor output.S
perl foo.pl flavor > output.S
Upstream has now unified on the first form after making a number of
changes to their files (the second does not even work for their x86
files anymore). Sync those portions of our perlasm scripts with upstream
and update CMakeLists.txt and generate_build_files.py per the new
convention.
This imports various commits like this one:
184bc45f683c76531d7e065b6553ca9086564576 (this was done by taking a
diff, so I don't have the full list)
Confirmed that generate_build_files.py sees no change.
BUG=14
Change-Id: Id2fb5b8bc2a7369d077221b5df9a6947d41f50d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8518
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's always one. We don't support other kinds of curves with this framework.
(Curve25519 uses a much simpler API.) This also allows us to remove the
check_pub_key_order logic.
Change-Id: Ic15e1ecd68662b838c76b1e0aa15c3a93200d744
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8350
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The case where ec_group_get_mont_data is NULL is only for arbitrary groups
which we now require to be prime order. BN_mod_exp_mont is fine with a NULL
BN_MONT_CTX. It will just compute it. Saves a bit of special-casing.
Also don't mark p-2 as BN_FLG_CONSTTIME as the exponent is public anyway.
Change-Id: Ie868576d52fc9ae5f5c9f2a4039a729151bf84c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8307
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The Conscrypt revert cycled in long ago.
Change-Id: If3cdb211d7347dca88bd70bdc643f80b19a7e528
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8306
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C gets grumpy when you shift into a sign bit. Replace it with a different bit
trick.
BUG=chromium:603502
Change-Id: Ia4cc2e2d68675528b7c0155882ff4d6230df482b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7740
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Avoid calculating the affine Y coordinate when the caller didn't ask
for it, as occurs, for example, in ECDH.
For symmetry and clarity, avoid calculating the affine X coordinate in
the hypothetical case where the caller only asked for the Y coordinate.
Change-Id: I69f5993fa0dfac8b010c38e695b136cefc277fed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7590
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is purely hypothetical, as in real life nobody cares about the
|y| component without also caring about the |x| component, but it
clarifies the code and makes a future change clearer.
Change-Id: Icaa4de83c87b82a8e68cd2942779a06e5db300c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7588
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
