Found by libFuzzer and then one more mistake caught by valgrind. Add a
test for this case.
Change-Id: I92773bc1231bafe5fc069e8568d93ac0df4c8acb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11129
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Not that this matters in the slightest, but the recent IETF mailing
reminded me we don't test this.
Change-Id: I300c96d6a63733d538a7019a7cb74d4e65d0498f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10961
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Changing parameters on renegotiation makes all our APIs confusing. This
one has no reason to change, so lock it down. In particular, our
preference to forbid Token Binding + renego may be overridden at the
IETF, even though it's insane. Loosening it will be a bit less of a
headache if EMS can't change.
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg00690.html
claims that this is already in the specification and enforced by NSS. I
can't find anything to this effect in the specification. It just says
the client MUST disable renegotiation when EMS is missing, which is
wishful thinking. At a glance, NSS doesn't seem to check, though I could
be misunderstanding the code.
Nonetheless, locking this down is a good idea anyway. Accurate or not,
take the email as an implicit endorsement of this from Mozilla.
Change-Id: I236b05991d28bed199763dcf2f47bbfb9d0322d7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10721
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In TLS 1.3 draft 14, due to resumption using a different cipher, this
is actually not too hard to mess up. (In fact BoGo didn't quite get it
right.)
Fortunately, the new cipher suite negotiation in draft 15 should make
this reasonable again once we implement it. In the meantime, test it.
Change-Id: I2eb948eeaaa051ecacaa9095b66ff149582ea11d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10442
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One less thing to keep track of.
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/549 got merged.
Change-Id: Ide66e547140f8122a3b8013281be5215c11b6de0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10482
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Some version mismatch cases were not being covered due to TLS 1.2 and
TLS 1.3 having very different spellings for tickets resumption. Also
explicitly test that TLS 1.2 tickets aren't offered in the TLS 1.3 slot
and vice versa.
Change-Id: Ibe58386ea2004fb3c1af19342b8d808f13f737a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10183
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Much of the ClientHello logic queries hello.vers. To avoid it getting
confused, do all modifications right at the end, otherwise
SendClientVersion also affects whether the key share is sent.
Change-Id: I8be2a4a9807ef9ad88af03971ea1c37e4ba36b9c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10341
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I998f69269cdf813da19ccccc208b476f3501c8c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8991
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is in preparation for switching finish_handshake to a
release_current_message hook. finish_handshake in DTLS is also
responsible for releasing any memory associated with extra messages in
the handshake.
Except that's not right and we need to make it an error anyway. Given
that the rest of the DTLS dispatch layer already strongly assumes there
is only one message in epoch one, putting the check in the fragment
processing works fine enough. Add tests for this.
This will certainly need revising when DTLS 1.3 happens (perhaps just a
version check, perhaps bringing finish_handshake back as a function that
can fail... which means we need a state just before SSL_ST_OK), but DTLS
1.3 post-handshake messages haven't really been written down, so let's
do the easy thing for now and add a test for when it gets more
interesting.
This removes the sequence number reset in the DTLS code. That reset
never did anything becase we don't and never will renego. We should make
sure DTLS 1.3 does not bring the reset back for post-handshake stuff.
(It was wrong in 1.2 too. Penultimate-flight retransmits and renego
requests are ambiguous in DTLS.)
BUG=83
Change-Id: I33d645a8550f73e74606030b9815fdac0c9fb682
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8988
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Implemented in preparation for testing the C implementation. Tested
against itself.
BUG=74
Change-Id: Iec1b9ad22e09711fa4e67c97cc3eb257585c3ae5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8873
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We still don't do anything useful with them, but we know not to put them
in the session ticket field.
In doing so, fix a bug in the CorruptTicket option where it would crash
if tickets are exactly 40 byets in length.
BUG=75
Change-Id: Id1039a58ed314a67d0af4f2c7e0617987c2bd6b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8872
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[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8850
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Change-Id: Ibde837040d2332bc8570589ba5be9b32e774bfcf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8811
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I0fdd6db9ea229d394b14c76b6ba55f6165a6a806
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8826
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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There is no longer need for the Go code to implement 'fake TLS 1.3'. We
now implement real incomplete TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I8577100ef8c7c83ca540f37dadd451263f9f37e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8823
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8720
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Not only test that we can enforce the message type correctly (this is
currently in protocol-specific code though really should not be), but
also test that each individual message is checked correctly.
Change-Id: I5ed0f4033f011186f020ea46940160c7639f688b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8793
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This will be used for writing the equivalent test in TLS 1.3 to the
recent DTLS change and similar.
Change-Id: I280c3ca8f1d8e0981b6e7a499acb7eceebe43a0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8792
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This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It
is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to
buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished.
When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we
will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong
encryption.
Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is
a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS
check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in
read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so
we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For
now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with
a proper check in TLS 1.3.)
Change-Id: Ia52b0b81e7db53e9ed2d4f6d334a1cce13e93297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8790
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Keep our C implementation honest.
Change-Id: I9e9e686b7f730b61218362450971afdd82b0b640
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8782
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I2f5c45e0e491f9dd25c2463710697599fea708ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8794
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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TLS 1.3 will go through very different code than everything else. Even
SSL 3.0 is somewhat special-cased now. Move the invalid signature tests
there and run at all versions.
Change-Id: Idd0ee9aac2939c0c8fd9af2ea7b4a22942121c60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8775
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest code advertised the signing set, not the
verify set. It also wasn't saving the peer's signature algorithm.
Change-Id: I62247d5703e30d8463c92f3d597dbeb403b355ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8774
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The extension is not defined in TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I5eb85f7142be7e11f1a9c0e4680e8ace9ac50feb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8771
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Tested against the C code.
Change-Id: I62639e1e46cd4f57625be5d4ff7f6902b318c278
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8768
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Tested by having client and server talk to each other. This adds the
certificate_extensions field to CertificateRequest which I'd previously
missed. (We completely ignore the field, with the expectation that the C
code won't have anything useful to do with it either.)
Change-Id: I74f96acd36747d4b6a6f533535e36ea8e94d2be8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8710
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
For now, skip the 1.2 -> 1.1 signal since that will affect shipping
code. We may as well enable it too, but wait until things have settled
down. This implements the version in draft-14 since draft-13's isn't
backwards-compatible.
Change-Id: I46be43e6f4c5203eb4ae006d1c6a2fe7d7a949ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8724
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Now that the odd client/server split (a remnant from the original
crypto/tls code not handling signing-hash/PRF mismatches) is gone, it
can just be pulled from the config.
Change-Id: Idb46c026d6529a2afc2b43d4afedc0aa950614db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8723
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This way we can test failing client auth without having to worry about
first getting through server auth.
Change-Id: Iaf996d87ac3df702a17e76c26006ca9b2a5bdd1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8721
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Implement in both C and Go. To test this, route config into all the
sign.go functions so we can expose bugs to skip the check.
Unfortunately, custom private keys are going to be a little weird since
we can't check their curve type. We may need to muse on what to do here.
Perhaps the key type bit should return an enum that includes the curve?
It's weird because, going forward, hopefully all new key types have
exactly one kind of signature so key type == sig alg == sig alg prefs.
Change-Id: I1f487ec143512ead931e3392e8be2a3172abe3d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8701
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
{sha256,ecdsa} should not be silently accepted for an RSA key.
Change-Id: I0c0eea5071f7a59f2707ca0ea023a16cc4126d6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8697
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
For when the PackHandshakeFlight tests get enabled.
Change-Id: Iee20fd27d88ed58f59af3b7e2dd92235d35af9ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8663
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper, revised by davidben.]
When we add this in the real code, this will want ample tests and hooks
for bugs, but get the core logic in to start with.
Change-Id: I86cf0b6416c9077dbb6471a1802ae984b8fa6c72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8598
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
While the random connection property extensions like ALPN and SRTP
remain largely unchanged in TLS 1.3 (but for interaction with 0-RTT),
authentication-related extensions change significantly and need
dedicated logic.
Change-Id: I2588935c2563a22e9879fb81478b8df5168b43de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8602
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Test with and without PackHandshakeFlight enabled to cover when the
early post-CCS fragment will get packed into one of the pre-CCS
handshake records. Also test the resumption cases too to cover more
state transitions.
The various CCS-related tests (since CCS is kind of a mess) are pulled
into their own group.
Change-Id: I6384f2fb28d9885cd2b06d59e765e080e3822d8a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8661
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper and then revised by davidben.]
Most features are missing, but it works for a start. To avoid breaking
the fake TLS 1.3 tests while the C code is still not landed, all the
logic is gated on a global boolean. When the C code gets in, we'll
set it to true and remove this boolean.
Change-Id: I6b3a369890864c26203fc9cda37c8250024ce91b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8601
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I'm surprised we'd never tested this. In addition to splitting handshake
records up, one may pack multiple handshakes into a single record, as
they fit. Generalize the DTLS handshake flush hook to do this in TLS as
well.
Change-Id: Ia546d18c7c56ba45e50f489c5b53e1fcd6404f51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8650
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.2 and 1.3 will process more-or-less the same server extensions,
but at slightly different points in the handshake. In preparation for
that, split this out into its own function.
Change-Id: I5494dee4724295794dfd13c5e9f9f83eade6b20a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8586
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.2 and 1.3 will both need to call it at different points.
