However, for now, we will only enable it if TLS 1.3 is offered.
BUG=85
Change-Id: I958ae0adeafee553dbffb966a6fa41f8a81cef96
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In TLS 1.3 draft 14, due to resumption using a different cipher, this
is actually not too hard to mess up. (In fact BoGo didn't quite get it
right.)
Fortunately, the new cipher suite negotiation in draft 15 should make
this reasonable again once we implement it. In the meantime, test it.
Change-Id: I2eb948eeaaa051ecacaa9095b66ff149582ea11d
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Change-Id: I2e1ee319bb9852b9c686f2f297c470db54f72279
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BUG=84
Change-Id: Ie5eaefddd161488996033de28c0ebd1064bb793d
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9498e74 changed the default value of verify_result to an error. This
tripped up NGINX, which depends on a bug[1] in OpenSSL. netty-tcnative
also uses this behavior, though it currently isn't tripped up by 9498e74
because it calls |SSL_set_verify_result|. However, we would like to
remove |SSL_set_verify_result| and with two data points, it seems this
is behavior we must preserve.
This change sets |verify_result| to |X509_V_OK| when a) no client
certificate is requested or b) none is given and it's optional.
[1] See BUGS in https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.html
Change-Id: Ibd33660ae409bfe272963a8c39b7e9aa83c3d635
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Also fix up those tests as they were a little confused. It is always the
shim that signs and has a configured certificate in these tests.
BUG=95
Change-Id: I57a6b1bad19986c79cd30aaa6cf3b8ca307ef8b2
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One less thing to keep track of.
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/549 got merged.
Change-Id: Ide66e547140f8122a3b8013281be5215c11b6de0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10482
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The TLS 1.3 state machine is actually less in need of the aggressive
state machine coverage tests, but nonetheless, we should cover all
handshake shapes. PSK resumption and HelloRetryRequest were missing.
We were also accidentally running "DTLS" versions of the TLS 1.3 tests
but silently running TLS 1.2.
Change-Id: I65db4052b89d770db7e47738e73aaadde9634236
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Right now the logic happens twice which is a nuisance.
Change-Id: Ia8155ada0b4479b2ca4be06152b8cd99816e14e8
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Some version mismatch cases were not being covered due to TLS 1.2 and
TLS 1.3 having very different spellings for tickets resumption. Also
explicitly test that TLS 1.2 tickets aren't offered in the TLS 1.3 slot
and vice versa.
Change-Id: Ibe58386ea2004fb3c1af19342b8d808f13f737a9
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BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
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Much of the ClientHello logic queries hello.vers. To avoid it getting
confused, do all modifications right at the end, otherwise
SendClientVersion also affects whether the key share is sent.
Change-Id: I8be2a4a9807ef9ad88af03971ea1c37e4ba36b9c
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The server should not be allowed select a protocol that wasn't
advertised. Callers tend to not really notice and act as if some default
were chosen which is unlikely to work very well.
Change-Id: Ib6388db72f05386f854d275bab762ca79e8174e6
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These are probably a good idea to ship so long as we have the PSK
callbacks at all, but they're not *completely* standard yet and Android
tests otherwise need updating to know about them. We don't care enough
about PSK to be in a rush to ship them, and taking them out is an easier
default action until then.
Change-Id: Ic646053d29b69a114e2efea61d593d5e912bdcd0
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If cert_cb runs asynchronously, we end up repeating a large part of very
stateful ClientHello processing. This seems to be mostly fine and there
are few users of server-side cert_cb (it's a new API in 1.0.2), but it's
a little scary.
This is also visible to external consumers because some callbacks get
called multiple times. We especially should try to avoid that as there
is no guarantee that these callbacks are idempotent and give the same
answer each time.
Change-Id: I212b2325eae2cfca0fb423dace101e466c5e5d4e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10224
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This is more progress in letting other stacks use the test runner.
You can provide a per-shim configuration file that includes:
- A list of test patterns to be suppressed (presumably because
they don't work). This setting is ignored if -test is used.
- A translation table of expected errors to shim-specific errors.
BUG=92
Change-Id: I3c31d136e35c282e05d4919e18ba41d44ea9cf2a
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We handle this correctly but never wrote a test for it. Noticed this in
chatting about the second ClientHello.version bug workaround with Eric
Rescorla.
Change-Id: I09bc6c995d07c0f2c9936031b52c3c639ed3695e
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Only X509_up_ref left (it's still waiting on a few external callers).
