This was removed a while ago. As of -18, the early data indication
extension is just a boolean.
Change-Id: I328b9abfafad326d4c2a3b5fe981af111f8401ad
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We missed that the TLS 1.3 code was inconsistent with the TLS 1.2 code.
Only on the server did we push an error code. But consistency between
client and server is probably worthwhile so, fix the 1.2 code to match
for now.
Change-Id: I17952c72048697dc66eacf0f144a66ced9cb3be8
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Change-Id: I07c4b67206440d169b314f24e1b3c1c697dda24f
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Certificate chain with intermediate taken from Chromium's tests. Though
it doesn't really matter because the runner tests don't verify
certificates.
BUG=70
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We used to enforce after the version was set, but stopped enforcing with
TLS 1.3. NSS enforces the value for encrypted records, which makes sense
and avoids the problems gating it on have_version. Add tests for this.
Change-Id: I7fb5f94ab4a22e8e3b1c14205aa934952d671727
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We have AEAD-level coverage for these, but we should also test this in
the TLS stack, and at maximum size per upstream's CVE-2016-7054.
Change-Id: I1f4ad0356e793d6a3eefdc2d55a9c7e05ea08261
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3c6a1ea674 switched what layer handled
the DTLS version mapping but forgot to correct the HelloVerifyRequest
logic to account for this.
Thanks to Jed Davis for noticing this.
Change-Id: I94ea18fc43a7ba15dd7250bfbcf44dbb3361b3ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11984
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is the last blocker within BoringSSL itself to opaquifying SSL.
(There are still blockers in consumers, of course.)
BUG=6
Change-Id: Ie3b8dcb78eeaa9aea7311406c5431a8625d60401
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 ciphers are now always enabled and come with a hard-coded
preference order.
BUG=110
Change-Id: Idd9cb0d75fb6bf2676ecdee27d88893ff974c4a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They will get very confused about which key they're using. Any caller
using exporters must either (a) leave renegotiation off or (b) be very
aware of when renegotiations happen anyway. (You need to somehow
coordinate with the peer about which epoch's exporter to use.)
Change-Id: I921ad01ac9bdc88f3fd0f8283757ce673a47ec75
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The existing tests for this codepath require us to reconfigure the shim.
This will not work when TLS 1.3 cipher configuration is detached from
the old cipher language. It also doesn't hit codepaths like sessions
containing a TLS 1.3 version but TLS 1.2 cipher.
Instead, add some logic to the runner to rewrite tickets and build tests
out of that.
Change-Id: I57ac5d49c3069497ed9aaf430afc65c631014bf6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12024
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change is based on interpreting TLS 1.3 draft 18.
Change-Id: I727961aff2f7318bcbbc8bf6d62b7d6ad3e62da9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11921
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Later work is going to cause some turbulence here.
Change-Id: Iba98bcf56e81492ec0dca54a381b38d1c115247a
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This shouldn't happen, but it is good to check to avoid the potential
underflow in ssl_session_is_time_valid.
This required tweaking the mock clock in bssl_shim to stop going back in
time.
Change-Id: Id3ab8755139e989190d0b53d4bf90fe1ac203022
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11841
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BUG=chromium:659593
Change-Id: I73a4751609b85df7cd40f0f60dc3f3046a490940
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On the client we'll leave it off by default until the change has made it
through Chrome's release process. For TLS 1.3, there is no existing
breakage risk, so always do it. This saves us the trouble of having to
manually turn it on in servers.
See [0] for a data point of someone getting it wrong.
[0] https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/9dbc21b1c3cc
Change-Id: I74daad9e7efd2040e9d66d72d558b31f145e6c4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11680
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Change-Id: I18cee423675d6a686f83b4ef4b38696cb618392c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11683
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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BUG=103
Change-Id: I9a49fbaf66af73978ce264d27926f483e1e44766
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Channel ID for TLS 1.3 uses the same digest construction as
CertificateVerify. This message is signed with the Channel ID key and
put in the same handshake message (with the same format) as in TLS 1.2.