Change-Id: Id62ec289213aa6c06ebe5fe65a57ca6c2b53d538
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8600
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 will need to call it under different circumstances. We will also
wish to test TLS 1.3 post-handshake auth, so this function must work
without being passed handshake state.
In doing so, implement matching based on signature algorithms as 1.3
does away with the certificate type list.
Change-Id: Ibdee44bbbb589686fcbcd7412432100279bfac63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8589
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper, tweaked by davidben.]
In TLS 1.3, every extension the server previously sent gets moved to a
separate EncryptedExtensions message. To be able to share code between
the two, parse those extensions separately. For now, the handshake reads
from serverHello.extensions.foo, though later much of the extensions
logic will probably handle serverExtensions independent of whether it
resides in ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions.
Change-Id: I07aaae6df3ef6fbac49e64661d14078d0dbeafb0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8584
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 defines its own EncryptedExtensions message. The existing one is
for Channel ID which probably should not have tried to generalize
itself.
Change-Id: I4f48bece98510eb54e64fbf3df6c2a7332bc0261
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8566
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Right now I believe we are testing against DTLS 1.3 ClientHellos. Fix
this in preparation for making VersionTLS13 go elsewhere in the Go code.
Unfortunately, I made the mistake of mapping DTLS 1.0 to TLS 1.0 rather
than 1.1 in Go. This does mean the names of the tests naturally work out
correctly, but we have to deal with this awkward DTLS-1.1-shaped hole in
our logic.
Change-Id: I8715582ed90acc1f08197831cae6de8d5442d028
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8562
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 defines a new SignatureScheme uint16 enum that is backwards
compatible on the wire with TLS1.2's SignatureAndHashAlgorithm. This
change updates the go testing code to use a single signatureAlgorithm
enum (instead of 2 separate signature and hash enums) in preparation for
TLS 1.3. It also unifies all the signing around this new scheme,
effectively backporting the change to TLS 1.2.
For now, it does not distinguish signature algorithms between 1.2 and
1.3 (RSA-PSS instead of RSA-PKCS1, ECDSA must match curve types). When
the C code is ready make a similar change, the Go code will be updated
to match.
[Originally written by nharper, tweaked significantly by davidben.]
Change-Id: If9a315c4670755089ac061e4ec254ef3457a00de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8450
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This implements the cipher suite constraints in "fake TLS 1.3". It also makes
bssl_shim and runner enable it by default so we can start adding MaxVersion:
VersionTLS12 markers to tests as 1.2 vs. 1.3 differences begin to take effect.
Change-Id: If1caf6e43938c8d15b0a0f39f40963b8199dcef5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This unifies a bunch of tests and also adds a few missing ones.
Change-Id: I91652bd010da6cdb62168ce0a3415737127e1577
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8360
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In TLS, you never skip the Certificate message. It may be empty, but its
presence is determined by CertificateRequest. (This is sensible.)
In SSL 3.0, the client omits the Certificate message. This means you need to
probe and may receive either Certificate or ClientKeyExchange (thankfully,
ClientKeyExchange is not optional, or we'd have to probe at ChangeCipherSpec).
We didn't have test coverage for this, despite some of this logic being a
little subtle asynchronously. Fix this.
Change-Id: I149490ae5506f02fa0136cb41f8fea381637bf45
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7419
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is a minor regression from
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5235.
If the client, for whatever reason, had an ID-based session but also
supports tickets, it will send non-empty ID + empty ticket extension.
If the ticket extension is non-empty, then the ID is not an ID but a
dummy signaling value, so 5235 avoided looking it up. But if it is
present and empty, the ID is still an ID and should be looked up.
This shouldn't have any practical consequences, except if a server
switched from not supporting tickets and then started supporting it,
while keeping the session cache fixed.
Add a test for this case, and tighten up existing ID vs ticket tests so
they fail if we resume with the wrong type.
Change-Id: Id4d08cd809af00af30a2b67fe3a971078e404c75
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6554
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
RFC 5746 forbids a server from downgrading or upgrading
renegotiation_info support. Even with SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT set
(the default), we can still enforce a few things.
I do not believe this has practical consequences. The attack variant
where the server half is prefixed does not involve a renegotiation on
the client. The converse where the client sees the renegotiation and
prefix does, but we only support renego for the mid-stream HTTP/1.1
client auth hack, which doesn't do this. (And with triple-handshake,
HTTPS clients should be requiring the certificate be unchanged across
renego which makes this moot.)
Ultimately, an application which makes the mistake of using
renegotiation needs to be aware of what exactly that means and how to
handle connection state changing mid-stream. We make renego opt-in now,
so this is a tenable requirement.
(Also the legacy -> secure direction would have been caught by the
server anyway since we send a non-empty RI extension.)
Change-Id: I915965c342f8a9cf3a4b6b32f0a87a00c3df3559
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6559
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