BUG=89
Change-Id: Ia2aec2bb0a944356cb1ce29f3b58a26bdb8a9977
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9141
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tls13_process_certificate can take a boolean for whether anonymous is
allowed. This does change the error on the client slightly, but I think
this is correct anyway. It is not a syntax error for the server to send
no certificates in so far as the Certificate message allows it. It's
just illegal.
Change-Id: I1af80dacf23f50aad0b1fbd884bc068a40714399
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We have tests for this as a server, but none as a client. Extend the
certificate verification tests here. This is in preparation for ensuring
that TLS 1.3 session resumption works correctly.
Change-Id: I9ab9f42838ffd69f73fbd877b0cdfaf31caea707
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Extend the DTLS mock clock to apply to sessions too and test that
resumption behaves as expected.
Change-Id: Ib8fdec91b36e11cfa032872b63cf589f93b3da13
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We will now send tickets as a server and accept them as a
client. Correctly offering and resuming them in the handshake will be
implemented in a follow-up.
Now that we're actually processing draft 14 tickets, bump the draft
version.
Change-Id: I304320a29c4ffe564fa9c00642a4ace96ff8d871
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As of https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/530, they're gone.
They're still allowed just before the ClientHello or ServerHello, which
is kind of odd, but so it goes.
BUG=86
Change-Id: I3d556ab45e42d0755d23566e006c0db9af35b7b6
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Change-Id: I998f69269cdf813da19ccccc208b476f3501c8c4
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In TLS 1.2, this was allowed to be empty for the weird SHA-1 fallback
logic. In TLS 1.3, not only is the fallback logic gone, but omitting
them is a syntactic error.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
SignatureScheme
supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
Change-Id: I4991e59bc4647bb665aaf920ed4836191cea3a5a
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We were sending decode_error, but the spec explicitly says (RFC 5246):
unsupported_extension
sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing
an extension that they did not put in the corresponding client
hello. This message is always fatal.
Also add a test for this when it's a known but unoffered extension. We
actually end up putting these in different codepaths now due to the
custom extensions stuff.
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
Change-Id: If6c8033d4cfe69ef8af5678b873b25e0dbadfc4f
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It seems much safer for the default value of |verify_result| to be an
error value.
Change-Id: I372ec19c41d77516ed12d0169969994f7d23ed70
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We managed to mix two comment styles in the Go license headers and
copy-and-paste it throughout the project.
Change-Id: Iec1611002a795368b478e1cae0b53127782210b1
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BUG=74
Change-Id: I72d52c1fbc3413e940dddbc0b20c7f22459da693
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Change-Id: I5cc194fc0a3ba8283049078e5671c924ee23036c
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This finishes getting rid of ssl_read_bytes! Now we have separate
entry-points for the various cases. For now, I've kept TLS handshake
consuming records partially. When we do the BIO-less API, I expect that
will need to change, since we won't have the record buffer available.
(Instead, the ssl3_read_handshake_bytes and extend_handshake_buffer pair
will look more like the DTLS side or Go and pull the entire record into
init_buf.)
This change opts to make read_app_data drive the message to completion
in anticipation of DTLS 1.3. That hasn't been specified, but
NewSessionTicket certainly will exist. Knowing that DTLS necessarily has
interleave seems something better suited for the SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD
internals to drive.
It needs refining, but SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD is now actually a half-decent
abstraction boundary between the higher-level protocol logic and
DTLS/TLS-specific record-layer and message dispatchy bits.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I9b4626bb8a29d9cb30174d9e6912bb420ed45aff
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Regression tests for upstream's
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1298.
Also, given that we're now on our third generation of V2ClientHello
handling, I'm sure we'll have a fourth and fifth and one of these days
I'm going to mess this one up. :-)
Change-Id: I6fd8f311ed0939fbbfd370448b637ccc06145021
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Change-Id: I7e85a2677fe28a22103a975d517bbee900c44ac3
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We already forbid renego/app-data interleave. Forbid it within a
HelloRequest too because that's nonsense. No one would ever send:
[hs:HelloReq-] [app:Hello world] [hs:-uest]
Add tests for this case.
This is in preparation for our more complex TLS 1.3 post-handshake logic
which is going to go through the usual handshake reassembly logic and,
for sanity, will want to enforce this anyway.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I80eb9f3333da3d751f98f25d9469860d1993a97a
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Per request from EKR. Also we have a lot of long test names, so this
seems generally a good idea.
Change-Id: Ie463f5367ec7d33005137534836005b571c8f424
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9021
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This is in preparation for switching finish_handshake to a
release_current_message hook. finish_handshake in DTLS is also
responsible for releasing any memory associated with extra messages in
the handshake.