BUG=103
Change-Id: Ia5b2dffe5a39c39db0cecb0aa6bdc328e53accc2
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{sha1, ecdsa} is virtually nonexistent. {sha512, ecdsa} is pointless
when we only accept P-256 and P-384. See Chromium Intent thread here:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/kWwLfeIQIBM/9chGZ40TCQAJ
This tweaks the signature algorithm logic slightly so that sign and
verify preferences are separate.
BUG=chromium:655318
Change-Id: I1097332600dcaa38e62e4dffa0194fb734c6df3f
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Some new tests needed to be suppressed.
Change-Id: I4474d752c338a18440efb213e0795ae81ad754fb
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This should land in the same group of revisions as the two parent
commits.
Change-Id: Id9d769b890b3308ea70b705e7241c73cb1930ede
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We'll never send cookies, but we'll echo them on request. Implement it
in runner as well and test.
BUG=98
Change-Id: Idd3799f1eaccd52ac42f5e2e5ae07c209318c270
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This doesn't currently honor the required KeyUpdate response. That will
be done in a follow-up.
BUG=74
Change-Id: I750fc41278736cb24230303815e839c6f6967b6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11412
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These too must be rejected. Test both unknown extensions and extensions
in the wrong context.
Change-Id: I54d5a5060f9efc26e5e4d23a0bde3c0d4d302d09
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This clears the last of Android's build warnings from BoringSSL. These
pragmas aren't actually no-ops, but it just means that MinGW consumers
(i.e. just Android) need to explicitly list the dependency (which they
do).
There may be something to be said for removing those and having everyone
list dependencies, but I don't really want to chase down every
consumer's build files. Probably not worth the trouble.
Change-Id: I8fcff954a6d5de9471f456db15c54a1b17cb937a
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This is part of TLS 1.3 draft 16 but isn't much of a wire format change,
so go ahead and add it now. When rolling into Chromium, we'll want to
add an entry to the error mapping.
Change-Id: I8fd7f461dca83b725a31ae19ef96c890d603ce53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11563
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We need to retain a pair of Finished messages for renegotiation_info.
SSL 3.0's is actually larger than TLS 1.2's (always 12 bytes). Take
renegotiation out in preparation for trimming them to size.
Change-Id: I2e238c48aaf9be07dd696bc2a6af75e9b0ead299
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11570
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11521
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Change-Id: Ifcdbeab9291d1141605a09a1960702c792cffa86
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11561
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Change-Id: I5d4fc0d3204744e93d71a36923469035c19a5b10
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The server acknowledging a non-existent session is a particularly
interesting case since getting it wrong means a NULL crash.
Change-Id: Iabde4955de883595239cfd8e9d84a7711e60a886
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
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BUG=77
Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
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EnableAllCiphers is problematic since some (version, cipher)
combinations aren't even defined and crash. Instead, use the
SendCipherSuite bug to mask the true cipher (which is becomes arbitrary)
for failure tests. The shim should fail long before we get further.
This lets us remove a number of weird checks in the TLS 1.3 code.
This also fixes the UnknownCipher tests which weren't actually testing
anything. EnableAllCiphers is now AdvertiseAllConfiguredCiphers and
does not filter out garbage values.
Change-Id: I7102fa893146bb0d096739e768c5a7aa339e51a8
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This is another case where the specification failed to hammer things
down and OpenSSL messed it up as a result. Also fix the SCT test in TLS
1.3.
Change-Id: I47541670447d1929869e1a39b2d9671a127bfba0
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The client/server split didn't actually make sense. We're interested in
whether the client will notice the bad version before anything else, so
ignore peer cipher preferences so all combinations work.
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ConflictingVersionNegotiation really should be about, say 1.1 and 1.2
since those may be negotiated via either mechanism. (Those two cases are
actually kinda weird and we may wish to change the spec. But, in the
meantime, test that we have the expected semantics.)
Also test that we ignore true TLS 1.3's number for now, until we use it,
and that TLS 1.3 suitably ignores ClientHello.version.