Except that's not right and we need to make it an error anyway. Given
that the rest of the DTLS dispatch layer already strongly assumes there
is only one message in epoch one, putting the check in the fragment
processing works fine enough. Add tests for this.
This will certainly need revising when DTLS 1.3 happens (perhaps just a
version check, perhaps bringing finish_handshake back as a function that
can fail... which means we need a state just before SSL_ST_OK), but DTLS
1.3 post-handshake messages haven't really been written down, so let's
do the easy thing for now and add a test for when it gets more
interesting.
This removes the sequence number reset in the DTLS code. That reset
never did anything becase we don't and never will renego. We should make
sure DTLS 1.3 does not bring the reset back for post-handshake stuff.
(It was wrong in 1.2 too. Penultimate-flight retransmits and renego
requests are ambiguous in DTLS.)
BUG=83
Change-Id: I33d645a8550f73e74606030b9815fdac0c9fb682
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8988
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now they're RSA PRIVATE KEY or EC PRIVATE KEY which requires a bit
more effort to parse. It means the PEM header is necessary to parse
these. OpenSSL and Go automagically convert the format, but other shims
(namely NSS) may not.
Change-Id: I9fa2767dcf1fe6ceeea546390759e1c364a8f16f
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Implemented in preparation for testing the C implementation. Tested
against itself.
BUG=74
Change-Id: Iec1b9ad22e09711fa4e67c97cc3eb257585c3ae5
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We still don't do anything useful with them, but we know not to put them
in the session ticket field.
In doing so, fix a bug in the CorruptTicket option where it would crash
if tickets are exactly 40 byets in length.
BUG=75
Change-Id: Id1039a58ed314a67d0af4f2c7e0617987c2bd6b5
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Also parse out the ticket lifetime which was previously ignored.
BUG=75
Change-Id: I6ba92017bd4f1b31da55fd85d2af529fd592de11
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We have no intention of implementing FFDHE and the DHE ciphers currently
don't work in the 1.3 handshake anyway. Cipher suite negotiation is to
be refactored in the spec so these cipher values won't be used for FFDHE
anyway.
Change-Id: I51547761d70a397dc3dd0391b71db98189f1a844
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This change allows the shim to return a magic error code (89) to
indicate that it doesn't implement some of the given flags for a test.
Unimplemented tests are, by default, an error. The --allow-unimplemented
flag to the test runner causes them to be ignored.
This is done in preparation for non-BoringSSL shims.
Change-Id: Iecfd545b9cf44df5e25b719bfd06275c8149311a
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WebRTC want to be able to send a random alert. Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Id3113d68f25748729fd9e9a91dbbfa93eead12c3
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Ridiculous as it is, the protocol does not forbid packing HelloRequest
and Finished into the same record. Add a test for this case.
Change-Id: I8e1455b261f56169309070bf44d14d40a63eae50
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Alas, we will need a version fallback for TLS 1.3 again.
This deprecates SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV. Rather than supplying a
boolean, have BoringSSL be aware of the real maximum version so we can
change the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade logic to kick in, even when
max_version is set to 1.2.
The fallback version replaces the maximum version when it is set for
almost all purposes, except for downgrade protection purposes.
BUG=chromium:630165
Change-Id: I4c841dcbc6e55a282b223dfe169ac89c83c8a01f
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[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8850
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Change-Id: I92425d7c72111623ddfbe8391f2d2fa88f101ef3
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Change-Id: Ibde837040d2332bc8570589ba5be9b32e774bfcf
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We never had coverage for that codepath.
Change-Id: Iba1b0a3ddca743745773c663995acccda9fa6970
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Change-Id: I0fdd6db9ea229d394b14c76b6ba55f6165a6a806
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There is no longer need for the Go code to implement 'fake TLS 1.3'. We
now implement real incomplete TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I8577100ef8c7c83ca540f37dadd451263f9f37e6
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This is basically the same as BadECDHECurve-TLS13. That the client picks
a share first but the server picks the curve type means there's less
redundancy to deal with.
Change-Id: Icd9a4ecefe8e0dfaeb8fd0b062ca28561b05df98
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Change-Id: Iad572f44448141c5e2be49bf25b42719c625a97a
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
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Change-Id: I1132103bd6c8b01c567b970694ed6b5e9248befb
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Not only test that we can enforce the message type correctly (this is
currently in protocol-specific code though really should not be), but
also test that each individual message is checked correctly.
Change-Id: I5ed0f4033f011186f020ea46940160c7639f688b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8793
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This will be used for writing the equivalent test in TLS 1.3 to the
recent DTLS change and similar.
Change-Id: I280c3ca8f1d8e0981b6e7a499acb7eceebe43a0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8792
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This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It
is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to
buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished.
When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we
will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong
encryption.
Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is
a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS
check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in
read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so
we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For
now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with
a proper check in TLS 1.3.)
Change-Id: Ia52b0b81e7db53e9ed2d4f6d334a1cce13e93297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8790
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Keep our C implementation honest.
Change-Id: I9e9e686b7f730b61218362450971afdd82b0b640
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It tests the same thing right now with Fake TLS 1.3, but we'll need this
tested in real TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Iacd32c2d4e56d341e5709a2ccd80fed5d556c94d
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This way we can test them at TLS 1.3 as well. The tests for extensions
which will not exist in TLS 1.3 are intentionally skipped, though the
commit which adds TLS 1.3 will want to add negative tests for them.
Change-Id: I41784298cae44eb6c27b13badae700ad02f9c721
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This is legal to enforce and we can keep our server honest.
Change-Id: I86ab796dcb51f88ab833fcf5b57aff40e14c7363
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This allows us to implement custom RSA-PSS-based keys, so the async TLS
1.3 tests can proceed. For now, both sign and sign_digest exist, so
downstreams only need to manage a small change atomically. We'll remove
sign_digest separately.
In doing so, fold all the *_complete hooks into a single complete hook
as no one who implemented two operations ever used different function
pointers for them.
While I'm here, I've bumped BORINGSSL_API_VERSION. I do not believe we
have any SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD versions who cannot update atomically,
but save a round-trip in case we do. It's free.
Change-Id: I7f031aabfb3343805deee429b9e244aed5d76aed
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This makes custom private keys and EVP_PKEYs symmetric again. There is
no longer a requirement that the caller pre-filter the configured
signing prefs.
Also switch EVP_PKEY_RSA to NID_rsaEncryption. These are identical, but
if some key types are to be NIDs, we should make them all NIDs.
Change-Id: I82ea41c27a3c57f4c4401ffe1ccad406783e4c64
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8785
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This gives us a sigalg-based API for configuring signing algorithms.
Change-Id: Ib746a56ebd1061eadd2620cdb140d5171b59bc02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I2f5c45e0e491f9dd25c2463710697599fea708ed
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The server must switch the outgoing keys early so that client
certificate alerts are sent with the right keys. (Also so that half-RTT
data may be sent.)
Change-Id: Id5482c811aa0b747ab646453b3856a83f23d3f06
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8791
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TLS 1.3 will go through very different code than everything else. Even
SSL 3.0 is somewhat special-cased now. Move the invalid signature tests
there and run at all versions.
Change-Id: Idd0ee9aac2939c0c8fd9af2ea7b4a22942121c60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8775
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest code advertised the signing set, not the
verify set. It also wasn't saving the peer's signature algorithm.
Change-Id: I62247d5703e30d8463c92f3d597dbeb403b355ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8774
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
ServerKeyExchange and SigningHash are both very 1.2-specific names.
Replace with names that fit both 1.2 and 1.3 (and are a bit shorter).
Also fix a reference to ServerKeyExchange in sign.go.
Change-Id: I25d4ff135cc77cc545f0f9e94014244d56a9e96b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8773
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The API is definitive and works in TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Ifefa295bc792f603b297e796559355f66f668811
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8772
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The extension is not defined in TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I5eb85f7142be7e11f1a9c0e4680e8ace9ac50feb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8771
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Resumption is not yet implemented.
Change-Id: I7c3df2912456a0e0d5339d7b0b1f5819f958e900
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8770
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The preceding client CA bug is actually almost unreachable since the
list is initialized to a non-NULL empty list. But if one tries hard
enough, a NULL one is possible.
Change-Id: I49e69511bf65b0178c4e0acdb887f8ba7d85faff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8769
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Tested against the C code.
Change-Id: I62639e1e46cd4f57625be5d4ff7f6902b318c278
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8768
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We need EnableAllCiphers to make progress so, temporarily, defer the PSK
error. Also flip a true/false bug in the OCSP stapling logic.
Change-Id: Iad597c84393e1400c42b8b290eedc16f73f5ed30
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8766
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deriveTrafficAEAD gets confused by the EnableAllCiphers bug. As a hack,
just return the nil cipher. We only need to progress far enough to read
the shim's error code.
Change-Id: I72d25ac463a03a0e99dd08c38a1a7daef1f94311
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8763
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We'll enable it again later, but the initial land of the 1.3 handshake
will not do resumption. In preparation, turn those off.