Change-Id: I76c660ddd179313fa68b15a6fda7a698bef4d9c9
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They weren't updated for the new version negotiation. (Though right now
they're just testing that we *don't* implement the downgrade detection
because it's a draft version.)
Change-Id: I4c983ebcdf3180d682833caf1e0063467ea41544
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Otherwise we panic. Thanks to EKR for reporting.
Change-Id: Ie4b6c2e18e1c77c7b660ca5d4c3bafb38a82cb6a
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I always forget this.
Change-Id: I9fa15cebb6586985ddc48cdbf9d184a49a8bfb02
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OpenSSL recently had a regression here (CVE-2016-6309). We're fine,
but so that we stay that way, add some tests.
Change-Id: I244d7ff327b7aad550f86408c5e5e65e6d1babe5
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BUG=106
Change-Id: Iaa12aeb67627f3c22fe4a917c89c646cb3dc1843
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Change-Id: I73f9fd64b46f26978b897409d817b34ec9d93afd
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This mirror's 2dc0204603 on the C side.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Iebb72df5a5ae98cb2fd8db519d973cd734ff05ea
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This is in preparation for implementing the version extension and is
probably what we should have done from the beginning as it makes
intolerance bugs simpler.
This means knobs like SendClientVersion and SendServerVersion deal with
the wire values while knobs like NegotiateVersion and MaxVersion deal
with logical versions. (This matches how the bugs have always worked.
SendFoo is just a weird post-processing bit on the handshake messages
while NegotiateVersion actually changes how BoGo behaves.)
BUG=90
Change-Id: I7f359d798d0899fa2742107fb3d854be19e731a4
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This GREASEs cipher suites, groups, and extensions. For now, we'll
always place them in a hard-coded position. We can experiment with more
interesting strategies later.
If we add new ciphers and curves, presumably we prefer them over current
ones, so place GREASE values at the front. This prevents implementations
from parsing only the first value and ignoring the rest.
Add two new extensions, one empty and one non-empty. Place the empty one
in front (IBM WebSphere can't handle trailing empty extensions) and the
non-empty one at the end.
Change-Id: If2e009936bc298cedf2a7a593ce7d5d5ddbb841a
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Get us a little bit more room here.
BUG=79
Change-Id: Ifadad94ead7794755a33f02d340111694b3572af
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That is an extremely confusing name. It should be NPN-Declined-TLS13.
Change-Id: I0e5fa50a3ddb0b80e88a8bc10d0ef87d0fff0a54
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We recently added a three-connection option, but the transcripts were
still assuming just -Normal and -Resume.
Change-Id: I8816bce95dd7fac779af658e3eb86bc78bb95c91
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Both the C and Go code were sampling the real clock. With this, two
successive iterations of runner transcripts give the same output.
Change-Id: I4d9e219e863881bf518c5ac199dce938a49cdfaa
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We want to ensure -fuzzer passes tests, except for the tests it
intentionally fails on. This ensures that we don't lose our ability to
refresh the fuzzer transcripts.
Change-Id: I761856c30379a3934fd46a24627ef8415b136f93
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Apparently we never wrote one of those. Also send a decrypt_error alert
to be consistent with all the other signature checks.
Change-Id: Ib5624d098d1e3086245192cdce92f5df26005064
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
SSL_peek works fine for us, but OpenSSL 1.1.0 regressed this
(https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1563), and we don't have
tests either. Fix this.
SSL_peek can handle all weird events that SSL_read can, so use runner
and tell bssl_shim to do a SSL_peek + SSL_peek + SSL_read instead of
SSL_read. Then add tests for all the events we may discover.
Change-Id: I9e8635e3ca19653a02a883f220ab1332d4412f98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11090
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The old numbers violate a MUST-level requirement in TLS 1.2 to not
advertise anonymous (0x0700 ends in 0x00). The spec has been updated
with new allocations which avoid these.
BUG=webrtc:6342
Change-Id: Ia5663ada98fa1ebf0f8a7f50fe74a0e9206c4194
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11131
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Found by libFuzzer and then one more mistake caught by valgrind. Add a
test for this case.
Change-Id: I92773bc1231bafe5fc069e8568d93ac0df4c8acb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11129
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Upstream added these functions after we did but decided to change the
names slightly. I'm not sure why they wanted to add the "proto" in
there, but align with them nonetheless so the ecosystem only has one set
of these functions.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Ia9863c58c9734374092051f02952b112806040cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11123
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This is in preparation for using the supported_versions extension to
experiment with draft TLS 1.3 versions, since we don't wish to restore
the fallback. With versions begin opaque values, we will want
version_from_wire to reject unknown values, not attempt to preserve
order in some way.
This means ClientHello.version processing needs to be separate code.
That's just written out fully in negotiate_version now. It also means
SSL_set_{min,max}_version will notice invalid inputs which aligns us
better with upstream's versions of those APIs.
This CL doesn't replace ssl->version with an internal-representation
version, though follow work should do it once a couple of changes land
in consumers.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Id2f5e1fa72847c823ee7f082e9e69f55e51ce9da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11122
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Passing --quiet makes valgrind only print out errors, so we don't need
to suppress things. Combine that with checking valgrind's dedicated exit
code so we notice errors that happen before the "---DONE---" marker.
This makes that marker unnecessary for valgrind. all_tests.go was not
sensitive to this, but still would do well to have valgrind be silent.
Change-Id: I841edf7de87081137e38990e647e989fd7567295
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11128
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the test failed due to non-ASan reasons but ASan also had errors,
output those too.
Change-Id: Id908fe2a823c59255c6a9585dfaa894a4fcd9f59
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11127
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Runner needs to implement fuzzer mode as well so we can record
transcripts from it. A bunch of tests were failing:
- C and Go disagreed on what fuzzer mode did to TLS 1.3 padding. So we
fuzz more code, align Go with C. Fuzzer mode TLS 1.3 still pads but
just skips the final AEAD.
- The deterministic RNG should be applied per test, not per exchange. It
turns out, if your RNG is deterministic, one tends to pick the same
session ID over and over which confuses clients. (Resumption is
signaled by echoing the session ID.)
Now the only failing tests are the ones one would expect to fail.
BUG=79
Change-Id: Ica23881a6e726adae71e6767730519214ebcd62a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11126
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If we see garbage in ClientHello.version and then select static RSA,
that garbage is what goes in the premaster.
Change-Id: I65190a44439745e6b5ffaf7669f063da725c8097
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11092
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Plain PSK omits the ServerKeyExchange when there is no hint and includes
it otherwise (it should have always sent it), while other PSK ciphers
like ECDHE_PSK cannot omit the hint. Having different capabilities here
is odd and RFC 4279 5.2 suggests that all PSK ciphers are capable of
"[not] provid[ing] an identity hint".
Interpret this to mean no identity hint and empty identity hint are the
same state. Annoyingly, this gives a plain PSK implementation two
options for spelling an empty hint. The spec isn't clear and this is not
really a battle worth fighting, so I've left both acceptable and added a
test for this case.
See also https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/275217/. This is also
consistent with Android's PskKeyManager API, our only consumer anyway.
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/PskKeyManager.html
Change-Id: I8a8e6cc1f7dd1b8b202cdaf3d4f151bebfb4a25b
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access_denied is only used to indicate client cert errors and Chrome
maps it to ERR_SSL_BAD_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT accordingly:
access_denied
A valid certificate was received, but when access control was
applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. This
message is always fatal.
We don't appear to be the cause of Chrome's recent
ERR_SSL_BAD_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT spike, but we should send these correctly
nonetheless.
If the early callback fails, handshake_failure seems the most
appropriate ("I was unable to find suitable parameters"). There isn't
really an alert that matches DoS, but internal_error seems okay?
internal_error
An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the
protocol (such as a memory allocation failure) makes it impossible
to continue. This message is always fatal.
There's nothing wrong, per se, with your ClientHello, but I just can't
deal with it right now. Please go away.