Change-Id: I5f98b6a9422eb96be26c4ec41ca7ecde5f592da7
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In preparation for getting the tests going.
Change-Id: Ifd2ab09e6ce91f99abde759d5db8dc6554521572
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Otherwise adding it to the handshake hash doesn't work right.
Change-Id: I2fabae72e8b088a5df26bbeac946f19144d58733
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We'll enable them once we've gotten it working. For now, our TLS 1.3
believes there is no PSK.
Change-Id: I5ae51266927c8469c671844da9a0f7387c297050
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8760
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RSASSA-PSS with SHA-512 is slightly too large for 1024-bit RSA. One
should not be using 1024-bit RSA, but it's common enough for tests
(including our own in runner before they were regenerated), that we
should probably do the size check and avoid unnecessary turbulence to
everyone else's test setups.
Change-Id: If0c7e401d7d05404755cba4cbff76de3bc65c138
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Tested by having client and server talk to each other. This adds the
certificate_extensions field to CertificateRequest which I'd previously
missed. (We completely ignore the field, with the expectation that the C
code won't have anything useful to do with it either.)
Change-Id: I74f96acd36747d4b6a6f533535e36ea8e94d2be8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8710
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper, revised by davidben.]
Change-Id: If1d45c33994476f4bc9cd69831b6bbed40f792d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8599
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
For now, skip the 1.2 -> 1.1 signal since that will affect shipping
code. We may as well enable it too, but wait until things have settled
down. This implements the version in draft-14 since draft-13's isn't
backwards-compatible.
Change-Id: I46be43e6f4c5203eb4ae006d1c6a2fe7d7a949ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8724
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Now that the odd client/server split (a remnant from the original
crypto/tls code not handling signing-hash/PRF mismatches) is gone, it
can just be pulled from the config.
Change-Id: Idb46c026d6529a2afc2b43d4afedc0aa950614db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8723
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Saves worrying about forgetting it. (And indeed I forgot it in the TLS
1.3 code.)
Change-Id: Ibb55a83eddba675da64b7cf2c45eac6348c97784
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8722
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This way we can test failing client auth without having to worry about
first getting through server auth.
Change-Id: Iaf996d87ac3df702a17e76c26006ca9b2a5bdd1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8721
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Rebased and tests added by davidben.]
In doing so, regenerate the test RSA certificate to be 2048-bit RSA.
RSA-PSS with SHA-512 is actually too large for 1024-bit RSA. Also make
the sigalg test loop test versions that do and don't work which subsumes
the ecdsa_sha1 TLS 1.3 test.
For now, RSA-PKCS1 is still allowed because NSS has yet to implement
RSA-PSS and we'd like to avoid complicated interop testing.
Change-Id: I686b003ef7042ff757bdaab8d5838b7a4d6edd87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8613
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Of course, it's still signing ServerKeyExchange messages since the
handshake's the old one.)
Change-Id: I35844a329d983f61ed0b5be20b333487406fe7e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8614
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Implement in both C and Go. To test this, route config into all the
sign.go functions so we can expose bugs to skip the check.
Unfortunately, custom private keys are going to be a little weird since
we can't check their curve type. We may need to muse on what to do here.
Perhaps the key type bit should return an enum that includes the curve?
It's weird because, going forward, hopefully all new key types have
exactly one kind of signature so key type == sig alg == sig alg prefs.
Change-Id: I1f487ec143512ead931e3392e8be2a3172abe3d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8701
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
That instead happens via signature algorithms, which will be done in a
follow-up commit.
Change-Id: I97bc4646319dddbff62552244b0dd7e9bb2650ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8700
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is in preparation for TLS 1.3 enforcing curve matches in signature
algorithms.
Change-Id: I82c3a1862703a15e4e36ceb7ec40e27235b620c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8699
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
{sha256,ecdsa} should not be silently accepted for an RSA key.
Change-Id: I0c0eea5071f7a59f2707ca0ea023a16cc4126d6a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8697
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 also forbids signing SHA-1 digests, but this will be done as a
consequence of forbidding PKCS#1 in 1.3 altogether (rsa_sign_sha1) and
requiring a curve match in ECDSA (ecdsa_sha1).
Change-Id: I665971139ccef9e270fd5796c5e6a814a8f663b1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8696
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Rather than blindly select SHA-1 if we can't find a matching one, act as
if the peer advertised rsa_pkcs1_sha1 and ecdsa_sha1. This means that we
will fail the handshake if no common algorithm may be found.