Change-Id: Icd1c998c09dc42daa4b309c1a4a0f136b85eb69d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11084
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I'm not sure what happened here. These are both the same as
MissingKeyShare-Client.
Change-Id: I6601ed378d8639c1b59034f1e96c09a683bb62ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11007
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It's easy to forget to check those. Unfortunately, it's also easy to
forget to check inner structures, which is going to be harder to stress,
but do these to start with. In doing, so fix up and unify some
error-handling, and add a missing check when parsing TLS 1.2
CertificateRequest.
This was also inspired by the recent IETF posting.
Change-Id: I27fe3cd3506258389a75d486036388400f0a33ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10963
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This will let us use the same test scenarios for testing messages with
trailing garbage or skipped messages.
Change-Id: I9f177983e8dabb6c94d3d8443d224b79a58f40b1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10962
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This mechanism is incompatible with deploying draft versions of TLS 1.3.
Suppose a draft M client talks to a draft N server, M != N. (Either M or
N could also be the final standard revision should there be lingering
draft clients or servers.) The server will notice the mismatch and
pretend ClientHello.version is TLS 1.2, not TLS 1.3. But this will
trigger anti-downgrade signal and cause an interop failure! And if it
doesn't trigger, all the clever tricks around ServerHello.random being
signed in TLS 1.2 are moot.
We'll put this back when the dust has settled.
Change-Id: Ic3cf72b7c31ba91e5cca0cfd7a3fca830c493a43
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11005
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Not that this matters in the slightest, but the recent IETF mailing
reminded me we don't test this.
Change-Id: I300c96d6a63733d538a7019a7cb74d4e65d0498f
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Although RFC 6066 recommends against it, some servers send a warning
alert prior to ServerHello on SNI mismatch, and, per spec, TLS 1.2
allows it.
We're fine here, but add a test for it. It interacts interestingly with
TLS 1.3 forbidding warning alerts because it happens before version
negotiation.
Change-Id: I0032313c986c835b6ae1aa43da6ee0dad17a97c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10800
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Now that we have the extern "C++" trick, we can just embed them in the
normal headers. Move the EVP_CIPHER_CTX deleter to cipher.h and, in
doing so, take away a little bit of boilerplate in defining deleters.
Change-Id: I4a4b8d0db5274a3607914d94e76a38996bd611ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10804
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Unlike the Scoped* types, bssl::UniquePtr is available to C++ users, and
offered for a large variety of types. The 'extern "C++"' trick is used
to make the C++ bits digestible to C callers that wrap header files in
'extern "C"'.
Change-Id: Ifbca4c2997d6628e33028c7d7620c72aff0f862e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10521
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Add a test that RSA-PSS is available in TLS 1.2 by default, both for
signing and verifying. Note that if a custom SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD is
used and it sets signing preferences, it won't use RSA-PSS if it doesn't
know about it. (See *-Sign-Negotiate-* tests.)
Change-Id: I3776a0c95480188a135795f7ebf31f2b0e0626cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10723
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Changing parameters on renegotiation makes all our APIs confusing. This
one has no reason to change, so lock it down. In particular, our
preference to forbid Token Binding + renego may be overridden at the
IETF, even though it's insane. Loosening it will be a bit less of a
headache if EMS can't change.
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg00690.html
claims that this is already in the specification and enforced by NSS. I
can't find anything to this effect in the specification. It just says
the client MUST disable renegotiation when EMS is missing, which is
wishful thinking. At a glance, NSS doesn't seem to check, though I could
be misunderstanding the code.
Nonetheless, locking this down is a good idea anyway. Accurate or not,
take the email as an implicit endorsement of this from Mozilla.
Change-Id: I236b05991d28bed199763dcf2f47bbfb9d0322d7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10721
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For now, they can be restored by compiling with -DBORINGSSL_RC4_TLS.
Of note, this means that `MEDIUM' is now empty.
Change-Id: Ic77308e7bd4849bdb2b4882c6b34af85089fe3cc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10580
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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To ease the removal of RC4, use 3DES in cases where RC4 is not required,
but is just a placeholder for "ciphersuite that works in SSLv3."