This is done in preparation for removing the SHA-1 default in TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I3584947909d3d6988b940f9404044cace265b20d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8695
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This reverts commits:
8d79ed674019fdcb52348d79ed6740
Because WebRTC (at least) includes our headers in an extern "C" block,
which precludes having any C++ in them.
Change-Id: Ia849f43795a40034cbd45b22ea680b51aab28b2d
For when the PackHandshakeFlight tests get enabled.
Change-Id: Iee20fd27d88ed58f59af3b7e2dd92235d35af9ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8663
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change scatters the contents of the two scoped_types.h files into
the headers for each of the areas of the code. The types are now in the
|bssl| namespace.
Change-Id: I802b8de68fba4786b6a0ac1bacd11d81d5842423
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We currently have the situation where the |tool| and |bssl_shim| code
includes scoped_types.h from crypto/test and ssl/test. That's weird and
shouldn't happen. Also, our C++ consumers might quite like to have
access to the scoped types.
Thus this change moves some of the template code to base.h and puts it
all in a |bssl| namespace to prepare for scattering these types into
their respective headers. In order that all the existing test code be
able to access these types, it's all moved into the same namespace.
Change-Id: I3207e29474dc5fcc344ace43119df26dae04eabb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8730
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Since they include an ECDHE exchange in them, they are equally-well
suited to False Start.
Change-Id: I75d31493a614a78ccbf337574c359271831d654d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8732
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper, revised by davidben.]
When we add this in the real code, this will want ample tests and hooks
for bugs, but get the core logic in to start with.
Change-Id: I86cf0b6416c9077dbb6471a1802ae984b8fa6c72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8598
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 will use a different function from processClientHello.
Change-Id: I8b26a601cf553834b508feab051927d5986091ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8597
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
As with the client, the logic around extensions in 1.3 will want to be
tweaked. readClientHello will probably shrink a bit. (We could probably
stuff 1.3 into the existing parameter negotiation logic, but I expect
it'll get a bit unwieldy once HelloRetryRequest, PSK resumption, and
0-RTT get in there, so I think it's best we leave them separate.)
Change-Id: Id8c323a06a1def6857a59accd9f87fb0b088385a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8596
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
While the random connection property extensions like ALPN and SRTP
remain largely unchanged in TLS 1.3 (but for interaction with 0-RTT),
authentication-related extensions change significantly and need
dedicated logic.
Change-Id: I2588935c2563a22e9879fb81478b8df5168b43de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8602
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Test with and without PackHandshakeFlight enabled to cover when the
early post-CCS fragment will get packed into one of the pre-CCS
handshake records. Also test the resumption cases too to cover more
state transitions.
The various CCS-related tests (since CCS is kind of a mess) are pulled
into their own group.
Change-Id: I6384f2fb28d9885cd2b06d59e765e080e3822d8a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8661
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper and then revised by davidben.]
Most features are missing, but it works for a start. To avoid breaking
the fake TLS 1.3 tests while the C code is still not landed, all the
logic is gated on a global boolean. When the C code gets in, we'll
set it to true and remove this boolean.
Change-Id: I6b3a369890864c26203fc9cda37c8250024ce91b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8601
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I'm surprised we'd never tested this. In addition to splitting handshake
records up, one may pack multiple handshakes into a single record, as
they fit. Generalize the DTLS handshake flush hook to do this in TLS as
well.
Change-Id: Ia546d18c7c56ba45e50f489c5b53e1fcd6404f51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8650
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.2 and 1.3 will process more-or-less the same server extensions,
but at slightly different points in the handshake. In preparation for
that, split this out into its own function.
Change-Id: I5494dee4724295794dfd13c5e9f9f83eade6b20a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8586
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper, tweaked by davidben.]
For now, ignore them completely.
Change-Id: I28602f219d210a857aa80d6e735557b8d2d1c590
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8585
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also move them with the other version negotiation tests.
Change-Id: I8ea5777c131f8ab618de3c6d02038e802bd34dd0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8550
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.2 and 1.3 will both need to call it at different points.
Change-Id: Id62ec289213aa6c06ebe5fe65a57ca6c2b53d538
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8600
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 will need to call it under different circumstances. We will also
wish to test TLS 1.3 post-handshake auth, so this function must work
without being passed handshake state.
In doing so, implement matching based on signature algorithms as 1.3
does away with the certificate type list.
Change-Id: Ibdee44bbbb589686fcbcd7412432100279bfac63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8589
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper and then tweaked by davidben.]
TLS 1.3 tweaks them slightly, so being able to write them in one pass
rather than two will be somewhat more convenient.
Change-Id: Ib7e2d63e28cbae025c840bbb34e9e9c295b44dc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8588
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper. Test added by davidben.]
Test vectors taken from hkdf_test.c.
Change-Id: I214bcae325e9c7c242632a169ab5cf80a3178989
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8587
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper, tweaked by davidben.]
In TLS 1.3, every extension the server previously sent gets moved to a
separate EncryptedExtensions message. To be able to share code between
the two, parse those extensions separately. For now, the handshake reads
from serverHello.extensions.foo, though later much of the extensions
logic will probably handle serverExtensions independent of whether it
resides in ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions.
Change-Id: I07aaae6df3ef6fbac49e64661d14078d0dbeafb0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8584
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper and tweaked by davidben.]
This will end up being split in two with most of the ServerHello
extensions being serializable in both ServerHello and
EncryptedExtensions depending on version.
Change-Id: Ida5876d55fbafb982bc2e5fdaf82872e733d6536
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8580
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
[Originally written by nharper and then slightly tweaked by davidben.]
Between the new deeply nested extension (KeyShare) and most of
ServerHello extensions moving to a separate message, this is probably
long overdue.
Change-Id: Ia86e30f56b597471bb7e27d726a9ec92687b4d10
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8569
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 defines its own EncryptedExtensions message. The existing one is
for Channel ID which probably should not have tried to generalize
itself.
Change-Id: I4f48bece98510eb54e64fbf3df6c2a7332bc0261
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8566
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Right now I believe we are testing against DTLS 1.3 ClientHellos. Fix
this in preparation for making VersionTLS13 go elsewhere in the Go code.
Unfortunately, I made the mistake of mapping DTLS 1.0 to TLS 1.0 rather
than 1.1 in Go. This does mean the names of the tests naturally work out
correctly, but we have to deal with this awkward DTLS-1.1-shaped hole in
our logic.
Change-Id: I8715582ed90acc1f08197831cae6de8d5442d028
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8562
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In preparation for TLS 1.3 using its actual handshake, switch most tests
to TLS 1.3 and add liberal TODOs for the tests which will need TLS 1.3
variants.
In doing so, move a few tests from basic tests into one of the groups.
Also rename BadECDSACurve to BadECDHECurve (it was never ECDSA) and add
a test to make sure FALLBACK_SCSV is correctly sensitive to the maximum
version.
Change-Id: Ifca6cf8f7a48d6f069483c0aab192ae691b1dd8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8560
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 defines a new SignatureScheme uint16 enum that is backwards
compatible on the wire with TLS1.2's SignatureAndHashAlgorithm. This
change updates the go testing code to use a single signatureAlgorithm
enum (instead of 2 separate signature and hash enums) in preparation for
TLS 1.3. It also unifies all the signing around this new scheme,
effectively backporting the change to TLS 1.2.
For now, it does not distinguish signature algorithms between 1.2 and
1.3 (RSA-PSS instead of RSA-PKCS1, ECDSA must match curve types). When
the C code is ready make a similar change, the Go code will be updated
to match.
[Originally written by nharper, tweaked significantly by davidben.]
Change-Id: If9a315c4670755089ac061e4ec254ef3457a00de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8450
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This replaces the old key_exchange_info APIs and does not require the
caller be aware of the mess around SSL_SESSION management. They
currently have the same bugs around renegotiation as before, but later
work to fix up SSL_SESSION tracking will fix their internals.
For consistency with the existing functions, I've kept the public API at
'curve' rather than 'group' for now. I think it's probably better to
have only one name with a single explanation in the section header
rather than half and half. (I also wouldn't be surprised if the IETF
ends up renaming 'group' again to 'key exchange' at some point. We'll
see what happens.)
Change-Id: I8e90a503bc4045d12f30835c86de64ef9f2d07c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8565
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This isn't filled in on the client and Chromium no longer uses it for
plain RSA. It's redundant with existing APIs. This is part of removing
the need for callers to call SSL_get_session where possible.
SSL_get_session is ambiguous when it comes to renego. Some code wants
the current connection state which should not include the pending
handshake and some code wants the handshake scratch space which should.
Renego doesn't exist in TLS 1.3, but TLS 1.3 makes NewSessionTicket a
post-handshake message, so SSL_get_session is somewhat silly of an API
there too.
SSL_SESSION_get_key_exchange_info is a BoringSSL-only API, so we can
freely change it and replace it with APIs keyed on SSL. In doing so, I
think it is better to provide APIs like "SSL_get_dhe_group_size" and
"SSL_get_curve_id" rather than make the caller do the multi-step
SSL_get_current_cipher / SSL_CIPHER_is_ECDHE dance. To that end, RSA
key_exchange_info is pointless as it can already be determined from the
peer certificate.