Change-Id: Ib459173e68a662986235b556f330a7e0e02759d7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10523
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Apparently we forgot to do this.
Change-Id: I348cf6d716ae888fddce69ba4801bf09446f5a72
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Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
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However, for now, we will only enable it if TLS 1.3 is offered.
BUG=85
Change-Id: I958ae0adeafee553dbffb966a6fa41f8a81cef96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10342
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In TLS 1.3 draft 14, due to resumption using a different cipher, this
is actually not too hard to mess up. (In fact BoGo didn't quite get it
right.)
Fortunately, the new cipher suite negotiation in draft 15 should make
this reasonable again once we implement it. In the meantime, test it.
Change-Id: I2eb948eeaaa051ecacaa9095b66ff149582ea11d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10442
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Change-Id: I2e1ee319bb9852b9c686f2f297c470db54f72279
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BUG=84
Change-Id: Ie5eaefddd161488996033de28c0ebd1064bb793d
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9498e74 changed the default value of verify_result to an error. This
tripped up NGINX, which depends on a bug[1] in OpenSSL. netty-tcnative
also uses this behavior, though it currently isn't tripped up by 9498e74
because it calls |SSL_set_verify_result|. However, we would like to
remove |SSL_set_verify_result| and with two data points, it seems this
is behavior we must preserve.
This change sets |verify_result| to |X509_V_OK| when a) no client
certificate is requested or b) none is given and it's optional.
[1] See BUGS in https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.html
Change-Id: Ibd33660ae409bfe272963a8c39b7e9aa83c3d635
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Also fix up those tests as they were a little confused. It is always the
shim that signs and has a configured certificate in these tests.
BUG=95
Change-Id: I57a6b1bad19986c79cd30aaa6cf3b8ca307ef8b2
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One less thing to keep track of.
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/549 got merged.
Change-Id: Ide66e547140f8122a3b8013281be5215c11b6de0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10482
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The TLS 1.3 state machine is actually less in need of the aggressive
state machine coverage tests, but nonetheless, we should cover all
handshake shapes. PSK resumption and HelloRetryRequest were missing.
We were also accidentally running "DTLS" versions of the TLS 1.3 tests
but silently running TLS 1.2.
Change-Id: I65db4052b89d770db7e47738e73aaadde9634236
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10441
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Right now the logic happens twice which is a nuisance.
Change-Id: Ia8155ada0b4479b2ca4be06152b8cd99816e14e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10440
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Some version mismatch cases were not being covered due to TLS 1.2 and
TLS 1.3 having very different spellings for tickets resumption. Also
explicitly test that TLS 1.2 tickets aren't offered in the TLS 1.3 slot
and vice versa.
Change-Id: Ibe58386ea2004fb3c1af19342b8d808f13f737a9
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BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
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Much of the ClientHello logic queries hello.vers. To avoid it getting
confused, do all modifications right at the end, otherwise
SendClientVersion also affects whether the key share is sent.
Change-Id: I8be2a4a9807ef9ad88af03971ea1c37e4ba36b9c
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The server should not be allowed select a protocol that wasn't
advertised. Callers tend to not really notice and act as if some default
were chosen which is unlikely to work very well.
Change-Id: Ib6388db72f05386f854d275bab762ca79e8174e6
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These are probably a good idea to ship so long as we have the PSK
callbacks at all, but they're not *completely* standard yet and Android
tests otherwise need updating to know about them. We don't care enough
about PSK to be in a rush to ship them, and taking them out is an easier
default action until then.
Change-Id: Ic646053d29b69a114e2efea61d593d5e912bdcd0
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If cert_cb runs asynchronously, we end up repeating a large part of very
stateful ClientHello processing. This seems to be mostly fine and there
are few users of server-side cert_cb (it's a new API in 1.0.2), but it's
a little scary.
This is also visible to external consumers because some callbacks get
called multiple times. We especially should try to avoid that as there
is no guarantee that these callbacks are idempotent and give the same
answer each time.
Change-Id: I212b2325eae2cfca0fb423dace101e466c5e5d4e
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