Change-Id: Ie90523083d8649701c17934b7be0383502a0caa3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
QUIC, in particular, will set min_version to TLS 1.3 and has no need to send
any legacy ciphers.
Note this requires changing some test expectations. Removing all of TLS 1.1 and
below's ciphers in TLS 1.3 has consequences for how a tripped minimum version
reads.
BUG=66
Change-Id: I695440ae78b95d9c7b5b921c3cb2eb43ea4cc50f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8514
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Otherwise if the client's ClientHello logic is messed up and ServerHello is
fine, we won't notice.
Change-Id: I7f983cca45f7da1113ad4a72de1f991115e1b29a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8511
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This also adds a missing check to the C half to ensure fake record types are
always correct, to keep implementations honest.
Change-Id: I1d65272e647ffa67018c721d52c639f8ba47d647
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8510
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We were missing this case. It is possible to receive an early unencrypted
ChangeCipherSpec alert in DTLS because they aren't ordered relative to the
handshake. Test this case. (ChangeCipherSpec in DTLS is kind of pointless.)
Change-Id: I84268bc1821734f606fb20bfbeda91abf372f32c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8460
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is the only codepath where ssl->version can get a garbage value, which is
a little concerning. Since, in all these cases, the peer is failing to connect
and speaks so low a version we don't even accept it anymore, there is probably
not much value in letting them distinguish protocol_version from a record-layer
version number mismatch, where enforced (which will give a version-related
error anyway).
Should we get a decode_error or so just before version negotiation, we'd have
this behavior already.
Change-Id: I9b3e5685ab9c9ad32a7b7e3129363cd1d4cdaaf4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8420
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This implements the cipher suite constraints in "fake TLS 1.3". It also makes
bssl_shim and runner enable it by default so we can start adding MaxVersion:
VersionTLS12 markers to tests as 1.2 vs. 1.3 differences begin to take effect.
Change-Id: If1caf6e43938c8d15b0a0f39f40963b8199dcef5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8340
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This unifies a bunch of tests and also adds a few missing ones.
Change-Id: I91652bd010da6cdb62168ce0a3415737127e1577
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8360
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Both messages go between CCS and Finished. We weren't testing their relative
order and one of the state machine edges. Also test resume + NPN since that too
is a different handshake shape.
Change-Id: Iaeaf6c2c9bfd133103e2fb079d0e5a86995becfd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8196
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is not very satisfactory.
Change-Id: I7e7a86f921e66f8f830c72eac084e9fea5ffd4d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8270
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
By corrupting the X25519 and Newhope parts separately, the test shows
that both are in use. Possibly excessive?
Change-Id: Ieb10f46f8ba876faacdafe70c5561c50a5863153
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8250
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There's a __pragma expression which allows this. Android builds us Windows with
MinGW for some reason, so we actually do have to tolerate non-MSVC-compatible
Windows compilers. (Clang for Windows is much more sensible than MinGW and
intentionally mimicks MSVC.)
MinGW doesn't understand MSVC's pragmas and warns a lot. #pragma warning is
safe to suppress, so wrap those to shush them. This also lets us do away with a
few ifdefs.
Change-Id: I1f5a8bec4940d4b2d947c4c1cc9341bc15ec4972
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8236
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I0aaf9d926a81c3a10e70ae3ae6605d4643419f89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8210
Reviewed-by: Taylor Brandstetter <deadbeef@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It's useful, when combined with patching crypto/rand/deterministic.c in, for
debugging things. Also if we want to record fuzzer transcripts again, this
probably should be on.
Change-Id: I109cf27ebab64f01a13466f0d960def3257d8750
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8192
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Depending on bittedness of the runner, uint16 * uint16 can overflow an int.
There's other computations that can overflow a uint32 as well, so I just made
everything uint64 to avoid thinking about it too much.
Change-Id: Ia3c976987f39f78285c865a2d7688600d73c2514
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8193
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
-timeout collides with go test's flags.
Change-Id: Icfc954915a61f1bb4d0acc8f02ec8a482ea10158
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8188
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This was probably the worst offender of them all as read_bytes is the wrong
abstraction to begin with. Note this is a slight change in how processing a
record works. Rather than reading one fragment at a time, we process all
fragments in a record and return. The intent here is so that all records are
processed atomically since the connection eventually will not be able to retain
a buffer holding the record.
This loses a ton of (though not quite all yet) those a2b macros.
Change-Id: Ibe4bbcc33c496328de08d272457d2282c411b38b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8176
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
